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ПАРАДИГМЫ ФИЛОСОФСТВОВАНИЯ

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PARADIGMS OF PHILOSOPHIZING

ΕΙΔΟΣ

Вторые международные философско-культурологические чтения • Second International Conference on Philosophy and Culture



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PRELUDE TO PREFACE

He, who first gave philosophy its name, in whose semantics Love and Wisdom merged into an indissoluble unit, thus disclosed to the world the vocation of a philosopher to hear, comprehend and transfer to others *the music of the Spheres*. Thus, philosophy calls on man to be a harmonizing being and to keep in his soul the image of the *musicos*.

Silence and the Word, breathing and thought, intuition and reflection, and...contemplation, contemplation, contemplation — such is, apparently, the ingenious arsenal of philosophical experience, opening before philosophy the horizons of transcendental being. It is here that man is given a chance for an authentic encounter — the encounter with the Other, the encounter with the Self (the ego and non-ego), the encounter with Truth and falsehood, Beauty and ugliness, Good and evil, Life and death--the encounter with the individual's experience of time in an expanding space of historical events and destinies.

Also, lurking in this arsenal are the possibilities of ontological losses and casualties, which manifest themselves with increasing intensity not only as conceptual visions of "*the death of the subject*", "*the death of the author*", and the ubiquitous dictatorship of the "*simulacre*", but also as a non-conceptual, metaphysical intuition of impending anthropological collapse.

Philosophy, when in a position of metaphysical confrontation with this "anthropological catastrophe," and contemplating its possibilities and limits, will, presumably, not only recollect the classical questions: *Who are we?, Where are we from? And Whither goest thou*; not only will it quote the poetical and unforgettable query of Kant*: What can I know?, What can I hope for?, What can I do to remain a human being?* Faced with this metaphysical confrontation, philosophy will not only accept onto itself responsibility for a keen insight into and masterly interpretation of the textual expanse of Culture, but, hopefully, will also endeavor to further extend the limits of vital consciousness, by scrutinizing the historical rhythms of man-in-the-world.

PREFACE:
PARADISE OF PARADIGMS

There is a legend that whenever Heraclitus appeared in public, he would weep, whereas Democrtitus in a similar case would only laugh. Obviously, the former did so because all our deeds seemed pitiable to him, while the latter considered them absurd.

Seneca. *On Tranquillity of Spirit*, XV.2

Evidently, the *logos* of wisdom is indivisible while its *eidos* is multifaceted. It seems Spinoza's wise pronouncement *"Neither weep not laugh, but rather understand"* can be met with the equally sensible objection, *"Do not treat the man in your discourse as you would perpendiculars and triangles."*

Philosophy, as well as the world, survives because of its variety and the unpredictable nature of its capabilities.

To examine the world of philosophy in its multifaceted phenomena — its vitality, its intentions, its responsibilities and free communication; to see, through philosophy, man and culture in a complex process of self-knowledge, self-problematization, self-description — all holding the possibility of transformation and transfiguration, such is the idea behind the Second International Conference on Philosophy and Culture entitled *"Paradigms of Philosophizing."* This invitation to examine the world of philosophy has been answered by numerous contributions from over 20 countries, which are herein published prior to the authors' actual meeting.

This conference is virtually a continuation of the First International Conference on Philosophy and Culture held under the title *"Language and Text: Ontology and Reflection"* (St. Petersburg, August 17-21, 1992. ***Silentium*** No. 2). It is hoped that the work of these meetings will be fruitful and that they will retain their importance and continue in the future.

Liubava Moreva

St. Petersburg 17.07.95

ПРЕЛЮДИЯ ПРЕДИСЛОВИЯ

И тот, кто впервые назвал *философию* ее именем, именем, в семантике которого Любовь и Мудрость слились в нерасторжимое целое, открыл тем самым на все времена глубинную призванность философа слышать, понимать и передавать другим "музыку" Универсума, т.е. быть существом гармонизирующим, хранить в душе образ *musicos'*а.

Молчание и Слово, дыхание и мысль, интуиция и рефлексия и... созерцание, созерцание, созерцание — таков, как кажется, бесхитростный "инструментарий" философского опыта, распахивающего перед человеком горизонт трансцендентности бытия. Именно здесь человеку дается шанс подлинной в с т р е ч и: встречи с Другим, встречи с собою (со своим Я и не-Я), встречи с судьбою и со свободой, встречи с Истиной и ложью, Красотой и уродством, Благом и злом жизни и смерти; встречи со своим временем в расширяющемся пространстве исторических событий и судеб. Здесь таится также возможность онтологических потерь и утрат, нарастающая интенсивность которых сказывается в философии не только концептами-ощущениями *'смерти субъекта', 'смерти автора'* и вездесущей тотальности '*симулякра*', но и внеконцептуальной метафизической тревогой-констатацией **антропо́логического краха** .

Оказываясь в позиции метафизического п р е д с т о я н и я 'пред лицом' (pre-face) 'антропологической катастрофы', п р е д в а р я я ее возможные и невозможные последствия, философия не только, видимо, вспомнит риторическую актуальность классического вопроса: *"кто мы, откуда и куда идем?* ; не только процитирует поэтически незабвенное вопрошание педантичного Канта: *"что я могу знать? на что я могу надеяться? что я должен делать,чтобы оставаться человеком?"* ; возьмет на себя не только опыт глубинных прочтений и виртуозных интерпретаций текстового пространства культуры, но, есть надежда, и продолжит его в опыте расширения горизонтов жизненного сознания, в опыте пристального внимания к со-бытийным ритмам человека-и-мира в пространстве Универсума.

ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ:
ПРАЗДНИК ПАРАДИГМ

Одно из преданий гласит: "Гераклит всякий раз, как выходил на люди, плакал, а Демокрит смеялся: одному все, что мы делаем, казалось жалким, а другому — нелепым"

(Сенека. *О спокойствии духа*, XY, 2)

Очевидно, *л о г о с* мудрости един, *э й д о с* ее многогранен. И на мудрое табу Спинозы 'не плакать, не смеяться — а понимать', есть не менее мудрое возражение: 'не рассуждать о человеке, как о перпендикулярах и треугольниках' .

Философия как и мир живет многообразием и непредсказуемостью своих возможностей.

Взглянуть на собственный мир философии в его феноменальности, в его жизненности, интенциональной ответственности и открытой общительности; увидеть философию, культуру, человека в сложном процессе самопонимания, самопроблематизации, самоописания и возможной трансформации и преображения — таков предварительный замысел Вторых Международных Философско-культурологических Чтений "ПАРАДИГМЫ ФИЛОСОФСТВОВАНИЯ". Откликом на данный замысел явились публикуемые ниже присланные нам более чем из 20 стран мира материалы, в свою очередь предваряющие живую встречу их авторов .

Данная встреча является своеобразным продолжением Первых Международных Философско-культурологических Чтений "ЯЗЫК И ТЕКСТ: ОНТОЛОГИЯ И РЕФЛЕКСИЯ" (Санкт-Петербург, 17-21 августа,1992 — **"SILENTIUM"** N 2) и хочется верить, что плодотворный опыт этих встреч сохранит свою значимость и будет продолжен в будущем.

Любава Морева

Санкт-Петербург 17.07.95

I
PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIRROR...
ФИЛОСОФИЯ В ЗЕРКАЛЕ...

A PHILOSOPHICAL PARADIGM FOR THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA)

On the threshhold of what in the West counts as the third millenium it is impossible, thinking of that, not to speculate about how to escape the invisible limitations of our largest conceptual resources. Of course, we cannot succeed if we imagine we need only reflect on the paradigms we have hitherto favored among a set of openended alternatives that we might otherwise have selected. Surely we are constrained by our best convictions, just as we should confess that our best selections are self-selected. And yet we succeed from time to time, we say, seeing darkly through the long glass of history. We cannot escape by way of the instant benefit of any deliberate intention, but we find (we say) that we *must have* escaped once we are able, in retrospect, to redefine the structure of our thought as the paradigms of the past. As a consequence, we teach ourselves to seek out the best clues among those of our present philosophies that may in time reveal how we may supersede what is self-limiting in the excercise of their best resources. I may find myself captured by that temptation — which is to say, the temptation to turn philosophy into prophecy. No doubt it is a fool's errand, but I know of none that is more charming.

I.

I believe I see a set of puzzles nested in one another, some that are partly solved (that were not always correctly grasped), others that are not solved at all (that loom more and more insistently as we proceed through time), that must (I suppose) *be* those best clues about how to escape the self-limiting horizon of our own thought. There is no other way to proceed, except by such guesses; risking that much, we cannot also claim, now, to determine the verdict of that future-future that lies beyond the present-future that we now begin to glimpse. Where we succeed, we succeed dialectically and somewhat blindly; and where we now fail may yet prove to be our own future's success.

The best strategies of philosophy are, I think, are caught up with reasons that we now believe would motivate a fundamental turn in, or the continuation of, the strongest strategies already in place. There is some threat of arbitrariness in affirming what those reasons are. But, in my opinion, the turning point of the whole of modern philosophy rests with the discoveries made in the interval

flanked by Kant and Hegel. I can put a label on those discoveries. There are at least two: the first is the clue about how to escape skepticism; the second concerns the historicity of thinking engendered by the first. Kant solved the first, but fell victim to it again in actually doing so; Hegel saw both (hence also Kant's double failure, since Kant could not yet grasp the new options of the second), but he (that is, Hegel) collected both clues in a florid idiom that no one has yet reliably fathomed. We are the beneficiaries, two centuries later, poised (I suggest) to explore the untapped possibilities of the double clue that the latest phase of Western thought is (now) strongly disposed to deny.

The main themes of English-language analytic philosophy, for instance, are those of objectivism and the denial of historicism, which, I daresay, are now in danger of being rapidly approved in German and French philosophy, that is, among those European currents with which Anglo-American philosophy has had most in common. We are, I believe, in danger of drifting back to pre-Kantian strategies, even if by way of Kant and Hegel; and that, I say, is what we should resist. Why so? you ask. Because, my argument goes, the skepticism that threatens through the relapse that is now pending, *is*, demonstrably, a palpable threat of the most disabling kind; and because its resolution is impossible without a turn toward acknowledging the historicity of thought itself. That, I insist, is ground zero for the whole of twenty-first century philosophy; and, there, it is not so much a matter of grasping a single clue as grasping how an entire network of conceptual puzzles rests on the pivot of that single clue.

In my view, the most important discovery, strategically, lies with resolving the puzzle of predication — and, through that, the puzzle of reference, and, through the two together, the puzzle of knowledge. Once we have probed that far, philosophy becomes quite orderly and we need only complete in a coherent way what, for narrower inquiries, is more or less in accord with our originating intuition.

Most important philosophies differ already in their treatment of the puzzle of predication, though they needn't address the matter in a frontal way. Aristotle, for example, does not address the skeptical question in the way the post-Cartesian world does; and yet, Aristotle's doctrine of the invariant structures of reality and the power of *nous* to be informed by same provides the classic setting in which the modern threat of skepticism first arose and proved insuperable. From Descartes to Kant, Western philosophy struggled hopelessly to hold skepticism at bay — with the single eccentric exception of Berkeley, who very distantly anticipates, in his *Dialogues,* the master theme of post-Kantian German Idealism, in which the minimal resolution of the skeptical threat was permanently provided. From that single point on, the resolution of all the puzzles of reference, of quiddity and haecceity, of universals, of individuation and identity, of the logic of truth and knowledge, of the nature of the self, of the inseparability of fact and value, and of the social constitution and contextedness of thinking, radiates in a most reliable way. All that is now threatened once again — through the reactive currents of late twentieth-century philosophy, which, viewed in retrospect, seem like the continuation of seventeenth- and early

eighteenth-century philosophy irrelevently interrupted by the negligible detour from Kant to Hegel!

The clue is this. *If* predication and reference are, effectively, the most entrenched features of language in the service of truth claims, then no theory of truth or knowledge can be disjoined from an account of the general structures (the "real generals," in Charles Sanders Peirce's idiom), the predicables, that we claim to find in the world. *If* those structures are said to be real independently of the conditions of human inquiry and understanding, then, at a stroke, we require a theory of Universals by which our inquiries may count as making objective discoveries and we thereby invite as well, instantly, an insuperable skepticism since there is no known way, within a merely human competence, to confirm that the would-be discovery of those Universals is genuinely such. Objectivity in the predicative sense — also, in the referential, because of the indissoluble link between reference and predication — must be *constructive*, that is, an artifact of the constituting powers of human understanding that must themselves be inseparable from the constituting structures of the intelligible world. In short, skepticism cannot be overcome unless — in Berkeley's naive phrasing — the general structures our ideas impute to the intelligible world are actually the same, in principle, as the general structures the Ideas (in God's mind) impose on the apparently external world. Kant saw this clearly in his transcendental idealism, but he also there supposed that he could still discern the independent constituting powers of the understanding mind. Believing that, he reinstated the secret threat of skepticism once again, that has now so virulently matured after two centuries — most notably, in late Anglo-American analytic philosophy and, through that, to the seemingly exhausted resources of French and German philosophy and, possibly, of Eastern European philosophy as well.

In any case, *if* the structure of the understanding cannot be disjoined from the structure of the world except in a subaltern way then Kant could never have set the conceptual powers of the transcendental ego apart from the phenomenal self (either psychically or socially) or from the putatively objective world. Hegel saw all that, saw therefore the skepticism lurking in Kant. In my own idiom, overcoming skepticism requires not merely Kantian *constructivism* but Hegelian *symbiosis*. In Hegel's purple prose (which we no longer need), Absolute *Giest* reflects on and comes to know itself through historical time. My gloss on this is the following: once you give up Universals but admit the "real generals" that predication requires, you cannot solve the problem of objective knowledge except in terms of the consensual life of historical societies — *in which*, that is, consensus never functions criterially but whatever we posit as the criterial marks of objectivity are themselves artifacts of that (symbiotized) consensus.

In short, general predicables are never merely discovered, one by one, in the world; they are agreed on as holding, in particular circumstances, only within the collective consensual tolerance of actual societies — hence, holistically and variably and transiently. That is surely a radical notion, but an inescapable one. That is also my reading of what is promised, but never quite delivered, in Wittgenstein's *Lebensform* and Foucault's *epistemes*.

I say that all the principal movements of late twentieth-century philosophy (those that are not completely exhausted or nearly exhausted) — analytic philosophy, phenomemology, post-Kantian thinking, particularly — have never been entirely clear about two aspects of the theory of selves or subjects that need to be reconciled with the resolution of the predicative puzzle: (i) the relation between the psychical and the social and (ii) the relation between the subjective in any sense appropriate to (i) and the subjective in the sense of a transcendental subject. My own suggestion is that there cannot be a principled disjunction between the psychical, the social, the transcendental, and the critical *if* the puzzle of predication is to be resolved; and that all the philosophies of the twentieth century that depart from the dialectical lesson of what I have labelled the "constructive" and "sybiotized" fail because they have opposed that lesson. Precisely the same weakness that I find in Kant appears, I suggest, in Husserl and in Quine — although in ways that are not always easy to detect. In any event, that is what I offer as the decisive clue of what should count as ground zero, philosophically, at the turn of the new century. If I am right in this, then the resolution of the skeptical puzzle is at once a turn towards historicism. For, under the terms of the argument, the denial of historicism both deprives us of ever resolving the matter of objectivity and drives us back, in our need to find a resolution, to the forms of sevententh- and early eighteenth-century skepticism, if not (say) to versions of the ancient and medieval options that, once the confident presumption of cognitive privilege is set aside, plainly devolved into the early modern skepticism we still need to escape.

II.

Let me put all that now as a single verdict, at least for memory's sake:

(1) our options regarding objective knowledge are only three: skepticism, cognitive privilege, and historicism.

The first is a scandal; the second is rejected on all sides or, if elected, falls back to skepticism (as in the hopelessness of the theory of Universals); and the third is the only, and entirely adequate, prospect of our recent past and future. It is extraordinary that the notion of historicity — the historied structure of reason and thinking — should have been the single novel doctrine of importance that the modern world (at the point of the French Revolution) should have bequeathed us that compares at all favorably with the work of the great career of philosophy prior to the contributions that span Kant's and Hegel's efforts. I see all that risked once again in the ahistoricism that is sweeping the Western world in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the vacuum that that collapse created with the putative but dubious victory of American and Western European objectivisms or the supposed privilege of supernatural revelations that, in both the East and the West, dreams of being comfortably enthroned in the natural world itself. Against these tendencies, my first theorem is meant to define ground zero for the philosophical paradigms of our shared future. The exhaustion of the main currents of Western philosophy has had the beneficial consequence of permitting us to reunite all the strands of Western thinking, even to the point of a more than incipient hospitality regarding philosophical

traditions of Asia at least. Our conceptual needs are now global — in philosophy as they are in politics and economics.

Once we have the first theorem in place, we cannot fail to see its principal corollaries, viz.:

(2) the subjective and the objective, as well as the cognizing subjects and cognized objects, are themselves artifactual disjunctions made, offered under the conditions of a historicized critique, within a symbiotized world;

and

(3) our conjectured solutions regarding the distinction of theorem (2) are horizonal, that is, historically constituted in such a way that we cannot fathom the full conditions under which they are both formed and tested; they are therefore subject to endless revision, discontinuously and divergently, under history again, in ways that cannot be horizonally anticipated or fully fathomed.

Theorem (1) I regard as the lesson, as I say, of the interval spanning Kant and Hegel; theorems (2) and (3) I regard as the slimmest lesson drawn from Hegel himself, shorn of Hegel's teleologism, shorn of his insistence on the internal necessities of history and the encompassing role of *Geist.* All that, I suggest, is a local extravagance that we can afford to do without or that risks the same danger Hegel saw in Kant. The picture is very trim and, I may as well add, utterly incompatible with the strongest versions of the leading philosophical currents of our time: in particular, against analytic philosophy, it shows the difficulty of eliminating intensional complexities; against phenomenology, it shows the difficulty of disjoining natural and transcendental cognitive powers; against neo-Kantianism, it shows the difficulty of justifying a distinction between constructivism and symbiosis; against all three, it shows the difficulty of disjoining first- and second-order (legitimative) discourse.

These are very substantial benefits, but they are not quite enough for orienting the philosophical paradigms of our future. We must look further. I said, if you remember, that there were important puzzles that were effectively resolved as well as puzzles that have never been resolved at all. I took the problem of predication to be the principal specimen of the first sort, and I have yet to supply a specimen of the second. I don't mean by that, of course, that there are no serious disputes about the nature of predication or the nature of general properties or the logic of reference. It's just that the lines of resolution are actually well in place and we confuse ourselves by ignoring or resisting what past philosophy has already reasonably accomplished. You may doubt that it has accomplished much, but I claim at least that any pertinent debate will turn up analogues of my first three theorems.

I make no similiar claim regarding what else is needed in the way of orienting ourselves effectively for the future. Indeed, I draw your attention to an unresolved puzzle that we cannot justify ignoring and that could easily orient the future of philosophy in a decisive way. It takes the form of an antinomy: it has been with us for a long time; but, viewed in accord with the way in which I claim the puzzle of predication is resolved, certain interpretations of that antinomy are

now more difficult to sustain. The antinomy may be put this way: on the one hand, it is very reasonable to suppose that the world of human culture has evolved in some way from some primordial, inanimate cosmic soup — from which, therefore, its evolution may be explained; on the other hand, the very conjecture that that is so is only made meaningful and possibly true if first formulated and open to being tested at that evolved level at which human investigators are already capable of construing the world as so ordered.

In the past, there was little reason to construe that puzzle as an antinomy. Now, however, given the plausible standing of symbiosis and historicity with regard to predication, it is either impossible or very difficult to confirm any simple form of reductionism or eliminationism. Physicalism itself turns out to be an abstraction from a symbiotized world; that is, the realist posit of physicalist categories is itself an artifact of a culturally ineliminable world. The independence and priority of physical nature over human culture is an entirely reasonable conjecture; but, on the argument, *that* conjectured priority is itself inseparable from the competence of human inquiries whose own existence is itself a precondition of *its* validity in realist terms. You begin to see, therefore, how the first puzzle affects the fortunes of the second. For example, concede the antinomy, and you have completely undermined the philosophical prospects of the unity of science program. I take the antinomy to be benign — not eliminable but nevertheless benign, in the sense (here, I spell out some additional theorems) that:

(4) there can be no viable realism that is not indissolubly encumbered as an idealism;

a fortiori,

(5) there can be no naturalism that is not indissolubly encumbered as a historicism.

These are two quite powerful consequences that follow at once from applying the resolution of the puzzle of predication to what I may now call the "antinomy of ontic priority." The antinomy is benign because each of the opposed priorities is the result of a perspective of reading (in realist and idealist trems) of an initial symbiosis in which no such priority arises except as relativized (separately) to the constituting function of cognizing selves and to the confirmed structures of the cognized world. Furthermore, whatever is posited at either pole is, on the argument, relativized to our historicized horizons. Hence,

(6) every thruth-claim is, implicitly, horizonally contexted, and

(7) every context of discourse is itself contexted, unfathomably and endlessly, in historicized terms.

On the argument, therefore,

(8) the world cannot be a closed system, finally described and explained in terms of some ideally adequate grasp of its essential structure.

The point of this entire sketch is to offer an impression of the extraordinary plausibility of the line of thinking that I recommend. I am trying to plot a trajectory of philosophical work from well within the most important part of the history of modern philosophy. The upshot, I say, is to disallow — or better: to subordinate as instrumental, heuristic, prejudiced, provisional — every pretense

at an adequate reductionism, extensionalism, physicalism, naturalism, phenomenology, realism, idealism, and every pretense at systematic closure in terms of modal necessity, apodicticity, totalizing, the originary, essences, computational modeling, or anything of the like. The image of our future could quite reasonably be that of Neurath's boat constructed and forever reconstructed through the voage of our own constructed history. The idealizations Frege and Russell and Carnap and Quine envisaged in their very different ways could never have accomodated such a conception. And yet we have attained it, here, by merely reclaiming a past they knew and repudiated without just cause.

III.

I hope what I am claiming is rightly understood. I am not making a pronouncement of how we *must* begin — in the science of philosophy, or in First Philosophy. I say there is no First Philosophy, but I do not offer *that* as itself an ineluctable first principle. I offer it as a philosophical *bet*, no more than a reasoned anticipation that no one will ever successfully recover the pretensions of First Philosophy again. I say that that follows from the resolution of the puzzle of predication, *if* we agree that the clue to its resolution is as I have sketched it. So I avoid the paradox of attacking First Philosophies by way of providing a First Philosophy of my own. We find ourselves in Neurath's sea; and, *there*, we have no idea how to recognize any conceptual plank as an assured first principle. In short, the puzzle of predication leads directly, but surprisingly, to the following comprehensive theorem — the philosophical bet, as I say, that:

(9) the world is a flux; that is there is no demonstrable necessity to suppose that the world possesses any necessarily fixed structure.

There are no interpreted (or substantive) necessities *de re* or *de dicto*. The "worlds" of mathematics and logic are themselves nominalized abstractions drawn from our discourse about the real world. Numbers and the True and False do not *exist*. There is no need to suppose that they do, in order to concede their reality and the usual necessities of formal calculi. Such necessities may stand: they are what we are unable to surpass at the most abstract level in our contingent history. They are relativized to our *Lebensform* or *episteme*, and they are uninterpreted. There are no interpreted necessities *de re*, every would-be violation of the principle of contradiction along such lines is itself always open to fresh reinterpretation as being not unalterably contradictory — the wave and corpuscular theories of light, for instance, the Bell inequalities with regard to classical mechanics.

Our natural languages remain in place as plainly viable. That we survive is all the proof we have — and all we need — regarding the holist fit of language and world. We cannot be massively mistaken and we cannot confirm the fit by way of any distributed privilege. Failure, here, is no more than what we *now* conjecture to be the cessation and utter absence of human inquiry. In that sense, we may now say:

(10) there is no principled distinction between theory and practice.

Theoretical and practical reason are themselves provisional distinctions within a *praxis* already sybiotized together with the world we ourselves abstract as

independent of our inquiries. That is the gathering theme I believe we may trace from Hegel through Marx through Nietzsche through Dewey through Foucault at least. It is now variously described as pragmatism, historicism, perspectivism, poststructuralism, relativism. I find it adumbrated, for instance, in Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" and Foucault's Nietzscheanized essays on power/knowledge. What is lacking is a relatively systemitized reading of the principal topics of philosophy under the conditions of history. That is,

> (11) the very admission of continuous human inquiry entails the realist fit of natural language, at least holistically; the presumption of confirming and disconfirming determinate truth-claims; and the interpretable congruity of all such truth-claims indexed under historicity.

Progress in science, for instance, does not confirm our realist presumptions *tout court*: it confirms them *on their* assumption — tacitly, under prejudice, in a *praxis*-centered way, yet in a way that is also reasonable enough. For, we may now conclude:

> (12) although the real is an artifact of symbiosis, it is not a fiction.

I associate this important finding with the work of the American philosopher, Peirce, who believed (probably mistakenly) that he was correcting Hegel in this regard: that what *exists* (what Peirce called Secondness) could neither be detached from what was predicatively *real* (what was interpreted as such, what Peirce called Thirdness) nor reducible to same. Peirce thought that Hegel subsumed Secondness under Thirdness. I believe he was mistaken in this. I also believe that that is all we need suppose in order to make good sense of the way in which we bridge the difference between our holist confidence and our distributed truth-claims, in terms of realism.

But the upshot of that concessiveness is a new hospitality toward pluralism and relativism. I distinguish the two in the following way. By *pluralism*, I mean the parsing, for the sake of determinate truth-claims, of what, holistically, we regard as the correct realism of our *praxis*, assuming that truth accords with that constraint, there can be no uniquely correct interpretation of the world; the world "appears" to us in alternative ways apt enough to be counted as true, without contradiction. Here, oddly enough, late analytic philosophy (as in Quine and Hilary Putnam) and continental genealogies (as in Nietzsche and Foucault) strikingly converge: the one without invoking history; the other, completely committed to historicity. By *relativism*, by contrast, I mean that way of reading our holistic conviction in accord with which we limit the scope of a bivalent logic, replace it with a many-valued logic (as of plausibility and reasonableness), treat truth and falsity asymmetrically, and admit "incongruent" judgments as valid, that is, claims that on a bivalent logic but not now would be or would yield contradictories.

Pluralism, therefore, is the upshot of abandoning truth and rationality as a *Grenzbegriff*: the world is the sum of its separable appearances, under the condition that they be made compatible bivalently; whereas relativism is the upshot of drawing out determinate methodologies from our *praxis*, without supposing that they must, at the point of application, invariably yield findings that *are* compatible bivalently. The first is perhaps best captured by the logic of

T.S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, the second, by something like Paul Feyerabend's anarchism or, less controversially, by the practice of literary and art criticism in which, not presuming that there is an ideally correct interpretation of any artwork, we are prepared to accomodate expert interpretations that are not compatible with one another but are rigorously reconciled with a holistic text and with whatever (bivalently) we regard as the minima that a relativistic interpretation must accomodate.

Now, here, the most important philosophical claim holds that:

> (13) the loss of cognitive privilege (*a fortiori*, any accomodation of history) yields pluralism; whereas historicism is itself a form of relativism.

I say, without intending any paradox, therefore, that the new paradigms for the next century cannot acknowledge the resolution of the puzzle of predication along the lines I recommend without being committed to some extent to relativism as well. The simple reason is this: *that* resolution itself depends on the historicized consensus of our predicative *praxis*. I take that to be a stunning finding, one that is completely ignored by analytic philosophy, except perhaps in the symptomatic zeal with which, in the English-language tradition from say, Bertrand Russell to Quine and Donald Davidson, every effort has been made to retire reference from our philosophical grammer — without any palpable success at all. The puzzle, I may say, is already implicit in Duns Scotus's mistaken account of haeccity and quiddity and in Leibniz's perceptive account of the impossibilty of fixing particular *denotata* by means of uniquely satisfied general predicables. In any case, you begin to see the radical thrust of the paradigms I recommend.

I need to remind you as well that, against Aristotle and Kant, Hegel is the true source of a *praxis*-centered philosophy and science, in spite of the fact that we may well reject Hegel's conception of the autonomy of the *Geist*. (In any case, that may not mean what it appears to mean.) What Hegel emphasizes is that what we *now* regard as true, in any methodologically responsible way, is inseparable from the actual history of inquiry in which our claims, their meaning, and the conditions of their confirmation are inseparable from our reflexive understanding of their continuous history. As a consequence, we may say:

> (14) there is no autonomous conceptual or cognitive or active human competence in terms of which what is true or right or valid or legitimated can be discerned in any punctuated or final sense; all meaning, truth, understanding, rationality, and legitiation are artifacts of a history continually recovered by criterial reflection that is itself an artifact of the same history.

In short, whether in Aristotle or Kant, the very idea of the independent competence of theoretical or practical reason entails the denial of the historicity of thinking. By the same token, it is impossible for either Aristotle or Kant to resolve the puzzle of predication.

There you have a remarkably powerful verdict drawn from remarkably slim premisses. The conditions on which "real generality" may be admitted preclude

the possibility that theoretical reason (Aristotle's *nous*, say) can directly grasp the predicable structures of things. There are no such isolable structures! These considerations also explain why there cannot be a hierarchy of cognitive powers arrayed in terms of reliability; for, contrary to certain explicit claims, it is impossible that the apodictic pretensions of reason — according to Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and Husserl — should, if predicative and referential competence be required, ever escape the *praxis*-centered, relational conditions on which their separate epistemic reliability depends.

IV.

If you follow the argument to its natural conclusion, you must admit another family of consequences. For, whatever the biological aptitude of *Homo sapiens* may be, the mark of being a *person* or *self* or *subject* or intelligent *agent* is the culturally acquired competence of language and any and all of those institutional competences ("lingual," as I call them — the ballet, for instance, the manufacture and use of complex tools, eating and making love) that presuppose the mastery of language but do not themselves require explicit speech. It follows from this, again as a consequence of resolving the signal puzzle of predication, that

> (15) the individual members of an aggregate of selves possess and manifest a social, even a collective, nature,

in that language itself has a collective structure that cannot be reduced to *any* set of relations among the biologically individuated competences of the members of *Homo sapiens*. If so, then nativists like Noam Chomsky and his company (for instance, Jerry Fodor) must be profoundly mistaken about the nature of language. *If* predication and reference presuppose the collective, encultured competence of a society of apt speakers, then the syntax and semantics of a natural language cannot be disjoined; and *if* they cannot be disjoined, then syntax cannot be *first* assigned biologically (in any sense) and semantics assigned either as a separate biological module or assigned at the level of subsequent enculturation. From this it also follows that

> (16) our innate mental competence, the competence of infants and prelinguistic animals, and the competence of machines that are said to stimulate the mind are and must be anthropomorphized in terms of the reportorial competence of linguistically apt selves.

This also explains why, reversing the pejorative jargon of recent analytic philosophy, science and philosophy cannot but be "folk-theoretic" — irreducible, that is, in any way that might be thought to escape implicating the predicative and referential resources of any one or another natural language. This is the reason, for instance, why both nativism and eliminativism are bankrupt philosophical policies. It is notorious that most of Western philosophy is methodologically solipsistic. Certainly, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Brentano, Husserl, Russell, Moore, Carnap, Quine, and now Chomsky and Fodor are methodological solipsists. That is what Hegel brilliantly espied in Kant and his predecessors, and that is what has been lost in driving out (at the end of our century) symbiosis and historicity.

I say it is a matter of philosophy's having taken a wrong turn. If truth and knowledge are cultural artifacts, that is because individual selves are such artifacts as well. Analytic philosophy has resisted making the same admission, because it correctly saw that doing so would irretrievably jeopardize its apodictic and totalizing pretensions. And Kantian philosophies have similarly resisted, because they correctly saw that doing so would irretrievably jeopardize the autonomy of reason and the very systemiticity of knowledge.

Hegel, of course, seems to have believed he could reconcile historicity and systematicity. So, to, the Marxists. That is precisely what Hegel's most recent admirers have abandoned — or must abandon: notably, among the evolutionary-minded pragmatists (John Dewey, for instance), the post-Heideggerean hermeneuts (Hans-Georg Gadamer, for instance), and the Nietzschean genealogists (Foucault, for instance). For the most part, these "admirers" are admirers *manqués*. It hardly matters. The point at stake is that, if, by "systematicity," one means the realist prospects of a closed system suitable for the description and explanation of whatever is actual, then, surely:

> (17) historicity and systematicity are essentially incompatible.

It may well be that Hegel is the ironist of history. I find him the most congenial when thus construed. But he may have been too much of a Kantian to have discerned the full implications of his own undertaking (in his *Phenomenology*). If so, then the full and radical import of the philosophical paradigm I have been sketching makes itself felt.

Closure is alien to any philosophy of the flux, and we are now at a point in the history of Western thought where there is no reasonably well-articulated historicism that refuses to cheat anywhere across the entire philosophical board. Doubtless there will be very few to risk the undertaking. In itself, that is hardly as serious as it may seem. The important prize is to ensure that the essential themes of historicity will not be drummed out of the professional lists. The local tide is against it. But if I am right in what I've conjectured about the puzzle of reference, it cannot be permanently disallowed. By a certain cunning of history, the *aporia* of the doctrine of Universals (namely, that Universals are epistemically inaccessible, which is the very reason — the *epistemic* need for them — that will, as far as can be guessed, always return us to historical *praxis*, now that the idea has been discovered. In the meanwhile, too much would be lost or distorted if the kinds of conceptual connections I have been at pains to outline were to be abandoned. That sort of labor has already succeeded — from, say, the original animus of Russell and Moore against the British Hegelians, down to the marginalizing of pragmatism in the American world, to the late imitation of Anglo-American analytic philosophy in France and Germany, to the near-disappearance of Marxist historicism in Eastern and Western philosophy — in reclaiming the old dialectical play between skepticism and cognitive privilege.

I have one final set of distinctions to lay before you. I shall fix their theme first in a single theorem:

> (18) cultural entities (persons, artworks, institutions and actions by courtesy) have histories rather than natures, or have natures that are histories, or *are* histories themselves.

Their "natures" are what they share of the collective culture (language, preeminently) that, by internalizing, they first emerge as selves or produce the usual cultural artifacts of their historical world. For that reason, their natures (or histories) are, as I should say, "Intentional" — the instantiated aptitudes (linguistic, lingual, active) of their encompassing culture; and, as a consequence, their natures are intrinsically interpretable and alterable as a result of their own (and others') interventions. Hence,

(19) cultural entities are *sui generis*, historically and interpretively determinable but never completely determinate.

For examine, the determinacy of selves or artworks with regard to numerical identity does not entail the determinacy of their natures or histories. Put another way, since the individuation of entities (natural or cultural) entails the conditions for their identity, but the conditions of their identity only presupposes (but do not actually entail) the conditions of their individuation, a theorem like (19) need not be incoherent or paradoxical. In any case,

(20) cultural entities are not natural-kind entities.

There is, for instance, no obvious sense in which their causal interventions behave in nomologically regular ways — primarily because they have Intentional natures. (I use the capital "I," I may say, to distinguish the significative or interpretable feature of cultural phenomena as collective and historicized, to distinguish that use from the solipsistic forms of intentionality offered by Brentano and Husserl.)

But they have causal roles: they exist and are real, and their relation to the things of the natural world must be made clear. My own sense of them is that

(21) cultural entities are emergent from physical nature in a *sui generis* way, indissolubly "embodied" in natural phenomena as their Intentional attributes are indissolubly "incarnate" in natural properties.

I press the point only to ensure a sense of the coherence and amplitude of the paradigm I have in mind. I cannot pursue the matter here. Beyond that, I close this sketch by drawing your attention to the obvious fact that,

(22) norms and values of any and every sort (truth with regard to science, the good and the right with regard to behavior) may be treated in objective and realist terms, once we admit the *sui generis* nature of cultural entities.

This is hardly to make the norms of truth and moral goodness self-evident, but it overcomes the initial bafflement of locating norms and values in the alien world of mere physical nature. I find the idea easily in Hegel and in his well-known critique of Kant's formalism. It is precisely what Hegel means by the *sittlich*. But, in admitting that, I remind you that I dismiss Hegel's teleologism and intra-historical necessities and absolute *Geist*. If you concede that a paradigm of such a sort — one guided by the twenty or so theorems I've been enumerating — is a recovery of Hegelian philosophy, so be it. If you do not, then, it is still, I think, the most promising paradigm for philosophy's future.

I myself, I may say, am too much of a witness of the actual practice of philosophy to claim that that paradigm cannot possibly be resisted. I think it ought to be irresistible. But we have all witnessed the postponement — possibly permanent — of our best political dreams. I see no reason why philosophy should not follow politics in this regard as in others, and I am entirely satisfied to have been able to put the temptation before you.

PHILOSOPHY AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THRESHOLDING[1]

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> Yet it is as evident in itself, as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals - every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present. [2]

> A secret streamlet trickles on beneath the heavy crust of inertia and pseudo-events, slowly and inconspicuously undermining it. It may be a long process, but one day it has to happen: the crust can no longer hold and starts to crack. This is the moment when something once more begins visibly to happen, something new and unique... History again demands to be heard.[3]

I believe Mill was altogether right regarding human cognitive fallibility. Were he alive today, his smile could only be an ironical one in the face of the various confident boasts issuing from the industries of knowledge. Havel, however, I believe to be correct as well, and in what will in all likelihood prove to be a deeper way. If Mill captures and then reprimands the orthodoxies of a stagnantly expiring present, Havel taps into the underlying currents of human history with respect to its impending (and perhaps cataclysmically dynamic) future. Taken together, they allude to an historical transition which is given to few people to undergo and to experience. Most probably, our historical moment is placing upon us just such a demand and, equally, providing us with just such an opportunity. Succinctly put, this is my thesis.

Though I have given these two thinkers, Mill and Havel, pride of place, it is nonetheless to someone else that I shall first turn for purposes of an historical orientation and overview, viz., Michael Oakeshott. Oakeshott made much in his "Harvard lectures" regarding the emergence some centuries ago of a certain sort of person, one whose successful advent and effective continuance required a particular governmental structure and set of attitudes themselves to emerge. I am going to call this person "capitalistic man"[4] and the optimally requisite governmental organization for his flourishing "liberal democracy." This process, of course, has taken a number of centuries, roughly the last five, to play itself out. As with virtually all such historical realities, it has grown and mutated in fits and starts, reactions and counterreactions, and must be said to have had no one, single ideal outcome, but rather, to have been simultaneously graced and burdened with a number of competing (and highly contentious) variants. For example, very recently one of these (paradoxically inverted) variants, communism, has fallen by the wayside and done so quite dramatically.

By far the largest portion of "political theory," as we have known it, is a reflection during and about the period of capitalistic man's - and liberal democracy's - intertwined journeys, focusing on their intentions, prospects and appropriate goals.[5] Whether the discussion has been generated from Machiavelli, Marx or Mill, Rousseau or Rawls, Hobbes or Hayek, Smith or

Sandel, or from any number of other theorists, this "problematic" has been what has enframed it.

Over the course of the last few centuries, however, but especially in our own, soon ending one, disquieting voices have arisen which have questioned the ability and the commitment of contemporary individuals both to sustain the conditions necessary for capitalistic man and to benefit from them. Some of these voices have been gleeful, others despairing. Nietzsche, Dostoevsky and, in places, de Tocqueville are good nineteenth-century examples of this phenomenon, as have been Weber, Freud, Solzhenitzen, Heidegger, and Havel in our own century. Yet political theory has continued largely in oblivion or defiance of these concerns. As John Gray, among others, has indicated, much political theory as of late has, in fact, as with much of the rest of professional philosophy, fed only upon itself. This cannibalism has occurred while much of the world seems almost literally to be disintegrating before our very (often television-oriented) eyes. If the twentieth century began in Sarajevo, with melancholy symmetry it now gives all appearance of ending there as well,[6] in a blaze of particularistic barbarisms. These occurrences, by no means limited to what was Yugoslavia, well outstrip any and all conceptual refinements of enlightenment-based procedural justice theory - not to mention other, equally removed and virtually stylized accounts of the way human relations "ought" to be. However commendable,, these latter are now being discussed in a world which renders them progressively more utopian, if not altogether irrelevant. Something has gone radically wrong: the human community is undergoing wrenching change, seemingly destructive transformation, installment by installment, and the underlying meaning and dynamic of this rebarbative event receive only geopolitical, ethnic or sociological commentary and analysis. On these matters the philosophers and political theorists have remained largely silent. If scholasticism ended with debates over angels dancing on the heads of pins, the enlightenment project may now be closing with arguments over equally indiscernible, if nonetheless highly sophisticated minutia. In the meantime, however, both then and now, the world was (and has been) turning over.

Let me now speak very bluntly. Though it is somewhat harsh to claim so, I believe most contemporary theory is medically parasitical upon what is in essence (and discerning diagnosis) a dying outpatient: capitalistic man in the acceleratingly disintegrating (yet diverse) neighborhoods of liberal democracy. Let me hasten to add that I also believe that these have been the very best and healthiest of neighborhoods we have known, and they are withstanding the world's unraveling with far more dignity and integrity, if not always success, than any of the other of the world's diverse locales. I am certainly not planning to offer something in their place, not yet at least. If my view is correct, such an attempt may be premature by a number of years and in fact, especially if "successful," would almost unavoidably turn into yet another strand in that interwoven, theoretical framework it seeks to escape.

At the same time and by analogy with Oakeshott I believe another kind of person is beginning to emerge in the last half of the twentieth century and in a manner suggesting considerable acceleration. I am hesitant to affix a label to this person, but were it required of me, if only to preempt others from doing it for (and to) me, I would call this individual "the thresholder." Just as most would admit that there were many capitalistic men prior to the advent of capitalism,[7] that it was hardly an altogether new phenomenon when it began to unfold, so I would gladly acknowledge the existence of many and diverse forerunners of today's thresholders, whom I hope in some ways to describe as spiritual vehicles. I shall call these forerunners advanced thresholders, suggesting in part that they were in advance of their time, but also, and perhaps more importantly, that they tended to be quite highly developed in their human capacities. More generally I am tempted to use the phrases "spiritual vehicle" and "thresholder" somewhat interchangeably to describe them in what follows, as I would "capitalistic man" and "shareholder" -- were that seemingly expiring historical period and its paradigm inhabitants my central and dominant focus. Furthermore, it is good to keep in mind that not everyone, not even close to a majority of the individuals in a capitalistic milieu turn out to be actual capitalists. By no stretch of the imagination is this the case, though the few who truly *are* might be said, nonetheless, to have defined their age. Similarly, it is not my claim that everyone, nor anywhere close to a majority of individuals are (or are transforming rapidly into) spiritual vehicles (or thresholders) as we approach the end of the twentieth century. It is my contention, nonetheless, that they are already (albeit often uncomprehendingly) beginning to define the era into which we are now moving -- some, in fact, without realizing either that they are doing so or, indeed, that they are in some significant sense thresholders at all.

By way of overview there are two, helpfully complementary ways in which the late twentieth century might be characterized in accordance with the conditions I now see emerging. The first is by analogy with grammatical syntax. As is widely known, Francis Fukuyama became briefly notorious with his conception of our having reached the end of history. Were he correct, history might then be understood as a long and complex sentence now having reached its completion. We would then be living not in *a* period of history, but in *the* (sentential) period of historical existence, in history's final consummatory phase. I believe a different punctuational trope is more appropriate however, *viz.* , the comma. In its terms we are at a pause between clauses, what Heidegger and others have called a "no longer" and a "not yet."[8] Where this grammatical analogy breaks down, or is at least somewhat misleading, is that there is no necessarily radical discontinuity between the connecting clauses, as if "in the comma" everything simply came to a standstill, something abruptly ending and something else equally abruptly starting up. This dramatically discrete point of view, which Foucault referred to (and endorsed) as an historically recurrent epistemic break, must surely be an oversimplification, best delivered at some distance from the historical moment in question. From a considerably distanced,

invariably retrospective vantage point, the break with medieval scholasticism and the rise of rigorously experimental and postulational science, for example, may look very definitive, discontinuously abrupt and dramatic. Close students of the sixteenth century, however, see something quite different: a somewhat confused (and confusing) period of backing and filling, disorientation and controversy, competition and alienation - all this in the midst of what was experienced as a prolonged and frustrating period of pause through deadlock. These features may well best characterize our own time, which in fact much resembles the sixteenth century. The long experiment with materialistically oriented and often pseudo-rational capitalism is winding down in fits and spasms, and though in a deep, subtextual sense it is "no longer," its successor, the age of spiritually oriented transformation, has not yet quite arrived to take its place. Similarly, as there were scientists prior to the sixteenth century and scholastics after it, undoubtedly there will be many capitalists in coming times as there have been numerous thresholders in past centuries. Nonetheless, I believe the most accurate general description of our particular historical moment, of our "comma," is that the age of shareholders is over and the time of thresholders is rapidly upon us.

If the comma as grammatical metaphor for troping our historical situation is the first means of characterizing late twentieth-century existence, the second means, and its complement, is less horizontal in orientation and weights more the individual, construed now less as an element *in* history than as a doorway reaching out *beyond* history. Though the word 'vertical' comes naturally to mind, reliance on this term is likely to prove misleading, for it suggests many of the *cul de sacs,* those metaphysically grounded conundrums, in reaction to which the shareholders era might be construed as a constructive escape. The word of preference for contrasting the horizontal may be 'transcending,' or 'transmuting,' though these terms are not without their difficulties as well.

Putting these two together, comma and transcendence (or transmutation), suggests a way of configuring what have been some terribly confusing, even destructively disjointed times. Most recently the dark side of our age has perhaps been most apparent. Irving Kristol suggests that we are "edging, glacier like" to an encounter with the "irrational" and that the twenty-first century will in large measure be "the story of that encounter."[9] Isaiah Berlin remarks that after every highly rationalistic era there has come a bout -with irrationalism, whether in romantic or other form. Now if a paradigm shift is occurring, from the standpoint of the paradigm being abandoned, conditions must seem chaotic, confusing, and destructive: in short, easily irrational. I believe such is an appropriate labeling of a disintegrating age from its own perspective, and, as sensitive and acute observers of their late twentieth century times, Berlin and Kristol are surely perceptive.

And matters can, in fact, become considerably worse ever so slightly "beyond" the no longer phase, yet still, in another sense, well within it. Little reaches the extent of difficulty experienced in the midst of an impending "not

yet," that situation directly prior to an uncertain arrival. Religiously this is referred to as the dark night of the soul, a condition of excruciating torment. Religious doctrines aside, however, and surely they can be every bit as misleading as political ones, the "not yet" frequently engenders an existential malaise, a sometimes numbing and at other times frightening and disorienting diseases which I believe is reasonably, if not altogether descriptive of our late twentieth century condition - once, that is, one looks slightly beneath the artificial hype and "hoopla" of consumer driven communications systems. One wants as quickly as possible to fill in the inhospitably challenging blank, for, again, little can be as debilitating as a sustained encounter with an underlying emptiness, now experienced as an unwelcoming and uninformative void. It gives just exactly ... nothing to reach toward and to which, then, to cling. And yet it is overwhelmingly this subtextual deficiency, this "encounter with nothingness," which is in important ways our predicament.

I have given "Liberty" pride of place in this investigation, for in at least two senses it is fundamental and of unassailable centrality and value in our current historical circumstance. Such is surely the case throughout the often complex and tangled development of human history, but it may be especially so in critically transitional moments. Among other things, liberty may be construed as a necessary milieu, as a "breathing" space within the maneuverability provided by which decisive changes can be made and significant transformations can occur. Having crossed over a certain negative threshold in terms of being "crowded" or "hemmed in," one can neither experience nor explore options, approach nor consider them. Properly nurtured, liberty overcomes such negative thresholds, thereby remedying the diminution of flexibility and the (metaphorical) suffocation inherent in all forms of confinement. In Kant's sense of the transcendental, that of a necessary condition which must be satisfied, if something is to be made genuinely possible, liberty must thus be said to be *the* necessary condition for all significant human activity and not just in critically transitional circumstances - though especially so, it is clear, in the midst of them. As this most fundamentally transcendental condition, I shall sometimes construe liberty very explicitly as a space in the sense just mentioned, as an opening providing opportunity for wide-ranging deliberation, reorientation, transformation, and decision. Items cluttering this space, thus negative to the exercise of liberty, I shall refer to, as I have in some earlier writings, as garbage.[10] With this the world in which we find ourselves is altogether too much replete, having thereby become in a very significant and also literal sense a wasteland.

Beyond its "transcendental" importance there is a second paramount sense in which liberty is of ultimate value. The message drawn from capitalism as from philosophy and the history of religions is that to be successful, human endeavor must be both responsive and responsible. Unfettered actions of a random sort, blind to the subtleties of surrounding circumstance, have a poor record of success. To flourish, human activity must not simply be unconstrained, it must

be contextually sensitive, self-referentially insightful and sustainably self-correcting as well. Surely it is the nourishing, yet at the same time potentially destabilizing environment of liberty which, in turn, makes the responsive and the responsible not only possible -- liberty's transcendental feature -but necessary, liberty's challenging and demanding, yet genuinely enhancing and enriching dimension. It is in this sense that Dostoevsky, Sartre and others have spoken of liberty as a burden, as requiring a robustness and discernment not obviously granted to everyone. And surely these thinkers, among them also de Toqueville, are altogether on the mark, however unpopular in "politically correct" times it is to say so. [11]

As these reflections continue, I am especially concerned to illumine those locales -- not altogether interchangeably, but sometimes more appropriately termed stages or settings - in which a very crucial and complex pivot can be made, where a particular, historically relevant and responsive change of direction can both be undergone and undertaken, one both engendered by liberty and very much in its service. It is said that all the world is a stage, and this may well be true. But, then, what are our various roles on this stage, and must they be in significant measure reconfigured on the other side of what I have called "the comma," this late twentieth century moment of (seemingly) impending transition? [12] Will a different drama soon begin to unfold? In particular, does a world in which thresholders rather than shareholders come to be the leading figures require different (self) directing and direction? Must its significant life be lead on what is itself a significantly altered stage? Liberty, of course, that space of disengagement and reengagement in the midst of which role changes can take place, is crucial to any such enterprise as I am suggesting be undertaken, however global or localized, grand or humble, these "dramatic" undertakings may prove to be. And the notion of an "altered stage" is particularly apposite in the light of Havel's prescient remarks regarding the potential effectiveness of theater.

> ... theatre doesn't have to be just a factory for the production of plays or, if you like, a mechanical sum of its plays, directors, actors, ticket-sellers, auditoriums, and audiences; it must be something more: a living spiritual and intellectual focus, a place for social self-awareness, a vanishing point where all the lines of force of the age met, a seismograph of the times, a space, an arena of freedom, an instrument of human liberation. [13]

The logic of directional reconfiguration, of resetting the stage, called by some re-contextualizing,[14] requires two, potentially overlapping activities: disengagement and redirection. Much has been made of the social engineering dimension of contemporary life, especially pervasive and oppressive since the French Revolution. Weber spoke of our current "rational-bureaucratic," and Foucault of our "disciplinary," society as just precisely and dominantly involved in controlling the individual. But not just these writers. Drucker has characterized the last two hundred years as the pursuit of "salvation through social engineering,"[15] and Havel's eloquent attack on "post-totalitarian" organizing systems, which structure people's activities in the interests of

ideology rather than in those of life, speaks concretely of pervasively orchestrated, if not always deliberate bondage. 16 More classically, Marx on the left and Heidegger on the right decried a variety of forms of organized, everyday constriction and, thereby, diminution of human life - though neither turned out to provide sustainable, or even always credible alternatives to that which they attacked.

Is constructive disengagement possible and appropriate, and, if so, how is it to be negotiated and achieved? Though by no means sufficient for attaining the good life, such strategic withdrawal is surely a prerequisite in and for our time. Freud was fond of saying that often the best one could do was make shrewd compromises with life. A better world would be one in which the vast majority of the social realities and the institutional structures at our disposal were unproblematically enriching to human life. In times such as the present, however, this is not the case and, in fact, gives evidence of becoming even less the case as we approach the end of this troubled century.

An argument can be made, in fact, that our time most resembles that of late Hellenism. Confidence in political and economic institutions has broken down. What is left of "empire," in our age now largely a multi-national and economic notion, is tired, and various particularisms are becoming chaotically insurgent. While right-leaning governments are giving way to left, and left to right, the accumulation of resources (and wealth) is more and more in the hands of the few, a neo-oligarchic circumstance construed to be destabilizing in as early a work as Plato's *Republic.*[17] Such destabilization and the subsequent, sometimes cataclysmic dissolution which typically follows in its wake are rare historical moments and lead often to highly dramatic punctuations of history.[18]

There is more to note. Through Alexander's conquests science as then known, and more importantly "rational" organizational structure, moved from West to East. Later, in ways hard to trace and even more difficult to describe in terms of intelligible content, various "mysteries" from the East moved westward. Along with the dislocation of numerous populations and their largely unstructured and diffuse emigrations (and immigrations) came further urbanization, uneasy multiculturalism and a sense of foreboding, of loss and homelessness with no obvious avenue promising, much less delivering renewal. Official tolerance, coupled with a growing cynicism toward secular authorities and a parallel rise in the number and intensity of mystery cults, led to disengagement on the part of the "intelligentia": the stoic alternative. World-weariness and anxiety coupled to breed an often quiet and courageous despair in this latter group, while all around them frenzied advocates of various competing schemes for salvation demanded attention and often developed large and sometimes aggressive followings. [19]

I do not wish to labor in the least various parallels with our late twentieth century situation. Different readers will find differing mappings appropriate to the underlying congruencies between the age of late Hellenism and circumstances existing today. I suspect such differences, if and as they become

known, will serve to supplement and complement one another in perspectival fashion, rather than stand in a destructive and ultimately, perhaps, self-refuting competition. These matters (at least temporarily) aside, and surely fine-tuned "scholarship" can be symptomatic of evasion as much as of integrity, a "thought experiment," as Kierkegaard would have called it, is very much in order. I have spoken of directional reconfiguration, of resetting the stage -- what various literary critics, following Derrida and others, call "recontextualizing." It will be helpful to engage in directional reconfiguring in one specific domain in particular, *viz.*, that of "psychology." The results of this undertaking are likely to prove both surprising and illuminating when taken as mappings of an emerging late Hellenistic subtext, a subtext significantly determinative of our late twentieth century "predicament."

One of the recurrent ways in which humans have been described is as being *in* , but not *of* the world. In the West this ascription is at least as old as the pentateuchal description of the Israelites as a special people in a special relationship to God[20] and as recent as Heidegger's monumental attempt to reaffirm Christian anthropological doctrine in secular terms in *Being and Time* . More generally speaking, the existentialists have struggled both intellectually and philosophically to retain what we might more neutrally call "the experience of transcendence," this with or without the notion of God, as have "bohemians" (and their successor groups) fought to maintain such an experience socially and culturally. With however much of a grudge, even Freud grants Romaine Rolland the experience of "oceanic feeling" at the beginning of *Civilization and Its Discontents* , though Freud is quick to undertake its undermining.[21] This understanding of human beings as in , but not *of* the world is also found in the orphically influenced Platonic claim that the soul is imprisoned in the body, in the gnostic rejection of the material world and in the long and sometimes tortured history of Christian accounts of salvation and the "afterlife."

The enlightenment project's injunction to replace "superstition" with reason, to dare to "know," accelerated by Nietzsche's culturally focused rage against Christianity, has led to a one-dimensionalizing of human existence in our soon passing century. Life has come to be understood in an almost exclusively horizontal manner by the mainstream intellectuals, with future-oriented and often utopian schemes for national or social salvation being undertaken almost as engineering projects by many. Recent dialogue concerning the reconstruction of Eastern Europe is a case in point. An economically calculated utilitarianism has underlain the rhetoric of much recent political discourse. In this respect the essentially right leaning corporatisms - Japan, Inc. being the most prominent example - and the remains of dreary five year plans in once socialist Eastern Europe are less in conflict than might initially be thought. After all, the promises of collectivisms and secularisms, whether of the right or of the left, tend to merge and blur when the metaphorical focus turns to the lives of great-great-grandchildren.

How to understand the individual in the midst of this spectacle of seemingly relentless, if largely unsuccessful social engineering, an engineering officially recognized as being for the sake of a delayed, but securably higher standard of living? More particularly, how to understand the anxiety and emptiness of our time? Is the sacrifice of the actuality of current individuals for the purported sake of future individuals not quite sustainable after all, as Oakeshott, Havel and others have in fact quite openly stated?

Let us start with anxiety. A useful distinction exists between pathological and ontological forms of this phenomenon.[22] Pathological anxiety can be construed as a diffuse and often crippling reaction to an inability to cope with one's life *in* the world and with that world itself as the arena of one's plans and actions. Quite obviously such a reaction only enhances the underlying coping problems and may easily promote still further ones. Pathological anxiety, in short, has as its functional center difficulties in being *in* the world. In a secularly one-dimensional age it is the only kind of anxiety there can finally be, for there is quite literally no other "world" to which to turn, either for anxiety's explanation or for refuge from it. Other anxieties must reduce to it, though it may itself be construed as having its origins in a very early and even infantile stage of "world-adjustment." Freud very much holds such a view, and when he speaks of our working out our salvation through *Lieben und Arbeiten* (love and work), it is in the service of an exclusively this worldly picture of things, one which puts its emphasis on infantile origins, that he utters his pronouncements.

Ontological anxiety, perhaps a misnomer, is another matter altogether and one which requires considerable explanation. In earlier, existentialist literature it was construed as an altogether appropriate reaction to the brute fact and undeniable precariousness of individual existence "as such." I am, though I might far more easily not have come into existence and must face and accept the inevitability of my eventual (and, for all I know, imminent) extinction. These, typically evaded facts are deeper than and far outweigh particular concerns, all of which can now be seen to be curiously parochial problems arising out of this frustration or that relationship, this anger or that loss, this hope or that disappointment. The anxiety implied in the full acceptance of utter contingency or finitude - favorite existentialist terms - is said to liberate the individual from delusions of long-term tenure, thereby freeing that person to use time in ways that neither waste nor take it for granted. To experience oneself as a visitor or tourist, though perhaps with no home to which to return, to experience the underlying futility of all attachment or emotional investment, is said to be the beginning of a very deep wisdom and a virtually inscrutable life enhancement - however painful may be the ontological anxiety required to reach a sufficiently developed existential insight in this regard. Without full intent Leon Bloy captures the paradoxical agony of it well.

> Man has places in his heart which do not yet exist, and into them enters suffering in order that they may have existence.[23]

As I have preliminarily sketched ontological anxiety, there resides a problem, at least for those who would want to take the "transcendence" thesis, that we are *in* , but not *of* the world, with full meditative seriousness. The classical existentialist formulation only claims that we cannot be *lastingly* in the world. Only in this restricted and essentially negative or privative sense are we not finally *of* it. There is certainly no overt claim or inference that we are *of* - construed now as "from" or that we "belong" - anywhere else. Any and all implications of the prepositional "of" appear, in fact, to be fundamentally misplaced. Ontological anxiety reveals an unremediable homelessness and an all too rapidly extinguished itinerancy as our inescapable human condition. In Kierkegaard and Heidegger, to be sure, even for that matter in Nietzsche, rather overt doctrines of human uniqueness, of a supervenience with respect to the natural world, do appear - and, in Kierkegaard especially, these doctrines are unabashedly theological - but they are not and cannot be generated on the basis of ontological anxiety's alleged revelations taken by themselves, no more than flu symptoms could in and of themselves generate medications or cures. On the other hand, various symptoms, especially painful ones, do motivate the search for means of alleviation, and the relief of these symptoms is usually taken as a necessary condition for judging positively the successfulness of any such search. Classical existentialist doctrine regarding ontological anxiety, thus, delivers far less than some have advertised for it.

Is (ontological) anxiety, however covertly, intentional - that is to say, it is *of* something? Fear is of the dog, war, disease, defeat and so on. Can the same be said of (ontological) anxiety? The classical answer itself has been resoundingly negative.

I want now to shift ground, speak of a particular sort of person who, for lack of a better introductory label, I shall provisionally call "the outsider."

Based in some ways on romantic reactions to heightened urbanization and industrialization, the notion of the outsider was nurtured in European, primarily German literature over the last few centuries and especially in our own. Hesse and Kafka are among its paradigm representatives. The outsider is cast as someone unable to find a "home" in the world and also largely incapable of participating in and thereby benefiting from various interpersonal and (more plurally) social networks of connection, networks which typically function as "support systems" for the contrasted (and typically impugned) "insider." As a consequence of this chronic disconnection the outsider is made more susceptible and vulnerable. But to what? This is obviously the pivotal question, and answers to it, however overtly divergent, have in fact significantly converged from Kant to Heidegger and Havel, from Kleist to Broch, Kundera and Klima.

A common sense response to the question suggests the susceptibility and vulnerability to be to anything which might otherwise have been taken in stride. On this basis one could speak of the infantile and usually traumatic origins of stress, as did Freud. More sophisticatedly, however, the "outsider" tradition came to focus upon absence or loss: the susceptibility was alleged to relate to the

often inexplicable experience of something's being missing. One was made vulnerable to an encounter with ... emptiness.

The question is now only pushed back one step further: why should (and how could) an absence, a "nothingness," have the altogether paradoxical power to wound? Vulnerability to a perhaps dangerous "something" makes sense. Susceptibility to ... nothing sounds either like its opposite, a kind of monadological, even insensitively insulated strength, or it raises suspicions of grammatical horseplay.

The notion of "belonging" opens out upon the solution to this conundrum. Humans are said to belong *in* — for some, more possessively oriented thinkers, *to* — another realm or dimension. Withdrawal *from* (or an absenting, in effect an excommunication *by*) this dimension is construed as both painful and disorienting. Social and more intimately interpersonal relations within the ordinary world of human affairs are said not just to lessen significantly the pain and disorientation, but to disguise their origin and, at the extreme, to hide and thereby largely deny their existence. Without such numbing palliatives to depend upon, however, the outsider's condition and circumstances are quite different. Absence — more particularly, the experience *of* it — could not be avoided. And alternative interpretations of it were always possible: as the consequence of an irreversible overcoming of superstition, thus a function of misguided nostalgia; as a result of rural, essentially pastoral and, thus, reputedly simple and unmanipulative existence, thus a function of urbanization and the ascendancy of economics -- in particular, those of capitalism; as the spiritual fallout from a turning away from God, thus a function of sinful pride and the rebellious attempt to achieve self sufficiency; and as the consequence of a debased and debasing consumerism, thus a function either of flagging cultural energy, a vitally grounded *Untergang* , the theory of choice from the theoretical right, or of an imperialism of mass-driven, because mass targeted markets of vulgar commodity production, the theory of choice from the theoretical left.

The "positive" account, of course, construed human being as belonging primordially, essentially and superordinately to another realm, whether it be construed spatially, temporally, ontologically or as a complex, often confusing admixture of the three.

Almost invariably language was viewed both as impediment (as in Babel) and as avenue and clue (as in revelatory parable and poetry) regarding the outsider's return and reunion, reunion and return. This dual understanding of language could even be held together with an underlying skepticism and disquietude regarding the ultimate result of the journey. Beckett illustrates this with concise (and characteristic) profundity.

> Let us hope the time will come, thank God that in certain circles it has already come, when language is most efficiently used where it is being most efficiently misused. As we cannot eliminate language all at once, we should at least leave nothing undone that might contribute to its falling into disrepute. To bore one hole after another in it, until what lurks behind it — be it something or nothing — begins to seep through; I cannot imagine a higher goal for a writer today..... In this dissonance between the means and

> their use it will perhaps become possible to feel a whisper of that final music or that silence that underlies All.[24]

What will the world come to look like if, as and when the "gods" commence their return? Will a place have been prepared for them? And is their return even possible without such (and much) preparation on the part of humans? The "outsider" motif, most articulately and persuasively developed by Heidegger, suggests that it is precisely the vulnerability of such outsiders, the fact and consequences of their discomfort with secular and collective existence, which will beckon and then shelter the return of "the sacred." Without wishing any specific congruence with Heideggerian tropes,[25] and partly because of this, I have chosen the term 'thresholder' to indicate an emerging gathering of shelterers: paradigmatic individuals whom I have also termed 'spiritual vehicles' and have claimed will define the coming age. Is there not considerable audacity even in admitting to such an "overview?" Statistically, yes. Most of the future-oriented discourse of the twentieth century has been carried out under the aegis of a materialistically oriented myth of occasionally interrupted progress, a myth that this soon passing century has done little to nourish and the world's accelerating population growth and rebarbative particularism are doing much to destroy. Other scenarios, particularly spiritual ones, have been largely captured by various ethnic identity crusades or religious fundamentalisms, thereby undergoing quite understandable discredit among the educated and historically informed intellegentia of the advanced, if disillusioned West. Is there a third way between the despair born of knowledge and the enthusiasm arising from ignorance? Is there an integrating and transforming alternative to the materialistic optimism of the well positioned market-force advocate and the spiritual pessimism of the tradition-bound and numerically dwindling religious believers? These are not easy questions, but I believe a series of positive answers are coming to be possible, answers arising from emerging human circumstance. Irving Kristol focuses the negative outlook, this in the face of his own sense of economic optimism. He does so, however, in a way which suggests that major change is virtually unavoidable.

> But if the economic anxieties Americans are experiencing are, at least to a large degree, symptoms of a deeper malaise rather than its cause, what are the sources of this malaise? That is not an easy question to answer, but we may find a clue in the fact that this malaise is not peculiarly American. In all the Western democracies, there seems to be a profound, inchoate dissatisfaction that transcends the language of economics in which it is most familiarly expressed. In all these democracies, it is democratic government itself that has fallen into disrepute, and it doesn't seem to matter much whether the government is left of centre or right of centre. Indeed, one suspects that it is this very centre that is at fault. We have spent the past half-century constructing this centre, have achieved the goals we had in mind, and are now leaning an old truth - getting what you want can turn out to be a disillusioning experience.
>
> What we wanted - what the people of our modern democracies wanted - was greater affluence and economic security. And this is what we have got.
>
> ...The centre is not holding. While our politicians, left and right, are pasting band-aids all over that centre, expanding national health insurance or privatizing it or whatever, the citizenry is turning anti-political. The new, distinctive feature of our modern democracies is the contempt of this citizenry for their governments and their politicians. They demand more and more of their governments, since they have been taught that this is their democratic duty, but at the same time they expect less and less. Deep down, very deep down, there is a free-floating anxiety that our secular civilization, along with the ideologies that have created it and sustain it, are edging glacier-like to some sort of crisis. Since life imitates art, we can expect some kind of "post-modern" politics, one that distances itself from the very building blocks of modernity - rationalism, secularism, science, technology and representative government. There ought to be little doubt that the story of this twenty-first century will be the story of this crisis.[26]

And on the "other side" of this crisis, "beyond" the disintegration of the present scene? However darkening are the shadows of impending cataclysm, re-integrative glimpses may nonetheless be possible. Such is the thresholder's intuition and claim.

NOTES

[1] It has been through the auspices and considerable generosity of both the Earhart Foundation and Pomona College that I have been provided time and opportunity to pursue these reflections, and I would be far more than just remiss, if I did not as publicly as possible acknowledge my considerable debt to these organizations. This I most gladly do.

[2] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 78.

[3] Václav Havel, *Disturbing the Peace,* trans. Paul Wilson (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), p. XII.

[4] I use the term 'man' quite deliberately with regard to the paradigm individual of the "capitalist era.' The term is less helpful with respect to that historical period into which we arc about to enter and regarding which much of my labor is directed. It may even be significantly misleading. Though the various "feminisms' that have come into play over the last few decades have had something to do with this, there are far deeper reasons, I believe, for the "un-gendering" or "bracketing" of gender appropriate to the coming era. 'Man' may more perspicuously give way not to 'person,' but to 'thresholder.' On this, more later.

[5] As will become evident, the post-capitalistic person need by no means be construed as presenting an economic alternative to capitalism, if by that is implied some theoretically based challenge to free markets. Rather, in a way somewhat in accord with Peter Druckcr's reflections in *Post-Capitalist Society* , the post-capitalist person comes to be anchored in something other than capital and exists, therefore, however metaphorically, beyond the 'material" plane of life as traditionally construed. In Drucker's case the anchor turns out to be information, something which neither competes against capital nor is adverse to it. If one were to be Hegelian, one would claim that on Drucker's view information preserves, yet subsumes capital — Hegel's famous *Aufhebung*. In the reflections which follow I am concerned to meditate on post-capitalist possibilities as well, though the reconfiguring which I see occurring — the transfiguration of values — will not have information as its most fundamental reality.

[6] This observation is attributed to Susan Sontag by Salman Rushdie in his *Bosnia on my Mind* in Index on Censorship , 1/2 1994, p. 17.

[7] The London Stock Exchange, just to give one example, was begun in what is now the reconstructed Mansion House in 1292.

[8] For a more extended treatment of this rendering of history, which might also be construed as a specific grammatology made experientially historical, see my "No Longer, Not Yet: Reading History Grammatically," Man and World, #28,1995. That history could be construed in terms of grammar is only odd prior to the considerations Hegel brings to cultural reflection. After these, grammar and history intertwine in ways which are virtually unavoidable. Nietzsche and, later, Heidegger and Derrida have made these ways vivid, if, regretably, not always sufficiently lucid. This combination of profundity and intermittent — some would way chronic — obscurity will cloak much twentieth century European philosophy in mystery and controversy for some time to come, as it did the "romantic" period prior to Hegel well into the nineteenth century. In some ways the romantic period, in Germany at least, came

more to be glossed over than to be understood. Heidegger and, particularly, Derrida are likely to be subject to the same fate, especially if European unification proceeds successfully.

[9] His remarks appear in the Times Litegary Supplement in an article entitled *America's Mysterious Malaise* which was published in May of 1992.

[10] See *The Space of Love and Garbage,* The Harvard Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2, Number 1, Spring 1992, pp. 33-41.

[11] As many have said, we may now be living in the age of victimization. In such a time "rights," construed primarily as what one has coming, either because of one's nature or as a result of what has been done to one, become altogether ascendant. They get most centrally construed in terms of a classical distributive paradigm, not, that is, as the freedom to do, but as the entitlement to receive. My 'right,' supposedly, is to a certain (usually significant) portion of this, that and the other thing. One of the prime rights demanded, intriguingly, is the light to receive respect, often conflated with special advantage or benefit and sometimes construed as compensatory, as if it were a commodity available altogether independently of one's own activities and the self-respect that both fosters these activates and is enriched by them. Some go so far, in fact, as to place monetary or other (calculable) values on the alleged compensatory dimension of respect, claiming almost literally to measure it. (Compensatory respect looks far more like compassion, charity or even pity, but this introduces a large and tangled set of issues, regarding which Nietzsche, however acidly in places, may have had as much to say as anyone.)

Underlying the victimization movement is a notion of person far more as recipient than as agent, far more passive than active. Governments are typically asked either to provide various advantages directly to this recipient or to guarantee through threat of punishment or sanction that other societal elements, or even individuals, will provide such benefits. Demands of this nature rob both the parties involved of their rightful self-appropriated and self-directed autonomy, which is not to deny the existence of many unfortunate people nor the value of those sorts of voluntary activities which foster, in turn, a greater autonomy in the beneficiaries of broadly charitable actions. Though for many it will be a hard saying, the meaning and destination of specifically *human* being are not necessarily encountered nor comprehended in materially absorbed welfare programs. The hardness of the saying derives in part from the quite legitimate truth that starvation, for example, undercuts the basic sorts of conditions required for any significant activity. On this more later.

[12] As cannot but become more evident as I proceed, I am far less inclined to argue *for* this transitional thesis than to engage in a Kierkegaardian type 'thought experiment' on its behalf, viz., to begin to sort things out and make sense of them on the *assumption* of such a transition. Futurology, on the other hand, presented as scientifically based inference from empirical evidence, is subject to altogether understandable epistemological diversions — nor, for that matter, was it likely to have predicted the timing or dynamics of the collapse of communism in any case, just to mention one of its more obvious and recent failures. Temporarily, at least, one might hope that the long age of epistemology and its attendant separations, its justificatory provision of isolationism for the intellectuals, may be ending. It is with this hope as my companion that I undertake this unusual project of tracing the pattern of the emerging age of thresholding.

[13] Havel, *Disturbing the Peace, p.* 40. It is interesting to note in this connection that Havel views the theatre of the absurd as the theatre of our time, but does not contrue it as nihilistic. Remarks such as this make us see more clearly why someone such as Beckett repays careful study.

[14] See in this connection Richard Rorty's *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). In contrast to recontextualizafion the atomistic tendencies of our passing century, grounded in thinkers like Descartes and Hume, have led to programmatic abstraction from context, a decontextualizing in the name of something misleadingly called "objectivity." This view both implies and is engendered by what is called the 'external relations" theory of things, best captured in Bishop Butler's (considerably opaque and only misleadingly commensensical) remark that "a thing is what it is and not another thing." This Butlerian claim seems to do well with loose stones, but has trouble with flames, rivers, and, most importantly, with humans.

[15] Peter Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1993), pp. 9-10.

[16] Vaclav Havel, *Open Letters* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992). See especially pp. 127-167.

[17] In fairness to Plato, of course, it must be granted that all developed economico-political stucturings eventually both destabilize and dissolve. Such is the consequence of his essentially cyclical reading of history. Oligarchic destabilization and subsequent dissolution, however, is one of history's more dramatic moments and not a frequent occurrence.

[18] Historically such times usually end in depressions, inflationary if ruling authorities choose to print money, deflationary if they don't. Earlier in this century opposite courses of action were taken by the German and the American governments. Since neither strategy was even marginally successful, a curious set of contrasting consequences has followed. Germany has been strongly inclined to defend its currency ever since, its altogether sober reaction to the inflationary route it took in the later stages of the ill-fated Weimar Republic. The United States, in contrast, has been equally strongly inclined to make money "easy," the Voelker era notwithstanding, thereby hoping to avoid a repetition of the disasters visited upon it by the severe money 'contraction' it experienced in the early thirties.

[19] One needs to look little further than Yeats' now classic poem, *The Second Coming* , to appreciate current circumstances in this regard.

[20] One can go back further, of course, the Egyptians of the second millennium B.C.F. providing a prominent case in point. Less accessible to us, however, their conceptualizations remain somewhat outside our purview, though not foreign to the "transcendence hypothesis" that humans arc not *of* the world. The rejection of transcendence is a rather recent development.

[21] See Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* trans. James Strackey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1974).

[22] In small measure at least, I owe this accounts beginnings to Rollo May and others, who attempted in mid-century to marry the metaphysics of existentialism to both psychology and culture. See in this connection *Existence,* ed. by Rollo May (New York: Basic Books, 1960). Paul Tillich's *The Theology of Culture* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) is a further and very significant example of this, often precarious matchmaking.

[23] Graham Greene quotes this as his frontispiece in *The End Of The Affair* (London: Penguin Books, 1975). That suffering might well be an inextricable component in the dynamics of any genesis, especially one alleged to be metaphorically *ex nihilo* , is a very old doctrine, one not unknown today among professionally trained psychotherapists. A variant of it is found in Augustine's otherwise cryptic remark that love destroys what we were, that we might become what we are not.

[24] Beckett, quoted in Christopher Ricks, *Beckett's Dying Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 56-57. As I have indicated elsewhere, "Ricks' study is extraordinarily sensitive and subtle, itself combining the poetic and the critical in what might themselves be called fracturing ways. Commenting on Beckett (on Proust), Ricks remarks laconically that "nothing will cure everything..." (p.21)." See my *No Longer, Not Yet - Reading History Grammatically* , Man and World, #28, 1995 pp. 83-99.

[25] I wish in no way to disparage the work of Heidegger. On the contrary, I believe that in many ways his work should be selectively celebrated. The time for scholarly exegesis, however, may well be largely over, for the boundedness of the German metaphysical tradition, the idiosyncrasies of its vocabulary, and the rapidly changing face of postmortem liberal democracies combine to suggest a renewing of direct, rather than exclusively commentatorial spiritual inquiry.

[26] Irving Kristol, *America's Mysterious Malaise,* Times Literary Supplement, May 22,1992.

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THE PARADIGM OF PHILOSOPHIZING

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1. There were, are and will be various ways of philosophizing but their common denominator, I contend, is an attempt to synthesize the *Weltbild*, i.e. to lay bare the sense of our existence, the being in general as well the cognitive grasping of them and settling given axiological criteria according to which we can deal with Others. In one sentence, philosophizing is founded on a paradigm which demands principled reflection upon the world and ourselves. Principled that means applying categories of ontological, epistemological and axiological character pertaining to universally relevant requirements. No philosophy known to us, whether European or beyond its ethnic domain, whether old or young, could do without such assumptions. Indeed, the ancient Greek "love of wisdom" entailed the irrevocable claim to provide the elucidation of the order of all things. One could safely state that from its very beginnings philosophizing was another form of religion and its rationalization by theology (whichever shape it took) and gradually it became a lay substitute of religious experience supported by theological thinking. This is said to enhance the hypothesis that at the roots of philosophizing one can point to the peculiar condition of human being (considered as *homo religiosus)* who inevitably needs to establish some general principles and ask about their source and authority. This condition - primordial, at first spontaneously expressed, then looking for the reasons and finally oriented towards' the legitimization of them seems to bear witness to man's self-defense against the precariousness of his (her) status in the world and the latter's presence as the flow of contingencies, a mere chaos.

2. If the above approach to the question under examination holds true and is sufficiently persuasive, one should confront philosophy as a special kind of thought (or strictly speaking, a body of thought) with other domains of spiritual expression and its embodiments such as religion, art and science. What we call culture - let us remind - rests primarily on all of them.

2a. In contradistinction to religion, philosophizing has to admit that there are many truths competing one with another and no one matrix of answers is attainable. The only common (ecumenical) axis consists in the cursed ultimate questions which cannot be avoided and eliminated because we are mortals, dissatisfied with empirical realm, transcending it and reaching, at most, *deus absconditus* (what amounts to Secret Silence), conscious of enigmas of existence, involved in constant inquiring into *unde malum*, etc. Thus philosophers being entirely lucid with regard to the ongoing emulation of their "Weltbilder" and the never final strength of their arguments which are to justify such and such position, have to be self-critical and realize the dramatic entanglement of their endeavor. Why dramatic? Because of the obvious aporia which accompanies their reflection. They must universalize their answers as much as the questions but cannot share the illusion that their own vocabulary and outline of being sketched by them is ultimate. They must be tolerant because of the pluralism of approaches like theirs own, and be at odds with tolerance as they have to foster their solution as the best. They touch upon the space of unknown (which seems solely "yet unknown") but obtain no reply. They must incessantly renew their offers in the same manner and directions although they are well aquatinted with the defeats of the predecessors and themselves unmask the pitfalls of their rivals'

conceptions. When they arrive to the brink of precipice, i.e. to the most radical skepticism, their principled thinking has to take the form of positive negativity. I mean by this the fact that they change chaos and ephemerality, relativity of knowledge, uncertainty of ethical rules, etc. into the foundations of never firmly founded reality. A genuine paradox which confirms the nature of philosophizing.

One could rejoin that religion (and theology behind it) remains also aware of plurality of solutions around. True, there is awareness of this fact but all other religions (theologies) are treated as sheer mistakes, a kind of deviation from the exclusive truth in the name of which given missionary (if not proselytic) tasks are carried out. No genuine philosopher would say that his (her) route-companions are deprived of any truth and should demand his (her) illuminating help. His (her) state is solely to offer the arguments which could be superior to the alternative ones, but at the end he (she) must assent to the latters' irrefutable power (unless there are some evident technical errors in the reasoning which are of secondary importance).

2b. In contradistinction to art philosophizing is again universalistic and self-critical but shares with It the consciousness of multiperpectivism of the word views. Philosophy (like theology) operates with logical discourse and is argumentative because it has to convince to its standpoint; it only privileges reason. Art is experiential (like religion), it esteems reason but at the service of demonstrating the multifariousness of reality rendered by the whole mind, by its perceptive antenae, feeling, imagination, intuition. Art can be philosophy - or religion-biased, but first of all, it bears witness to the messiness and muddle of our existence, hence also to the many sidedness of wrangling doctrines, ideologies and philosophies among which one is to make thechoice. Philosophy cannot help, as already emphasized, to pretend to that premises and conclusions are generally valid; art instead is the expression of private view to sharing of which other people are not bound but barely invited. Art's paradigm amounts to revealing man's all possible existential dramas without passing the verdict that everything is questionable and our doom is to impose on the world a net of principles. For art is resistant to them or suspicious of them whereas philosophizing is their bearer and harbinger. Art too tries to make our existence meaningful but on its own account, i.e., on the author's perspective which is more or less appealing to others and therapeutic. Philosophy turns the sense of being, settled as principle, into universally binding. Both are unsure whether they hit the mark. But art treats the state of uncertainty as beneficial normalcy whereas philosophy finds it disquieting or even despairing. Finally, art's paradigmatic position consists in creating new reality, philosophizing instead aims at discovering the Inherent structure (or de-structure) and regularities (or Ir-regularities) of the world outside and inside. They often converge, nonetheless their autonomous qualities decide about their distinction and separation.

2c. In contradistinction to the particular sciences philosophy's achievements cannot be tested and verified in the same fashion as the results of physical and biological or psychological and sociological research. I maintain that philosophizing should not be scientifically proved as it is meta-scientific (and in this sense always somewhat metaphysical). Sciences establish the laws governing selected areas of reality. In their exact version they employ experiments, their purpose is to explain how the processes here and there

proceed, what the scrutinized reality is like and draw from it practical contusions. Their findings allow for short or long-terms predictive statements. Nothing similar occurs with regard to philosophic meditations. They cross-cross with scientific procedures when practiced as methodology, but philosophizing has no Instrumental value in the sense of handling the world-stuff so as to attain concrete success. When it is argued that philosophy has to explain the reality in order to chance it, its model becomes science and thus it gets distorted. Marxism was interpreted this way although one can equally (what happened in the train of vicissitudes of this worldview since Gramsci and early Lukacs) see its blue-print of proletarian revolution with Its consequences not qua the verification of social necessities and historical *telos* but as a collective action partly determined by given circumstances and partly presenting the outcome of utopian thinking (or, if you prefer, of lay eschatology). Anyway, the differences between philosophy and science concern not so much the width of their scope (the former comprises as many regions of reflections as possible, the latter is the more effective, the less territory of research it covers) as their fundamentally distinct attitudes. The paradigm of scientific investigation is maximal operationality, winning scores in the fight with nature and society in order to subordinate them to man's plans (also the ecologically-oriented scientist has in mind his [her] preponderance). Contrariwise, adequate philosophizing looks for man's harmony with nature and warns against technocracy in coping with social iils.

3. If my understanding of philosophic paradigm can stand critical analysts, then the postmodern "rebellion" against it should be judged as futile. For it is inconceivable that philosophizing which entails the search of principles and their universal relevance can be ever abandoned. Nor makes it sense arguing that all thinking of this kind is blatant mystification. The conceptions of all leading postmodernists (so appointed or self-nominated) bring evidence that anti-philosophizing does not work fully. They are only dedicated to another sort of philosophy what is, by the way, stressed in some fragments of the *oeuvre* of Lyotard, Deleuze and Marquard. As I dwelt on this topic in the English few year ago, I do not want to repeat here my counter-discourse. Another matter is the postmodernist de-construction (which is at the same time as Rorty states, re-textualization) of the philosophic treatises, unearthing their blind alleys, deficient formulations of problem, abuses of principled considerations. Noteworthly, such healing self-correction was exercised in our century - since many decades either by opposing mythos to the imperial logos, or by assaulting metaphysics in its specific endearing version (Heidegger and hermeneutics), or by denouncing the perils of historiosophic projects which settle a priori whither and how history develops (the critique of totalitarian philosophies) or else by distancing oneself from the Platonic myth of philosopher - the king of intellectuals who must be obediently followed by others (the essayistic trend, Bataille and Cioran), etc. There is no wonder that Levinas' crusade against of ontology and Adorno's micrologies are quoted so often as the starting points of postmodern strategy. However, such examples only confirm the vitality of philosophizing which resists decapitation as it stems from the inner drive to meet the puzzles of our existence and call for some "signposts". Levinas fixed them in religious ethics, in being a hostage of Other's Face, Adorno in negative dialectics opening horizons to *das Andere,* i.e., homeliness and spontaneity in magic contacts with nature.

All in all, such philosophic practices are to be acknowledged as the most advanced continuation of the best modernist procedures opposed to the remaining on which a shadow of doubt was cast. This doubtful and criticised heritage embraces e.g. coining the idea of linear progress, or rationalizing the belief that the divine kingdom can be achieved on earth or the ruthless exploitation of natural resources in the name of social all-over welfare, or sticking to the priestly self-conceit because of the possession of keys to highest wisdom, and so on. The response - the sharpest and peremptory - to the above (and others) sins of heretofore philosophizing was as if pre-conceived and generated by the very character of philosophy. By its - what I enhanced before self-propelling criticism. Hence such postmodernism would not be a destruction of the paradigm I delineated but rather it improvement. This goes in line with the views of say Lyotard, Eco and Bauman when they elucidate that the new logic of culture boils down in fact to a special mode of modern consciousness and its output in all spheres of life.

Nonetheless I am not inclined to stop at this juncture. Postmodernist syndrom is, I deem, a cultural phenomenon. It transgresses the borderlines of philosophy and the family quarrels with its own past. it depends on what happens in the network of postmodernity the gist of which is consumerism and permissiveness. Their all-pervasive influence has a counterpart in the praise of chaos, precariousness, contingency, segmentation, fractality of events and conformism recommending adjustment to the present-day status *quo.* Philosophizing is treated in this context to be out of our time. Antifoundationalism is preached as a new gospel and so through the hind doors re-appears like boomerang, the principle banished through the front doors. A sophistry? Not quite. It is true that the shibboleth "merrygo-lucky" (of course purified of any paradigms, meant to be man's chains!) Is triumphantly voiced from every corner. However, when the slogan is reflected upon, it has to take the form of universal rule. But what a miserable rule it is, how much beneath the capacities and possibilities of human being, how far from his (her) tragic lot (ever the same spectacle of Promethean fire, and its, reverse, ashes)! We are doomed to challenge our crumbling existence. We are unable to give it up and via philosophizing we realize that it cannot be victorious i.e. endow us with absolutely certain final vocabulary binding humankind. Exactly this propensity and Its syndrome (heroic striving and defeat), in other words - a hopeless hope makes us what we are; god-like and godless at the same time, Prospero knew too well that trampling down the fathomed here paradigm could turn us into Calibans. Are we then not allowed to say woe to these who violate and impoverish *conditio humana*? Philosophizing is, as once R. Kroner rightly evinced, *Selbstbesinnung* (self-awareness) of culture, of its top potentialities in duel with purely pragmatic values which do not deserve an alliance. If I am persuasive, is programmatic disowning of philosophy a proper dialogue with our unsound civilization and a good medicine for the mind attracted by fundamentals of being cognition and ethics?

TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTICS AND THE PARADIGM OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY
(abstract)

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My paper tries to suggest the possibility of a critical and - in a sense systematical reconstruction of a sequence of paradigms of First Philosophy that is indeed characteristic of the history of Occidental philosophy. The reconstruction is made possible, I suggest, by the present paradigm - *transcendental semiotics* - because this paradigm is based on a triadic basic structure (*semiosis* in tire sense of Charles Peirce) which can be considered as a reflective integration of the three, subsequent main paradigms of First Philosophy in Europe, viz. ontological metaphysics, (transcendental) philosophy of the 'subject' or consciousness, and (transcendental) philosophy of language communication or intersubjectivity. Transcendental semiotics, I suggest, can systematically derive the two pre-semiotic paradigms of First Philosophy (and even some types of language-analytical philosophy, characteristic of the 20th century) as resulting from abstractive or reductive fallacies committed in respect of the elements (relata) of the triadic basic structure of transcendental semiotics, Thereby I can show that the pre-semiotic paradigms of First Philosophy must be insufficient as rational foundations for theoretical as well as practical philosophy.

FROM THE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT OF CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS EMERGENCE OF PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY INTO CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

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HISTORY is essentially a creation, says Cornelius Castoriadis. For him it is not only past history but also history in the making and history still to be made. Creation does not mean objective indetermination or subjective enforceability of events and of the course of history.

History is the sphere where the human being creates anthological forms, history and society being the primary source of such forms. Creation does not necessarily mean "good creation", or "creation of positive values". Auschwitz and the Inquisition are creations, the same as the Eiffel Tower and the theory of relativity. But among the creations of our history, the Occidental-Greek history, there is one creation of particular importance. It is the Greeks who through criticism, self interrogation established a political community, wrote their own law instead of receiving it from some divinity. They created a break, a rupture.

THE OCCIDENTAL-GREEK tradition is the only one that called in question society's imaginary institutes, and that gave birth to a project and established an AUTONOMOUS SOCIETY.

The Greeks created autonomy in society and individuals. The institution of a society is a creation. It is a form made of a surging material, from which alone we can understand something and reflect upon the enigma of its existence.

The Greeks understood that HISTORY is not made by God, or by any sort of laws. It is because they did not believe any longer in such extra-historical determination that they were able to create DEMOCRACY and PHILOSOPHY.

One should not forget that history is the area where the creativity of all men and women from here and elsewhere and all humanity unfolds.

If history is creation, then we can question the image we have of our world, in order to understand it better. What do we think of our culture? From where does the idea of democracy come, the idea of progress or development? What are the a priori hidden behind all the speeches, whether liberal, socialist, dictatorial, systemic?

All these are questions introduced by Cornelius Castoriadis, philosopher, psychoanalyst, economist, director of studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes de Sciences Sociales in Paris.

In order to unmask the absolutes of our civilisation, Cornelius Castoriadis is asking important questions:

- what holds a society together, how does it maintain itself, and why?
- How does something new emerge in history?
- Are culture, the imaginary institutes' significance, the scientific knowledge developing in a coherent way?

SUBJECTIVITY as a deliberate and thoughtful (thought and will) instance, is a historical/social project. Its origin can be dated and localized. We have seen two examples in Greece and in Occidental Europe, where the project was created under different models. The core of both examples is THE MONADE PSYCHICAL irreducible to the SOCIAL HISTORICAL but shaped by it. The

main requisite is to provide meaning to the "psyche", and this happens during the whole of life, beginning at birth. Cornelius Castoriadis emphasizes that the social institutions dominate individuals because they produce and shape them: totally in traditional societies and to a large degree in our liberal societies. It is the result of the interiorisation of institutions by the individual during his whole life. Here the main point is the interiorisation of imaginary social meanings. Society pulls the human being away from the closed universe of the monade psychical and forces him to enter into the hard world of reality. In exchange, society offers him meaning. In the real world created each time by society, things have a meaning, life, death have a meaning. This meaning is the subjective face, the face for the individual, of social imaginary significations. Society is not reducible to the "inter-subjectivity".

In fact a society surpasses the sum of the individuals who form it, although it can exist only through them. Therefore a society is a "SOCIAL-HISTORICAL" complex, in other words a social project dated by time and marked by the desires of these who compose it. What is important is to understand how something new emerges, in the meaning of creation of the "SOCIAL".

Society creates and institutes itself with two dimensions woven together: the "holistic identical dimension" (set dimension) and the properly "imaginary dimension" or poïetic.

The holistic identical dimension creates the institution with its stable and permanent qualities. But the main dimension of a society is the imaginary that shapes it. Each society builds its world, its own reality. One community could be totalitarian, equalitarian, or "sporting"; another one "sub-developed", "Catholic", etc.

Each individual is therefore a constructor of this invisible social reality, thanks to his necessary participation in the culture of his community (through school, sports, movies, etc.)

One must understand the difference and not confuse the institutions that are real and established (the legislative power, schools or the hospital system, for example) with the imaginary representation that individuals may have. Every citizen should respect this important difference in order to reach an equilibrium in our civilisation.

Sociology and philosophy have always put in opposition the INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY. Cornelius Castoriadis suggests one should rather prefer the distinction "psyche"/society, because the social individual has a soul and is not a pawn on a chess-board. The citizen is not only at the service of social institutions. He is also their architect. That is why the individual has a large power that he easily forgets.

CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS studies the specificities of the "psyche" relative to the human being. The "psyche" goes through a number of stages. It begins with a monade psychical closed on itself, goes through an oedipean stage, ends with different sublimation processes of which the result is the SOCIAL INDIVIDUAL.

Regarding SOCIALISATION, in other words life in society, it is through it that the person forms and moulds himself. The part (role) of the mother is important, because she talks to her children. As a social individual, she speaks the language of a specific society with its own imaginary signification. For the new-born baby, the mother is the first representative of society. She transmits

the representations of past generations. This socialisation process begins with birth, or maybe even before, and terminates with death. The result of this process is the SOCIAL INDIVIDUAL who learns to use several masks in order to play the social game. Sometimes the masks hide the different positions occupied by the social individual in the multiple social realities.

We can say that the human groups can be distinguished by the images they reflect to themselves. These images lead their activities. It then becomes possible to undertake the interesting analysis of myths and values of societies.

As we already mentioned, modern society was born in antique Greece, when the philosophers of that time refused to submit to external determination such as all-powerful gods.

This consideration is important. It emphasizes our responsibility since we can no longer throw blame on some god or scapegoat. Society needs norms and limitations. Based on the confrontation of opinions, democracy emerges with its strength and weaknesses.

From the time society got out of the sacred institution, when the Greeks asked the questions: what shall we think? what shall we do? there was no escape from the responsibility of choice, of decision.

In fact the decision to be free had been taken and it was the first step towards freedom.

Social and individual autonomy require a project because autonomy means "deciding one's own law" in an endless movement.

A critical interrogation on the foundation of the faith did accompany the creation of democracy and of the philosophy of Athens.

If on one side social reality is a set of values, criteria and priorities, and on the other side society establishes its own limits, then almost everything is possible. That is why so many different social forms are possible, from all kinds of totalitarisms to all kinds of democracies.

A society emerges from the reunion of human groups and creates its own laws and projects, using self-reflexive thoughts. This society is therefore going to notice the shift between reality and its representation. From this situation results the major problem of the relativity of institutions. It appears that the institutions of others are just other institutions, thus making it impossible to impose on others our own criteria, our norms and our values (for example difficulties of United Nations interventions).

In its social philosophy, Cornelius Castoriadis reaches the bitter conclusion that there is no ABSOLUTE value acceptable for all. The freedom of individuals, the equality of men and women, the respect of private property, the choice of tolerating other religious practices, all this depends only on SOCIAL-POLITICAL choices and decisions.

Paradoxically, the effective social reality (what we are doing) differs from the fiction of the social project (what we would like to do). Cornelius Castoriadis emphasizes the urgency to understand the SELF-JUSTIFICATION that makes our desires look like necessities.

Behind the words of Castoriadis, we can see an interrogation about CHANGE. How can society change? Shall we question our way of thinking, our socially instituted ideas on nature, on the importance of science, on our mathematical, biological, physical, political, economical knowledge? Shall we introduce more interdisciplinarity into our lives?

Today our OCCIDENTAL CULTURE is shaken by a period of crisis. This crisis affects philosophy as well. It is urgent to react because philosophy is a central component of the Occidental-Greek project of individual and social autonomy. There is no freedom without philosophy.

In order to be genuine, philosophy must be critical. Like arts, philosophy is a reflexive activity, that is not accumulative. Being a reflection on our way of thinking, philosophy has to be constantly re-created. It is a project without end. According to Cornelius Castoriadis, it is important to consider that the conception one has of philosophy is closely linked to the conception one has of the history of philosophy, and vice-versa. But it is also impossible to think about what philosophy is without a certain conception of history, since philosophy is also a SOCIAL-HISTORICAL construction.

One cannot understand what PHILOSOPHY really is without taking into account its central role in the birth and development of the social-historical project of autonomy (social and individual). Philosophy and democracy were born at the same time and the same place. Both of them express the refusal of heteronomy. The refusal of imposed rules and pre-existing representations, the refusal of any outside authority (in particular "divine authority"), the refusal of all extra-social sources of truth and justice. In other words philosophy and democracy mean the questioning of existing institutions and the assertion of the ability of the collectivity and of thought to establish themselves.

Democracy is the system of political self-questioning. It questions laws, their reason to be and their effectiveness.

In philosophy the most important questions are: "what should I think about being, about justice, about my own thoughts, etc.".

Democracy is the project emerging at the COLLECTIVE LEVEL while philosophy is the project emerging at the level of INDIVIDUAL THOUGHT.

PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY are expressions of the AUTONOMY PROJECT. In order to overcome its crisis, our civilisation should become creative and self-questioning. We should not allow the true philosophical questions be forgotten, or dominated by materialism and sensationalism.

As we said before, self-questioning thought emerged thanks to human activity at a certain time and place. We must then admit that it is a human creation. It becomes evident that human history is creation: the creation of significations and institutions which embody them, creation of the social individual from the stage of the "psyche", creation of subjective questioning.

Cornelius Castoriadis thinks that from the point of view of philosophy and democracy, nearly all societies were instituted as heteronomous, within and through the closing of their institutions and significations. Philosophy and democracy created the project of individual and social autonomy.

The meaning of THIS PROJECT is the refusal of the closing and the establishment of a new relationship between individuals and the institution, between the imagination and the social individual, between the ceaseless reflexive activity of thought and its results at any given time.

This statement leads us to the question: "is there a modality of being able to alter its way of being?" Thus it belongs to what we think of Being, it is a way of being.

On the other hand, this project contains the creation of a social historical space in which a model of individual (reflective subjectivity) questions the truth.

The creation of the project of autonomy, the reflective activity of thought, and the fight for the creation of self-reflective institutions, that is to say democratic institutions, are achievements and manifestations of human doing.

It is human activity that created the need for freedom, equality and justice in its fight against established institutions.

Until now this project has been only partially accomplished, and it is our responsibility to continue the struggle towards this goal, using POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL tools together.

Philosophical activity and critical reflection greatly influence politics. We are conscious that we are currently facing an acute crisis of the political imagination, combined with intellectual lethargy. We cannot and must not accept an opportunist ideology or populist lies. It is urgent to remember that we are responsible for our destiny. Cornelius Castoriadis invites us to ponder over this deep reflection.

Cornelius Castoriadis, philosopher, economist, psychoanalyst, logician, approaches his subjects with the interdisciplinarity that characterizes him. He masters sciences, human sciences and philosophy, without which any effort of synthesis is in vain.

Reflecting on the systemic paradigm, where the interaction between two elements is one of its characteristics, I can say that Cornelius Castoriadis' philosophical thought interacting with other thoughts from different fields of culture, different times and different places, may lead to the emergence of new and important developments.

In the history of human thinking, the most creative developments have sometimes been born at the intersection of two currents of thought.

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"AND YOU, MY MOUNTAIN, WILL YOU NEVER WALK TOWARDS ME?"
(Beyond Paradigms Of Philosophizing)

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The title of the text on hand is a motto. It is, so to say, the opening phrase of Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle* (Cambridge 1989). The words are expressive of a basic sense of community and a corresponding lifestyle; and upon rationalization they lead to "ecology" as an intellectual activity. They express horror as well; they bear witness of an appalling experience as they were said when a comrade had been caught by surprise and buried in an avalanche.

At face value the words suggest a paradigm of philosophizing. But what is a paradigm? A conceptual and instrumental framework that functions when a complete theory is not yet available? Is it a way of seeing things, more or less implemented by artefacts that enable man to explain a puzzling encounter with the world? If so, then the meaning of the opening phrase of Naess' book clearly stretches "beyond" paradigm. For the phrase knows of no bounds whereas a framework or a way of seeing is characterized by what makes it specific. The meaning of the words transcends any rational procedure:it testifies to a source from which rational activity is born.

A paradigm is dependent upon its beginning, of which it provides an interpretation, consciously as well as subconsciously. It interprets its beginning consciously in so far as it is generated by immediate experience, and it does so subconsciously in so far as it feeds upon the relevant cultural context of its discovery. The choice of a paradigm exemplifies the personal character of human knowledge; it is part of a process of selfrealisation, where the prefix "self" is to include all and everything.

Awareness of the fact that a paradigm interprets its beginning implies awareness of what is "beyond", which leads to the intuition of a value that is out of man's reach. Following Naess this way of reasoning may be called "ecosophy".

Is ecosophy something characteristic of our time with its threat of ecological disaster? Or is ecosophy a wisdom of old, a wisdom of which we are reminded by an impending global catastrophe, and to which we might return if we are wise enough to do so? Perhaps!

As it seems, the present need for ecosophy, the continual questions concerning the relation between science and religion ever since the development of European scientific culture, and the age-old dispute between philosophy and theology, all basically point to one and the same query: the status of man and his imbalance between autonomy and heteronomy, in traditional terms, between the human and the divine, prefigured in the Chalcedonian disputations.

ФИЛОСОФИЯ В ПОИСКАХ САМОИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ, ИЛИ РЕФЛЕКСИИ О "ДРУГОМ". Препозиции
PHILOSOPHY IN SEARCH OF SELF-IDENTITY, OR REFLECTIONS ON "OTHERNESS". Propositions

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Философия как встреча и... наоборот

Философия как мысль
как созерцание
как интуиция
как размышление
как слово
как текст
как письмо
как чтение
как понимание
как непонимание
как вопрошание
как отвечание
как чувствование
как концептуализация
как систематизация
как образ
как с к а з

как голос
как интонация
как звучание
как энергия
как интенсив
как горизонт

как прообраз
как подобие
как бесподобие
как гармония
как борьба
как расплата
как грех
как добродетель
как покаяние

как стратегия
как техника

Философия как жизнь
как дело
как опыт
как судьба
как любовь
как мудрость
как глупость
как путь
как потерянность
как экзерсисы смерти
как самое важное

как проклятие
как раскаяние
как исповедь
как проповедь
как искупление
как диалог
как музыка
как радость
как страдание
как одиночество

как со-весть
как тайна
как самопознание
как субъективность
как трансцендентность

как поэзия
как стихия
как огонь
как вода
как воздух
как земля
как неопределенность
как бесконечность
как нефилософия
как со-бытие

Философия как миф
как вера
как наука
как искусство
как убеждение
как заблуждение
как мировоззрение
как мироотношение
как общение
как творение
как универсум

как переход
как преодоление
как аллюзия
как иллюзия
как фантазия
как фикция
как воображение
как слепота
как "если бы"
как симулякр

как разум (нус)
как меон
как сфера
как культура
как природа
как пространство
как время
как небо
как логос
как эйдос

Философия как метафора
как трагедия
как комедия
как драма
как гротеск
как сатира
как критика
как стилистика
как риторика
как поэтика

как образец
как догма
как парадигма
как предложение
как высказывание
как музыка
как танец

как растение
как зерно
как корень
как ключ

философия как рефлексия
как отражение
как выражение
как заражение
как влияние
как школа
как учение
как ученик
как учитель

как зеркало
как спектакль
как игра
как язык
как речь
как река

как пир
как тур
как круиз
как путешествие
как возвращение
как повторение
как неповторимое

как сказанное
как несказанное
как говорение
как слушание
как внимание
как болтовня
как пустословие
как бессоница
как бессмыслица
как стыд
как маятник
как память
как забвение
как припоминание

как профессия
как данное
как созданное
как заданное
как творимое
как творящее

как излишество
как каприз
как необходимость
как действительность
как возможность
как невозможность
как очевидность
как наваждение
как отчуждение
как со-бытие
как бытие
как открытие
как праздник
как ритуал

как имя
как фамилия
как цех
как университет
как каста
как Curiculum Vitae

как Сократ
как Ницше
как Пифагор
как Парменид
как Гераклит
как Иванов, петров, сидоров
как личность
как сущность
как явление
как феномен
как единое
как множественное
как часть
как целое

как лолгика
как метод
как открытость
как замкнутость
как ритм
как история
как предыстория
как рассказ
как нарратив
как экзистенция

как то,что ждет
как то,что ожидаемо

как божественность
как человечность
как преодоление
как смирение
как общность
как разъединенность

как ментальность
как взлет
как скольжение
как полет
как падение

как афоризм
как система
как притча

как закон
как необходимлоть
как произвол
как свобода

как тюрьма
как замок
как окно
как дверь

Философия как мета-физика
как встреча
как расставание
как поиск
как смысл
как безумие

как солнце
как свет
как тьма
как бездна
как нить
как лабиринт
как стрела
как острие

как благо
как зло
как утрата
как обретение
как воздаяние
как сон
как сновидение
как пробуждение
как тривиальность
как трюизм
как оксюморон
как обыденность
как трансцендентность
как трансгрессия
как умирание
как спасение
как обреченность
как забвение
как выбор
как память

как время
как стояние
как движеие
как диалог
как начало
как конец

как междометие
как предлог
как существительное
как грамматическая единица мира
как глагол

осуществиться
исполниться
пребыть
состояться

как уникальность
как универсальность
как бесконечность
как усилие
как бессилиие
как свобода
как мужество
как слабость
как сила
как непокорность
как гармония
как гармонизацмя

как порождение
как возрастание
как интенсив
как логика
как эмпатия
как симпатия
как агрессия
как мания

как забота
как зов
как отклик
как призвание
как замысел
как исполнение
как точка
как зависание
как анализ
как синтез

как боль
как лекарство
как спасение
как гибель
как родина
как убийство
как наказание
как награда
как благодать
как блаженство
как горе
как чужбина

как абстракция
как конкретность

как остановка
как убегание

как детство
как старость
как зрелость

как сосредоточенность
как рассеянность
как ожидание
как надежда
как трезвость
как посвященность
как вечность
как радость
как наслаждение
как страдание
как присутствие
как отсутствие

как интервью
как интроспекция
как интуиция
как прозрение
как слепота
как глухота
как бесчувствие
как скорбь

как поэтика
как риторика
как more geometrico
как доказательство
как убеждение
как равнодушие
как мудрость
как любовь

Философия как праздность
как праздник парадигм
как праздность парадигм

Философия как...
...почему
...зачем
...кто
...что
...когда
...всегда
...никогда

Философия как гносис
как откровение
как полнота
как пустота
как энергия
как встреча
как потеря
как множество
как единство
как вакуум
как истина
как Слово
как молчание

ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ МЫШЛЕНИЕ В ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ КУЛЬТУРЫ
PILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT IN THE SPACE OF CULTURE

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Moisey Kagan (St. Petersburg, Russia)

The author exemines the problem of place of philosophical thinking in the space of culture. Philosophy is a unique form of mental activity that has many structural faces because in the cultural space philosophy lies beetween the four principal forms of assimilating of reality: each of them has its own aim - to cognize the beeing, or to evaluate it, or to ground the ideals ("models of needed future") of social and personal life, or to fulfil syntheticaly all these tasks as fine arts and literature do. Thus philosophy becomes the structure of science, or of ideology, or of projecting, or of art images.

In different periods of history of culture philosophical thinking tends to one or other of this four forms of mental activity; that depends upon the character of the type of culture.

The other ground of diversity of kinds of philosophy is the peculiar structure of its subject - the relations between the man and the world. In studying these relations, one may approach from the world to the man, or from the man to the world, or considering this system as interaction of both its components; thus, philosophy turns to onthology, or to anthropology, or to culturology (i.e. the theory of human activity). Primary development of any of these three kinds of philosophy depends upon the character of culture, where it was created and where it is functioning.

New type of culture that has begun its evolution in the postindustrial world demands the development of all forms and kinds of philosophical reflection, not as rivals, each of them claiming to be the only true representative of philosophy, but as participants of the intellectual dialogue.

1. Тот, кто хоть поверхностно знаком с историей мировой философской мысли, не может не изумиться ее многоликости - я имею в виду не многообразие идей, концепций, взглядов философов, которое естественно и закономерно, а разнородность самих форм философской рефлексии, особенно разительную в сравнении с однородностью структур в других сферах культуры - в научном познании, в идеологии, в искусстве: достаточно напомнить резкое различие, если не противоположность и несовместимость, теоретического дискурса Канта и Киркегора, Гегеля и Ницше, Соловьева и Шестова, Хабермаса и Хайдеггера, не говоря уже о включенности в историю философии художественного творчества, ярчайшими примерами которой могу служить "Гамлет" и "Фауст", "Кандид" и "Братья Карамазовы", стихи Тютчева и Межелайтиса... Чем же объясняется это уникальное культурное явление?

2. На первый взгляд тем, что проблемы, традиционно считающиеся специфически философскими, могут быть выражены в самых различных ментальных формах, и выбор конкретной формы зависит лишь от характера мышления философствующей личности. Анализ строения культуры позволяет, однако, пойти дальше и обнаружить тут определенную закономерность, объсняющую не только многликость

философии, но и изменения удельного веса разных ее модификаций в историческом движении культуры. Если исходить из того, что духовное освоение человеком мира протекает в четырех, необходимых и достаточных для полноты решения культурных задач, основных формах: научно-теоретической,идеологически-публицистической, идеологически -проективной и художественно-образной - то философия оказывается в центре этой архитектоники культуры, поскольку способна рефлектировать во всех этих формах, обращаясь к той или к другой в зависимости от преследуемых ею целей; наглядно это можно представить в такой схеме:



3. Ориентация философского мышления на способ освоения мира, свойственный той или иной смежной форме духовной активности человека, определяется тем, какие задачи становятся доминантными в деятельности мыслителя, что, в свою очередь, определяется типом культуры, данным мыслителем представляемым: при познавательной доминанте культуры философия ориентируется на науку - на естествознание, или на социологию, или на психологию, или на лингвистику; при ценностно-ориентационной доминанте культуры философская мысль приобретает публицистический, лирико-исповедальный характер, редуцируясь не к онтологии и гносеологии, к натурфилософии или социальной философии, а к теологии, этике, экзистенциальной антропологии, аксиологии; при проективной доминанте философия выдвигает в центр своего внимания конструирование идеала человеческого бытия (отсюда отличие "идеалогии" от "идеологии"), выражающегося в социальных утопиях, футурологических конструкциях, построении педагогических моделей; при внерационалистической доминанте культуры, порождаемой либо неразвитостью рациональных механизмов (в мифологическом сознании), либо разочарованием в их эффективности (в романтическом и модернистском сознании), философия обращается к посредству художественно-образных структур, выступая в "превращенной" для теоретического дискурса форме мифа или искусства - начиная с разных родов искусства слова и кончая языками живописи, музыки, танца, архитектуры, театра и кинематографа. Разумеется, во многих случаях - от Платона до Сартра - мы встречаемся с тем или иным сочетанием разных способов философствования у одного и того же мыслителя.

4. Но есть и другая причина разнообразия форм философствования - особенности его предмета, которые допускают разные подходы к решению философских проблем. Предмет этот - человек и мир, в их единстве, связях и взаимодействии. Потому оказываются возможными три существенно различных взгляда на этот, подлежащий осмыслению, предмет: со стороны мира , со стороны человека и с той точки зрения, с которой открываются закономерности самих взаимоотношений

человека и мира как равноправных подсистем единой системы; первая позиция ведет к растворению философии в онтологической проблематике, вторая - в проблематике антропологической, третья - в проблематике культурологической, деятельностной, охватывающей все связи природного и социального бытия (а в религиозной философии - бытия бога) с бытием человека, связи многообразные по формам и исторически изменчивые по их содержанию; и эта ситуация может стать наглядной в ее системности при ее схематическом представлении:

антропологичесий тип философствования
|
ЧЕЛОВЕК и МИР — культурологический тип философствования
|
онтологический тип философствования

Удельный вес и авторитет каждого типа философии, а иногда и завоевание им господствующего положения в культуре, говорит о ее меняющихся исторически и социально потребностях, интересах, установках. Есть все основания полагать, что в наше время именно третий ее тип становится наиболее продуктивным и перспективным.

5. Для современного состояния мировой философской мысли характерно сосуществование и враждебное соперничество всех ее модификаций, что свидетельствует о критической фазе развития европейской цивилизации, оказывающей все большее влияние и на культуру Востока. Видимо, объективная историческая задача, встающая перед философией конца XX-го века, состоит в том, чтобы превратить взаимоотчуждение и конкуренцию разных форм философствования в их диалог, ибо только таким способом можно достичь необходимой современной культуре полноты и разносторонней целостности познания-понимания-осмысления-проектирования-переживания мира и человека в мире как целостно-неделимой системы.

В этой связи мне представляется продуктивным решение проблемы постмодернизма в философии и культуре второй половины нашего столетия, остающееся пока предельно противоречивым. А это служит дополнительным обоснованием того, что сейчас на авансцену философской рефлексии выходят вопросы методологии, решение которых может быть осуществлено только в научно-теоретической форме и при системно-целостном взгляде на содержание философского дискурса.

К ПРОБЛЕМЕ СТИЛЯ И ТИПОЛОГИИ ФИЛОСОФСКОГО МЫШЛЕНИЯ
ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF STYLE AND TYPOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

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The specific features of philosophy as a special form of human consciousness consists of such that it is situated between two poles of human activity: 1) the process of knowing, and 2) value-orientation activity.

The first aspect of philosophy is closer to science and allows the existence of logical-rational style in philosophy, where the scientific knowledge is an ideal for philosophy. The second aspect leads to the connection between philosophy and art and religion and creates the aesthetic-image and religious-mystical styles of philosophy.

The typological division of philosophical schools on the "materialistical" and "idealistical" levels demands concrete-historical understanding. However, a resolution of the question of connection between mater and consciousness is an unproven hypothesis. The culture of philosphical thought is determined not by the sense of the hypothesis but by the method of proving such hypothesis, which by the way is one of the main problems of human existence.

Специфическая особенность философии как особой формы человеческого сознания, на наш взгляд, заключается в том, что она "располагается" между двумя полюсами таких видов человеческой деятельности, как познавательная и ценностно-ориентационная. Между этими полюсами находятся и другие формы сознания: наука, религия, искусство, тяготея или к познавательной деятельности, как наука, или же к ценностно-ориентационной деятельности, как религия, или же как искусство, подобно философии, включая в себя оба вида деятельности. Взаимодействие философии с другими формами сознания проявляется в том, что в самой философии существуют различные стили.

Проявление в философии познавательной деятельности сближает ее с наукой. Это дает возможность для существования *логико-рационального* стиля философии, в котором научное знание с его рационалистичностью, системностью, логической доказательностью и обоснованностью становится интеллектуальным идеалом для ряда философов. Философия еще до того, как сформировалось само научное знание, будучи учением о мире в целом, о законах его бытия и познания, включала в себя все фундаментальное научное знание и тем самым олицетворяла науку. Поэтому философия в донаучную эпоху не без основания рассматривалась как "наука всех наук", "царица наук", "светильник для всех наук".

По мере становления науки как особой формы человеческого познания и знания, многие философы стремились даже в изложении своих мыслей следовать принципам научности, образцом которых служили математические науки. Спиноза не только излагает "в

геометрическом порядке" философию чтимого им Декарта, но в виде труда по геометрии пишет свою "Этику". Не говоря уже о том, что немало выдающихся мыслителей соединяло в себе мудрость философа с талантом ученого-исследователя (Декарт, Лейбниц, Ломоносов, Кант и т. д.), наука становится образцом для многих крупнейших философов, начиная с XVII века. Свое краткое и популярное изложение "Критики чистого разума" Кант называет "Пролегоменами ко всякой будущей метафизике, могущей появиться как наука". Философия призвана, по его убеждению, обосновать саму возможность математики и естествознания. Это же относится к областям знания, связанным с "практическим разумом": "хранительницей науки всегда должна оставаться философия".[1]

Эта кантовская традиция стремления философии к научности и науки к философичности была продолжена в XIX и XX веках. Неслучайно Фихте называет свою философскую систему "Наукоучением". Натурфилософия Шеллинга не только обобщала достижения естествознания своего времени, но и предугадывала ряд его последующих открытий. Для Гегеля основные разделы философии представляют собой философские *науки* и сама философская система предстает как "Энциклопедия философских наук". Откликнувшийся на необычайные успехи естествознания позитивизм и затем неопозитивизм всецело ориентируется на естественные науки и математику. Марксизм считает своей важнейшей заслугой создание "научной философии" и превращение социализма из утопии в науку. Вне зависимости от того, насколько справедлива эта претензия, показательна сама апелляция философии к научности. Э. Гуссерль замыслил создание своей феноменологической философии в качестве "строгой науки".

Ориентация на научное знание, так сказать, сциентизация философии, не есть единственная тенденция развития философской мысли. Со времени своего возникновения философия развивалась также в эстетико-художественном ключе. Это проявлялось и в обращении к художественно-образному строю мыслей, предполагавшему поэтическую и драматическую форму изложения, как и Ксенофана и Парменида, Платона и Лукреция Кара, в "Утопии" Томаса Мора и "Так говорил Заратустра" Фридриха Ницше, в пьесах Сартра и романах Камю. Тяготение философии к художественному творчеству выразилось не только в эстетичности философии, в образовании философии искусства и красоты - эстетики, но и в философичности самого искусства, сотворившего "Божественную комедию" Данте и "Человеческую комедию" Бальзака, "Фауста" Гете и "Доктора Фаустуса" Томаса Манна, жанры философского романа и философской лирики. Для понимания русской философской мысли очень важно иметь в виду ее проявление в жанрах философского романа и философской лирики. Великие романисты Достоевский и Лев Толстой, замечательные поэты Державин, Баратынский, Тютчев, не говоря уже о Пушкине, должны рассматриваться не только в истории русской литературы, но и русской философии. Таким образом, связь философии с ценностно-ориентационной деятельностью делает

возможным взаимодействие философии с искусством и порождает *эстетически-образный стиль* самой философии.

Благодаря связи с ценностно-ориентационной деятельностью философия также выражала себя через религиозные символы. Религиозный характер носили многие течения Восточной философии. В период европейского Средневековья философия являлась, по ее самоопределению, "служанкой богословия". Религиозно-мистическая философия Мейстера Экхарта, Якова Беме, "философия откровения" Шеллинга, философия Серена Кьеркегора, Владимира Соловьева и русских религиозных философов "серебряного века" с полным правом входят в историю философской мысли. Доминирование в той или иной философии религиозной тематики и проблематики, обращение к религиозной символике и иррационально-мистической методологии обозначим как религиозно-мистический стиль философии. Разумеется, деление философии на логико-рациональный, эстетически-образный и религиозно-мистический стили относительно. У одного и того же философа и даже в одном и том же философском произведении можно подчас обнаружить особенности различных стилистических ориентаций. Философия, по Канту, призвана помочь человечеству ответить на вопросы: 1. "*Что я могу знать?*"; 2. "*Что я должен делать?*"; 3. "*На что я могу надеяться?*".[2] В целостной философской системе ответы на каждый из этих вопросов взаимосвязаны. Поскольку же в философском мировоззрении ответ на вопросы: "Что я должен делать?" и "На что я могу надеяться?" обусловлен пониманием возможностей человеческого познания, то философия не только ориентированная сциентистски, но и эстетически-образного и даже религиозно-мистического стиля, обращается для обоснования своих положений не к эмоциям, как искусство и религия, а к логике, к рациональности, хотя и разного типа, стремясь даже в иррациональном обнаружить нечто рациональное. Можно сказать, что идеалом философского мироотношения является спинозовский принцип беспристрастного и свободного исследования, принцип, заимствованный у математики: "я постоянно старался не осмеивать человеческих поступков, не огорчаться ими и не клясть их, а понимать".[3]

Следует иметь в виду, что философия, в отличие от искусства, морали, религии, выражает не просто ценностные ориентации людей, а формулирует теоретически критерий этой ориентации, стремится определить *теоретико*-ценностную, аксиологическую ориентацию. Этим этика, эстетика, аксиология как философские дисциплины отличаются от практической морали и нравственности, от непосредственного эстетического мироотношения, от не всегда осознаваемой ценностной ориентации. Конечно, в разных философских направлениях и течениях соотношение между различными частями философии - теоретико-познавательными и теоретико-ценностными - могут быть различными, однако, будучи *теорией*, философия стремится к наукоподобию, не являясь по своей специфике наукой. Несомненно, существует проблема *научности философии*, как и философии науки. Но в то же время та или иная

философия может быть вненаучной и даже антинаучной, не утрачивая свое специфическое качество *философии* как особой формы сознания.

Различные философские дисциплины, образующие структуру философского знания, могут разрабатываться и излагаться различными стилями, обладая определенными стилевыми предпочтениями. Если гносеология или эпистемология тяготеют к логико-рациональному стилю, то натурфилософия может быть и религиозно-мистической. Этика может уподобляться геометрии, как у Спинозы, но может формулироваться и в эстетической форме или через религиозные символы. То же относится и к эстетике, которая может поверять "алгеброй гармонию", но может быть "поэтической эстетикой", художественно образно определяя красоту и задачи искусства.

Стилистическое разнообразие философской мысли проявляется в многообразии философских жанров. Это и логико-рациональный трактат, и эстетическо-образный диалог, форма эссе или письма, художественной критики, художественной исповеди и религиозной проповеди.

Более общей классификацией является деление философских направлений на "материалистические" и "идеалистические". До XVII столетия философия вообще обходилась без терминов "идеализм" и "материализм". Появление их отражало определенную дифференциацию в развитии философской мысли. Сами слова "идеализм" и "материализм" употреблялись в самых разных значениях. В чисто философском смысле под идеализмом, в противоположность материализму, стало пониматься "утверждение, что истинное бытие принадлежит не материи, а духовному началу",[4] "воззрение, определяющее объективно действительное как идею, дух, разум, рассматривающее даже материю как форму проявления духа".[5] В этом русле находится и известное противопоставление материализма и идеализма, данное Энгельсом [6].

"Идеализм — в широком смысле слова, — стихия философии, и, лишенная этого кислорода, философия задыхается, а затем увядает и гибнет", - говорил в лекции "Общечеловеческие корни идеализма" П.Флоренский.[7] Напротив, в марксизме культивировалось представление о реакционности идеализма, антинаучного по своей природе, являющегося "дорогой к поповщине", противостоящему полноценному материализму " генеральному направлению развития философской мысли. Правда, театр абсурда советской жизни проявлялся и в том, что изгоняемый из философии и клейменый "идеализм" почти безраздельно господствовал анонимно в официальной идеологии, подобно тому, как в обществе, провозглашавшем себя атеистическим, господствовал религиозный культ вождя, партии, вера в коммунистический рай (этот исторический парадокс был точно зафиксирован в философском "фольклоре": "идеалист" - это тот, кто верит в бессмертие души, а "материалист" - это тот, кто верит в посмертную реабилитацию).

Занимая промежуточное положение между объективным познанием и субъективно-личностной оценочной деятельностью, философия не безлична как результаты научных открытий. Философская система,

как художественное произведение, выражает индивидуальность ее творца. Поэтому первоначальная типология философских направлений определяется именами философов - основоположников тех или иных направлений: платонизм, аристотелизм, эпикуреизм, томизм, картезианство, спинозизм, кантианство, шеллингианство, гегельянство, марксизм и т. п. Иногда философское течение обозначается центральным понятием той или другой системы: атомизм, позитивизм, скептицизм, прагматизм, феноменология, экзистенциализм, персонализм, интуитивизм и др.

Идеалистические или же материалистические принципы построения философских систем существовали в глубокой древности, но в "чистом" виде они проявлялись далеко не всегда (многих досократиков невозможно достоверно отнести ни к материализму, ни к идеализму). Опыт истории мировой философской мысли показывает, что наиболее значительные философские системы опирались на различные методологические основания - и идеалистические, и материалистические, порой сочетая и те, и другие. Уже во второй половине XIX века начали раздаваться голоса об относительности противопоставления идеализма и материализма. Становилось все более и более ясно, что само по себе решение "основного вопроса философии" в духе материализма или же идеализма еще не решает насущных философских и жизненных проблем. Становилось также ясно, что материалистическое или идеалистическое решение вопроса об отношении материи и сознания, духа и природы имеет значение принципиально недоказуемой аксиомы, аналогично аксиомам в геометрии. Крупнейший русский неокантианец А. И. Введенский, будучи сам идеалистом и считая материализм "умственным развратом", признает неопровержимость материализма как всякой метафизической гипотезы. Однако, "как и всякая метафизика, он тоже недоказуем".[8]

Понятия "материализм" и "идеализм" не должны рассматриваться как оценочные, и философия имеет право на свободу совести не менее, чем религия. Вместе с тем, культура философского мышления определяется не теми "аксиомами", из которых оно исходит, а тем, как оно доказывает свои "теоремы", иначе говоря, тем, как решаются им коренные вопросы человеческого существования.

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ПАРАДИГМЫ ФИЛОСОФСТВОВАНИЯ: ПОИСК КАК ПРЕОДОЛЕНИЕ
PARADIGMS OF PHILOSOPHIZING: SEARCH AS OVERCOMING

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This paper is devoted to an anaysis of philosophy as an indispensable stage on the road to the super-individual, super-rational truth. This task is not intended as an effort to force Truth to descend to a purely human level, but rather is an effort to transform the individual so that his or her normal boundaries are surpassed and contact is made with Truth.

В процессе осмысления современного мира, характеризующегося тенденцией к раздробленности, множественности, несводимости к каким бы то ни было моделям и образцам, вдруг открывается: то, что обычно называется культурной реальностью, есть ничто иное как культурная конструкция, обусловленная определенным социальным, а значит совместным, но негласным соглашением. Данное соглашение культивируется социумом, предполагая однозначность восприятий и объяснений "нашего" мира в качестве единственно реального. В результате все, что выходит за рамки принимаемых образов восприятия и моделей объяснения, отторгается и отрицается нашим рацио. Но, как убедительно показывает в своих работах американский антрополог Ф.Доннер, это лишь один из возможных способов видения и описания мира.

Стремление же разорвать пелену чисто человеческих допущений и стереотипов подталкивает к постижению сложных форм абстрактного знания, к философствованию, как одной из них. Однако на пути к высшему уровню чистого интеллекта философия выступает как подготовительный этап овладения рациональной стороной человеческого существа, безусловный по своей значимости, но преодолеваемый в дальнейшем. Так как задача состоит не только в поиске глубинного единства, скрытого под видимостью множественности, или, другими словами, в постижении мира без каких бы то ни было интерпретаций, но и в действии, освященном такого рода знанием.

О МНОГОМЕРНОСТИ ФИЛОСОФСКОГО ТЕКСТА
MULTI-MEASURED OF PHILOSOPHICAL TEXT

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At present multi-measured interaction of a reader and a text is evident. However, it is simple impossible to show this complex system relations in new text. So we try to express levels, which pass a reader during reading. Level structure is presented in accordance with philosophical experience of XX century. Level names are given in reconstruction context of their own sense, but not in direct association with corresponding philosophical trends.

1. Perception logical level;
2. Gnoseological level;
3. Germenevtical level;
4. Phenomenal level;
5. Intuitive level;
6. Existentional level;
7. Metaphysical level;
8. Postmodernism

Сейчас уже вполне очевидна многомерность взаимосвязи читателя и текста. Однако, эту сложную систему отношений почти невозможно отобразить в новом тексте. Поэтому попробуем выразить ее в виде иерархии уровней, по которым проходит читатель, погружаясь в текст. Структура уровней представлена в соответствии с логикой раскрытия проблемы, а также с опытом философствования XX века. Наименование уровней дано в контексте реконструкции их собственных смыслов, а не по прямой ассоциации с соответствующими философскими направлениями.

Глава 1. "Знание и текст".
ЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ уровень восприятия:

Основное требование к тексту - доказательность.

Сформулирована гипотеза. Она должна быть доказана с помощью общепринятых методов. В тексте выстраивается логическая схема, реализуется некий алгоритм. Утверждается самодостаточность логического содержания. Читатель и текст находятся вне времени и места. Чтение выполняется как ритуал приобщения к абсолютной истине. Смысл и содержание текста должны быть общезначимы, поэтому личностный контекст игнорируется.

Текст предстает как механизм для конструирования смыслов. Абсолютность позиции читателя по отношению к тексту. Текст воспринимается как объект для манипуляций. Происходит редуцирование смысла текста к его логическому содержанию. Цель чтения - буквальное восстановление изначального смысла текста; систематизация и рациональное обоснование знания. Главный критерий ценности текста - инструментальность знания.

Глава 2. "Познание и текст".
ГНОСЕОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ уровень:

Основное требование к тексту - познавательность.

Должна быть новизна в постановке или решении проблемы, в чем-то превосходящая прежний уровень накопленных знаний. Читателю нужно узнать что-то новое, не обязательно доказанное строго логически. Но это должно быть нечто такое, что вполне узнаваемо, рационально формулируемо и легко вписывается в привычный контекст научного или обыденного знания. Необходимо соотнесение общепринятого и личностного контекстов.

Происходит отбор и доопределение смыслов, заключенных в тексте, по произволу читателя. Навязывание тексту внешних критериев. Диктат читателя. Текст воспринимается как окно в мир. Чтение совершается как узнавание, принятие, признание. Цель чтения - воспроизведение смысловой структуры текста и приращение знания. Главный критерий ценности текста - конструктивность знания.

Глава 3. "Понимание и текст".
ГЕРМЕНЕВТИЧЕСКИЙ уровень:

Основное требование - возможность понимания смысла текста.

Читателю нужно понять нечто радикально новое, что расширяет ранее известные границы познания. С этим можно согласиться или не согласиться, но вполне возможно понять и выразить вербально.

Первичность читателя по отношению к тексту. Сознание читателя - как система координат, в которую должен вписаться текст. Проблема соотнесения смысла текста и его контекста: герменевтический круг. Неизбежна произвольная интерпретация текста. Происходит привнесение субъективного смысла в текст, преломление смысла текста через призму личного понимания.

Текст видится как зеркало. Текст - это инобытие читателя. Чтение - это способ самопознания и самопонимания. Чтение совершается как собирание, коллекционирование смыслов. Цель чтения - прояснение смысла или его реконструкция. Главный критерий ценности текста - осмысленность текста, ясность содержания.

Глава 4. "Сознание и текст".
ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ уровень:

Усмотрение содержания в тексте.

В тексте представлен некий объект для созерцания (медитации), с которым что-то происходит в поле сознания читателя и за этим процессом можно целенаправленно наблюдать. Читатель как свидетель изменения (жизни) смыслов. Происходит встречное движение сознания читателя и текста. Внимание тексту.

Понимать, доказывать и объяснять этот процесс не обязательно и даже невозможно, но в сознании происходит открытие нового смыслового горизонта и выход личности за пределы общедоступного опыта в уникальность. Это состояние не описывается в рациональных понятиях.

Текст является целостным и самодостаточным организмом. Смысл текста - это собственное сознание текста. Текст как метафора. Самодетерминация текста. Текст живет, порождая смыслы; текст говорит. Самоактуализация смыслов. Нужно позволить тексту быть тем, что он есть и тогда в системе координат сознания читателя появляется новое измерение. Удивление тексту.

Направленность сознания, его устремленность к смыслам. Чтение совершается как наблюдение за движением смыслов. Визуализация пространства текста. Живописность текста. В нем можно рассматривать смысловые узоры. Текст предстает как лабиринт. Цель чтения - обогащение внутреннего опыта личности. В процессе чтения происходит трансцендирование сознания к новым смыслам и ценностям. Главный критерий ценности текста - представимость содержания.

Глава 5. "Интуиция и текст".
ИНТУИТИВНЫЙ (интуитивистский) уровень:

Прикосновение и взаимопроникновение читателя и текста.

Динамика смыслов в тексте. Ощущение энергетики (ауры) текста. Магия текста. Чувство читателя соприкасается в тексте (за текстом) с чем-то живым и активным. Сознание читателя погружается в текст и растворяется в нем. Читатель обживает пространство текста. Читатель укореняется в тексте и одновременно текст проникает в подсознание читателя и прорастает в нем.

Диалог подсознания читателя и смысла текста. Открытость тексту. Принятие смыслов. Читатель как соучастник рождения смысла. Взаимоопределение и дополнение читателя и текста, их резонанс. Взаимное генерирование смыслов. Равноправие читателя и текста. Соразмерность пространств личности и текста.

Символизм текста: происходит перестройка сознания читателя, настройка на частоту звучания текста-камертона, даже если не понятен смысл написанного. Такое измененное состояние сознания не выразимо вербально. У читателя возникает потребность в тексте, желание текста. Читатель впитывает смысл, питается смыслом. Доверие и любовь к тексту. Взаимность и нежность. Непосредственность и интимность отношений читателя и текста. Соитие с текстом. Бытийственность, телесность текста. Текст - это рай. Текст даруется читателю.

Чтение совершается как вслушивание, созерцание, воспоминание. Текст звучит, его можно слушать как музыку, как сказку. Тогда чтение - это праздник. Цель чтения - прикоснуться к тайне текста, почувствовать его поэзию, услышать мелодию смыслов. Главный критерий ценности текста - яркое впечатление от его красоты.

Глава 6. "Экзистенция и текст".
ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫЙ уровень:

Слияние и сопричастие читателя и текста.

Текст - это Другой. Встреча и Со-бытие читателя и текста. Уподобление по энергиям читателя и текста; их

взаимопроникновение. Проживание личностью содержания текста. Изменение поведения и мировоззрения читателя.

Открывается изнанка текста, выплескивается стихия смыслов. Происходит столкновение экзистенций читателя и текста. Читатель ранен текстом. Нарушается граница личности. Разрушается замкнутость и самодостаточность личности читателя. Сознание, подсознание и тело читателя как продолжение текста. После прочтения невозможно жить по старому. Происходит вторжение текста в судьбу человека. Чтение как событие, шанс, случай.

Парадоксальность содержания текста. Читатель в ситуации абсурда. Непредсказуемость будущего. Неопределенность и бесконтрольность причин и следствий. Пограничная ситуация. Страх потеряться в тексте. Может что-то случиться: счастье или несчастье. Такое событие непредсказуемо и неповторимо. Судьба читателя как инобытие текста. Мистика текста. Перед читателем развертывается бездна.

Текст предстает как миф, а смыслы - как бытие желаний, воли. Сопротивление читателя власти текста. Бунт против тирании текста. Борьба (война) экзистенций читателя и текста. Возможна какая-то мутация сущности читателя в соответствии со смыслом текста. Чтение - это страдание. Боль. Текст - это ад.

Чтение случается с читателем, текст настигает его, застает врасплох. Чтение совершается как поступок, выбор, бой, драка. Текст принимается как испытание. Текст - это судьба, это трагедия. Цель чтения - инициация читателя текстом, приобщение к истине. Мистерия текста. Главный критерий ценности текста - он беспокоит, раздражает, дразнит, задевает за живое, выбивает из колеи.

Глава 7. "Текст и бытие".

МЕТАФИЗИЧЕСКИЙ уровень:

Трансформация и преображение читателя и текста.

Взаимобытие читателя и текста. Открытие нового метафизического измерения в личности читателя. Происходит непредсказуемый сдвиг во всем существе читателя. Точка бифуркации. Неопределенность цели. Вся жизнь читателя сворачивается в точку "здесь и сейчас". Все мироздание воплощается в системе "текст-читатель".

Метаморфоза внутреннего мира читателя без каких-либо гарантий. Децентрация субъекта. Отказ от претензий, смирение. Чтение как служение. "Не я живу, а живет во мне ... текст". Нужно довериться тексту, признать его власть. Тогда появляется непредзаданность жизненных целей и открытость личности неведомому, внутренняя свобода и спонтанность сознания (и поведения).

Читателю нужно потеряться в тексте. Забыть себя. Читатель должен стать текстом. Прыжок в пропасть. Читатель убит текстом. Смерть субъекта и новое рождение в другом качестве. Инверсия: оборачивание текста и читателя друг в друга.

Текст - это личность (персона). Текст довлеет над читателем как абсолют. Текст - это откровение бытия, дверь в вечность. Текст - это бог. Чтение свершается как самопожертвование. В нем же читатель и

спасается. Цель читателя при чтении - раствориться, умереть в тексте. Главный критерий ценности текста - захваченность читателя текстом.

Глава 8. "Текст и ничто".

ПОСТМОДЕРНИЗМ:

Аннигиляция личности читателя и смысла текста.

Неразличение читателя и текста (и автора), субъекта и объекта, Я и не-Я, бытия и небытия, смысла и существования. Нерасчлененная целостность, единство текста и читателя. Тотальность текста. Текст и другие тексты: аллюзии, цитирование, репрезентация. По одному тексту можно составить представление о всех остальных текстах. Любой текст - это текст всех текстов. Текст как поле всех возможностей и невозможностей, как семантический и онтологический универсум. "Нет ничего, кроме текста" (Деррида).

Неопределенность и размытость смысла. Неразличение смыслов. Плюрализация смыслов. Их мозаичность. Текст воспринимается как калейдоскоп смыслов. Дробление и взаимоотражение смыслов. Эхо смыслов. пыль смыслов. Деконструкция смыслов. Симуляция смыслов. Самоирония. Скольжение, мерцание смыслов, их самостирание. Смысловые лакуны и туманности. Текст - это майя. Он скрывает, обманывает. Хитрость текста. Он заманивает в ловушку самонетождественности.

Мгновенность, одномоментность бытия смыслов. Смыслы вспыхивают как искры и тут же превращаются в дым. Текст - это только пепел смыслов, их бесплотные тени. Нигде не остается никаких следов: ни в сознании, ни в бытии, так как нет ни времени, ни пространства. Пустотность смысла. Бессмысленность текста. Приближение к тишине. Чтение как бездействие, пассивная активность или активная пассивность. Чтение - это неслышимый крик, громовое молчание. В нем выражается тоска по невозможному, погоня за недостижимым, познание непостижимого. "Пойди туда, не знаю куда, принеси то, не знаю что". Текст как тайна. Нечто длится, намекает, зовет. Остается только голос (смех) и жест (танец) читателя-текста. Чтение как игра, в которой происходит взаимоуничтожение читателя и текста, и одновременно их взаимодополнение до универсума.

Самоуничтожение читателя и текста как взаимное жертвоприношение. Текст как литургия. Воскрешение, освобождение и спасение читателя и текста в игре. Чтение - это воплощенное чудо (благодать), это победа над небытием и пребывание в царстве свободы. Чтение - это награда за страдания, покой, сон, забытие (забытие). Цель читателя при чтении - экстаз, кайф. Главный критерий ценности текста - это когда сквозь пошлость обыденности просвечивает невидимый свет, которым сияет никогда не существовавший Первосмысл.

КНИГА ПРИРОДЫ В ЭМПИРИЧЕСКОМ ОКРУЖЕНИИ. РАЗНЫЕ МЕЛОЧИ. НАСЕКОМЫЕ.
THE BOOK OF NATURE IN THE EMPIRICAL ENVIRONMENT: TRIFLES

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1. To comprehend The Book of Nature is to throw on the world a subtle net of understanding. Nevertheless, there is something which remains untouched by its strings, which we call trifles. These trifles should be defended from a semiotic totalitarianism which finds for them their proper places in the larger body of empirical evidence. The "setteled" trifle is truly trivialized.

2. The trifle comes into being suddenly, in states of distended attention. It is out of focus and calls casuality into question.

3. The word "trifles" and similar "signs" of phenomena may be considered as a kind of pronoun. But they are perpendicular to the traditional pronounal axis, "nothing", "something." Their main property is a certain evasiveness which appears as a deviation from the normal environment.

4. Trifles arise as the result of the failure of language and sight to take all of the environment together as one percept. Trifles are language's stumbling in the effort to describe the world coherently.

1.

На мелочи обычно досадуешь. Читал книгу на берегу - и вдруг ветер нанес песок между страниц. Или брызги прибоя попали на страницу. Через два года память возвращает это чтение только по ощущению этих брызг и этого песка.

Мелочи нуждаются в защите как редкие события, состояния или существа. Эти несущественности и впрямь кажутся живыми : рукописи правят, но опечатки - вылавливают.

Человек не коллекционирует подробности - он живет ими. Мелочи могут уцелеть лишь в переживании, - наколотые на булавки или рассмотренные в микроскоп, они утрачивают себя , становясь просто приложением к книге. Семиотизируя их, мы их теряем. Для этих частиц действует свой принцип неопределенности.

2.

При всем том, что они окружают нас самым непосредственным образом, мы этого не улавливаем, соотнося окружающее с теми или иными языковыми играми - видя его через призму теоретических категорий и инструментальных навыков.

Книга Природы - это мир, воспринимаемый как пространство соответствий и уподоблений - то ли их вместилище, то ли источник, то ли сам дар уподоблять. Культурно-исторически такое представление предшествует естественно-научной категориальности и впоследствии утрачивает былую методологическую роль, сохраняя, однако, иллокутивную силу уже в качестве метафоры.

Этому, некогда универсальному, видению свойственна активность, выходящая за рамки простой медиативности - вещь, явление не только постигается через посредство Книги, но тем самым вписывается в Книгу, заносится в нее. В этом смысле Книга Соответствий не антропоцентрична (как полагает М. Фуко[1]) а автоцентрична, она узнает во всем себя самое.

В этом пункте Книга сближается с современным образом семиосферы (Ю.М. Лотман). Книга - полна зеркал, она и есть Зерцало и тем самым семиотична : отражение есть отраженное значение[2]. Этот оттенок обнаруживается как только мы пытаемся найти предикат, более точный чем слово "видеть" . Книга Природы открывается созерцанию. Вбирая в себя (или это только попытка ?) - созерцающего.

Виденье как узнаванье, исходящее из образцов и подобий - это видение риторическое. Так видеть - значит многого не замечать; то, что не содержится в Каталоге - остается без имени, о нем не упоминают. Иначе говоря, такое созерцание не есть наблюдение, а Книга Природы отражает (и вбирает в себя) далеко не все из того, что ее окружает.

Эмпирическим такое окружение можно назвать лишь условно (внедрение позитивистской парадигмы было бы здесь анахронизмом) ; может быть, лучше сказать, что Книга окружена отсветами, вторжениями феноменального мира.

Незамечание иногда требует почти осознаной психологической техники. Птицы не портят архитектуру собора, шум дождя не мешает музыке. Книга Соответствий мыслится как нечто идеальное и потому открыта не всем. Выражаясь не столь архаично - это значит, что теоретическое знание основано на абстракциях и символах.

Новое понимание закономерного сохраняет неизбывность и существенность зазора : эмпирически наблюдаемое не есть закономерное. Физический эксперимент дает именно то, чего в реальности мы не можем наблюдать, подчеркивает Курт Левин[3].

... Что же в зазоре ? Так, всякая всячина. Бумажки, пылинки: они не падают, как честное ньютоново яблоко, а летят вверх. Различные мелочи.

Эмпирическое событие выступает (при таком ракурсе) как некое речевое высказывание - в противоположность языку как системе (коду). В еще более грубой модели разные мелочи предстают как шум, примешивающийся к информации. Семиотика ухитряется включать эти несистемные элементы в свои модели - несемантизированное

понимается как резерв для явлений стиля или для построения вторичных моделирующих систем или как динамический фактор (схема центр-переферия).

Мелочь "ущербна " не только как смысл, но и аксиологически : она неполно-ценна. Контексты (например, интерьер), пытающиеся приручить или вразумить мелочь, носят смешанный характер: они не только совокупности знаков, но и ценностно-событийные поля со сложной медиативной перспективой. Мелочь, незначащую фразу, тень на стекле рассматривают как свидетельствующую об ином [4].

Мы не знаем, какое пространство образуют мелочи (они ведь не кие переживания на грани субстанциального, но не сами вещи). Уж во всяком случае - не ту с зеркальными стенками сферу из которой нет выхода и внешность которой тоже семиотична . Не тот семиоаквариум, в котором даже малые тельца плавают в качестве семиотических монад[5]. Есть обратное явление - кусок старой газеты под обоями, вдруг выпавшая из световой рекламы буква, листок календаря в качестве закладки и т. д. Но превращение знаков в разную мелочь культурная традиция признать не хочет - в этом случае они объявляются приметами, намеками, уликами (детективная практика, психоанализ, семейотика Карло Гинзбурга)[6].

Мы хотим уловить облик мелочи, услышать ее собственный голос. Не стоит представлять мелочь как начало какой-то длинной нити: если за нить потянуть, мелочь исчезнет.

Мелочи требуют какой-то иной ментальной активности. Какого-то вдруг отвлекающегося - но различающего! - внимания.

Суть мы привыкли понимать как находящуюся внутри. Она в той знаковой сфере - созвучной, как полагают, левому полушарию мозга (правое слышит шум). Умозрение запирает себя в зеркальном шаре.

" Не отвлекайся на мелочи, вникай в суть".

- Напротив. Отвлекайся.

3.

Пробегая лесной дорогой, спускающейся с холма, я был чем-то остановлен. Это темное что-то оказалось муравьиным трактом , бродом , проложенным поперек дороги.

Почему они не переправляются произвольным образом, а все скапливаются на узкой полоске - и почему именно здесь ? Притом что по обе стороны их переправы ничего особенного не наблюдается - ни дохлой лягушки ни чего-нибудь другого, столь же привлекательного.

4.

Постояв в нерешительности, или в некоторой рассеянности, - ощущаю неуместность моего вопроса. Мое недоумение как-то не вяжется с происходящим. Более того, не ощущается и правомерность самой

попытки отнести видимое к происходящему, придать ему статус события или хотя бы наблюдаемого факта.

Нечто выделено из потока лишь моим неожиданным зрячим прикосновением к нему - вдруг, окказионально попало в поле внимания. Так выходящий из глубокой задумчивости случайно фиксирует взглядом какую-нибудь мелочь, царапину на кнопочке от настольной лампы, зеленое пятнышко на боку стеклянной пепельницы.

Он может обьяснить это пятнышко как рефлекс заоконной листвы, но странное дело - обьяснение кажется неуместным, потому что вопроса никто не задавал, вопросительности нет в самой ситуации. Снова о том же: нет и " ситуации " . Конкретность и выделенность окрасили это место (интонировали его), но имеет ли эта точка еще что-нибудь за душой ? - странность ей присущая , это лишь другое выражение того же момента выделенности и различимости - та же интонация.

Может быть, подобные состояния сознания и составляют сон на яву. Эти состояния обыденные, но другие. Странные какие-то, И странность их не такая, вообще-то и не странность, потому что она и не пытается обратить на себя внимание, ей не только не до нас, но и не до себя - она-то себя не выделяла из всего того, что мы, колеблясь, именуем происходящим.

5.

Допустим все же, что мне удалось заметить гусеницу на той стороне "переправы". Смог бы я тогда констатировать тут причинно-следственную связь, сюжет, дискурс ? Нет. Я не знаю ни обстоятельств гусеницы, ни обстоятельств муравьев : монада не имеет окон. Жук ползет . Можем ли мы построить полное высказывание, предложение, которое содержало , дополнение или обстоятельство? 'Жук ползет по тропинке'. Но это тавтология, мы его на тропинке и видим.

Воспринять какой-то кусок реальности как фрагмент в причинно-следственной цепочке - это подразумевает систему мысленных действий, включачающую и локализацию, выделение. Но тогда это именно каузирующая окрашенная дискурсивностью локализация: поверхность камня видится как страница; шишка, палочка и улитка на дороге ощущаются как потенциальное словосочетание или предложение. Между тем произвольное внимание совсем по-другому выделяет эти вот острова и уголки - тут уже не не логическое подчеркивание, а некий курсив прикосновения.

Но тут - так кружится голова при ледоходе - перестаешь понимать: а где ты , - если ты заодно с ними (островками, мелочами) - вообще находишься ? То, что обращает на себя внимание в состоянии снаяву - эта вдруг оподробнивающая себя явь - не может быть, все-таки, названо Окружающим. Ведь тут иное - странная предпочтительность

каких-то ракурсов, узких телесных углов в пространстве, каких-то зрительных лучей.

Мелочи, всякая всячина, пустяки. Тут не только малость, тут готовность к "ослабленному существованью" - уменьшить яркость и четкость, разфокусироваться, отступить в фон... рассеяться в мерцающей пустоте - это все на грани ощутимости, на грани ускользания. Оно не имеет цели обступить меня со всех сторон, оно вдруг сжимается и становится, как сказали бы обэриуты, мал-мала-меньше[7]. Оно не берет нас в плен и не навязывает себя - но иногда будто по прихоти оказывается рядом.

Вот почему и проскользнуть в этот странный мир или приблизиться можно лишь каким-то боковым, косвенным движением. Насекомые, различные мелочи стоят у дверей (но это не здесь и не там) - приглашая войти - если эту их различимую малость принять за дружеский жест, поощрение.

Все это, будучи на виду, не выставлено на обзор.

Пустяк, всякая всячина - это уже не совсем вещь (денотат), это ее ослабленный заменитель - поэтому, закавычив слово ('пустяк') мы не получим и настоящего имени - получим что-то вроде местоимения ('всякая всячина ', 'мелочь' - ср. 'нечто ') .

Довольно трудно найти имя тому, что вдруг отделяется от слитного фона в момент, когда сознание не успевает притворить почему-то приоткрывшуюся дверь: испытываешь особое ощущение онтологической косвенности того, что в этом состоянии - ненароком - снабжает зрение подробностями. Мы тут с краю и непричем.

Эта окказиональная причастность как бы противоположна позиции зрителя в партере, знатока или следопыта, перед которым мир предстает как нечто исполненное смысла и прагматически предназначенное (или даже адресованное). Как Текст, как Книга Природы.

Это состояние далекое от всякого самопроецирования , а так же от тех страхов и предчувствий, которые превращают любую обнаруженную подробность в примету и знак судьбы. Мы именно и говорили о состоянии человека просто так бегущего по лесной дороге, вниз с холма. О моменте бескорыстной восприимчивости.

6.

Уточним. Речь идет не о том, чтобы вглядываться в это мерцание, спрашивать, что она такое - эта " ничтожащаяся " явь. Если и впрямь углубляться - наверное не обойтись без последнего предела, этого ужасного Ничто[8]. Но в том-то и дело, что этот хайдеггеровский мотив звучит тут как-то неуверенно, словно пространство уклоняется от него. Между мирами, в которых мы углублены осмысленно-жизненно ("нечто") или осмысленно-гибельно ("ничто") есть особый озонный слой, но он не между, а по соседству, и он не вырождается,

не ничтожится в одно-единственное ничто - он естественно-множествен, только эта множественность не стала грамматическим множественным числом, а зиждится в расплывчатой собирательности/рас-средоточенности : пустяки, всякая всячина. И эта побочно-косвенная область как-то простирается, намекает на свои горизонты и может сама за себя постоять перед лицом уничтожения: она уходит в сторону, уклоняется. И даже притягивает в свои местоименные земли все то, что могло бы стать ничем или осмыслиться как вещь. Не только 'пустяк' не эквивалентен 'ничто', но, наоборот, 'ничто ' превращается в 'ничтожный случай', в 'нечто ничтожное '. Для сравнения представим еще такой диалог: 'Как твои новые посадки?' - Ничего.

Ничего означает не столько степень наличия/отсутствия, сколько адекватность сторонности-косвенности - сигнал того, что углубляться не нужно: 'живут себе '

Вопрос о сторонности-косвенности - он не о том, *что* это есть, а о том, как это умудряется не быть здесь (т.е. не быть этим) .

7.

Так ли уж конкретно-индивидуальны и различимы эти насекомые, монады, атомы - 'несекомые ' по терминологии XVIII века? Зрительное внимание, которым мы их выделяем, - это дейктическое усилие, указательный жест, курсив, а не номинация.

Что мы имеем в виду, говоря, что вещь находится "здесь" ? То, что это слово и это чувствование, совмещаясь с актом речи, имеет свойство центрировать некий круг , место вокруг говорящего. И эта здешность ни одного предмета назад не отдает - здесь нет ничего лишнего. Уход предмета, как персонажа со сцены - создал бы иную здешность. Большая вещь или маленькая удерживается этим всеохватным притяжением и готова откликнуться, как на поверке : стакан для карандашей ! - Здесь! Итак, тут все существенно; следовательно, тут пустяков и мелочей нет.

Но жук, вдруг оказавшийся в поле внимания, не откликнется, да и не мог бы. Прикрепить к здешнему - значит накрыть вещь сразу двумя сачками : взглядом и речью. Но тень, отблеск, неуверенность (а тот ли это муравей?) так не ловятся. Это сторонние частицы - на них речевизуальные силы моей здешности не действуют.

Но мелочь не откликнется еще и потому, что ее и не звали: ибо можем ли мы ее позвать? Внимание (наш дейктический собеседник) указывает : ' жук '. Но это - остенсивная дескрипция ситуации. Что она означает ? То ли : смотри, оно ползет (тогда должен откликнуться предикат 'ползет'). То ли : какие усики! То ли: окраска как у тигра!

Хочется отмахнуться от этих детских ошибок? Но не эта ли неопределенность, размытость, неотделяемость - в жесте - вещей от их качеств является той изначальной стихией, которая рождает мелочи?[9]

Тут требуются уточнения. Чтобы мелочь ощутилась, а сбой почувствовался необходимо находится на границе дискурса. Наши силы здешности ориентированы на дискурс и потому-то и упускают кое-что из под своей власти. А вот для Наивного Мышления и впрямь ничего лишнего и стороннего нет: оно странноприимно. И ему соответствует иная и глубокая интуиция здешности. Здесь - это дух единой общины, готовность к превращениям друг в друга, к тем метаморфозам (вроде переноса признака лица на действие), которые предшествуют формальной грамматикализации. Охотник-бушмен знает о приближении антилопы: черную шерсть на ее боках он чувствует собственными ребрами. "У нас в ногах такое ощущение, будто бы ноги антилопы шуршат в кустах" [10] . С нашей точки зрения, такой перенос на себя - это косвенный речевой акт, смещенное указание (defferred ostension) по терминологии У.Куайна [11]. Но для охотника это не дейктическая метафора, а тождественность, превращение (о чем писал Э.Каннети) - для него тут нет ничего косвенного. По-вимимому, Мелочь не является универсалией мысли (и культуры). Возможно, и у нас были времена, когда мелочей не было.

Остенсивность в речевых актах оказывается глубокой логической проблемой. Но еще важнее - установить сам статус "сбоев" и "ошибок", которые неизбежны при наложении акта речи на акт произвольного внимания или при совмещении речи с указательным жестом. Эту тему затрагивает Л. Витгенштейн в "Философских исследованиях"[12]. Это, конечно, не ошибки, а нечто иное.

И оттенок беззаботного бега вниз с холма тут необязателен. Правда, вопрос о "сбоях" - это уже иная тема и целостный образ мелочи мы рискуем утратить; но зато *тема* мелочей проявится в некотором существенном контексте. Не все сны наяву легки. Но попробуем сказать кое- что о веществе этих снов, помня, что "мы созданы из вещества того же, что наши сны". Мелочь - это своего рода - хотя и пустяковая - фрустрация чувства здешности. Само же это явление пустяковым не является.

Голос диктора: "солдат кормит ребенка из полковой кухни". Сбоку на экране я вижу женщину, неподвижно лежащую у развалин дома. Так, очевидно, и следует понимать эту фразу 'солдат кормит ребенка из полковой кухни '.

Закончу отрывком из одного письма, где обсуждается вопрос о шумах, примешивающихся к информации. " Возможно, что и само наше здесь-пребывание есть именно остенсивное определение. Что-то происходит и параллельно что-то говорится, звучит (вспомни эти слова из "Макбета " про шум и ярость, взятые Фолкнером). И здесь предикат (эк, как бегает), имя (тигр) и состояние (красиво и страшно) перепутываются, и кто-то говорит "тигр" пока я думаю о том, что нечто, мелькающее за прутьями клетки, есть маятник, отсчитывающий мгновения моей жизни".

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НЕФИЛОСОФСКИЕ ФОРМЫ ФИЛОСОФСТВОВАНИЯ. NON-PHILOSOPHICAL FORMS OF PHILOSOPHIZING

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Let us call philosophizing our everyday understanding of the philosophy as the reasoning on various things without empirical foundations.

Then the philosophy is a standard of philosophizing established in Ancient Greece and practiced with rational means by a member of civil society. Any deviation of the said definition may be called non-philosophical philosophizing, and naturally there must be a diversity of non-philosophical forms of philosophizing. An apriori but irrational philosophizing has rather rhizomal shape, while classical philosophy is always a system and its shape is the tree.

A philosophizing founded on empirical basis may be called liubomudrie (Russian word meaning "philosophy enthusiasm"). In case of sacral experience we have spiritual practice, in case of philosophing on invisible Platonic world we have metaphysics. Any form of philosophizing may be called ideology when including values; an ideology may be collective or individual. Empirical foundedness of everyday philosophizing generates a picture of the world. The most integral of them is mythology; mythologized scientific picture of the world is less integral. The metasciences (methodology, mathematics, cybernetics, logic) have no own empirical basis, but their underlying disciplines have. Apparent philosophicity of some of them is determined not by their developped epistemicity, but merely by the high level of reflexion on the empirical.

At the time now, metascientific disciplines are diversified (methodology, psychology of creativity, metabletics, etc), and traditional philosophic problems turn out entered the domain of positive knowledge.

As a result, philosophy is now "circumpressed" by those empirically (true, indirectly) founded metasciences.

Philosophical investigation appears as introspective revealingof apriori limits of comprehension, whereas they can be positively studied by the science, too. Revealing such limits for concrete disciplines is the subject of their philosophies. Philosopher himself is a component of the limits. Philosophers having sophisticated psychic and sociocultural (including linguistic) organization, there are a variety of philosophizing forms.

Different forms of philosophizing are compared by the hermeneutics as metaphilosophy. As a result, we have a kind of rhizome-like and reminding Medieval Age post-modernist discourse, the complexness being an example of which.

1. В обыденном сознании, нефилософской профессиональной деятельности, в бытовом поведение философов-профессионалов некоторые формы речемыследеятельности квалифицируются с помощью естественного нетерминологизированного языка как философия или философствование. Во всех этих случаях речь идет о ситуациях, когда "философствующая" личность имеет развитую, значительно более дифференцированную чему остальных окружающих, понятийную сеть и успешно оперирует с ней т.е. обладает эпистемическим сознанием обращается к таким областям, которые по мнению окружающих, не имеют опоры в эмпирическом референтном мире. Представляется, что действительно для обозначения таких форм деятельности можно использовать термин "*философствование*", при том, что философствование может иметь разную степень социальной значимости и внутреннего совершенства.

2. Для определения нефилософского философствования целесообразно определить философствование философское - философию. Это определение основывается на принятии представления о сфере Парменида, гераклитовском образе реки, кантовского различения рассудка и разума, гегелевской логики, и вообще в большой мере немецкой классической философии как образцов собственно философии. Тогда можно философию охарактеризовать следующим образом.

3. Во-первых, философия не имеет своей эмпирической базы.Такое отсутствие эмпирической базы придает ей априорность (что не означает беспредпосылочность философии, причем именно различие предпосылок определяет многообразие философии и философствования). Внеэмпиричность философии позволяет ей восполнять пробелы в эмпирически фундированных представлениях (напр., познавательных), поскольку то, что эмпирически фундировано всегда фрагментарно, не полно, философия может быть важным источником целостности. Но в этом её опасность - она порою подменяет собою то, что может быть дано в эмпирии. Тогда возникает коллизия согласования эмпирически данного и философски необходимого, которая может решаться по-разному (эмпиризм игнорирует доводы философии, рационализм - эмпирию, возможно постулирование необходимости их согласования и т.д. - см.п.18). Критерий внеэмпиричности побуждает исключить из философии богословие, проблематизировать предмет религиозной философии и т.д., поскольку религиозное сознание ориентировано на эмпиризм, но эмпиризм иной, эмпиризм духовного опыта. Кроме того, критерий внеэмпиричности требует исключения из сферы философии метанаук, методологии и других подобных концептуализаций, имеющих хотя бы опосредованную эмпирическую базу (см. пп. 14-17; ср.сократовский тезис о том, что он пуст).

4. По отсутствию/присутствию эмпирической фундированности сопоставимых по сложности эпистемических построений, философию можно противопоставить *любомудрию* - эмпирической мудрости, которая характерна, к примеру, для софиологии, русской традиции

философствования или "философии жизни". При этом роли философа противопоставляется роль мудреца.

В зависимости от предметной специфики эмпирической базы любомудрие может касаться преимущественно природы, и тогда заниматься построением космологий, или обществом и человеком, порождая социальные или антропологические учения ("социальную философию" или "философскую антропологию").

Особые сферы любомудрия связаны с ненаивными пластами эмпирии. Один из них - постигаемый через *откровение* духовный мир, является эмпирической базой богословия, другой *платонов мир,* постигаемый особыми аскетическими практиками. Такие формы любомудрия будут обозначаться как *метафизика.* Если достаточно объестествить аристотелевский образ ума как органа чувств для восприятия формы, то вообще практически все философствование придется признать метафизикой (ср. 24).

5. Для философии характерна опора на *рационализм.* В принципе, нет запретов на то, чтобы философия была построена на других основаниях (эмоциональном, эмпатическом, деятельностном), хотя некоторая предрасположенность философии к рационализму (это видно на примере европейской философии) определяется тем, что именно на его основе легче строить развитые эпистемы. Однако используя пиктограммы, музыку, танец, скульптуру (подобную статуям будды, соотносимым с определенными сутрами), архитектуру можно выражать и эпистемы не рационального типа. Квалифицировать ли их как нерациональные формы философии или как нефилософский тип философствования - вопрос конвенции, однако в любом случае они будут презентироваться явно не деревом, а ризомом (в смысле Делеза). Маркированность философии как рационального философствования определяется его выделенным социально-психологическим статусом.

Эталоны философии были порождены в Греции с её ценностями гражданского общества и главной из них - личностью. Разум же является таким средством философствования, которое позволяет - замкнуть философствование внутри индивида, обеспечить его самодостаточность (ср. традицию именования философий по именам их создателей) и во - вторых, сделать результаты этого философствования общезначимыми, с необходимостью принимаемыми другими личностями.

В итоге философия, являющаяся результатом индивидуального творчества, получает статус· бытийной аподиктической общезначимости для тех, кто принимает ее исходные постулаты. Такой статус философии и определяет её несовместимость с эмпирической фундированностью.

6. Итак, философия в строгом смысле слова - эмпирически нефундированная эпистема, выполненная индивидом - субъектом гражданского общества с помощью только рациональных средств, что

придает ей аподиктическую общезначимость. Очевидно, что так понимаемая философия - очень редкий феномен греко-новоевропейской культуры, практически не имеющий аналогов в других культурах.

При этом философии действительно свойственны приписываемые ей профаническим сознанием черты - развитая эпистемичность и эмпирическая нефундированность. Нефилософские формы философствования характеризуются развитой эпистемичностью, сложными взаимоотношениями с эмпирической фундированностью, разным социально-психологическим статусом и некоторыми дополнительными отличительными чертами.

7. Очень распространенной формой философствования является *идеология,* отличающаяся тем, что в тело этой формы философствования включаются ценности и оценки. Идеология может быть как философской, так и любомудрской, в том числе, религиозной, метанаучной или научной. Поскольку ценности не могут быть порождены в чисто рациональной технике, идеология включает в себя эмоциональные, эмпатические, деятельностные компоненты, что придает ей черты ризома.

Включение в идеологический дискурс эмоциональных, волевых и других компонентов входит в конфликт с чисто философским или любомудрским дискурсом, что может как обесценить (например, внося агрессивные интенции как способ реагирования на эмоциональные травмы), так и обогатить (например, введением нравственных ограничений) его. Однако, рефлексия и коррекция элементов такого дискурса - задача нетривиальная и малотехнологизированная в новоевропейской традиции (но известная, например, по "Добротолюбию" или "Абидхарме").

8. Для идеологии характерна ориентация на коллективное сознание и в особенности на *коллективное* (групповое) бессознательное. Поэтому идеолог органически противопоставлен философу, причем если допустима безадресная философия, то безадресная идеология бессмысленна.

Характерный пример смешения этих двух модусов философствования - рассуждения о классовых истоках философии. Примером же такого философствования является русская "философия" соборности, основанная на незначимости идеи индивидуальной личности в русском менталитете, развитости коллективного бессознательного и его интерпретации как позитивной ценности.

Для общественных образований восточного типа обычно подобное развитие коллективного бессознательного и соответственно распространенность идеологий при отсутствии философии. Идеология, апеллирующая к коллективному сознанию /бессознательному, придает общезначимость суждениям как особым социальным нормативам, не выводя их из каких-то предпосылок и не выявляя в эмпирии, а конструируя и назначая.

9. Развитая эпистемичность, воспринимаемая обыденным сознанием как "философичность", может быть свойственна и явно эмпирически фундированным областям деятельности. Начать их рассмотрение следует с *обыденного сознания*, которое своей эмпирической фундированностью и задает идеал не философичности. Для него свойственно обращение к эмпирии практически в любой точки сколько-либо неэмпирического дискурса, причем каких-либо специальных правил обращения к эмпирии не существует. При этом неэмпирический дискурс может иметь пунктирный характер. Таково мироощущение. Более развитые его форму порождают мировоззрение, которое будучи отрефлексировано предстает как *картина мира*.

Тем не менее, подобный гетерогенный дискурс может обретать черты эпистемичности, складываясь в мифологическое сознание и приобретая рафинированную форму в *мифологической* картине мира. При развитой эпистемичности мифология как тип философствования противостоит собственно философии именно своей эмпирической фундированностью, которая приобретает особое значение в Новое время в концепции *позитивного* знания.

10. В большинстве инструментов науки - в эмпирических данных, представленным в разных формам, эмпирических обобщениях, операциональных правилах, алгоритмах и т.д. - эпистемичность не очевидна, а эмпирическая фундированность налицо. В идеале все такие построения должны иметь характер индуктивных обобщений, обладающих *индуктивной общезначимостью*.

Тем не менее в основе конструкции этих инструментов лежат в высшей степени спекулятивные, порою принципиально эмпирически нефундируемые или фундируемые весьма нетривиально, положения, понятные лишь небольшому числу ученых. Более того, такие инструменты создавались на основе именно мировоззренческих предпосылок, порою находящихся в прямом противоречии с принципом эмпирической фундированности (Галилей) и по своему статусу очень близких к философии. При этом особой проблемой является характер соотнесения эмпирии и общих принципов науки (в этом зачаток ризомности преимущественно древовидных научных структур), отсутствие компетентности в которой превращает деятельность ученого в чисто мифологическую.

11. Некоторыми теоретическими построения в совокупности с индуктивными обобщениями под видом последних ученые представляют как мифологичную по природе *научную картину мира*, которую по степени эпистемичности и нетривиальности эмпирической фундированности не профессиональное философское сознание готово рассматривать как философствование. Создание такой "философии" - явная задача "философов"-позитивистов разных поколений.

12. В той мере, в какой деятельность позитивистов и позитивистски мыслящих исследователей адекватна поставленным ими задачам, их деятельность представляют собой работу по созданию частной или

общей *методологии* науки, имеющей, как и всякая методология, нормативно-предписывающий характер.

13. В сферу методологии науки часто включается и проблематика, которую ныне все чаще и точнее начинают относить к области науковедения, истории, социологии и психологии научного творчества (ср. метаблетику, биоисторию), частенько также приписываемые к философии науки. Однако, все эти области имеют явную эмпирическую базу и при этом могут быть низко эпистемичны, но имеют дело с высокими степенями *рефлексии* эмпирии (см. п. 15).

14. На основании вышесказанного можно зафиксировать следующую структуру эмпирически фундированных форм деятельности:

а) Собственно научные построения - эпистемически неразвитые и явно эмпирически фундированные, но имплицитно содержащие сложные спекулятивные конструкции, в том числе, и строго философские;

б) Общедисциплинарные построения (общая физика, общая химия, общая биология, общая психология и т.д.), содержащие эскиз соответствующей картины мира в её онтологическом, гносеологическом и аксиологическом аспектах и в силу этого неизбежно философичные (в форме мифологизации);

в) Методологии конкретных дисциплин (физики, химии, биологии и т.д.);

г) Основания этих дисциплин, включая их историю, психологию, социологию и собственно философию (физики, химии ...);

д) Метанауки - междисциплинарные построения типа кибернетики, системного подхода, методологии (не выделяя из неё историю, социологию и психологию науки), математики, логики, которые имеют эмпирическую базу в разных предметных областях, но связаны с эмпирией опосредовано, через результаты обобщения конкретных дисциплин.

15. Структура метанаук сходна с развитой эпистемичностью и тем самым напоминают философию. В них есть и ценности, что наделяет их идеологичностью.

Однако, у метанаук есть эмпирическая база, что сближает их с любомудрием, в частности, делает их компонентом научной картины мира. К тому же, некоторым метанаукам свойственны черты ризомности. Кроме того, впечатление развитой эпистемичности и эмпирической нефундированности возникает вследствие того, что имеет место многоуровневая *рефлексия* эмпирии - эмпирические единиц заменяются спекулятивными, спекулятивные - теоретическими, теоретические конкретных дисциплин - конкретными междисциплинарных построений, из которых создаются новые единицы подлежащие исследованию и т.д.. При этом суммарный понятийный аппарат оказывается достаточно развитым, но на каждом уровне

анализа он вырожден и не может претендовать на то, чтобы быть развитой эпистемой.

Таким образом, по сути, междисциплинарные построения противостоят философии, хотя часто предметниками воспринимаются как философствование.

16. Несколько выделенное положение в ряду метанаук занимают основания математики и некоторые разделы логики (основания логик, деонтические логики, многозначные логики и т.д.), которые по сути переплетаются с философией.

17. В итоге, в рамках введенных различений и с учетом нынешней дифференциации знания, можно зафиксировать, что собственно философия - очень специализированная форма когнитивной деятельности, которая окружена сложно организованным ореолом сходных с ней или мимикрирующих под неё форм деятельности, некоторые из которых, к тому же, могут действительно занимать места, соответствующие в общественном сознании философии.

18. В результате взрыва дифференциации парафилософских дисциплин и развития специализированных позитивных, рефлексивных и методологических дисциплин в XX веке возникает ситуация крайней "зажатости" собственно философии в круге интеллектуальной деятельности.

В таком положении философ вынужден осуществить выбор между следующими возможностями:

а) вообще игнорировать сферу конкретного знания и философствовать безотносительно к нему (что демонстрировали казенные философы советского периода истории России);

б) находить специальные формы согласования философии и эмпирически фундированных дисциплин, простейшим из которых является согласование результатов философского и положительного научного постижения; при этом центральной проблемой оказывается процедура выявления этой согласованности философского и нефилософского знания (однако опыт показывает, что заключения философов, допускающие эмпирическую проверку, часто опровергаются учеными, так что идя по этому пути, надо очень корректно очерчивать сферу компетенции философии);

в) принципиально игнорировать данные положительного знания, следуя тому, что "если факты противоречат истине, то тем хуже для фактов", тотально интерпретируя их как "кажимость" (на что, однако, хватает отваги мало у кого из современных философов).

В поле современного менталитета наиболее бесконфликтна такая философия, которая вообще не касается эмпирически верифицируемых или фальсифицируемых реалий.

19. Описанные обстоятельства и являются основанием высказываемого некоторыми мыслителями мнения о конце философии. Но в то же время происходят некоторые события, заставляющие

посмотреть иначе на саму постановку традиционной проблематики философии.

20. Гуссерлевский метод феноменологической редукции очистил сознание от эмпирического содержания, сделав все конкретные интенциональные объекты предметом интерпретации как сферы нефилософской (конкретной, положительной) деятельности.

21. Гуссерлевское представление о жизненном мире, слоистости бытия Н.Гартмана естественным образом смыкаются с психологической типологией К.Юнга и позволяют говорить о типологии философствующего индивида. Таким образом можно различать разные типы неэмпирической фундированности, разные типы априорности, свойственные представителям разных психологических типах.

22. Имея представление о разных типах философствующих личностей можно обогащать эту типологию рассматривая разные аспекты организации философствующего - культурные детерминативы его менталитета, профессиональные - имеющихся у него парадигм, нозологические - характерных психологических акцентуаций и т.д.

Так понимаемая философствующая личность действительно может реализовать нерациональные формы философствования ("нерациональную философию" - ср. п.5), причем представляются они в виде ризома.

Тогда оказывается непринципиальным индивидуальная или групповая эта форма философствования, индивидуальный и коллективный субъекты оказываются равноправными (ср.пп.5, 8), философствование легко может стать идеологичным.

23. Реализуя потенциал грамматики Пор-Рояля, логический позитивизм и Витгенштейн в XX веке показали, что априорные категории философов в большой мере являются просто категориями языка. Различие философствования стало выступать как различие языковой компетенции. Развитие этнолингвистики, в частности, этносемантики, и этнометодологии сделали эти структуры предметом изучения позитивных наук (языкознания и этнографии).

24. В итоге философ оказался обладающим сложной организацией - соматической, психической, культурной, личностной, языковой и т.д. Поэтому философ (как и продукты его деятельности) стал предметом исследования многих частных дисциплин - психологии, истории, культурологии, лингвистики, социологии и т.д. Эти дисциплины могут объяснять философствование и философию как его продукт научными средствами, рассматривая это философствование как определенный рисунок интеллектуальных процессов. Философ же, в том случае, если он философствует от собственного "Я", а не имитирует формы философского поведения, действительно извлекает из себя результаты неэмпирически добытого постижения, определяемого его собственной организованностью.

Таким образом, имеет место релятивизация области философии - то, что в интроспекции (что опять же превращает философию в метафизику) дано личности как философия, со стороны может выглядеть как иной тип философствования или вовсе не философская деятельность (ср. п. 4), причем в таком философствовании есть след соборной метафизики (ср. п. 8)

25. Организованность философа (как и всякой философствующей личности) позволяет выявить в его деятельности постоянно используемые им типы априорных конструкций - *априорные рамки*. Язык, психологический статус, менталитет, парадигмы и т.п. - важнейшие типы коллективных априорных рамок. Некоторые из таких рамок имеют строение ризома.

Априорные (а в силу этого и аподиктические) рамки формируются соматической организацией личности, нормативами культурного наследия, органической патийностью (сродством) личности к той или иной предметной области и т.д.

При этом априорность выступает как априорность по отношению к той области, в которой реализуется сознание философа. Однако, эта реализация опирается на опыт, сформированный в других областях, и в этом отношении в определенном, своеобразном понимании, можно говорить об апостериорности - но опосредованной - такого философствования, апостериорности, заключенной в априорных рамках.

Описание априорных рамок и создаваемых с их помощью конструкций м является областью философии. Традиционные для философии категории, категориальные конструкции, эпистемы и представляют собой фрагменты априорных рамок.

26. К числу априорных рамок относятся и априорные рамки отдельных дисциплин. Там, где они осознаются и описываются (напр., в галилеевской или эйнштейновской механике, теоретической биологии), описание и исследование подобных рамок рассматривается как сфера теоретического естествознания, хотя точнее эту область было бы квалифицировать как философию (в строгом смысле слова) данной области. Подобные конструкции непосредственно вовлечены в процесс эмпирического научного исследования (ср.п. 10).

27. Признание структурированности философа и существование разных типов такой структурализации, выявление многообразия априорных рамок и техник философии сохраняет представление об аподиктичности философии, но делает её не общезначимой, а значимой для определенных типов личностей. Разные типы личностей при этом органически становятся приверженцами разных школ философии.

28. Описанный тип философии, как представляется, сохраняет эталон философии как особой формы деятельности, но ставит для неё очень жесткие ограничения. Особенно очевидными эти ограничения

становятся на фоне практики, ведущую роль в которой играет не "гнозис", а "техне".

Таким образом, при сохранении своей природы ныне философия играет совершенно иную социальную роль, которая оказывается не сопоставимой с ролью, к примеру, идеологии (научной, религиозной, политической, национальной и т.д., философской, любомудрской или мифологичной).

Ожидать создания в такой ситуации великих философских систем (подобных системам Канта или Гегеля) представляется маловероятным. Однако, это скорее свидетельство не упадка философии, а обретения ею своего подлинного места в культуре среди других форм философствования.

29. Наличие множества вышеописанных философий, имеющих при этом аподиктический характер, ставит проблему их соотнесения, объяснения их множественности и причин и характера различий, а также других средств интерпретации.

Возникает потребность метафилософии, которая обращалась бы уже к тому, над чем осуществлена феноменологическая редукция. Роль такой *метафилософии* и берет на себя *герменевтика*, для которой значимыми являются не вопросы "Что есть?" и "Как есть?", а "Почему представляется, что есть именно так?". Герменевтика смещает центр интереса с собственно философствования (в том числе и философии) на способ презентации результата философствования, создавая, тем самым, предпосылки для распространения логоцентризма.

30. Очевидно, что описанные современные формы существования философии носят явно постмодернистский характер. Нарочитая гетерогенность, вплоть до эклектичности, постмодернистского дискурса обесценивает идеал собственно философии, ставя ее в один ряд с остальными нефилософскими формами философствования (включая и метафилософию).

С другой стороны, и сама философия в её современной форме, оказывается наделенной постмодернистскими чертами - содержит ризомные образования, сложные нормативы спекулятивной деятельности, неявные критерии качества и т.д.

31. Как одно из направлений постмодернистского философствования может рассматриваться *комплексность* - развиваемая с конца 1970-ых годов в Санкт-Петербурге А.П.Сопиковым версия практической деятельности, в которой снимается противопоставление онтологии и гносеологии, объекта и субъекта, причем последний замещается образом человека-комплексника, использующего разные типы своих психических способностей, а первые реконструируются из ситуативного сопряжения разных междисциплинарных картин описания (субстратной, структурной, энергетической и др.) и т.д.

Вместе с тем, развитая эпистемичность и сложно опосредованное эмпирическое фундирование (через сращение теоретического тела и

эмпирии в фокальных точках ризома) безусловно требуют квалификации комплексности как способа философствования, однако, нефилософского (при том, что локально теоретическое пространство комплексности превращается в философское построение), что особенно очевидно ввиду присутствия явно ценностных конструкций, свойственных идеологии, опоры на опыт как в любомудрии и т.д.

32. Итак, следует зафиксировать относительную редкость собственно философии, погруженной в окружение множества не философских форм философствования - любомудрия, идеологии, духовидения, метафизики, мифологии, создания картин мира, методологии и других метанаук, рефлексии высоких порядков, герменевтики, комплексности и т.д., - каждая из которых организована по своим принципам, имеет собственные критерии совершенства и эталонные образцы реализации.

Смешение этих форм философствования обедняет культуру и профессиональную философскую деятельность за счет семантического коллапса тотальной синонимии, что в конечном счете не упрощает, а делает практически невозможным творческий обмен между разными формами неопределенного философствования.

II
THE POSTMODERN CONDITIONS AND THE CONDITIONS FOR METAPHYSICS: LIFE, LANGUAGE, TEXT AND ONTOLOGY
ПОСТМОДЕРНИЗМ И ВОЗМОЖНОСТЬ МЕТАФИЗИКИ: ЖИЗНЬ, ЯЗЫК, ЗНАНИЕ, ТЕКСТ — ОНТОЛОГИЯ

THE POSTMODERN CONDITIONS OF MEANING

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The postmodern is an indirect speech act on a massive scale. Its overt random surface is not what is meant, its covert meaning hidden behind an aesthetic screen. Semantics under postmortem conditions must address this paradox: that never before has the syntactic free-play of differentiation been more celebrated than in recent cultural descriptions, while at the same time, never has a greater number of people been more efficiently controlled on a global scale for economic purposes.

Contrary the picture presented in a narrow conception of semantics, 'meaning' has always been a function of its sociocultural frame rather than the result of stipulated definitions. Late capitalist societies mirror their cultural structures in their semantics no less than did their religious and mythological forebears. Rather than demonstrating 'the destruction of meaning', (Baudrillard 1984d: 38f.) postmodernity merely conceals the semantics which makes it what it is.

Both the Fregean conflation of formal and natural language sense as well as the Saussurean collapse of semantics into the differential system of linguistic signs are inextricably linked with the fusion of science, its formal tools and its socioeconomic consequences, and the concomitant secularization of European metaphysics. This process has received a new impetus by the possibility of representing the reduction of formal logic to binary syntax by way of electronic materiality. Differentiation has entered a new stage. At the metaphysical periphery of this shift we find a redefinition of difference in its diverse guises, with Derrida's 'difference' as a master trope indicating the condition without which those differential relations could not be thought. For lack of a better term and under the pressure of a massive literature on the topic, we engage 'postmodern' to cover the new conditions under which 'meaning' must now be reformulated.

The importance of semantics for such a description cannot be overestimated. What is required is a generous conception of semantics capable of attributing meaning to the specifics of the social, to gesture, linguistic expression, ways of looking, fashion, styles of transport and shopping, in short, to the minutiae of a

culture. Given this perspective, two kinds of semantics have to be eliminated from the start. An empiricist semantics in which meaning is guaranteed by the relationship between language and the world as a physicalist given. Instead, we need a semantics which includes the constructivist claim that the physical world is to a very large extent the result of our significations, with base constraints inferred of necessity.

A second kind of semantics to be abandoned is the tradition which, following Frege, conflates the sense of formal systems, such as geometry or formal logic, with the sense of natural languages. (Ruthrof 1993) Likewise deficient is the semantic side of Saussure's linguistics in which semantics mirrors syntax as a differential system, a description that works if you know French, which begs the very question of how meaning is possible. In its minimalist Carnapian form, semantics is always a secondary set of signs systematically linked with a stipulated primary language. In natural language, the relation could be said to be reversed, in that its syntax is construed after the fact of semantics as signified social acts.

Contra Frege and Saussure, what we need is an intersemiotic definition of reference, understood as a linkage between various significatory practices and, at least as importantly, a way of theorizing deixis and modalities, which produce modifications of meaning as a consequence of utterance under specific historical circumstances. An intersemiotic semantics in which meaning is described as a nexus of diverse sign systems promises to be able to characterize the meaningfulness of social doing as a whole, without losing the force of arguing the specifics of verbal and non-verbal signs. In particular, natural language meanings would be characterized from the outset as always already having some referential and deictic background, features which are essential for a social picture of semantics. If semantics is to describe specific acts as meaningful within belief systems, then it will also have to address the heterogeneity of such frames within the social at large. Supposing that certain belief systems tend to be dominant at any given historical moment we can schematize the shape of cultures in the following manner.

The Decline of the Pyramid

Let us assume a vertical axis representing value ranking, or engaged differentiation, and a horizontal base axis representing mere differentiation, or indifferent difference in time. Suppose further that the first figure to be inserted into this co-ordinate system is a steep, tall pyramid with a narrow base, its apex defined as a summum bonum of some kind. Further to the right, imagine a pyramid without an apex, its top cut off, resulting in some sort of trapezium. If we were to draw a straight line between the apex of the pyramid and the right top of the second figure, extending the line so that it intersects with the two coordinate axes, we would receive the following picture. A decline from high value hierarchization towards the axis of indifferent differentiation.



Simplifying starkly, one could say that European medieval societies, the Catholic Church, or fundamentalist subcultures, could be represented by steep pyramids in which every aspect of social life is governed by hierarchically ordered principles, culminating in a highest - good. Where, in other words, the vertical arrangement outweighs its horizontal extension in time. This of course suppresses the important fact that within such structures there always lurk counter forces waiting for their historical moment to bid for supremacy. But whatever the specific textuality of the pyramid, it presents a metaphysic in which the meaning of linguistic expressions cannot be divorced from the whole. Nor is the whole itself only a form of language. Rather, it is a way of social being in which language plays a special role, with its syntax a function of the semantics of hierarchically sorted beliefs. What a particular sentence means is not isolatable as a free standing propositional content. On the contrary, the entire value system acts as a massive modal force on the directional schema of the expression.

Only an intersemiotic description of meaning is able to capture this picture. Linguistic meanings, accordingly, are events of linkage between verbal expressions and non-linguistic signs, such as visual, haptic, tactile and other perceptual readings. I have elsewhere referred to this explanation as the intersemiotic corroboration thesis (Ruthrof 1992;1993;1994). In less hierarchized cultural formations, this explanation is not replaced but merely modified by, for instance, a loosening of the rules which bind meaning clusters into metaphysical units.

If we were to canvass the opinions of people in the streets of London as to what values are to be placed at the top of their cultural pyramid, some might suggest the Queen's corgies; others, the Beetles; some perhaps, Manchester United; few, the Archbishop of Canterbury; fewer still, the Empire. To simplify, what we are left with is an image of a culture which has abandoned any singularity of leading values and is halfway towards the baseline of indifference. The semantics of such a postindustrial culture is still best described in terms of an intersemiotic schema, with the difference that the bonds between meaningful sentences have lost their force. In this, meaning mirrors the relations of the culture as a whole.

The Postmodern

A further step in this direction is a structure which looks increasingly like a flat oblong yielding, it would seem, more and more to the flatline of its base: a picture perhaps of the managerial society of bitstream commodification.



Viewed from the perspective of the apex of hierarchized culture, the new structure appears as a random assembly of values. Viewed from its base, the opposite is the case. We note an intricate structuration of every aspect of society from its footing. Let us call this the fundamental paradox of the postmodern. It is this paradox which also profoundly informs its semantics. On the one hand, the bonds which bind social acts into a meaningful whole appear to be ruptured according to the free-play of mere differentiation. This is the picture portrayed by the majority of statements about the postmodern.

On the other hand, there is the observation that the surface of randomness is an orchestrated illusion, that in fact the seeming phenomenal jumble is the screen blinding us to the fundamental control exerted by the machinery of international capital. If this is so, then the syntax of indifferent differentiation should be able to be shown to produce a seductive microstructural semantics of playful and chaotic indifference while it is itself produced by a larger, coarse-grain semantics whose syntax reflects the control mechanisms of the market. As it turns out, one and the same syntax serves equally well two radically different structures of meaning.

That the discourse about what constitutes the postmodern as a style (postmodernism), an economic process (postmodernization), and as a philosophical perspective (postmodernity) is more tangible than the phenomena it describes is possibly the strongest argument for acknowledging the postmortem as a significant cultural shift. (Frow 1991:16; Jameson 1993:ix) The postmodern in this sense acts as an umbrella term for such stylistic features as an adversary aesthetics' the toxic sublime, mere listing, high speed images, or the collapse of semantics into syntax, which we associate with postmodernism; the digital, the bar code, virtual reality applications, DNA signification and gene shearing, the production of new species (pigs the size of elephants), remote control, and selfregulating technology of postmodernization; as well as anti-teleological writing, deconstruction, conceptual instability, difference, dehierarchization, and the deanthropo-morphization of discourse characteristic of postmodernity.

The difficulties in theorizing the postmortem are best summed up perhaps by the observation that the very object of inquiry, the concept itself, radically undermines traditional expectations of definitional focus and delimiting boundaries. As a cultural style it is 'internally conflicted and contradictory' (Jameson

1993:xxii), as a social phenomenon it remains doubly incoherent. Its exemplification lurching between illustrative emptiness and overinclusiveness, while its periodization is vitiated by a teleological violence of totalization and the incompatibility of its objects. (Frow 1991:9ff.) As an 'epochal concept' the postmodern fails as a result of its dependence on 'historico-spiritual fictions' which blind us to what is going on.(Frow 1991:35), its *Nachträglichkeit* linking it problematically with modernity. Nevertheless, as Jameson concedes, 'we cannot not use it'. And when we do use the concept, we cannot escape rehearsing its incongruities and staging its paradoxes. (Jameson 1993:xxii).

Let us return to the point when the 'debate' was transformed from a discussion in architecture and a small number of precursor texts into an academic industry by Jean Francois Lyotard's emphasis on the 'linguistic turn' in postindustrial knowledge. 'For the last forty years,' he writes, 'the "leading" sciences and technologies have had to do with language'. (Lyotard 1984:3) But what is the relationship between the postmodern and its most characteristic technology, electronic circuitry? What are the discursive features which make the 'digital' a postmodern phenomenon and how are certain features of postmodernity and its aesthetic, postmodernism, related to the 'discursive' workings of its dominant technology?

There is no shortage of works addressing contemporary technology and its impact on social processes. What is less frequently explored are the discursive operations which inform digital technology and their social effects. To anticipate, the postmodern as a cultural style can be regarded as a vast ADA-Converter, an analogue-digital-analogue exchange system of massive proportions. It transforms the semantic processes of traditional cultures into tera-flop bit streams, and retransforms these once again to be readable by "docile bodies" as bar-code commodities.

This situation strikes me as a special case of what happens to the syntactic-semantic order in transformations from culturally saturated, natural sign systems into their formal abstractions. Such transformations are historical reversals of which they still bear traces. All formal systems are either derived directly from natural languages or in a secondary manner via other formal systems, and all formally empty systems are what they are as the result of processes of referential and deictic reduction. When they are reapplied to socially saturated signs, the original semantic features of saturation cannot be restored and instead the syntactic of the formal has new semantic effects on the nonformal. I suggest the reality effects of the digital apparatus constitute a special case of such a transfer.

The Postmodern Surface

As a style, the postmodern is the linkage between the ludic forms of culturally saturated discourse and the digital. Postmodernism takes its signifiers from the former and its syntax from the latter, while its surface semantics is in free-play. This combination renders postmodernism both aesthetically attractive and politically insidious.

A survey of the literature on postmodern phenomena reads like a metaphorization of digital syntax. Hassan's 'indetermanence' for instance is indistinguishable from the indifference of differentiation in the bit stream. Almost all the features which he lists reflect a merely differential deep grammar: disjunctive, open play, chance, anarchy, process, happening, antithesis, absence, dispersal, text, intertext, syntagm, parataxis, metonymy, combination, surface, signifier, scriptible, antinarrative, polymorphous, androgynous, difference, and difference. (Hassan 1980:123f.) What Hassan fails to do is to ask what kind of conditions must prevail for such a series to be visible.

Another surface phenomenon of the postmodern as style is pop art, with its billboard and 'casino culture' (Huyssen 1984:15f.) Robert Venturi's 'landscape of Las Vegas' or Leslie Fiedler's celebration of popular literature, such as his defense of the Western. While this 'postmodernist mentality' has been characterized by the dissolution of subjectivity, the embrace of commodification, and a resulting political naiveté, (Wolin 1984/5:19) pop art is credited at the same time with having instigated a critique of the credo of modernism by reviving ornament and metaphor in architecture, 'figuration and realism in painting', literary representation, and 'the body in music and theatre'. (Huyssen 1984:16)

Postmodern aesthetic is above all 'to play with pieces', says Baudrillard. (Baudrillard 1984a:24) Derrida's paper 'Point de folie: Maintenant l'architecture' on Bernard Tschumi's geometrical experiments supports this observation, even if 'play' is not to be taken too lightly. (Derrida 1985) Playing with pieces comes to the fore in the postmodern transformation of quotation into pastiche. Where Mahler and Joyce still quote previous literary materials intertextually, the postmortem artists rework them to a degree where traditional evaluations fail to capture the nature of the transformation. (Jameson 1984:65; cf. Hutcheon 1986/7) Instead of an intertextuality which respects the cultural past, the postmodern pastiche is typically a process by which old styles 'are retooled and recycled.' (Foster 1984:67) As a result, we encounter a number of different kinds of postmodernisms which gesture towards baroque, rococo, classical and neoclassical, Mannerist and Romantic varieties of style. (Jameson 1984:55)

Postmodern art is said to question traditional knowledge by way of obsessional repetition, as for instance in LeWitt's *Variations of Incomplete Open Cubes. In* opposition to definitional knowledge which states a rule and invites its variations as imaginative extension, LeWitt employs a 'generative principle in each of its possible cases' in a style of garrulous digitality. We are dealing here with designs beyond the rational, 'design spinning out of control'. (Kraus 1987:253f.)

Another characteristic transformation can be said to be the flattening semantic hierarchies by way of hyperbole. If everything is hyperbolic, nothing is. The postmortem is a style of superterms, not only in art but also in the culture of technology. We speak of supercolliders, superconductivity, superstrings, superfluidity, supervacancy, supercomputers, SuperCALC (one of the hit softwares), supercommunication (cf. Bell's theorem with its collapse of sender and receiver

and the notion of communication independent of human subjects), supervacancy: the multiplication of the vacant subject positions of postmodernism; the 'hyperreal' (Baudrillard 1983:146) the 'hypertelic' (Baudrillard 1988b:189), and let us not forget the information superhighway. Yet the flatline effect of the superterm style conceals its oppositional and controlling shadow: the intensification of hierarchization and the possibilities of control.

Yet another motif which goes with the levelling effect of the postmodern is 'the loss of history,' the absence of any 'temporal horizon,' so that it 'restlessly wanders between present and past, indiscriminately retrieving its aesthetic forms from the imaginary museum of the cultural tradition.' (Christa Buerger 1986:97) In a series of perpetual nows the originality of modernism is replaced by an endless chain of repetitions, not unlike the procession of bytes in the digital bitstream.

The Digital

The binary digital is central to the production of discreteness in the logic gates of electronic circuitry, its binary character a technical realization of formal sign systems of two-valued logics. Digital machines employ the transsemiotic principle of separating discrete units of whatever kind in order to realize algorithms. These procedures allow us to move from given input quantities to output quantities at high speed. If critical theorizing is to keep in touch with its Other, techno-scientific discourse, the repressed relation between digital technology and the postmodern warrants attention. Not because it will itself furbish the concealed ground of the postmodern, but rather because without at least a schematic understanding of its discursive principles we are unable to see important links between postmodern surfaces, its merely differential syntax, and the deep semantics which drives them both. What are the new syntactic-semantic relations that should make postmodern culture so particularly vulnerable to depoliticization (Habermas) and commodification (Eagleton, Jameson)? Perhaps there are features in both the postmodern nontechnical and techno-scientific discourses which display affinities of a kind and degree absent in previous social structures.

If we see Derrida's difference as that which allows all forms of differentiation to be both thinkable and actualizable, different discursive operations are informed by difference in a different manner. Looking at discursivity as a gradation from culturally saturated discourses such as jokes, the literary, myth, or everyday speech, towards technical and formal language, we can observe an inexorable process of reduction of reference and deixis towards zero. We can imagine a heuristic scale at the one end of which we locate the richest realizations of difference and metaphoricity and at its opposite their starkest, minimalist counterparts. The former optimize difference and metaphoricity in reference and deixis, the latter minimize them.

The binary digital could be regarded as that form of semiosis, both in its formal logical representation (0,1) and in its electronic form (off, on), which mirror the barest version of differentiation: the mere principle of semiotic dis-

cretion. It is thereby not severed from discursivity but merely reduced to the withered result of a shriveled horizonality. (Cf. Heidegger 1962: 188ff.)

Yet the binary digital still carries the traces of full social discursivity from which is was derived, in so far as we are still dealing with a translatable sequence. Certainly, at the level of digital machinery we engage with semiotic bodies, with organs and orifices, pathways and memories. There are peripherals such as camera (eyes), microphone (ears), speakers (mouth), tactile devices (hands, arms, legs), thermal sensors (skin), smoke detectors (smell), seismograph, printer, keyboard, tape recorder, terminal display, magnetic disc, or character recognition device. A CPU interacts with a Program Memory (ROM). Digitized signals are stored in a Data Memory (RAM) from where they are retrieved and processed once more by the CPU before they are sent via the DAC through output ports to another set of peripherals, such as printer, monitor, or oscillograph. Logic chips with AND, NAND, OR, NOR, flip-flop gates, NAND flip-flop, NOR flip-flop, or agate arrays' combine into 'megachips' or 1 million chip combinations. The minimal discursive structure common to all parts of this organism is a syntax made up of strings of bytes, constituted by clustered bits of 0's and l's.

Two truths are told
0101010001110111011011110010111101110100011100100111010101110100011101100111100101111011101000111001001110101011101 0001101000011100 0010111101100001011100100110010100101111011101 0001101111010110111101100100 (Macbeth I,iii,127)

Speed is a function of directness of wiring (printed microcircuits) and the frequency of the tact generator (megahertz). The current speeds up to gigaFLOPs (billions of float-point operations per second) are now being challenged by the promise of teraFLOPS (trillions of operations/sec). While at the level of actual phenomena we are dealing with parallel, slow, simultaneous systems, at the level of the digital the complex flow of the phenomenal world has been transformed into time multiplex, high-speed linearity, an electronic channel into which the phenomenal world is poured as into a funnel. Parallel processing and time multiplex make linearity appear as simultaneity. In doing this, the digital flattens complex simultaneities into seriality, so that the length of the syntagm or the number of frequencies make up for complexity, while speed (FLOPS) makes up for the disadvantage of linear spread or the length of the bit stream. In principle, there is no theoretical limit to the dehierarchization of the phenomenal. Yet the digital is not readable as such except via retranslation, nor does it offer any hierarchization of knowledge itself. Rather, it makes its digits available through its concomitant technology (RAM, ROM, DAC, Ports) to those with a will to hierarchization and the required access-power as readily as to those who dream of the emancipatory force of the random.

Social Metaphoricity of the Digital

When we describe the effects of digital processes on culture we note what I would like to term the semantic paradox of the digital. While syntax is not transparent to semantics, while we cannot proceed from phrase constructions to meaning, unless we already know the language, the digital syntax can be said to have at least semantic effects. There appears to be a feedback relationship not at the level of propositional contents but at the level of syntax. That is, the style of the digital operation itself affects social practice and thus contributes significantly to a shift in late twentieth century textuality. As I have argued elsewhere, in this sense the digital furnishes a deep structure to match the new surfaces of our culture. (Ruthrof 1992) In summary, this deep structure consists of: seriality; replaceability; speed; indistinction; indifference; forgetting; dissolution of subject; availability; shelvability; masking of mediation; repeatability; iterability; either/or syntax; chain reaction of the textual; data flow; fusion of the actual and the fictive; fragmentation; dehistorization; random access; dissolution of reference; dissolution of deixis; rapid creation and satisfaction of desire; packaging and speed of delivery; and the exchangeability of images. These features are recognizable not only as characteristics of the bitstream but increasingly also as characteristic of a social style. In this sense, the syntax of the digital has social effects and so could be said to generate its own semantics.

This transformation is reinforced by electronic metaphoricity, new discursive formations produced by the digital industry. The barcode reader, a photoelectronic scanner that deciphers bar codes printed on products, reappears in postmodern society in the shape of barcode readers who recognize reality by the way it is packaged, shelved, organized, transformed, named, quantized, and digitized. The interaction of ordinary discourse and computer speech results in a metaphorical transfer between the two realms, thus diminishing the divide. Stack, bubble memory, droop, data smoothing, chopper, crosstalk, dumb terminal, bus, bus driver, and bus delays, card dealer, have a strict technical application as well as the effect of semantic leakage into everyday speech. Postmodern subjects are 'dumb terminals', a digital version of Foucault's 'docile bodies', in a dumb terminal society, or perhaps worse, a GIGO culture. (GIGO for 'garbage in, garbage out'). The consolation is that the more we align ourselves with machines, the less it will hurt. Cyborgs won't mind the difference.

Metaphenomena of the Postmodern

If the digital provides a conditional deep structure for the postmodern, this should be evident not only at the stylistic surface of social phenomena but also at the level of its theorization. Not surprisingly, theoreticians on the left have on the whole argued the latter, while poststructuralist have weighed in on the side of the former.

Much has been said about postmodern commodification. And yet the principal observations in this debate are still to be found in the early papers by Eagleton and Jameson. For Eagleton, capitalist technology appears as a vast 'desiring

machine', a giant electronic exchange 'in which pluralistic idioms proliferate and random objects, bodies, surfaces come to glow with libidinal intensity'. (Eagleton 1985:69) In his early comments Jameson concedes to postmodernism the possibility of a revolt against totalizing reason (Jameson 1982:82) and yet he is sceptical of a postmodernist architecture which promises a democratization of its buildings by eulogizing its place in 'the motel and fast-food landscape of the postsuperhighway American city'. (Jameson 1984a: 64f.)

The more recent Jameson is less hopeful. He sees postmodern consciousness as a self-mirroring phenomenon which can do no more than enumerate the shifts in its own condition, clocking its variations, an aestheticization in Benjamin's sense, 'consumption of sheer commodification as a process', and thus a version of some sort of 'advanced monotheism'. (Jameson 1993:ixf.) Because there is little inquiry into the conditions which make postmodern styles possible, but merely lists of surface phenomena, almost anything can be 'mobilized in the very search for the present itself and pressed into service as a symptom and an index of the deeper logic of the postmodern' which gradually represents itself as the theory of itself. We note with Jameson a certain 'frenzy' in the piling up of radical differences to earlier historical moments suggestive of an autoreferential pathology by which our differential consciousness of history is turned into a unique, schizoid and permanent now. (xii)

We cannot help but note that the very search for underlying conditions, transcendental or otherwise, makes no sense in postmodern terms. Postmodernism has developed a style ill-suited for its own analysis, many of its descriptions looking like wishfulfillment, or a significatory sublimation of its opposite. The surface description of random play belies the fact of a horrendous and fast-growing structuring from outside the play pen. Beneath, the binary-digital weaves its syntactic and grammatical web, remote controlled by the semantics of transnational commerce. No metafictional and self-reflecting loops there, but instead a hierarchization of an array of social phenomena in a well-integrated and detailed structure of control.

Without addressing the question of 'transnational business' we are not in a position to provide philosophical and sociological answers to any of those phenomena. We must come to terms with international labour, 'a vertiginous new dynamic in international banking and the stock exchanges (including the enormous Second and Third World debt)', new media networks, and the emergence of new capital sustained social classes. (xix) Jameson looks for the principles underlying those changes beyond the postmodern explanations via a logic of differentiation. (Jameson 1993:342) With the emphasis on 'expensive form' as the watchword for postmodern commodities, 'exchange value' itself has turned into a commodity.(386) The loss of the individual as well as any collective subject, neither idealism nor materialism, nor any other systemic alternatives, are notions which now make sense. The fully commodified world has made everything optional, or so it would seem.

What is attractive in Jameson's analyses of postmodern culture is his concern 'with the conditions of the possibility of the concept'.(418) For they must remain outside the control of postmodern styles. I suggest that the search for those conditions splits into two parts, one which looks into the primary grammar of postmodern styles and the second, which investigates the conditions of this condition. The first will have to deal with the technical deep syntax of our present social performance, the second with the covert semantics which frames the social at large. It would seem that we are dealing here with two related conditions. On the one hand, there is the very syntax which acts as the condition without which postmodern diversity cannot be thought, its deep grammar of mere differentiation; and on the other, and more importantly, there is a master code within which that deep grammar as well as its surface phenomena make perfect sense: the semantics of production. I stress semantics here, because with the exception of stipulated formal systems, syntax is always a function of semantics. This is where the buck stops, at the covert pyramid of the engaged value hierarchy of advanced international capital.

Another significant metaphenomenon of the postmodern is the connection between postmodernity and poststructuralist theory. Part of Jameson's dismay at the abandonment of political will is echoed in Jürgen Habermas' critique of the neoconservative tendencies in poststructuralist theory. It is the heritage of the Enlightenment, emancipation through rational debate free from domination, which Habermas finds threatened by certain features of poststructuralism and postmodern culture in general. It is not surprising then that he objects to the very term postmodernism, which suggests that the 'project of modernity,' reason in its plural manifestations, has been completed. He likewise objects to theoretical positions which rely on the Nietzsche-Heidegger axis as a set of mastertexts. (cf. Hohendahl 1986:50). The critique of Derrida illustrates this point. Derrida is charged with 'an inversion of Husserlian foundationalism' in having transformed 'the originative transcendental power of creative subjectivity' into 'the anonymous, history-making productivity of writing'. In the place of philosophical foundationalism, he substitutes 'the still profounder - though now vacillating and oscillating - basis of an originative power set temporally aflow' with the help of his 'Urschrift'. Habermas also takes Derrida to task for having replaced the authority of Heidegger's Being by 'the authority of a no longer holy scripture' inciting the 'frenzy of deciphering interpreters'. As a result, 'the labour of deconstruction lets the refuse heap of interpretations, which its wants to clear away in order to get at the buried foundations, mount even higher'. For Habermas, Derrida has merely returned 'to the historical locale where mysticism once turned into enlightenment.' (Habermas 1987:178-184) Thus Habermas critiques poststructuralism as an aestheticization of the political and a reduction of the concept of rationality to a point where grounding distinctions can no longer be made. Rational, social-political praxis has lost its footing, and with it any *Geltungsansprüche* (validity claims), which are central to his emancipatory social theory.

As to the question of depoliticization and commodification, the characterization of the postmodern, and our sketch of the digital suggest a number of important relations. Postmodern dehistoricization, the removal of critical reason, fragmentation, random access, mere repetition, as indeed the whole long list of postmodern features which one could compile are mirrored in the syntax of the digital. Especially the digital dissolution of deixis and reference, its rampant subjectivity, its dehistoricized self-identity, and its high-speed retrievability turn out to be ideal ingredients for a hierarchized institution that knows precisely what it wants and so does not play by postmortem rules. Ironically, international commodification finds an ideal sorting base in the syntax of the postmodern. The shared transformability of the fictive (metafiction of politics and tourism vs transformability of the digital), the isolation of items from their socio-political and historical context, availability, local and locatable surfaces, shelving and shelf-life, mobility, nameability, speed of access, reading desire, creating desire, satisfying desire, packaging, and high speed delivery, all display their double character. Randomness, if viewed from a postmodern aesthetics; controlled functionality, from the perspective of the semantics of international capital.

In contrast with the Habermasian project of social reason based on the stipulation of a consensus ideal, Lyotard's 'postmodern condition' is characterized by heterogeneity, an 'agonistics' of language games, the difficulty of gaining access to the data banks, 'performativity' as input-output ratio, local justice and a new form of the 'sublime.' (Lyotard 1984a:passim) In 'Defining the Postmodern' he divides the debate about modernity and the postmodern, a debate his book helped to focus, into three main trends: (1) 'the abrogation of Euclidian geometry' and the transformation of quotations into repetition; (2) the replacement of progress by 'motricity' and (3) the substitution of 'ana-lysing' as '*ana*-mnesing' for reflection. (Lyotard 1986a:6)

To Lyotard, the postmodern precedes the modern as that 'which in the modern poses the unpresentable in the presentation itself', in other words, the sublime. (Lyotard 1984b:16f.) And it is in the conception of the sublime that Lyotard discovers a parallel between Kant's notion as a response to art deprived of rules and the postmodern situation, where likewise a body of artistic rules have been abandoned. (Lyotard 1986b:8) This new sublime is contradictory, a mixed feeling of 'both pleasure and displeasure' with which we confront the new technologies and their 'complexifications'. (Lyotard 1986c:10) In this, Lyotard has tended to foreground the aesthetic over the teleological, as he does again in his recent reading of Kant's Third Critique. (Lyotard 1994)

However, is the principle of aestheticization compatible with Lyotard's anti-totalizing political agenda? There seems to be a contradiction between what is required for knowing what to do in specific historical situations without engaging a larger narrative within which the specific can be allocated a value. Is there not a paradox in the very notion of local justice? Is not its sine qua non some submerged, cohesive narrative which Lyotard denies? Perhaps this is no more than a question of emphasis and degree. But it seems clear that one of the disagreements between Lyotard and Habermas is that Lyotard rejects the Enlightenment narrative. Where Habermas sees an as yet unrealized programme of emancipation, Lyotard, following Theodor Adorno, sees Auschwitz. (Lyotard 1993:78) The narrative of emancipation has been liquidated. (Lyotard 1993:18) Yet the question remains whether Lyotard's anti-totalizing solution can be used as a critical weapon against the new control structures which govern the postmodern.

Nor is the anti-totalizing motif restricted to Lyotard's work. It can be found in all poststructuralist theorizing and, not surprisingly, lies at the very heart of the text of Derrida. The value of the contribution of Derrida's infrastructural critique of conceptuality is beyond dispute. What is less clear is whether his anti-teleological stance constitutes an advance over previous positions. (Derrida 1985:69) It seems that Derrida's rejection of teleology repeats part of the critique of teleology offered by Kant, who sharply distinguishes between a teleology of determining reason of closed systems, such as in the formal domain, and the teleology of reflective reason, which is open-ended and so forever adjustable to interpretive needs. This latter form, Kant insists, we cannot do without, if we are to judge anything outside strictly formal procedures. How could Derrida conceive of the critique of the concept without teleology in this sense? And how could Lyotard judge any linguistic exchange as a differend if he were not to draw on something like it? And is not every teleological judgement a minor narrative? And how could we think differends consistently if those minor narratives did not amount to some larger and, *cum grano sales,* non-contradictory structure?

At the metaphenomenal level of postmodern theorization the digital syntax shines through in the emphasis on discontinuities (Foucault), dissemination, anti-telos, and difference (Derrida) and the war on totalization (Lyotard). Here we bump again into the paradoxical character of the postmortem and the asymmetry of the digital syntax of the postmortem surface serving two kinds of semantics in the opposite way. Superficially, the postmodern displays itself as a world of seeming free-play with the attractions of an aesthetic and, for some, even an emancipatory promise. If, on the other hand, if we see the political will of an economic master reading, the very same syntax functions as a basis for the concentration of bureaucratic power and economic control of global populations. How are these two possible at the same time?

Meaning Now: Semantics under Postmodern Conditions

Indifferent differentiation, of which the digital is the most recent technical form, equally supports a semantics of the phenomenal free-play of dissemination and a semantics of control. The freedom of meaning which we celebrate in the former, finds its semantic *Doppelgänger* in the latter. The irony is that the emancipatory potential of semantic freedom dissolves unless it is realized in a political culture with a will to project. Without the will to social projection, the semantic freeplay of the postmodern is no match for the well organized meaning

structures of economic production and its military back-up. Here the syntax of indifferent information can be optimized by strict hierarchization. Nothing is lost, and everything can be viewed from the most promising parameters, reorganized at digital speeds, multiplexed and put to productive use on a global scale.

Given the flexibility of its digital foundations, it is not surprising that the postmodern as a cultural style can subsume all existing genres (the tradition in bits and pieces, traditional hierarchies as parodic, quotation without source, pastiche without declared interpretive aim). Because of the removal of semantic cohesion, diction, phrases, image chains, in short, since every signifier is compatible with every other, their common bond is purely syntactical. We are still able to translate items and data strings, but we are impeded by this very same syntax from endowing the bit stream with a semantic umbrella. The digital signifiers cannot be transferred directly to saturated social discourse. What is transferred is the syntax itself. Like all formal systems, the digital in itself has no semantics, unless we add one, as for instance some kind of geometry or a natural language. This means that there is a special relationship between semantics and syntax at this level. On the one hand, we confront a special case of the arbitrariness of signs, in that the stability or change of application can be rapid or stable, relative to the imposition of a master code. On the other hand, when the digital syntax is transferred, important semantic consequences are the result.

Habitual cultural contents which are now processed via digital machinery are affected such that traditional readings of contents are gradually replaced by different habits of reading. Specifically, they are readings which increasingly accommodate thinking in terms of sequence, strings, replaceability, availability, in short, features of indifferent differentiation, which clash radically with the intricate value hierarchization, the semantics of traditional culture. When what is important, let alone what is sacred, can be replaced, reinserted, left in memory, added to another string, or eliminated, at the touch of a laptop key, the 'doing' of culture been has drastically altered. The weakening of the content so digitized is no more than a question of time and degree. Fundamentalisms of all shades have understood this deep threat, even if their attacks tend to be directed against specific visible embodiments rather than the semantics of capital.

Social visions are by definition in conflict with mere differentiation. The former requires a committed semantics, the latter, in spite of producing semantic effects, has no semantics at all. The consequences of an unacknowledged transfer from the formal to saturated sociocultural signs are visible in the celebration of the randomness of signs at the phenomenal level of the postmodern. In this, Frege's conflation of two kinds of sense has found a political echo in the postmodern. We are now in a position to conflate the digital syntax of the postmodern, or its formal sense, with its semantics, its non-formal sense, with a host of opportunities and attractions for doing so. If we do this, we have severely crippled two important features of culturally saturated semantics: one, actual social

reference and, with it, an intervention in the kind of world we may want; and two, we have weakened the possibility of actual deixis, that is, utterance in the full corporeal, social sense of speaking as political beings.

Without the telos entailed in the political moment of speaking the politics of what is said cannot be retrieved; it dissolves into random bits. Hence the paradox: postmodernism cannot articulate itself but merely demonstrate its own surface; its description requires a different structure, the structure of the cultural production of social vision. In a sense, then, the project of modernity is indeed incomplete, or at least, has to be replaced by projects able to cope with the failures of the Enlightenment and with the necessity for a global extension of the public sphere.

For unperturbed, and globally, the rule of production continues, highly ordered, in spite of, and even because of, the disrupted postmodern surface. Its deep structure shares with the surface the syntax of indifferent differentiation, but not its semantics. In postmodern culture, surface semantics and deep semantics belong to different domains. Severed from its referential base of realist constraints, the surface semantics of postmodernism is indistinguishable from its syntax, while the deep semantics of the new polis draws on a specific socioeconomic reality, organized by a powerful systematic beyond cultural forms of regional and national identities: transnational capital.



If the Fregean conflation of two kinds of sense did no more than undermine the development of a rich form of semantics, the same cannot be said of the conflation of digital sense with social meaning in accounts of the postmodern. For here the separation of reference from sense and the elimination of deixis have far-reaching political effects. Once we accept the representation of meaning by formal means, as for instance by the digital bitstream, we have given away the possibility of critique. For critique requires the specifics of historical background (reference) and the specific circumstances of utterance (deixis). Without these, political programmes are interchangeable, in fact, we could not even identify them. As a result, where the syntax of indifferent differentiation dictates its calculus structure to semantics, resulting in the abandonment of engaged reference and utterance, there cannot be any cohesive position from which to confront the highly motivated semantics of the market. This is why Derrida's recent statement concerning justice is not postmodern: 'If anything in undecon-

structable, it is justice'. (Derrida 1994:36) Nor can the 'differend' be resolved at the level of syntax. (Lyotard 1988)

The analysis of the basis of the postmodern cannot stop at the identification of its syntax of indifferent differentiation. It needs to search for the conditions which make this syntax not only attractive, but so very useful. What we will find is that the actual control structure of the postmodern is not a syntax at all. Rather, the postmodern control mechanisms lie within the well organized semantics of international capital, in which mere differentiation and its current technical expression, the binary digital, act as both a vast and highly efficient retrieval system and an attractive screening syntax against critical analysis.

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A SCENT OF PARADISE

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1. It is probably a unique feature of occidental culture that the search for first truth, which would be neither mythical nor religious, has played such a prominent role in its history. Philosophy has provided crucial contributions to the moulding of this feature of the west. This essay looks at the relevance of the linguistic turn in reshaping the promises of the philosophers' quest.

2. For all their differences, Plato and Aristotle agreed that philosophical knowledge must be about things that are, to quote Plato, "always, unchanged, unaltered" and that "any precise and exact truth attaches to things ... free from change". (*Philebus* 59c, 59a-b.) Plato and Aristotle also agreed that philosophy must be, to use a modern phrase, relentlessly discursive - i.e. that in philosophy no ungrounded assumptions ought to be accepted. (Cf. *Republic*, 510b-511d, *Metaphysics* 1006a.)

These two ideals do not fit well together. Plato's solution was to rely on an intuitive vision of higher reality. The problem with this influential idea is that it requires that philosophy gives up the ideal of discursive accessibility. Aristotle realized this. He therefore suggested that philosophers should give up intuition concerning a higher plane of reality and try to understand being, because if we understand being we understand something that is part of all understanding. We then reach universal, and hence, in a new sense, first knowledge. (*Metaphysics* IV.1-3., VI.1. and XI.3.) Later it has been shown that Aristotle's programme can't be realized because there is no core meaning of "being" which encompasees all the varieties of meaning of this interesting concept. (See Tugendhat 1992.) Later models of philosophy have only provided varieties on Plato's and Aristotle's themes.

The conclusion, or the scandal, is that philosophers have not, despite 2400 years of effort, been able to explain how we might gain access to truth, which would be "first" (universal, foundational or both) but still discursively accessible. This scandal explains the appeal of the linguistic turn in philosophy during the past hundred years: When philosophers reflect on language they do not rely on empirical evidence, nor do they resort to intuitive insights. In reflection on language philosophy is therefore simultaneously a priori and equally accessible to all.

The problem, however, is that with the turn to language, philosophy must give up its claims to higher truth, or first knowledge. Or so it seems.

3. Here is the short argument for this thesis. Philosophy after the linguistic turn reflects on concepts, on their meaning and relations, through reflection on language. Language has an ongoing history. Hence, we may conclude, the understanding provided by philosophy after the linguistic turn is an understanding of something contingent and changing.

It has often been claimed that this argument is self-refuting: in making it we have to assume that the claims, that all reflection on language is reflection on contingent matters and that there is no essence of meaning beyond what grammatical investigations shows, are not contingent.

The objection does not hold. The sense of the distinction between the universal and contingent is given in language. We can gain understanding of its significance through reflection on the meaning of the concepts involved, i.e., by

paying attention to how the concepts are used, to how they matter, to what difference they make, and to how they link up with other concepts and with practice; with what people do and how people live. In such investigation there is no appeal to essences or meta-concepts and therefore no circularity. (See Wittgenstein 1953 and 1969.)

That is how the linguistic turn can make philosophy discursively accessible through and through. But the price philosophy has to pay is, people have thought, that it gives up its ambition to reach higher truth; truth that, as it were, takes us beyond the contingencies of history.

4. Remarkably, most linguistic philosophers have been aghast at this prospect. The most influential effort to preserve "first philosophy" starts with the assumption that that there is some feature of language - assertion or predication are the usual candidates - which is necessary or universal and argues that a philosophical (semantic) theory of how assertions can have meaning will be able to take the place of first philosophy. (Cf. Quine 1960, Tugendhat 1976, Dummett 1992.)

In this figure of argumentation, however, the problem of the accessibility of the foundational claims reappears. The question is: how do we have access to the first assumptions of semantics? If we give up intuition as a source of insight we may want to reflect on the meaning of the notions used to make the foundational claims by reflecting on the rules governing their use in lanaguage. But then we leave the realm of eternal truth and land right back in investigations of a contingently shaped material.

Astonishingly, few philosophers of language have bothered to meet this criticism, even though it was made with such clarity and rigour in Wittgenstein's later work. A fine exception is Michael Dummet who has sought to defend the idea of theoretical semantics as a first philosophy against Wittgenstein's challege. (Dummett 1987 and 1992)

5. Dummett, in one of his arguments, draws on the simple observation that in ordinary discourse we make a distinction between truth and convention, between what we usually say (believe) and what we are justified in saying (believing). Dummett notes that Wittgenstein accepts and makes use of this distinction. (1987, p. 198, 1992, p. 160.) He goes on to assert that the distinction is only possible if we have a certain theoretical apparatus. This theoretical apparatus must be something like a theory of meaning. Ergo: Wittgenstein surreptitiously relies on a theory, the possibility of which he rejects. (1992, pp. 160-164)

The weakness in Dummett's argument is this: Dummett does not give any arguments to show that the distinction between truth and convention is dependent on theory or implicit theoretical assumptions. He only claims they are. To understand why this claim need not be convincing I will try to lay bare some of its preconditions.

Let us look first at the concrete example Dummett supplies to illustrate his argument: Can we attribute thoughts to animals? Or, is it or is it not correct to say about a dog "He understands every word". - Dummett seems to be of the opinion that it must either be true or false that a dog understands every word, or that animals can have thoughts. But why is that? - Is it because there *must* be a state of affairs that decides the matter. But how could we know? - We could of course bring in naturalistic dogma to settle the matter. (Cf Quine 1960 and 1969.) But that would only plunge us back in a philosophy that starts with

intuition about foundational matters, and we would have achieved nothing as compared with Plato.

We might ask what evidence one could rely on to decide the question: "Can this dog understand every word you say?" Let us say we decide to give the dog a nice piece of meat, prepared with a suitable lethal poison undetectable to the dog's senses. Simultaneously we explain to the dog that the meat is poisonous. If the dog eats the meat and dies she has not understood. - But, of course, it could be maintained that the poor dog did understand, but committed suicide. Which is only to say what already Plato knew: that we can not turn to empirical evidence as a source of first knowledge. - We could also seek for linguistic (or "grammatical") evidence and point out, for instance, differences between what we (usually) take dogs and people to understand. (CF. Wittgenstein, 1953, part I, # 25, part II, p. 174.) But in this case it could be maintained that whatever grammatical evidence we find is due to prejudice only - that *my* dog certainly understands all *that*. Which, again, is only a way of noting that no piece of grammatical evidence can be rock-bottom. In both kinds of investigations - empirical and grammatical - we rely on certain criteria, on certain rules. In both cases any investigations will leave room for doubt. - Only if we presuppose that the distinction between conventional and justified belief is dependent on the possibility of absolute, irrefutable knowledge is there a problem here.

We can put the argument even more bluntly. Dummett, like many other philosophers, wants philosophy to give us the essence of truth, or of meaning, thought or some other enigmatic phenomenon. And the problem is that he has not been able to explain how we could have access to the kind of thing he is searching for, nor is it clear what it is that we would be looking for in such an investigation. - When my brother and I go trout-fishing on the Baltic a friend always asks us how we know that it is trout we are fishing for, since we never catch anything. Yet, we are confident that we know what it would be to have success in this difficult mission. But does Dummett know what his trout looks like?

Dummett also argues that it is a fact that "anyone who has a mastery of language is able to understand an infinity of sentences ... This fact can hardly be explained otherwise than by supposing that each speaker has an implicit grasp of a number of general principles governing the use in sentences of the words of the language." (1987. p. 206) Perhaps Dummett's use of "hardly" here reflects his own doubt. But the doubt doesn't cut deep enough. Because what we should ask is what the word "explanation" can mean here? Or: why do we think an explanation is called for? What form could such an explanation take? - In Dummett's view such an explanation would have to find something other than use of language which explains it. This he calls "principles". But again one is tempted to ask: where is the trout in this chain of reasoning? - Dummett might reply: but surely there must be *something* governing language use. It is absurd to say that language just *is there*. To claim *that* is to make semantic theory *impossible*.

It is exactly at this point that Wittgenstein provides an alternative. His philosophical investigations concern language use, and he says he is interested in the rules that govern it. In Wittgenstein's descriptions of how language is used we gain an understanding of the rules by which it works. But these rules are not separate or hidden entities nor non-entities that he invites us to theorize about.

The case of the possibility of theoretical semantics, of heavenly philosophy if you like, can be compared with the the question of "foundations" of mathematics.[1] Frege was inclined to ask "Can we *really* do arithmetics unless we *know* what a number is?" - But why ask this question? What does it mean? What could satisfy the one who asks? - We have, after Frege, learnt a technique for reducing arithmetics to logic and set theory. But it does not mean that arithmetics has been placed on a more secure or clearer footing. Nor does it mean that we now know something we did not know before, namely what a number *is*.

Here is another point in Dummett's argument. Dummett, probably with the backing of a majority of analytic philosophers, is convinced that assertions, or something of the kind (e.g. sentences in which we make reports about ordinary, middle-sized objects), are, and must be, central to language.

Dummett says Wittgenstein has shown "no compelling reason why me must reject it /assertion, considered as a type of linguistic/" nor has he "given us any indication of what we are to put in its place" (1987 p. 203). What Dummett misses is that Wittgenstein has not suggested that the notion of assertion must be rejected nor has he been concerned that something should take its place (ibid. pp. 201-203). What Wittgenstein suggests is that it is not clear what wo do if we accept this, or other theoretical notions of semantics. That is why Wittgenstein writes: "The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one *couldn't* do. As if there really were an object, from which I derive this description, but I were unable to shew to anyone." (1953, part I, # 374.) Still, it is evident from Dummett's text that he has not noticed that Wittgenstein is not rejecting the notion of assertion.

One source of Dummett's failure to take note of the *kind* of scepticism Wittgenstein raises concerning the notion of assertion becomes clear when he (Dummett) says: "... the *general* notion of sentence meaning is prior to that of word meaning. This idea has not been challenged by Wittgenstein or anyone else." (1987, p. 203.) It is, however, difficult not to read Wittgenstein 1953, part I, ## 114-116 as such a challenge. The fact that Wittgenstein does not say: "There is no such thing as the general notion of sentence meaning" or "we can not have a general notion of sentence meaning" appears puzzling only as long as we fail to ask what such a rejection could mean. If the meaning of the thesis is vague, its rejection will not help to make things clearer. Look at the final sentence in Wittgenstein 1953, part I: "It would be possible to speak of an activity of butter, when it rises in price, and if no problems are produced by this it is harmless."

One intention with my discussion up to this point has been to show that semantics is not butter: there are problems related to the idea of e.g. a general sentence meaning. One such problem is the unredeemed but hypnotically

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[1]Wittgenstein once, speaking of Hilbert's remark that "no one shall drive us from the Heaven which Cantor has created for us" said "I would never dream of trying to drive anyone from any Heaven. I would try to do something quite different: to show that it isn't Heaven. And then you'll leave of your own accord". Quoted from Rhees 1970, p. 46.

attractive conviction that this notion is a fundamental challenge to philosophy. Most of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* can then be read as an effort to show that the notion of general sentence meaning is not a compelling reason for theory. His book provides us with an alternative approach. Once this alternative, which consists in bringing "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (Wittgenstein 1953, # 116), is in place, Dummett's search for something else loses its compelling air. Perhaps nothing worthwhile will happen as long as we keep asking questions like "what is the general form of a sentence", or "what is the essence of language". We do not even know how to proceed from such questions to a field of inquiry. We lack agreement on method here, as well as agreement on what we are studying when we are studying e.g. "the form of a sentence".

Because of all this confusion about analytic philosophy as a search for universal understanding semantics has often taken the form of a meta-discipline: The problem has been to find the right form of such a theory. (Cf. Davidson 1984) And all proposed solutions remain mired in controversy.

6. It seems then that the linguistic turn as taken by the later Wittgenstein shows us how philosophy as a form of non-empirical reflection exempt from all dogmatic assertions is possible. Apparently, however, such philosophy requires that we give up the age-old ambition to reach, wholly discursively, unassailable truth about eternal and unchanging matters.

The significance of what is at stake has, however, often been misunderstood in these times of post-metaphysical and post-modern fashion. The arguments above do not warrant the conclusion that philosophers ought to give up all interest in eternal truth or other age-old topics. On the contrary: The concepts of eternity, absolute truth, intuition of first things, certainty, meaning etc. remain deeply fascinating, troubling, and pregnant with promise. They maintain their place among the legitimate subjects of philosophical inquiry. Perhaps, therefore, a scent of paradise can be preserved in philosophy also after the linguistic turn.

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DISCOURSE, FIGURE AND EVENT

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In this paper I shall speak of Jean-François Lyotard's early work *Discours, figure* (1971). Why should this book from more than two decades ago warrant our scrutiny? First of all, because Lyotard's later works have received wide attention and recognition and it may hence be useful to point to some of the notions and ideas from this early work which illuminate those occurring in his more recent writings. Secondly, numerous authors have made use of the ideas put forth in the book under discussion. Therein Lyotard developed a psychoanalytical theory which countered that of Jacques Lacan and paid significantly more attention to art than did the latter's. Furthermore, it may be interesting to take note of some of Lyotard's views and theories from the late sixties and early seventies because of the recent revived (or strengthened) interest in phenomenological aesthetics.

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Lyotard's book *Discours, figure* began to receive a wider acclaim a decade and more after its publication. This is especially true of the English speaking countries, for a Spanish translation had already appeared in 1979. In that year the book *Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud* from 1973, which brought together articles and other materials written mostly at the time of writing or preparing for publication *Discours, figure*, was published in Italy, with a Preface by Gianni Vattimo. It was one of the two of Lyotard's books published in 1973 which received a greater and more immediate response than *Discours, figure.* I am referring to the collection of papers written between 1970 and 1973, which appeared under the title of *Des dispositifs pulsionnels.* The other book from 1973, *Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud,* brought together various texts written between 1968 and 1971. Although Geoffrey Bennington is undoubtedly correct in stating that these essays prepare *Discours, figure* (Bennington 1988, 2), I perceive their role as greater than that of preparatory analyses. They not only reveal much of the background of *Discours, figure*, and not only offer clarifications of some of the theses and statements found therein, but also illuminate some of its purposes. Lyotard himself implies that much for he writes in the 1972 preface to *Dérive*, that '[a]ll these essays could be taken as extensions and structures of *Discours, figure*' (Lyotard 1973, 18). If we read *Dérive* in this way, we can also answer the two questions posed by David Carroll. Carroll writes: 'Lyotard characterizes his first major work, *Discours, figure*, as a "detour leading to the practical critique of ideology". Why such a detour is necessary in the first place, and why, for Lyotard, to be critically effective it must pass through the aesthetic field are two of the principal questions I find necessary to ask of this book' (Carroll 1989, 24-5). One of the answers that Lyotard offers to the first question can be found in an essay included in *Dérive*. There he writes: 'We are making the following hypothesis: underneath the articulated signification or the iconic meaning which are offered immediately, the plastic figure of a poster goes by itself as a symptom of a political unconscious. It is legitimate within this hypothesis to try to localize

this symptom with the aid of Freudian categories. In this way we work at an elaboration of a critique of ideology' (Lyotard 1973, 276-7). In other words, Lyotard here claims to be developing a theory for a critique of ideology which would be based on Freudian psychoanalysis and would as its central subject employ art, since in art desire is present in a most direct way.

The answer to the second question posed by Carroll can be even more indicative than the first, for in *Discours, figure* Lyotard does not merely abundantly illustrate his theses with works by various artists (mostly painters), but he ascribes to their opinions and statements concerning art and the creative process *the same value* as those expressed by philosophers and theorists. His *approach* to art is thence inherently different from that of his more 'scientifically' minded contemporaries who view art and literature only as 'discursive practices' and as the effects of unconscious processes and co-determined by more or less mediated class relations. According to this latter view art is primarily an *ideology*.

In such a situation Lyotard finds himself in a conflicting situation which he fails to resolve. Hence, on the one hand he accepts the presentation of ideology or ideologies put forward by his radical contemporaries (which is also obvious from the terminology he employs and quotation marks that he sometimes assigns to 'art' or 'artwork'). The latter not only develop theories of symbolic economy and frequently endorse economic and social reductionism of art but denigrate art as such, for they regard it as a remnant of the religious notion of creation. At the same time Lyotard is, by following the phenomenological tradition of Merleau-Ponty, Mikel Dufrenne and the circle around *Révue d'esthétique* who all ascribe a high importance to art as the highest form of *creativity*, also on the other, 'humanist' and more traditional side of the French cultural scene.

According to Lyotard, art can never be rigorously enclosed within any sort of boundaries, for it is its main feature that it emerges as an unexpected and unforeseen event. Art also possesses a 'disturbing' quality that displaces the discursive and the theory, enables a continuation of transformations and offers truth which always resides in the disorder: 'The truth lies not in the order of knowledge, but is met in its disorder, as an event' (Lyotard 1971, 135). Such views made Lyotard into an incessant champion of avant-garde art, for here the new and hence the event are again viewed as having a paramount value. In his article on 'The Sublime and the Avant-Garde' from 1984, the emergence of an event is described as 'a question mark "before" happening as a question. It *happens* is rather "in the first place" *is it happening, is this it, is it possible?* Only "then" is any mark determined by the questioning: is this or that happening, is it this or something else, is it possible that this or that?' (Lyotard 1989, 197). The event is a disturbance and it retains its value only so long as it doesn't pass into the realm of knowledge. It would even seem that an artwork remains veritably art for Lyotard only for so long as it possesses the disruptive quality of such an event. In this respect the presentation from the eighties of what the quality of art is doesn't differ substantially from that encountered in *Discours, figure*. The same observation applies to Lyotard's writings from the late seventies, when he claims: 'Today's art consists in exploring things unsayable and things invisible' (Lyotard 1984a, 120).

Christa Bürger may be right in stressing that Lyotard's writing 'draws its inspiration from the memory of May 1968, from that time when theory and action were one, that privileged historical moment of boundless intensity which seemed to herald the sudden transformation of political into libidinal economy; his writing is "an effort to raise theory to the same degree of intensity as had been attained by practice in May 68"" (Bürger 1992, 73; quote from Lyotard 1973, 10).

I think there is reason to assume that what Lyotard had in mind when he referred occasionally to ideology in *Discours, figure* was to develop a psychoanalytic or what he would call a 'libidinal' aesthetics.[1] This one would more faithfully than some others follow Freud (but would also remain critical towards him), and would hence counterbalance what Lyotard considers at that time to be Lacan's erroneous interpretation of Freud's work. It would also bring to the fore not only the figural but the sensible in the broadest sense of the word, and hence the topics and solutions advanced by phenomenological aesthetics. Moreover, it would assert the role of the figure present in the discursive itself, and simultaneously offer a theory capable of approaching the ideological aspects of works which conflate the visual and the verbal and which, also, didn't receive adequate theoretical attention.

Discours, figure really is, as Lyotard phrases it, 'a defense of the eye, its localization' (Lyotard 1971, 11). This 'eye' refers not only to the visual as such but to corporeality, the senses. Lyotard quotes Breton: '"The eye, says André Breton, exists in a savage state"; the perceptible is, says Merleau-Ponty, the place of the chasm or, better, in the chasm itself where the place is positioned, there is absolutely no Other, but instead an element which doubles itself, reverses itself, positions itself oppositely while making itself at the same time perceptible, there is a "there is" which is then not the heard speech [*parole entendue*] , but the work of an effort of *dérive* which is a tearing up of the element into two flanks, leaving them in the imbalance of which, in effect, speaks the life of ethics, but which is that of the gazing and of the visible (*celui du voyant et du visible)*, which is the unheard speech (*parole inentendue)* (Lyotard 1971, 11).

Here, at the beginning of *Discours, figure*, Lyotard is positioning himself within the French phenomenological tradition. Such a stance probably inadvertently brought with it also the need to situate oneself as regards other views, opinions and theories. Vincent Descombes draws our attention to a conflict 'highly characteristic of French philosophy, between the two camps, phenomenology and epistemology (in France, the name taken by that philosophy which maintains that it is for science to tell us what is, the rest being "poetry", or, as it is believed, subjective expression). For phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty understands it, tries to re-establish a method of communication between things and the mind. (...) *That which shows itself to me* is measured in terms of *that which is possible for me to say about it.* A phenomenon is thus identified with the sayable' (Descombes 1980, 59-60). It is this issue of the sayable over which Lyotard parts ways with Merleau-Ponty, an event that takes place within the very process of writing *Discours, figure* and which represents the beginning of a

procedure that drew Rodolphe Gasché into proclaiming that '[h]owever different Lyotard's work may be from that of Derrida, *Discours, figure* is a monument of deconstruction similar to *Of Grammatology*' (Gasché 1979, 183).[2]

'By the mid-1970s, [Lyotard] was already established as one of the major figures in French aesthetics, having written numerous catalogues, articles, and reviews in the field - writings that reflected his interest in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, Dufrenne's notion of poetic language and the work of many art theoreticians (...). He had also acquired a reputation as a strident defender of the international artistic avant-garde' (Harvey and Roberts, xiii-xiv). Harvey and Roberts also draw attention to 'a certain thematic progression' in Lyotard's work and claim that '*Discours, figure* sets the stage for what was to be known as his drift in tone and subject matter, prefiguring the motifs of the libidinal, the pagan, and the intractable' (Harvey and Roberts, xiv). I would argue even more strongly than these authors that in spite of what many authors refer to as his 'early studies' (Pefanis 1991, 92), or ignore altogether since it doesn't fit into their postmodern presentation or use of Lyotard,[3] his 'early works' offer a revealing glance at certain references that have engaged him and served him at least from the time of *Discours, figure*. Moreover, many of the positions he developed in that book have resurfaced later on and are in fact strongly present in his more recent work. Bennington (Bennington 1992) and Peter Dews (Dews 1984, 49), too, point to such connections and explicitly link *Discours, figure* and the notion of the *différend*.

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Bill Readings found the topics of figure and discourse to be of such an interest that he devoted a third of his book on Lyotard (Readings 1991) to 'figure'. The other two chapters presented *Libidinal Economy* (1974) and *Le différend* (1983). Readings's decision to focus on these three books was based on Lyotard's own statement that he 'sees himself as having written three "real" books' (quoted in Readings 1991, 2), that is, the three mentioned above. It does seem that such a choice is not unwarranted, since Lyotard himself points out in 1984 that he 'spent nine years elaborating and writing' *Le différend* (Lyotard 1984c, 16) which brings us into the middle of the seventies and hence into the time before 1979 and the *Postmodern Condition*. This work commenced Lyotard's 'postmodern turn' (Best and Kellner 1991, 160) and, especially, once and for all ended his preoccupation with libidinal economy and the 'aesthetics of desire'.

Still, the works from the middle of the seventies onwards display a continuous engagement with topics similar to those presented especially in his 1971 book. The problematics of judgment, as developed in Kant's third *Critique* and being pursued by Lyotard in the last decade and a half by the way of the topics of the sublime, the *différend*, the event, and the postmodern, conflate what appear at first glance to be disparate topics and separate domains of interest. But the same logic is followed already in *Discours, figure* where its author also brings together disparate domains and invests old notions with a new use, attempting at the same time to avoid their complete discursive fixation. Such perseverance also explains his rather peculiar selection or interpretation of artists and the works he sometimes chooses to employ in his arguments which hardly follow the trodden

paths of art history, even in its contemporary form. Hence his use of the very term avant-garde is highly problematic (or at least highly personal) as are his examples of modernist and postmodernist painting and architecture.[4] All this becomes even more confusing when it turns out, somewhat later, that what Lyotard actually had in mind when he referred to the 'postmodern' was not the postmodern in a temporal sense but as 'working through' a *Durcharbeitung* of the modern itself.[5] It is as if Lyotard were following a path of incessant reinvention and would invest his own interpretations of modernist art, amongst other topics, with an unexpected meaning. The same could be argued about his designation of modern art by the category of the 'sublime'. In this instance it again appears as if he pursued an endless procedure of ascribing new meanings to words or events and hence of following his statement that '[t]he truth lies not in the order of knowledge, but is met in its disorder, as an event' (Lyotard 1971, 135).

We witness a similar logic regarding the figure and the figural. Carroll justly points out that 'Lyotard does everything he can to keep the term [of the figure] as elusive as possible and even drastically changes the terms used to characterize it in the course of the work' (Carroll 1989, 32). In this respect some of Lyotard's writings follow a similar logic of conflating writing and meaning. Or, perhaps, rather than speaking about a 'similar logic' it would be more warranted to speak of a similar *strategy*. discourse and figure are mutually interdependent, for each of the two notions exists in the other without ever eliminating or replacing it, and without ever achieving an equilibrium, a synthesis or a clear separation from its opposite. This reminds one of the impossibility of litigation in the case of the *différend*.[6] To avoid the rigid separation and the predominance of the discursive and the Symbolic, and to 'show' the transient nature of discourse, Lyotard develops his own discourse, in *Discours, figure*, as carrying out the logic of elusive referentiality and signification. Also, the placement of 'the postmodern' within the modern itself is a strategy similar to the one employed in *Discours, figure*. 'His interest in the postmodern continues only as long as the postmodern may resist becoming the newest, most sensational modernity' (Readings 1991, xxviii).

In what Harvey and Roberts suggest to be Lyotard's 'greatest work to date' (Harvey and Roberts, xiii), the author has aimed at presenting a 'critique of discourse' and to show that 'language may be considered as the phenomenological, but not as the ontological ground of the perceived world' (Dews 1984, 48, 42-3). The possible historical and theoretical reasons for such views have already been discussed. By steering clear of defining the main terms he uses, Lyotard put most of the examiners of this work of his at a loss as to how to 'grasp' them conceptually. Bennington distinguishes between reading and seeing by differentiating between 'flatness, surface, signification, opposition, systematicity, conceptuality, legality and the "discourse" of the book's title; [and] on the side of seeing, [the] terms such as depth, *sens*, difference, instability, the body, desire and transgression, and the eponymous *figure*' (Bennington 1992, 58).

In his later writings Lyotard obviously despairs and doesn't return to such a degree of an intentional 'sliding of meaning' except in his *Libidinal Economy* and the more 'Nietzschean' writings from *Des dispositifs pulsionnels*. The inten-

tional shifting or sliding of meaning of some of the key terms employed in *Discours, figure* is supposed to bring about an 'eventhood' of the signification of the terms he uses. But this eventhood can be retained only at the expense of eliding a fixed meaning. Or as Readings describes this procedure in reference to the *différend*: '[T]he time of the event is that which is unaccountable in representation, appearing as either the difference inscription makes to the temporality of linguistic phrases, or the difference narrative makes to the temporality of knowledge, or the difference unrecognizability makes to the institutional commodification of art' (Readings 1991, 57). In his later writings Lyotard reaffirms the value he ascribes to the event in the 1971 book but ceases to invest a similar measure of 'eventhood' into his own theoretical discourse.

Discours, figure starts with a short opening chapter which presents the three traits of the figural which later reappear as also being its main virtues: the figural as opacity, as truth and as event. The subsequent first part of the book is devoted to discourse and hence to a large extent to linguistics. The second part presents the figural and the figure through a lengthy discussion of psychoanalysis and also reasserts the link between the discourse and the figure.[7] What Lyotard is after in his 1971 book is obviously a defense of the perceived world and the figural which he believes is being taken over by the discursive and the linguistic. Yet the relationship between the two is not a simple one: 'For Lyotard, the figural in art is not the figuration of representational art that one finds in Francastel. It is instead the elements of visual form that create illusive, yet suggestive phenomena that affect a viewer, without necessarily translating as representations or meanings' (Turim 1984, 94). Moreover, what Lyotard is here continuing on is Merleau-Ponty's attempt to say the unsaid to present the unpresentable. As becomes obvious as we proceed with Lyotard through *Discours, figure*, this aim is impossible to reach, except perhaps by changing the essence of the nature of the very discourse he uses, i.e. by discarding the 'terrorism of theory' and reverting to a Nietzschean narrative - a procedure Lyotard was tempted to employ in *Des dispositifs pulsionnels* (1973). In his 1971 book these conclusions (which apparently persuaded Lyotard himself that they lead into a dead end) have not yet been drawn. The task he sets himself is to show the relationship between discourse and figure as a relationship between the intelligible and the sensible and to demonstrate that the primacy of language, as suggested by Derrida and a series of others (Lacan included) is erroneous. If language cannot 'capture' the prelinguistic this does not signify that there is nothing outside of language. Language and image are permeated by figure and discourse. These two pairs are not oppositions but interchangeable and complementary realities the signification of which depends upon our perception: a letter can be viewed as a line, but in that case it is not read as a letter but perceived as an image. In a similar vein rhetorical figures employed in discourse are not only dependent upon its linguistic nature but also upon the figural which links them to visual images and their figural and figurative nature.

Throughout the book Lyotard carries out a procedure analogous to the work of an artist in organizing his or her work. What Lyotard says towards the end of

Discours, figure about the artist, applies also to his procedure in the book itself: 'The artist is not someone who reconciles but who upholds the absence of a unity' (Lyotard 1971, 383). It is for this reason that *Phenomenology of Spirit* becomes an object of criticism in *Discours, figure*, for Hegel attempts a reduction of the figure to discourse, an 'absorption of seeing into saying' (Dews 1984, 44) and a transformation of the sensible into a mediated conceptual form. The other shortcoming of Hegel's philosophy is what Lyotard will later call 'the arrogance of the mind' (Lyotard 1988, 7), that is, '[t]he idea that thinking is able to build a system of total knowledge about clouds of thoughts by passing from one site to another and accumulating the views it produces at each site' (Lyotard 1988, 6).

In the opening chapter Lyotard offers an undifferentiated presentation of the figural and its defense which is at the same time an initial attack on those who construct a discourse from the unconscious (Lyotard 1971, 14). He adds that the work of dreams is not a language but an effect of the force of the figural (as an image or a form) on the language. This force transgresses the law, it prevents hearing and causes seeing. The basic issue is whether the unconscious is structured like a language, as Lacan claims, and we can hence speak of the primacy of the Symbolic (and in a way of the discursive) or whether - as Lyotard believes - the unconscious is 'the other of discourse, and not (...) another discourse' (Lyotard 1973, 225). The letter of the discourse and the line of the figure meet and intersect but they never form an unproblematic and synthetic whole. There is no reconciliation between the two and also, there can be no reduction of one to the other. Since the figural, emerging from the primary process and expressing desire, disrupts the secondary process, it causes a perpetual tension within the signifier. Also, '[s]ince the primary process is not constitutive of the secondary process, (...) any philosophy, aesthetics, or politics of mediation and reconciliation (...) is rendered impossible. Thus the Freudian investigations of *Discours, figure* form part of the elaboration of an aesthetic in which the work of art is seen as being "constantly on the edge of its own rupture"' (Dews 1984, 48; quote from Lyotard 1971, 384).

To summarize in Martin Jay's words: 'For Lyotard, discourse implies the domination of textuality over perception, conceptual representation over prereflexive presentation, rational coherence over the "other" of reason. It is the realm of logic, concepts, form, speculative reciprocity, and the symbolic. Discourse thus serves as the locus of what normally passes for communication and signification in which the materiality of signifiers is forgotten. (...)

Figurality, in contrast, is what injects opacity into the discursive realm. It works against the self-sufficiency of linguistic meaning, introducing an unassimilable heterogeneity into putatively homogenous discourse. (...) The figural is not so much the simple opposite of the discursive, an alternative order of meaning, as it is the principle of disruption that prevents any order from crystallizing into full coherence' (Jay 1993, 564).

A series of authors have written about the elusive figure and discourse. According to Gasché Lyotard, when trying to combine the negativity of speech and discourse with the negativity of language, goes beyond that distinction and also beyond linguistics. He then advances a third negativity which is the figural and

which constitutes the reflexive discourse of speech and the non-reflexive system of language. This last negativity, which is not a sublation of the other two, represents the limits of reflexivity. As Lyotard mentions on numerous occasions, an example of such a negativity is poetry, with the poetry of Mallarmé often being his prime example. 'It is deconstructed language, because it is a language that by delaying communication through the intervention of extra-linguistic procedures and by exhibiting the laboratory of the images causing the seductive power of poetry, accommodates what impedes its reflection' (Gasché 1979, 188-9).

Mallarmé refers to a critical function which rests upon a gap between the poetic and the ordinary language. For Lyotard, this 'gap is much more than a gap: the order of discourse maintains itself open to its other, to the order of the unconscious process. This latter discloses itself here as a figure. The presence of figures (on all levels) in the discourse is not only a deconstruction of discourse; it is also a critique of discourse as a censorship, repression of desire' (Lyotard 1971, 323-4).

The figure, originating in the Imaginary, appears in different forms, that is, on different levels. What constitutes its poetic dimension is the mentioned deconstruction, the gap, and the critique (Lyotard 1971, 325). At the same time the figural makes possible critical alternatives to discourse and the transgression of signification; it is, as Carroll puts it, 'first and foremost the opening "within" language' (Carroll 1989, 32).

The different forms (and hence levels) of the figure are the image-figure, the form-figure, and the matrix-figure. The first 'deconstructs the contours of the silhouette; it is the *transgression of the revealing trace*' (Lyotard 1971, 277). As an example of an artwork in which this figure is present Lyotard uses a drawing by Picasso. As he explains later on (Lyotard 1971, 406) this example refers actually to the phenomenology of perception, i.e. Picasso is presenting different angles and perspectives of a nude girl, and hence showing different perceptual points of view.

'Figure-form is what supports the visible without being visible, it is its vein; but it can be made visible. Its relation to the unconscious space is given by the transgression of the *good form* (Gestalt)' (Lyotard 1971, 277).[8] Lyotard distinguishes between 'good' and 'bad' form and illustrates the latter with Pollock's 'action painting' and with the works of Arshile Gorky. He describes Pollock's case in the following way: 'The formal or rather the anti-formal Pollock colors which present the movement of desire itself and no longer that of its hallucinatory object, cannot be invested with the pleasure principle; the desire doesn't desire to be seen, it desires to be lost by discharging itself on and within an object' (Lyotard 1971, 278). Lyotard claims that what we encounter here is a reversal from the figural image of the surrealist into a figural form of Pollock's painting.

The third figure, figure-matrix, claims Lyotard, cannot be seen, for not only it is not visible but it is also unreadable. 'It doesn't belong to the plastic space, nor to the textual space; it is difference itself' (Lyotard 1971, 278). It resides simultaneously in the spaces of discourse, image, and form. And Lyotard concludes: 'These are then the fundamental modes of connivance that the desire

reveals with figurality: transgression of the object, transgression of form, transgression of space' (Lyotard 1971, 279).

Among the figures that Lyotard develops in *Discours, figure* it is the figure-matrix that is philosophically the most interesting. A discussion of figures appears also in *Dérive* where Lyotard refers first to literary expression and explains that a written work is charged with the 'figure': 'We can identify at least three sorts of "figures", each of which inserts itself into the work and inhabits it in a specific way: the image which is inferred in the mind of the readers, the trope which operates the order of the linguistic signifiers and the form or the configuration of the story. (...) [By containing the figure, the literary work] can, at least in this respect, oppose to the commentary an opacity which is comparable to that of a painted or sculpted work' (Lyotard 1973, 54). Lyotard explains, following Freud and Ehrenzweig (from whom he also borrows the conceptualization of the figure, employing practically the same vocabulary as in the previously quoted passage from *Discours, figure* [9]), that the 'figural' operations 'present the same traits with which Freud tried to situate the "unconscious" order, "the absence of contradiction, primary process (the mobility of investments), atemporality and substitution to the exterior reality of the psychic reality"' (Lyotard 1973, 55).[10]

These somewhat different designations of the figures would suggest that Lyotard was uncertain as to how to use the term. Furthermore, Lyotard's interpretation of Pollock's painting could be considered arbitrary. In the case of Picasso's drawing his arguments have a certain strength which is primarily drawn from the support he finds in phenomenology. In other words, different levels of the figure as well as its designation are among the less sound segments of Lyotard's 1971 book. Nevertheless, its *general ideas*, i.e. the significance attributed to the figure and the figural, the deconstructive process of presenting the relation between discourse and figure, the importance ascribed to art as an *event*, and the critique of Lacan's interpretation of the unconscious as a language, the replacing of it by assigning to the primary processes the function of the locus of desire that discharges itself through discourse and figure, the interpretation of art as a consequence of that same desire which disrupts the secondary processes and brings forth an event that necessitates a 'reconfiguration' of our knowledge - these ideas are of consequence not only for Lyotard's further writings but also for a series of authors who found them congenial.

* * *

To evaluate Lyotard's 1971 book, it perhaps suffices to survey the concrete analyses he made at that time or in the book itself. I refer, besides his favorite example of Mallarmé's poetry, to his analysis of El Lissitzky's 'Street Poster' (1919-20) entitled: 'Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge'. The work itself, which was intended for political propaganda (the Red Wedge being the Red Army and the Whites the counter-revolutionaries), was also one of El Lissitzky's first abstract works. The work itself presents a paramount example of the juxtaposition of the textual and the figurative, with each element retaining its individual significance as in a binary opposition. The poster as a whole, besides being political propaganda, also carries an overt aesthetic potential. Lyotard mentions Lissitzky in *Discours, figure* (Lyotard 1971, 373-4), but approaches the above mentioned

work more thoroughly in *Dérive*. There he observes, in connection with the poster, that '[t]he connivance of the reality principle and of the pleasure principle is the energy of the ideology' (Lyotard 1973, 304). While giving a semiotic analysis of the poster and mainly referring to Barthes, he notices acutely that there is a plastic paradox in Lissitzky's poster, for 'the written becomes form, the figure appears to become the text of forms. There is a deconstruction of letters and words, on one side, which bears not only upon the signified ("beat with the wedge") but upon the graphism as well, dealt with in a plastic relation with the space: it is therefore figural work' (Lyotard 1973, 302). Nevertheless, Lyotard also criticizes the opacity of the poster, its two-dimensionality, and its nature of writing. It would thus seem that in spite of what he claimed in *Discours, figure*, the figural, as appearing in this article, basically is the visual and the plastic space of *a painting*. If this is so, then Lyotard really was, at least at the beginning, with *Discours, figure* carrying out 'a defense of the eye'. It is also within the context of concrete semiotic analyses of written and visual works of propaganda that his comments upon developing a theory of ideology make sense.

After a parallel reading of *Discours, figure* and his contemporaneous writings, Lyotard's endeavors in his 1971 book appear relevant primarily due to the importance he assigned to the *figural* within a context which was heavily dominated by the linguistic, discursive and the theoretical. This accent on the visible, the sensual and the corporeal has (in conjunction with Lyotard's re-evaluation of Freud's theory at the expense of Lacan's), enabled *Discours, figure* to have a rather late, but subsequently so much more forceful influence on a series of writers who were either impressed by his early theory as a whole or applied its segments to their respective theoretical domains, with these ranging from sociology and film to consumer culture. *Concrete analyses* which the author developed and expressed in the book under discussion and in other writings of that time are not highly original. If in his general hypotheses he draws heavily upon Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne and on French aesthetics in general, he nonetheless develops them in a unique and productive way which is seen also in his later works in which they reappear. On the other hand, the connection he makes between general theses and concrete 'analyses of ideology' as concerns works that conflate or juxtapose the textual and the visual is often weak and not as impressive as his general theses. The mentioned example of Lissitzky's poster witnesses this. A few years before *Discours, figure*, in 1968, Michel Foucault published an early version of his essay *This is not a Pipe* which was primarily devoted to the juxtaposition of the textual and the visual in the paintings of René Magritte, an artist that Lyotard was also very interested in. Roland Barthes published his essay 'Rhetorics of the Image' already in 1964 and the relationship between art and the visual on the one hand and their ideological impact and meaning on the other were common currency in the late sixties and early seventies.

Some of Lyotard's ideas from the 1971 book have retained a continuous presence in his other writings, with the notion of 'event' being the most obvious. Also, numerous authors[11] have found and are still finding *Discours, figure* to be of profound interest and stimulus, this is often so because it counters the predominance of Lacan's interpretation of language and the unconscious, since it is

to a large extent concerned not with the textual but the visual and figural, and since it pays special attention to art and hence to an appreciation of its specifics - which also implies an importance assigned to the aesthetic issues.

It is perhaps useful to quote Lyotard himself regarding his 1971 book: 'The anger I felt against Lacan's reading of Freud was related to the third term, the Symbolic, to which the entire field of language and knowledge belongs. According to such a distribution, knowing turns out to be framed in the exclusive form of theory, that is, as a network or structure of oppositions between signifiers. And in addition, all the other modes of, say, expressions (or phrases) have to be thrown into the Imaginary, which is the term of the lure. Consequently, forms, the different modes of the organization of data into time and space , the rhythms of sounds, the correspondence of timbres, the rhymes of colors and luminous values, the compounding of lines, surfaces and volumes, and writing as an art - all of these would be considered as formations produced by the unconscious with the aim of fulfilling demands and deluding desire. Incidentally, in such a schema, to apprehend such forms and appreciate them, as we once used to say, by feeling pleasure or pain, which is merely taste, would offer nothing but an occasion to be deceived by "our" unconscious. I considered this to be an emergency situation and that something had to be done to save a place for beauty and sentiment, given the imperial preference granted by the Lacanian system to the concept. Presumably that was the main incentive motivating the inquiry into the issue of forms that *Discours, figure* (1971) constituted. Today I wonder if the answers provided by this book were not themselves too convenient, and that it remains too close to a conception of the unconscious coming directly form Freud' (Lyotard 1988, 10-11).

To conclude: *Discours, figure* breaks into many different territories by its very procedure of writing changing as the author writes it, for he wants in this way to avoid a discursive fixation of meaning and stage the very book as a deconstructive 'event'. It may be true that Lyotard himself wasn't very sure how to proceed with the notions he created, since, with the important exception of the 'event', he didn't pursue them further or, at least, not under their original names. The book led Lyotard to the final limit concerning the problematics of desire brought about by the *Libidinal Economy* (1974) and probably previously apparent in some of the papers in *Des dispositifs pulsionnels*. The 1971 book nonetheless remains a crucial work, important in itself and as Lyotard's early articulation of ideas present in his more recent works.

NOTES

[1] Lyotard also characterizes as a 'decisive contribution to a libidinal aesthetics' the works of Anton Ehrenzweig. (See Lyotard 1989, 160.)

[2] Carroll disputes Gasché's claim and insists, I think correctly, that Lyotard's deconstruction differs essentially from that of Derrida. (See Carroll 1989, 192.)

[3] See for example Wolfgang Welsch, *Unsere postmoderne Moderne* (Weinheim, VCH 1991), where the author, in spite of using Lyotard as one of his main references, ignores *Discours, figure* altogether. In his more recent book, *Ästhetisches Denken*, it is mentioned only that 'already his first big book [*Discours, figure*] (1971) was dedicated to the questions of art' (Welsch 1990, 84). The authors of the volume *Ästhetik im Widerstreit. Interventionen zum Werk von Jean-François Lyotard*, (ed. by Wolfgang Welsch and Christine Pries; Weinheim, VCH 1991) also never mention *Discours, figure*.

[4] Lyotard, while admitting that he acquired the term 'postmodernism' from American architectural practice, offers a rather denigrating view of 'postmodern architecture', quite at odds with its factual flamboyant existence. (Cf. Lyotard 1986, 114.)

[5] 'As you know, I made use of the word "postmodern": it was but a provocative way to put the struggle in the foreground of the field of knowledge. Postmodernity is not a new age, it is the re-writing of some features modernity had tried or pretended to gain'. (Lyotard 1987, 8.)

[6] As Lyotard stresses, 'the *différend* is not a matter for litigation; economic and social laws regulate the litigation between economic and social partners but not the *différend* between labor-power and capital' (Lyotard, 1984b, 6).

[7] The nature of the link is suggested also by the very title of the book: instead of a conjunction or a disjunction we are faced with a comma that separates the two central notions but at the same time implies them to be parts of a series (as well as suggesting many other meanings, one among them pointing to the problematical status of such a title itself).

[8] Lyotard here extensively uses Ehrenzweig's theories. For some of the similarities between the two see: Turim 1985, 18-19.

[9] See Lyotard 1973, 70 and 55; Lyotard 1971, 276-9.

[10] Lyotard is quoting from Freud (cf. Lyotard 1973, 70, n. 4).

[11] See Bennington 1988; Bennington 1992; Readings 1991; Lash 1991; Turim 1985, etc.

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ПИСЬМО КАК МЕТА-ФИЗИКА ТЕКСТА
WRITING AS META-PHYSICS OF TEXT

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Мир живет в долговременном распадении метафизики - сознание конца века порождает стратегии "внеметафизических метафизик". Метафизика текста имеет дело с "телом смысла" и "смыслом тела" - именно их со-бытийностью и ино-бытийностью. Эстетическое переживание наличности субъектом соединяется с его активной формирующей энергией. *Био* трансформируется в *графо*: фрагментарность достраивается до сферности. Наличность эстезиса как движения по следу дополняется целостным образом, фоном жизни, отношением к событию смерти и абсолютному будущему. Письмо-тело-знак - развернуто в сторону "физики" и в сторону "метафизики", - между телом и смыслом вобласти культуры нельзя провести абсолютной границы, отмечал М.М.Бахтин. Текст одновременно хранит в себе природную жестовость и культурную символичность. Письмо ощущается только в процессе осуществления и каждый раз предполагает приближение к пределам. Текст всегда парадоксален.

Развертывание письма - это движение по следу и одновременно же реализующаяся энтелехийность. Письмо не удовлетворяется наличностью высказывания, ибо обращено к абсолютному полюсу как некоему пределу.

О метафизике текста имеет смысл говорить там, где нет отчужденности от чувственности. Письмо двигается как бы сквозь произведения: мета-физика есть одновременно зона разрыва и возврата, возвращения к сущему там, где указан источник. Положение страдающего мира/тела ведет к его внутреннему страданию, становясь пластической ценностью, выражением и воплощением переживания. Несовершенный мир преодолевается оформливанием и завершением, оставаясь до конца не постижимым.

Мета-физика текста содержит в себе и вопрос, и ответ именно здесь появляется над-бытие: нечто совершенно новое - над-человек, над-я, свидетель и судия - *другой*. Одновременно же появление "всег я" - это жест освобождения от эмпирической реальности, выносимой "за скобки" и не перестающей быть. Свобода над-я не изменяет бытие, но изменяет его смысл. Реальность физики до конца не подчиняется свободе создания смыслов. Но понимание природной обусловленности порождает обращение к *другому* как средоточию потенциальных смыслов.

Метафизика текста имеет дело с процессами выращивания понятий и их вращиваемостью в реальность. Это традиция "философии ландшафта", соборности и всеединства, произведения и письма, эстезиса и языка философии - тех проблем, что являются принципиальными в понимании философствования XX века.

АВАНГАРД КАК НЕСКОНЧАЕМОЕ НАЧАЛО
(к со-че(чи)танию русской футуристической книги)
THE AVANT-GARD AS THE ENDLESS BEGINNING OF RUSSIAN FUTURISTIC LITERATURE

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Взрывное, эпатажное и навсегда хрестоматийное "Дыр бул щыл"[1] Алексея Елисеевича Крученых /поэта, издателя и художника/ стало началом беспощадного выгравливания "грязных клейм... "Здравого смысла" и "Хорошего вкуса" ради "Зарниц Новой Грядущей Красоты Самоценного /самовитого/ Слова"[2]. Давид Бурлюк так расшифровывает эту футуристическую матерщину: "Дырой будет уродное лицо счастливых олухов"[3].

Сразу же начинаются сдвиги по фазе. И даже по многим... Грамматическая нелепость самой "аббревиатуры" /*щыл*/, "неакадемичность" расшифровки, вызывающее несоответствие трехсложного /=трехсловного/ заклинания шестисловному карканью и наговору /"дырой будет..."/. Дырой. Пустотой. Ничем, чреватым, как это часто бывает, - Всем. Но до Всего еще далеко. А пока..."неакадемичность" оборачивается своеволием, грамматический нонсенс - фонетической калькой /*сч* редуцируется в *щ*, а бедолага *ы* - в неопределенное *а* - в слове *счастливый*/, а все это вместе - в заумь, чреватую, как та самая дырка, многим, если и в самом деле не Всем...Материал для всего. Для всего сразу. Но не для законченных отдельностей этого самого всего. Но обреченный так и оставаться материалом, хотя и чреватый всем. Посмотрим...

Первоматерия словоречи. Материал, преодолевающий собственное сопротивление в звонких гейзерах литер, слогов, фонем, из коих волен произрасти свободный текст - из праречи, перво-речи. Из речи "внутренней". "Вне школ и систем"(*Пастернак*). Но следы "внутренней речи" неизбывны в высвободившихся текстах. Угадываются в них. И потому к ней и влекутся.

Пра-начало. Итак: от заклятия словом - к зловещему предсказанию близкой и ужасной судьбы гармонического лада и складной напевности - "дырой будет..." На границе жизни и письморечи, жеста площадного нахала и манифестанта-языкотворца. Или - купно: к со-чинению, со-че/чи/танию, со-слаганию, со-гласованию /почти по Далю/ книги-диковинки, книги-изделия , книги-артефакта. В такой книге сочинено все: буквы, слоги, почерки, рисунки, цвета и бумага в их текстуре-фактуре, брошюровочные скрепы, тираж как сумма самоценных - не экземпляров! - штук... Вот "*из какого сора*" делалась авангардная - футуристическая - книга как вещающая вещь. Но..."сором" и оставалась... Произрастала легкими усилиями Крученых, Д.Бурлюка, Маяковского, Хлебникова. Но и - Гончаровой, Ларионова, Татлина, Розановой, Малевича, Филонова, Зданевича... Художник и поэт. Поэт и художник. Издатели. Книгоделатели...

"*То вместе, то поврозь, а то попеременно*". Сначала - и навсегда - так. Но со-чинение авангардной книги зиждится на сдвигах речесмыслов и жанровых специфик. Рефлексирующий собственную работу со-чинителя книги Алексей Крученых придумал "сдвигологию" - такую науку... Сдвинутость - в исходе, по ходу дела, на выходе. Всегда. Изначально, но и в результате. Начало как результат?..Много результатов. Противоречивых.

"Наобумное /алогичное, случайное, творческий порыв, механическое соединение слов: оговорки, опечатки, ляпсусы, сюда же, отчасти, относятся звуковые и смысловые сдвиги, национальный акцент.../... Заумь - первоначальная /исторически и индивидуально/ форма поэзии... Заумь пробуждает и дает свободу творческой фантазии, не оскорбляя ее ничем конкретным ..."[4] Не здесь ли путь к наичистейшему жанру из области художеств - супрематизму Малевича? Меж двух небытий: до-начало - за конечной чертой. Ориентация на беспредметность: ломка /кросс-вордность/ линейности письма, свободное движение букв, настройка глаза на слуховое - не-орфографическое - восприятие письморечи... Бегство конкретного - к чистым, гомогенным фомам. К праобразам начал. И - напротив: шершав, занозист материал этих литографических, автографических, гектографических - как бы допечатных, безнаборных, рукописных - книг. Листы из старых обоев, только что бывших каляным и ломким убежищем для клопов и тараканов, или из газетной бумаги /"так и хочется завернуть селедочку"/ [5],нарочитая небрежност ь брошюровки... Одним словом, "антикнига", нахально противостоящая комильфотным изданиям "Мира искусств". До-начальная книга как библионачинание?..

Земная заумь? Коржавые, царапающе шершавые, эти книжки - удивительно! - "взлетали", паря над повседневностью, п ри этом ею и являясь. /Татлин - "Летатлин"../ Парили и взлетали, шокируя при этом своим косноязыким "горькогласием" классико-подобных соловьев. И вместе с тем сущностно свидетельствовали о тайной своей соловьиности. Вспомните, а вспомнив , вслушайтесь в хлебниковское /1908-1909 годы/ "Бобэоби пелись губы...": из звуков-празвуков встает Лицо. Творится мир с конца - из разрушенного. Из "элементарных частиц". От изначального... Но не только творится, а как бы сообщается способ делания этого мира. Лица как мира. /Именно так - "Мирсконца" - названа книга Крученых и Хлебникова /1912 год/, сделанная Н.Гончаровой./ Знать мир /или его фрагмент/ означает сказать как его сделать. (Но...не сделать. Начало, многообеща я, не преодолевается.) Эта европейско-средневековая установка вполне явлена в книгоделании русских авангардистов 10-х - 20-х годов XX века. Но без изготовления законченной вещи - шедевра для любования. Вспомним: цветомузыку гласных у футуристов /вслед за Рембо/. А "хлюстра - люстра в момент падения" /*Крученых*/. Или - его же - "юйца" вместо "яйца", потому что "ю" лучше, чем "я", отражает продолговатость яйца. /От мира "с конца" - к миру с Начала.Мифо-поэтическое мышление, в коем мнится целое - "Бобэоби" и Лицо "вне протяжения"... Вновь - к творческому хаосу первого дня, провидящему через череду изготовленных сделанностей хаос конца.

Так русский книжный авангард делил мир на мир книги и мир жизни, на Мир как книгу и Книгу как мир. Но и соединял - в один двоящийся Мир. Мировое яйцо Начала.

"Дух святой носился над водами..."

Но сначала все-таки разрушение. Но ради изготовления первоматериала для нескончаемых начинаний. А.Крученых: "Мы рассекли объект! Мы стали видеть мир насквозь. Мы научились следить мир с конца, нас радует это обратное движение /относительно слова мы заметили, что часто его можно читать с конца, и тогда оно получает более глубокий смысл!"[6] Ему вторит Д.Бурлюк:

"1. Мы расшатали синтаксис Русской речи, бросив его в свободную реку творческого безволия.

2. Мы стали придавать содержание словам по их начертательной и фонетической характеристике..."[7]

Сначала разрушить - разъять - растормошить, а потом, подобно Адаму - дарителю имен, - назвать, то есть пересотворить. А может быть, просто по-новому посмотреть? Но как бы то ни было, в результате: свободно плавающие сущности, вольно взмывающие фонемы, прихотливо разбросанные обломки слов и загогулины литер...Но... прихотливо, свободно - вольно. Влекущиеся друг к другу, но не складывающиеся. В нераздельной неслиянности. Потому читатель - тоже волен, хотя и приобщен к творчеству, приглашен в со-авторы. Но - теперь уже изнутри - вправе сам выбрать путь во-вне к новой гармонии, во все оружии старых средств - коллажа, "наивного" рисунка, шрифтовой готики, лубка, кустарности собственной выделки, собственным почерком, собственной опечаткой /хотя и соборной, - скажем вослед Хлебникову,- общинной природы/[8],цветозвучием стопы и поступи. К со-гласию сквозь сутемень и коловорот... На пути к новой гармонии. Но всегда - на пути и никогда - в ней самой. На границе разлада и лада...

Легко войти, а пребывать-понимать, чтобы лично выбрать, - трудно. Потому что легка отмель, но тяжелы заторы и сшибки слов, слогов, препон-препинаний.Потому что все сделано для того, "чтобы писалось туго и читалось туго, неудобнее смазных сапог или грузовика в гостиной"[9].

Жизнь в жизни и жизнь в книге хоть и рядом, но все-таки поврозь - не поле перейти и, тем более, не просто пробежать - наискосок - страницу. В смазных скрипучих сапогах... Как и положено в культуре. Потому что и жизнь - тоже в начале. как и перво-речь, "пратекст" книги. Смыслосдвигология будетлян-речетворцев - ради светов истин. Или - истины? Кубофактура

"Скрипки" Пикассо. Его же "Герника". Но - много раньше "Взорваль" Крученых... Хаос конца предшествующих гармоний .

А теперь еще один сюжет - из близких, но с человеческой теплотою. И потому с иным отсветом - в бесknижную жизнь , ставшую книгой /точнее, - веером книг-самоделок/. В бесknижную жизнь изначальную ради закрепления перво-речи речетворца-изначальника. Речь вот о чем.

В конце 20-х годов "Группа друзей Хлебникова" издавала гомеопатическими тиражами / до 100 штук/ рукописные ксилографические брошюры под общим названием "Неизданный Хлебников". Среди этих молодых Пименов, вернувших поэта /иначе бы пропал!/ для нынешнего и теперь уже /хочется верить/ нескончаемого бытия, были: Артем Веселый, Юрий Олеша, Борис Пастернак...

Это издание уникально. Штучно по своей природе. (Точнее: в предчувствии штучности и, одновременно, ее недостижимости.) Оно создавалось не только соратниками Хлебникова по перу - творческими личностями, но и не менее личностями - друзьями - художниками /уже мною названными - из круга Крученых/.

Группа личностей, объединившихся ради штучного дела: сохранить поэта в его хаотическом, противоречивом первородстве. Собор личностей. Возможно ли?

Человеческая неповторимость всепроникающа. Ею трогательно отмечено здесь все: тепло живой руки, живой кисти, литеры с заусенцами старенького ундервуда на пожелтевших от времени, тронутых порчей, потрескавшихся листах "самопальных" брошюр более чем полувековой давности. Они изготовлялись стеклографическим способом в разных мастерских. Одна из них - "Стеклопечать" - размещалась в Москве, на Пушечной, 3, куда можно было позвонить по тогда еще пятизначному телефону 5- 96-08. И все это - "на правах рукописи" /а ведь так оно, по-сути дела, и было/ и исполнялось по заказам, номера которых обязательно ставились на титульных листах брошюр. На "догутенберговских" правах рассыпающихся литер, на скорую руку упорядоченных. Опекал это издание друг Хлебникова - Крученых, нищенствующий в послевоенные советские годы и перебивающийся с хлеба на воду продажей за жалкие копейки бесценных рукописей своих чудаковатых поэтов-друзей денежным библиоманам. Едва жизнь - едва книга. Едва еда былого мастера начал речи, звуко-буквы, письма...

Началось это издание волне легально - в 1928 году. Но постепенно сошло в самиздат, составлявший едва ли не самую опасную "группу риска" в зловещие 30-е годы.

Никто сейчас в точности не знает, сколько на самом деле вышло книг "неизданного Хлебникова". Одни считают, что с то, другие говорят, что тридцать, третьи утверждают, что около тридцати... И здесь сутемень начала. Морок неведения.

Не знают? Не знали. А теперь будут знать. В чем дело?

Нам посчастливилось. В экземпляре выпуска N 23, выпущенного в свет в 1933 году и случайно попавшего в наши рук, мы обнаружили сделанную рукой Алексея Елисеевича такую запись: "Выпуски 20,21,22 были отпечатаны только на пишущей машинке и перепечатаны в пятитомнике В.Хлебникова /о чем см. в конце двадцать четвертого выпуска. Дальнейшие готовятся! 1 1/1 - 38г." Из приведенной записи следует, что увидели свет 24 выпуска. На этом и была окончательно прихлопнута эта удивительная самиздатовская акция. Жуткая гармония сумеречного, хаотического начала в его бессчетных возможностях явить многие смыслы.

Что же осталось? Считанное число разрозненных комплектов в нескольких библиотеках страны и у частных лиц. Но полный комплект, насколько нам известно, - в хранилище редких книг Музея Маяковского в Москве.

Так "Неизданный Хлебников" в "образцовом" образе русской авангардной книги XX века - в ее продуктивной завершенности, но и незавершенной открытости всем сторонам художественной вселенной, простертой в пространстве и времени. В ее общинной дружественности всех - ради одного /"друзья Хлебникова"/. Дисгармония индивидуальных почерков - ради полиграфи ческого соответствия, сделавшего универсальным "самовитое" слово поэта на пути к его многотомному собранию тридцатых и далее - к относительно недавнему - "Творениям Велимира Хлебникова" 1986 года. Пафос жанрово-смысловых сдвигов: дневник и стихотворение, карандашный рисунок и

ретушированная фотография, черновик черновика случайного - на память - наброска и перебеленная - неизвестно зачем - рукопись, неповторимый почерк скриптора /переписчика/ и безликая ундервудовская машинопись... Пафос осознаваемой остраненности - ради жизни Лица. Личной жизни Лица и коллективной жизни Книги, герой и автор которой - Лицо в круге личностей, избывающих собственную индивидуальность ради недостижимого - непостижимого Лица друга в виду будущей гармонии новой цивилизации, должной восстать над хаотической сутеменью книжно-житейского "Неизданного Хлебникова". Но уже не в невротическом авангарде, а в умиротворенной классике.

М.Мамардашвили: "Акт чтения как жизненный акт". Книгосложение как жизнесложение. Вечно длящееся настоящее - начинающееся. Зачинающееся. Не есть ли это сущностное свойство /одно из/ авангардной книги, всегда свидетельствующей о само-делании - о вечной своей "неизданности", начальности?

Новое? Никогда раньше не бывшее? Почти верно. Если бы не память о прошлом. Если бы не загад на будущее. Но сперва - в прошлое авангарда. И оно - на глаз и ухо - уже легло: вещь как способ ее делания, со-чинения, писания слов из букв как сложения архитектурных ансамблей из готических построек - всею артелью вольных каменщиков - скрипторов. Но это новое - всегда начало. Перво-начальное. Новоначальное.

В путь за аналогиями? Поищем, а найдя, всмотримся...

Может быть, прошлое авангарда - библейско-книжное, средневеково-христианское? Первородное. Со Всесловом - Всемиром - в книгочейской культуре европейского средневековья. Рукописной и рукодельной... Догутенберговское, до-иванфедоровское книгосложение - со-чинение жизнесловий. А раз до, то, стало быть, не авангард, а скорее - арьергард? И да, и нет ...*Авангард прошлого*?

Итак, Книга. Одна на всех. Все - ее читатели-слагатели: ее и своих жизней. И-н-д-и-в-и-д-у-а-л-ь-н-ы-х и коллективной - всечеловеческой. Каждый раз новой /=новозаветной?/. И тогда Новый Завет - *вечный авангард*? Ибо *наследуется только новое. Только новое имеет традицию*. Влечется к началу, самое им и являясь. Проверим...[10].

Входить в Книгу одним, а выходить иным - преображенным, чтобы жить в совестливом бесknижии. Подобно Учителю из Галилеи - в слове и поступке, купно составивших четвероевангелие. А оно - для простого чтения и простой жизни. Жить просто или просто жить? Жизнь Франциска из Ассизи, "окниженная" в "цветочки" учениками его учеников - неоевангелистами XII века. В рифму с "первоавангардистом" - в слове-жесте Нового Завета. Жить в слове, словом, в виду его. Гармония или только ее подобие, однозначно окаменевшее в незыблемом после-начальном каноне?

Старорусская книга: если ее не читать, то самовозгара ется. Западноевропейская средневековая книга. Бумагу следовало экономить - дорогая... Поэтому тогдашние читатели смывали буквы вином, а ополоски выпивали - приобщались к книжной премудрости. Потому что буквы священны: из них сложено имя Иисус Христос. Винопитие - буквопитие - словолитие. Буква и дух. Spiritus. Spiritus vini...

"*Река времен - Глагола звон*".

Однажды Генрих II /X век/ велел потихоньку подчистить у Мейнверка, епископа паденборгского, в тексте его заупокойной молитвы первые слоги в ключевых словах: Pro (fa)mulis et (fa)mulabis tuis /За рабов и рабынь твоих/. Как император и ожидал, епископ, не заметив этой каверзы, торжественно пропел: Pro mulis et mulabis tuis /За ослов и ослиц твоих/. Узнавши про шутку, которую с ним сыграли, епископ высек шутника - королевского капеллана. Но потом, пожалев беднягу, по дарил ему в утешение новую рясу.

Случай маргинальный, но характерно маргинальный. Буква вторгается в течение жизни. Учено-книжная жизнь книжно-у ченого средневековья пишется латинскими литерами. Все это и есть книга-жизнь в ее грамматико-литеральной изощренности и , одновременно, в простоте розог по заднице, когда не только "*образ входит в образ*", но и "*предмет сечет предмет*", а иссеченное слово, как елочные конфетти, рассыпается буквами...

Но хаос начала вс+-таки оформлен: в притчу, случай из жизни, поучительный пример. Начало продолжилось, выйдя из самого себя и, тем самым, преодолев пафос авангарда как извечного начала.

Или такое: двумя веками ранее. В Алкуиновы времена, исполненные трепетного пиетета к слову, - вдруг греческий *тмесис* /рассечение живого слова, как будто оно не слово и не живое, а чурка какая.../ И в это кровоточащее зияние вставлено другое слово. У Алкуина в "Послании к Коридону" читаем: "Ныне он рад при - пилигримским - зывать песнопеньем..."

Слово эксгумировано: лад - строй, порядок - поколеблен своевольной игрой в слова, но игрой по строгим правилам тмесиса, залетевшего из греко-римского версификаторства в анатомически пристальное ученое словолюбие Каролингского возрождения. Еще пример /его приводит М.Гаспаров/: "ЭР - сладкозвучные эти стихи написаны - МОЛЬДОМ". Здесь уже рассечено имя реального автора /Эрмольд/ - во имя кросс-вордного /"сдвинутого"/ стихосложения, но в виду вполне "гармонической" просодийной науки латинян - "Gradus parnassum". Вновь канон, сбитый из первоначальных обломков-тмесисов. Гармония изготовленностей.

Тмесис запруживает ручей речи, обеззвучивает его, зато, уплотняя, делает его лицезримым - самоценным. Контрапункт звукоряда. Остроугольный загад, взрывающий линейный лад. Кроссворд тмесиса - обломок молнии, назначенный замкнуть небо на землю /"заземлить небо"/.

Не град ли небесный и град земной сошлись в "Исповеди" Августина - трагической гармонии смысловых тмесисов, сдвинутых смыслов, сшибок судеб во имя одной - всем в пример - судьбы? Законченное произведение. Жанровый канон?

Но кто знает, как сломать молнию, по каким-таким правилам? Тмесис слишком правильно ее ломает... Зато обещает ф орму, скрадывающую собственное - до формы - начало.

Шифр, код, тайнопись... Загадывание смысла в слове. Слово, загадочным образом приуготованное к вчитыванию - вслушиванию в него. Загадка как смыслопостижение. Но можно ли загадать смысл? А мир? Загадать или представить? Загадать авангардно, а представить гармонично. Дисгармония загадки - порядок лицезримого смысла. "Скрипка" Пикассо - скрипка Паганини-Ойстраха... Но загадки Алкуина как матрица для всех вещей восстающего из хаоса божественного Космоса - совсем другая история, преодолевающая сдвиги смыслов ради чаемой гармонии. И все же..."сдвигология" Хлебникова-Крученых - логика тмесиса эпохи средневекового мучительного словолюбия - лишь момент, развернутый в завершенное время, запамятовшее о первом своем миге.

То же и жития святых, противостоящие бурным историям-жизнеописаниям /"История моих бедствий" Петра Абеляра/. А "Цветочки" Святого Франциска - поучения, произошедшие от гармонического слияния этих жанров и предназначенные всем. Одна-единственная жизнь - жизням всех. В незыблемое поучение, экранирующее первую жизнь того, кто...

Но здесь же и прямо контр-авангардный ход Абеляра-текстолога, с благочестивыми целями освобождающего даже тексты Писания от случайных "нелепостей" /описок, языковых ляпсусов, ошибок памяти, наточностей перевода.../ пра-речевой стихии. В результате - всецелое разрушение текста. А среди руин - жизнь Учителя из Галилеи с его почти Крученыховской "невнятицей" высказываний и чудоподобных жестов...И тогда вновь - к Новому завету - классически "авнгардному" тексту? С буквицами - вратами-башенками, вочеловеченными инициалами, авторски выписанными артистами-скрипторами. В каноническом списке и в народных версиях...Еще раз: "*авангард*" *классики* - каждому и всем. Но скорее - *классика авангарда*. И потому не авангард вовсе, а мир подобий - в чеканных рецептурных формах, оформивших начальное бесформие квазиавангардной перво-речи .

Но жизнь при Книге - где-то здесь. Рядом. Книжная жизнь. Бытующая и бытийственная одновременно. И вновь - из бытия-быта Академии Алкуиновых времен - "Академии Карла Великого", бывшей сразу как бы АН, Минпросом и Минкультом, но и дружеским кружком. Попеременно: богословские словопрения, сочинение в стихах изысканных посланий, брайн-шторминги над разгадыванием всяческих замысловатостей, веселые застолья...Членами Академии были Карл и его домочадцы, духовные и светские начальствующие персоны, лучшие учителя и любимые их ученики. Каждый член Академии принимал античный и библейский псевдоним. Вот и получилось, что Карл звался "Давид", аббат Корбийский - Августин, его дочери - "Луция" и "Евлалия", Алкуи н - "Флакк", Муадвин - "Назон", а также были: "Неемия", "Сульпиций", "Тимофей"...

Театрализация ученой жизни, быта этой жизни. Живая книга. *Книга-театр* со своею продуманной режиссурой. Цельная в своей инородности. Но - цельная. И потому неимпровизированная. Вторичная.

Театр как ино-сказание авангардной книги? Но другой театр. Не этот...Еще одно сущностное ее свойство./Заметим: массивы разнородных, хотя и предметно близких трактатов, сплетались - иногда даже с общей пагинацией - в единые своды, именуемые *театрами* /например, тома "Theatrum Chemicum", издаваемые, правда, в более поздние времена - в XVII веке/.

"Авангардный" театр как "авангардная" книга жизни VIII-IX веков. *Ретро-авангард*. Но *ретроспектива, чреватая перспективой* гармонически чистых форм. Но у этого авангардного ретро было свое - и в самом деле архаическое ретро: Рим, Афины, Иерусалим. Вновь - меж двух гармоний: Прошлого и будущего. И потому квази ретро-авангард. Вновь подобие, представл енное ради контраста с неповторимым подлинником по имени *Хлебников-Крученых*.

Античный фасад, а то, что внутри, - христианское. И все же именно фасад определял форму этой книжной учености, поэтику каролингских элоквенций. И все же античная форма /лишь форма!/ вкупе с истинностью Христовой веры и есть подлинное "вежество", противостоящее грубости /rusticitas/. Цельность учено-книжного канона обеспечивалась прочным триадическим каркасом, сработанным из "Франкского меча, христианской мысли и античного слова" /*М.Гаспаров*/. Хотя и полого античного слова. Декоративного... Все это было "пра-речью" чаемой идеальной гармонии "меча", "мысли" и "слова". Пра-речью в горниле /горле?/ каролингской "зауми", турбулентном потоке сознания /многих сознаний/..."Внутренней речью" для грядущих г армонических стилей, чистых жанров и сольных партий. А перво-речь Хлебникова-Крученых - *за так*, не ради или во имя. Сам а по себе...

Но идеал Каролингов так и остался иллюзорным - и в политическом, и в идеологическом , и в культурном отношении. Синтез не случился. Антично-христианский кентавр оказался квелым. Вергилиевская тень в свете библейского Солнца истончилась, мирская монастырская школа сделалась школой для послушников. Латинская культура вновь уходит под монастырские своды. Через Храбана Мавра - вновь к Августину, очищенному от латинских реминисценций. В результате: античность радикально выведена из состава реакционной смеси, загруженной с культурно-синтетическими целями в Алкуинов автоклав всеевропейского культурного возрождения Каролингской "пост-авангардной" эпохи [11]. Результативной, предметной. Неизначальной...Правильной, то есть единственной. Одной на всех.

Так выбраживалось сусло Каролингского "авангарда", в предкультурном /точнее - предцивилизационном/ своем бытии, суля, как уже сказано, чистые жанры, стили и образцы. И - так до нового - Дантова - "авангардного" автоклава /точнее, "технологической нитки" их: Ада, Чистилища, Рая/. А в нем вызрело новое сусло для новых чистых жанров / например, Франческа да Римини в музыке, "Ты пришла с мороза раскрасневшаяся..." Александра Блока, рисунки к "Аду" Эрнста Неизвестного, "чисто" авангардного самого по себе.../. "Гармонический авангард" "Божественной Комедии"...Но и в круге Данте мреет собственная гармония: "новый сладостный стиль" Гвидо Кавальканти, например. И не только. В творчестве самого Данте - тоже : "Vita Nuova" как "гармоническая ипостась" божественно-авангардного Флорентийца... Не говоря уж о Данте-лирике, пластично встроившего себя-лирика в собственную прозу "Новой жизни", сделав прозу стихопрозой - прозометрией. Еще один "авангардистский" тмесис, разыгранный внутри, рядом и в виду собственно гармонического жанра - лирической исповедальной прозы .

Только собственно авангард - хлебниковский - ничего не обещает, не провидит, не мнит, не сулит...Божественно бормочет. Лепечет. Шелестит. "*Как тополи, лепетал...*" На ветру. Посреди лебеды.

И, наконец, еще одна выразительнейшая картинка:

Я скромной девушкой была,

Virgo dum florebam,
Нежна, приветлива, мила.
Omnibus placebam.

Пошла я как-то на лужок,
Flores adunare,
Да захотел меня дружок...
Ibi deflorare...

Так начинается вагантская песенка, в которой жизнь житейская-школярская удивительно смешно вправлена в грамматический - тоже вполне живой - каркас университетской латыни / в переводе Льва Гинзбурга, исхитрившегося не тронуть латинские строки макаронической песенки этой пастушки/. Вновь тмесис: сдвиг, споспешествующий тем, кто хочет выучить средневековую латынь и заодно грамматику любви. Но и - сдвиг культур: осовремененной римской и школярско-книжной/средневековой /./В запоздалую рифму с Алкуиновой игрой В Каролингскую академию./ Так случилось в вагантской лирике XII-XIII веков - в "Carmina Burana": книге лирического "авангарда"/опять же - в рифму с Дантовым эпосом как средневековым "авангардом" per se в "сдвиге" нежных дружб Данте с язычником Вергилием, Данте с христианнейшей Биче.../.

Казалось бы: авангард - время кризисных состояний культуры. Но и - неизбывный момент "нормальных" ее состояний. Время культуры, время истории. Или - полнота мига с загадом на будущее? А если с загадом на будущее, то тогда вовсе не авангард. Потому что цель убивает перво-речь, которая *просто так*.

Борис Пастернак:

Однажды Гегель ненароком
И, вероятно, наугад
Назвал историка пророком,
Предсказывающим назад...[12]

Если точка отсчета *Хлебников-Крученых*, то феномен Каролингского возрождения и есть это "*предсказание назад*". Ес ли же считать от Академии Карла, то Данте с его комедией - предсказание вперед, не говоря уже о русском XVIII столетии, которое хотя и *вперед* /от Алкуина/, но все же *назад* - от Хлебникова-Крученых. Челночное время истории культуры: раньше - позже. Всегда? Нет! Все воспроизведенные здесь "предсказания" не выдержали испытания Хлебниковым-Крученых, обернувши сь квази-подобиями, хотя и с основательным эвристическим потенциалом.

Но... русский восемнадцатый. Особенно важный в нашей истории с авангардом, со-чиняющим Книгу. Испытаем и его.

Когда начался и когда закончился XVIII век? Чудной вопрос. Не правда ли? Между тем, дезавуируя вопрос, скажем так: в каждой культуре есть свой XVIII век. И значит, он - cum grano salis - всегда. Русский восемнадцатый - хаотическое пред-бытие гармонического девятнадцатого. Но и - некая, внутри себя хаотическая, целостность, пердвосхищающая лад. Склад, куда спешно /по разным причинам/ собралось все из того, что уже было на Западе. Чтобы и у нас это все было. Как у людей...Хотя бы даже и очень давних. Например, Каролингов, театрализовавших свою книжную ученость в память о "римско-библейской" гармонии в разножанровом "мистериальном действе". Классически канонизированном. Приведенном в порядок.

И здесь - в восемнадцатом - близкое к тому. Склад - экспозиция - от леденящей душу трагедии до разудалого плутовского романа. Здесь и русский Расин /Сумароков/, и отечественный Лафонтен /сами знаете кто.../, и многое иное, что было в большом достатке /как, впрочем, и всегда/ в "просвещенной" Европе. Сыгранные персонажи...Но просветительство - дело второе /оно скорее для Европы/. Больше сходства с "Каролингским возрождением" /реминисценции "Телемахиды", переводы греческого эпоса, анакреонтические мотивы в лирике.../. И здесь же европейское природознание, в диковатых /от нынешних норм/ переводах и без особых комплексов составившее целую книжную коллекцию-библиотеку Сопикова - Лопухина. Среди авторов и книг: Гильбоа и Галле, Иоанн Голанд и "Колыбель камня мудрых", Джон Пордедж и "Хризомандер"... А Луллий - в новом переводе и, так сказать, допечатно - в рукописи. Коллекция. Музей. Восковое. Мумифицированное... *Не* Хлебниковское в принципе...

XVIII век угловато нелеп: реформы Петра, но с обязательным бритьем бороды, императрица - самодержица, а состоит в переписке с "вольтерьянцем" Вольтером, науколюбие с Академией, но спервоначалу тоже какой-то не такой - славяно-греко-латинской... Но - очень скоро - с Эйлером и другими важными немцами. *Уже* Российская Академия наук...С Ломоносовым, вы ломившимся из поморского люда. С библиоманией - звонкой и впечатляющей. Все - из *ряда вон*: из силлабики - к силлаботонике /Тредиаковский/, но с сонетами Сумарокова, тоже выходящими из себя - из своего европейского, трехсотлетней прочности , канона. Из своего чужестранства. Невпопадно. *Вон - из ряда*. И - "*поверх барьеров*". Но, в отличие от французского восьмого религиозного, наш восемнадцатый - век секулярный. /Священный Синод - все-таки не Ватикан, а Патриарх - не Папа./ В от почему "из ряда вон" и "выходы из себя" были облегчены.

Кстати, о выходах-выездах. Сценических, фасадных...Театральных. "Потемкинские деревни" - декоративные, показушные. По-детски правдивые. И Потемкин, и царица знали, что все это - "рисованные задники" огромной - на весь жизнесценический Юг России - сцены. Но радовались жизнеподобию. Играли в театр. То же - и выезды в пределах одной всего улицы, но с приготовлениями на полдня. Играли в эти самые деревни, покуда не проехали эти "правдиво" нарисованные деревни. Русский восемнадцатый серьезно играл в этот развеселый театр - с притворною правдой, водевильной интригой, подражанием невпопад... Так со-чиняла себя эта авангардно-подобная жизнь, ставшая инвентарной книгой для новых жизней в ладно сложенных "чистых" жанрах новых близких времен. От неоприходованного склада к гармоническому ладу с почти пониманием того, что мы, люди восемнадцатого века, играем жизнь-пиесу, со-чиняем *за жизнь*, про-живаем мелодраму, вышучиваем водевиль... Ситуация авангарда (?) как пред-бытия культуры-цивилизации /театра, книги, оперы, картины.../. Но и - тяга к монументальной цельности. А это - антитеза к нашему предмету. Нескладное деревянно-жестяное предвосхищение складного и золотого девятнадцатого. Неперебеленная рукопись культуры, которую нужно переписать начисто. А Хлебников не переписываем... От хаотического жара новаций к ровной остуде классических образцов.

Вот одно из таких переписываний. В.Тредиаковский:

Что ж бы тогда, как пройдет уж сто лет?
О! вы, по нас идущие потомки,
Вам слышать то, сему коль граду свет,
В восторг пришед, хвалы петь будет громки.

Оказывается, это "черновик" пушкинского:

Прошло сто лет, и юный град,
Полнощных стран краса и диво...

Или у Ломоносова: переложение Горациева "Памятника", который еще раз переложит Державин, потом перепишет набело Пушкин, а Ярослав Смеляков, аж более чем через сто, думая, что пишет лучше Пушкина, поведает:

Приснилось мне, что я чугунным стал.
Мне двигаться мешает пьедестал.

(А лепет перво-речи не перелепить ни в каком опыте. Даже в Мандельштамовском...Но зато влечется к перелепливаниям: многим, разным, противоточным - противо-речивым. И никогда - веле-речивым, медоточивым.)

А "тень Баркова", которая высветлилась "Гаврилиадой"? Вот и названо самое потаенное имя XVIII века - Иван Барков. В то время, как все говорят в печатной литературе неважными переводами с французского, Барков говорит нормально, пот ому что его предмет не является предметом литературным. Он интернационален, и о нем надо писать так, чтобы было понятно всем. Здесь-то и начинается язык Пушкина - русская речь XIX века. "Девичья игрушка" ходила по рукам - в тогдашнем "самиздате". Выпадая из официальной культуры, она возвращается к допечатным своим формам /в силу своей непечатности/. Зато нормальна по языку, гармонична и закончена. Косноязыкий XVIII век вел к русской речи XIX века. А речь авангарда в речь непереводима. Она стихийна. Но томится по разноречию, полнится им.

XVIII век оказался распахнут всем ветрам. Запасники пополнялись, раскладывались в коллекции - для любования и восхищения, с приличествующими случаю воздыханиями. А нужно иное: не *чтить*, а *читать* русский XVIII век как *образ* /не образец!/ *культуры*. В контексте двадцатого - в виду двадцать первого. Хотя и в отталкивающем контексте авангарда двадцатог о. Ради первородства того и другого.

Сходства - сходу, но при всматривании - и отличия. Но здесь необходимо усилие всматривающегося. Усилие войти в иное культурное пространство. Ради освоения и присвоения его.

Поэтому XVIII век - театр квази-авангарда двухсотлетней давности. Одно дело маски в театре XVIII века, и совсем другое - маски в театре "Серебряного века". В "Серебряном" - рефлексивно несчастны все. В восемнадцатом же лишь изредка находимы рефлексивные свидетельства различений. Муравьев отмечает "наслаждающееся размышление самого себя". Карамзин, подчеркивая историческую свершенность XVIII века, в "Рыцаре нашего времени" посмеивается над историческими романами, в которых герои встают из гроба то в римской тоге, то в испанской епанче с черными усами, и каждый, протерев глаза, начинает свою повесть, но привыкшие к могильному сну, они часто зевают, а вместе с ними зевает и читатель. Потом он переход ит к обычному нормальному рыцарю, который далек от этих масок, и главной фигурой оказывается его собственное "я", размышляющее по поводу себя.

Последнее утверждение скорее высказал бы сам Карамзин. XVIII век лишь намекает на "я" индивидуальное. Иное дело - "серебряный век", искушенный не только девятнеадцатым, но и всеми манифестами двадцатого. Маски "серебряного" - игро вые маски, персонифицирующие собственное "я". А маски восемнадцатого - словно приколочены раз и навсегда. Объективирова ны. "Я" как бы вдето в них - вбито, но без этого начала не было бы и театра "Серебряного века", устремленного к новой Турандот. Может быть, это и есть первое /одно из?/ приключение XVIII века как образа культуры в иных культурных пространствах и временах? Но такое приключение, которое себя же и не узнает, потому что оно - *другое*?

И все-таки рефлексия пересмешника-простеца. Эта "маска" органически включена в пьесу театра, имя которого "авангардно"- "классицистический" русский XVIII век. В виду уже отмеченной декорационности. *Только* декорации /без иного/ обесценили бы этот век. По меньшей мере двуголосие этого театра есть его сущностная характеристика. По меньшей мере два персонажа: счастливый человек, надутый, но доверчивый, и насмешливый простец. (Простец, впрочем, и Хлебников, но другой простец. Его прототип по жизни - писатель Новиков.) Именно это и сделало эту культуру - культурой. И похожей на авангардную - тоже! /"Езда в остров любви", "Опыт модного словаря щегольского наречия", "Словарь для щеголих" и прочее./ И все это - рядом с тяжелыми трагедиями, несмешными сатирами, корявыми баснями и прочим. Но - в виду друг у друга: щегольски насмешливое и надутое от счастья. Так два полюса этой культуры составили магнетически цельный ее образ. Слаженность двойного тела. Далековатый от авангарда - того, о котором речь. То есть - *как такового*.

Рефлексивное остранение - сейчас, на излете двадцатого, - понятно. Рефлексия как момент самой культуры - тоже. Но и рефлексия по завершении. Но, в отличие от Карамзина, - в той же речевой стихии. (Как если бы Хлебников рефлексивно о себе?) Это Радищев - "Осьмнадцатое столетие" /1801 год/:

> Луч рассечен тобой света: ты новые солнца воззвало...
> Солнца на всходе цветут, блекнут с закатом они...

Вслушайтесь: какой дикий тмесис/инверсия?/: Луч света. Но...дисгармоничное окликание новых солнц со своими новыми - гармоническими - свечениями. И вот эти многие "светы" уже перемигиваются друг с другом - *светы* предстоящих жанров, которые потом - в XIX веке - будут отмечены золотыми промельками шедевров.

"Нелепое", но переписанное набело, становилось лепотою "правильностей" в классике XIX века. (А нелепица Хлебникова лепа сама по себе. Многолепа.)

Но... "*прошло сто лет*". Начало двадцатого. Гармоническое "сладкогласие" девятнадцатого обернулось "сдвинутой" музыкой авангарда нашего века, генетически (или по видимости?) отмеченного веком-дедом (?) - восемнадца-

тым. "Авангард" и "арьергард" - вновь лицом к лицу... Обновляются жанры. Появляются жанры-инновации: перво-речь гласных, "внутренняя речь" в ее первоматериальном первородстве, "наука числ" в "Досках судеб"...Кто он, Хлебников? Близкие соблазны: математик? пророк? знаток всего? человек Мира или Председатель Земшара? - Просто Поэт вечно длящегося XVIII века как вечного мгновения любого отрезка времени? Или Поэт только своего времени - первой трети XX века. *Классика авангарда* или *классика авангардна*? Творение in status nascendi и потому творение per se. Перво-речь как Про-изведение. Много произведений...

Позади - гармония девятнадцатого. Впереди напыщенно-задушевная гармония соцарта с высверками случайной талантливости /Заболоцкий, Мартынов, Слуцкий, Вознесенский.../, - кристаллами нового "авангарда" лепящимися близ аморфного лада пристойных соответствий. В лучшем случае - библиотек "Academia","Всемирной литературы", серий издательства "Книга", худлитовских собраний.

Но... "Видеомы" Вознесенского, библио-книго-сложение Льва Рубинштейна, многоипостасное явление Пригова западновосточным народам...Накануне XXI века. В свершении двадцатого.

Вид буквы - вид слова. Книга... На библиографических карточках и на фоне задников в духе соцарта /Лев Рубинштейн - Гриша Брускин/: Книга как мир /инсталляции стен Гриши и слов Левы под названием "Генеральная инструкция" - "Другое имя"/. Переименование давно бывшего - бывшего всегда: "колумбарий законов" вечного /вечно нового авангарда (?) Всегдашн его? /Томас Манн:"...мы идем по стопам предшественников, и вся жизнь состоит в заполнении действительностью мифических форм"/ Так ли? Заполнение жизнью библиографических карточек. "Другое имя" "авангардной" - неоавангардной - книги. Восстановление модальностей библиологии, вынуждающей прочтение библиотечных карточек, на которых начертаны письмена жизни: библиоподобное пере-именование жизни. Но сначала - матрицы мифа. Книго-мифа...

Авангард? Нет, конечно. Всего лишь пародийный соцарт. Безначально отвердевший, тождественный (пусть даже и анти -) соцреалистическому гипсовому канону.

Бродячий вагант из XIII века распевает в книжном пространстве "Carmina Burana":

> Если не сведут с ума
> Римляне и греки,
> Сочинившие тома
> Для библиотеки.

Книга-жизнь авангарда исторического (первой трети XX века), встроенная в библиотеку? Если ., то это и есть книга per se, книжность по преимуществу. И потому есть восстановление книги в момент ее дисплейно-компьютерного исчезновения.

Листание книги как сущностное ее свойство: в делании, просматривании, про- и пере-читывании. Пере-листывании... Начинании.

Делание /"моделирование"/ книги - одно из многих призваний гениального Дмитрия Александровича Пригова /поэта, художника, философа и еще Бог знает кого.../. Вот один из его книжных проектов. Один лист, сложенный в шестнадцать долей, состоит из чистых страниц, и на каждой с однообразием зануды написано: "См. на след. стр.". И так - до выходных данных. Книга как чистое, беспримесное перелистывание, что и есть все ее содержание, способ изготовления и образ ее жизни. "*Дайте до-*(листать) *роман до последнего листочка*". Правда, сначала - *до-писать*. Книга как листание; листание как ее - книги - модальность. В высшей степени оптимистическое напоминание о возможной безвозвратной потере, которая *вот-вот* или *почти уже*...

Книга как механизм. Как способ быть /или стать/ Книгой. Многими книгами: четверокнижием, семикнижием, (n+1)книжием...Но с тем существенным отличием от книгоделания Крученых, что проект Пригова завершен счетом конечного числа страниц. А надо бы остаться на первой, то есть в Начале.

Что предлагает Дмитрий Александрович Пригов в своем театрально-текстовом "авангарде" - Гайдпарке совстилей, кои неукоснительно отслеживает *Мильцанер* Пригов? Пасет...

"Стратегия авангардного искусства, его поведение - это разыгрывание основной драматургии *искусство-неискусство*. /курсив мой. - *В.Р.*/," - говорит Дмитрий Александрович [13]. С отвоевыванием у неискусства все новых и новых территорий для искусства. Вновь: театр, режиссура, игра...ценою утраты собственного голоса. Но не ценою жизни, интенсивно живой в виду искусства: "...я не есть полностью в искусстве, я не есть полностью в жизни, я есть эта самая граница, этот квант перевода из одной действительности в другую" / *Он же*/ [14]. Его книга и есть этот "квант перевода", то есть он сам. А мы /каждый/, легко входя в нее, должны выбрать для XXI века - для себя в этом веке. И это свобода, а он в виду языка с его относительной - частичной - свободностью. Он - склад "неоклассических" образцов /в смысле двадцатого, но в виду классициского восемнадцатого века/. А свобода - вне языков и вне жанров. Она, по Пушкину, - "счастье" и "права". Но искусство - всегда в языке и жанре. XXI веку предстоит искать. И найти... Если только и в самом деле возможен гармонически й авангард как *жизнекнига*, вызволенная в пафосе "производительного существования"/*Пастернак*/ из хаоса стилей и жанров. Из интернационального языкового хаоса - вненациональный авангард. Предстоит войти и выбрать. Демократически и свободно. ..

Но такой авангард невозможен, потому что, обещая, указует на что-нибудь одно. Попытка предсказать вперед? Да. Если только забыть о всем том, что уже - на этих страницах - "предсказано назад". Или, как у Велимира, ничего не предсказано. Знаменитое стихотворение Марины Цветаевой "Читатели газет" - ярчайший пример "безличной" авангардной лирики. Абсолютная модель авангардной жизнекниги, рассказывающей о себе самой - самое себя; то есть о собственном своем устроении -сделанности. *Книга в честь себя же самой*. Вот ее возможный "конструкционный" эпицентр:

Кача - "живет с сестрой"-
Ются - "убил отца!"-
Качаются - тщетой
Накачиваются.

Средневековый тмесис-анжебман режет по живому: текст жизни и жизнь текста - порознь. Но в виду друг у друга. "Подземный змей" /метро/ на стыках рельс дает сбои, и потому - смысловые сдвиги рваного сознания человека с газетой /например, тогдашним-нынешним - "Московским комсомольцем"/: "живет с сестрой", "убил отца"...Ну, чем не рубрики "Срочно в номер", вбиваемые-вдвигаемые в строки этой анти-газетной инвективы, находящейся в ритмическом неладу /ладу?/ с колесами на стыках рельс? Осколки тмесисов в режиме "передергиваний" живут самостоятельной жизнью - субъектно, собственноименно. Начально...

Всякие там *кача*, *ются* и как их там еще! Убивают отца и живут с сестрой... Но эти же осколки вновь магнитно влек утся друг к другу, складывая книгу тщеты, книгу-газету; но прежде впустив - меж острия - сонмы читателей газет, свободн о и естественно сделавших природу этих людей противоестественной. Жизнь-газета как газета-роман. Роман-газета... *Вечное сегодня* - без вчера и, конечно же, завтра. *Нескончаемое начало*, в котором много разных завтр.

Разорванная страница книги, сращенная и оживленная авангардным /сдвигосмысловым/ тмесисом /живою водой/, живет как речь, но помня еще /или уже?/ о первоматерии, из которой сделана, - о перво-речи... Анализ /мой/ и самоанализ /цвет аевская строфа-книга/ отождествились: *читатель - соавтор - книга - автор...Жизнь*. И их вариации. Стык рельс и гладь рельс, чередуясь, спрямляются в отциклеванную бесшовную плоскость пластической речи. Книга - целое, но и книга - сдвиг. Дисгармоническая гармония авангарда. В данном случае - книжного.

Книга ожила, но не сделалась. Жизнь стала как бы книжной, но именно оттого - универсально живой.

*

Борис Пастернак: "Ни у какой истинной книги нет первой страницы". Решительно переиначу: только одна она и есть. Первая страница... *Всегда первая* - в книге, если это книга о книге. Или - точнее: если это книга о начале книги. О многих возможностях ее начать. Акт творения. Акт со-творения, со-твор чества исторического автора при нашем - зрительско-читательском - соавторстве.

Так живет и так поступает авангард - в первоматерии материала, из материала. В его имя и в его честь. Во славу материала и в нем. Всегда - в начале, с начала. Сначала. Единоначально. Многоначально...

А все иное - при любой степени сходства - иное: квази-подобия, хотя и льстящие уму, склонному к историко-подобным узнаваниям, суляцим что-то объяснить в смене культурных масок. Хотя и не без культурологических эвристик по пути и по ходу дела; по ходу, заданному каталитически стимулирующим началом.

Нескончаемым начинанием...

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АВАНГАРД - ЧЕРНОВИК КУЛЬТУРЫ ?
(Вместо послесловия. Манифест)
THE AVANT-GARD A ROUGH DRAFT OF CULTURE?
(Epilogue and Manifesto)

This philosophical-cultural investigation is presented in two texts--the actual investigation and a digest, presented as a manifesto about the avant-garde.

The subject of analysis is Russian futuristic literature of the first third of the twentieth century (mainly the work of Hlebnikov and Kruchenyh). The work of these futuristic authors is understood as a unique combination of multifaceted artistic abilities.

During the course of this investigation the examined phenomena are placed in the wider context of European literature (including Russian) and in a retrospective which adumbrates the future of this genre. This context permits an understanding of some of the aesthetic preferences found in avant-garde phenomena.

The conceptual design of this text, in general, can be read in its title.

1. Авангард как мирочувствование противостоит гармонии человеческого мира, его рациональным соответствиям и самодостаточной целности. Отрицая привычный порядок мира, практика авангарда превозмогает усталость устойчивых форм в культуре через революционное действие как действие изначальное и живущее в поле многих начинаний.

2. Жест авангардиста это его язык, каждый раз оказывающийся как бы вне истории; но при всматривании исторически памятливым, своевременно животворящим. (Вперекор Эжену Ионеско: "Только "история" подвержена склерозу, тогда как н е-историческое остается живым". Отсюда, согласно Ролану Барту, хотя тоже вопреки, "возможность трансисторического бытия").

Это перво-речь для грядущих гармонических стилей, чистых жанров и сольных партий; но так и остающаяся при своем начале, полнящемся противоречиями. (Крученых Хлебников: "Взорваль" языка как нормы: возможность пере-со-творения "мира с конца" из "элементарных частиц" перво-речи. Много возможностей...) Перво-речь естественное эсперанто, возникшее в результате Вавилонского столпотворения, учи ненного ре-четворцам и-интернационалистами для "улицы безъязыкой" и, одновременно, первомате-

рия для формотворчества культуры как "производительного существования". Из хаоса перворечи в гармоническое куда... Но только как вектор, так и остающийся лишь указателем. При Начале.

3. Перво-речь, как бы широко она не представлялась, все-таки по меньшей мере озвученная буква. И потому перво-слово,перво-текст. Про-из-ведение per se. Это текст и что-то еще рукотворное, текстурно-фактурное. Возможность многих разных произведений в изначально одном. (Речь, в частности, идет о русской футуристической книге первой трети XX ве ка.)

Иначе: книга-изделие, книга-кунстштюк, книга-артефакт. Вещающая вещь. Результат разных противо-речивых умений: текстовиков, шрифтовиков, переплетчиков, литографистов-скриптгоров, фотографов, ретушеров, композиторов-макетчиков, художников, колористов и прочих. Принципиально незавершенных умений. Незавершимых...Лишь начатых в общем делании. (К уже названным прибавлю: "Кукиш прошлякам" Крученых, "Неизданный Хлебников" Крученых со товарищи...)

Герой такой книги сама книга. Точнее: книга о начале Книги. Во славу и в честь материала, из которого она сра ботана: бумаги, красок, текста, шрифтов, рисунков и опять-таки прочего... Или так: Книга как способ быть (стать) книгой, свидетельствующей о своем происхождении. О Происхождении Мастера (Мастеров) этой книги. Книга как судьба самой книги в ее незавершенной открытости для пере-листывания, пере-читывания, до-дельывания... Завершения? Нет!

Сызнова к началу: со-чинению, со-слаганию, со-гласованию, со-че(чи)танию книги как артельного дела с подчеркнутой индивидуализацией каждого в этой артели. Но при этом именно делать книгу, а не деять; пере-читывать-читать, а не умильно чтить...Начинать ее.

Но перво-речь авангардиста в его книгостороительном качестве отнюдь не "первичный бульон" "без берегов" или броуновский хаос.

Греческий тмесис как сознательно сдвинутый смысл и есть порядок, вносимый в перво-речь авангардной книги. Она, книга, вся на сдвигах противо-речесмыслов и жанровых специфик, рассечениях и распадах строк, слов, слогов вплоть до литеральных, цветовых, шрифтовых первоматерий. Метанимность. Кроссвордность тмесисов. Игра анжебманов. "Сдвигология" как учение о рефлексивной остраненности сдвигосмыслов.

Внешне все невпопадно, из ряда вон. Торчком. Но... в виду чаемой гармонии сдвинутых смыслов в перспективе слаженного двойного тела, оставляющего след в "со-чиненной" книге. Но только как возможность. Много возможностей грядущих многоликостей, лишь угадываемых в начале. Всегда в нем. И потому просто так.

Авангард черновик культуры.

5. Перво-речь как материал речи. Но и сама речь. Она река, в которую вольно войти каждому. Войти из жизни в перво-текст: опечаткой, оговоркой, проговоркой, опиской, лингвистическим ляпсусом, а то и просто житейским умыслом-помыс лом замышлением.

Мир книги и мир жизни взаимообратимы. Жизнь текста оборачивается текстом жизни (и наоборот). Книга жизнь... К нига оживает делается. жизнь становится книгоподобной, и потому универсально живой. Изначальной...

6. Но это не просто жизнь, встроенная в книгу. А жизнь с книгой. Жизнь читателя книги: чтение как акт жизнесложения (Мераб Мамардашвили). Но именно акт не факт. Нескончаемое дление. Чтение как деятельность, трансформирующая сознание человека на пути к внетекстовой реальности, к хаосу предкультурного бытия к предбытию культуры как творческого акта. К про-из-ведению.

Авангардный писатель приглашает читателя в соавторы, оставляя его вольным выбирать. Войти легко, потому что текст-произведение перво-речь. Она открыта, незавершена, половодна.

А чтобы выйти, нужно усилие: выбрать в творчески приуготованном хаосе ориентир на будущее. Самому выбирать...Так читатель становится со-автором исторического автора. А может быть, и более чем. Потому что он наделен правом выбора из НЧЛНРЗДельного множества смыслов своей версии смысла. Слияние с выбранной версией в запредельном бытии, Сверхкниге , которой (или которых) не будет. Они лишь возможны.

В этом и состоит внутренняя свобода читателя (теперь уже и со-автора; а может быть, в известном смысле, и автор а) в пафосе "постмодерна".

Авангард демократичен.

7.Но читатель авангардной книги не только со-автор исторического автора. Он еще со-режиссер и со-исполнитель в книге-театре. (А начал со зрителя.) На жизнесцене, на которой разыгрывается основная по Дмитрию Александровичу Пригову драматургическая коллизия авангардной книги: "искусство неискусство". "Квант перехода" (он же). Сцена все глубже вдвигается в зрительный зал, отвоевывая у неискусства все новые области; рекрутируя новых актеров из числа зрителей.. . Театрализация жизни, которая "не

читки требует с актера, а полной гибели..." Актера и зрителя друг в друге. Неискусства в искусстве. Авангардной перво-речи в возможностях пластической речи...Почва и судьба в первом-последнем акте авангардной драмы сдвигосмыслов. Вот почему коллизия не Приговская иная: нескончаемое начало противо-речий. Просто так. Ради во-век не оформляемых безрезультатностей, которые всегда здесь и теперь при начале. Вначале.

8. Спросим: архетипика авангардной книги (авангард как перво-речь сдвинутых смыслов в драматургии Книга Жизнь) и в самом деле исторически вненаходима? Нет! Вполне находима в истории русской культуры первой трети XX века. Это русская футуристическая книга в ее противо-речивых нескончаемых начинаниях. Но по видимости обнаруживается в качестве поворотных моментов в культурной диахронии. И не только. Она опять же по видимости неизбывный момент каждого куль турного акта как "производительного существования ". Тмесис авангардной перво-речи тоже как будто внеисторичен. Но... почему-то изменчив. Но сама эта изменчивость исторически первородна, неповторима. А стало быть, исторически первороден и тмесис. Иные тмесисы лишь подобья.

Авангард как сдвигомыслие душа авангардного действия как поля начинаний. Сдвигомыслие фермент, бродильное начало...Просто начало будущих фиксированных возможностей, "результативной" культуры как цивилизации, перебеливающей, переписывающей набело "черновики" авангардной перво-речи. И все же испытаем и эту "архетипическую" интуицию. Итак, возможно ли об авангарде как всегда? Или о нем же как бродильном начале истории, истории культуры?

В таком повороте темы архетипический историзм авангардной перво-речи сдвигосмыслов чреват продуктивным конструктивизмом " предсказываниями назад", загадами на будущее в штормовых волнах гармоний и взрывов. Но такой поворот далек от истории к ак череде спорящих неповторимостей.

А теперь о тмесисе. Если тмесис сдвиг смыслов в авангардной перво-речи с виду архетипичен, то он же, тмесис, столь же и уже не только с виду инновационен, и потому тяготеет к экспансии во времени к движению, развитию, истории. Иначе: тмесис перво-речи синхронно-диахронный образ культуры в пафосе авангарда. Но и в пафосе "культуры как производительного существования" и в гармонических ее поступях и следах этих поступей в цивилизационно значимых результатах культуры. Если точка отсчета авангардная инновация как сдвиг смыслов перво-речи, то в глубь времен гармония; равно как и на песчаных отмелях будущего тоже гармония. Меж двух(многих) гармоний. От хаотического жара новаций к ровной остуде классических образцов. Дисгармония индивидуальных почерков в виду чаемой гармонии. Но...авангард прошлого или авангард в прошлом? Классика авангарда или классика авангардна? Ретро-авангард? Но такой, когда ретроспектива полнится перспективой гармонически чистых форм. Если так, то не есть ли история культуры история авангарда? Ведь наследуется только новое; то лько новое имеет традицию. Конструктивность ложной, хотя и соблазнительной интуиции?

9. Авангард всегда начинающаяся "константа" культуры. Автоклав, в котором вызревает, а потом и перегоняется, виноградное сусло будущих марочных (и ординарных тоже) вин чистых жанров и выдержанных стилей. Еще раз проверим... Вот лишь в порядке предположения некоторые фазы (?) брожения в сдвигомыслии-сдвигодействии авангардной перв о-речи, явленные в истории библейско-христианской и новоевропейской (и русской тоже) книжности. Книги "Нового завета" в пафосе многозначимого слова и чудотворящего жеста Учителя из Галилеи на жизнесцене раннехристианских земель и веков. " Новый завет" как вечный авангард? Но...завет как регламент. Канон. И потому посленачалие, забывшее об изначальном. Августинов сдвиг двух фундаментальных религиозных установок (манихейской и христианской) в двойственном (двоесмысленном) исповедально-покаянном слове "Исповеди" в контексте "Града Божьего" (IV-V века). Но...исповедь как устойчивый жанр. Академия Карла Великого в пафосе словолюбивой книжности Каролингского возрождения (VIII-IX века), любовно экстумирующего слово ради воскрешающихся из обломков сакральных смыслов целого (тмесисы загадов, загадок, загадываний) в театре ряженых в римские тоги христианских отцов и учителей. Словосмесительный карнавал?

Но...учебник, по которому учатся несколько веков.(Учительская акция Алкуина.) Жизнь святого Франциска в сдвиге басенно-притчевых "неоевангелистов" (XII-XIV века, "Цветочки").

Но...каждый "цветочек" басня с моралью, И потому вновь литературный жанр. И не медленное восстановление в текстологии Петра Абеляра (XII век) текста "истинного", избавленного от всего человечески "ошибочного" и ...обернувшегося текстовым ничто, зато в полной мере словом-жестом-поступком Учителя из Га лилеи (вновь к авангардному Книго-сложению в пафосе... анти-авангардизма (?).

Но... зато без бормочущей пра-речи первых слов. Ваганты (X11-XIII века) с их макаронической сдвигологией, в разгульно-бродяче-учено-книжно-школярском актерстве разыгрывающие европейско-средневековую "бурсу" Гоголя и Помяловского (с крупицей соли, конечно).

Но... пародия. И потому как минимум дубль. Дантова "божественная Комедия" в ее гигантских смыслосдвигах Ада, Чистилища и Рая, язычника Вергилия и христианнейшей Биче на фоне его же лирически ламинарной "Новой жизни" с турбулентными столкновениями "прозометрии-стихометрии".В контексте и на фоне "Нового сладостного стиля" Гвидо Каваль канти. И в перспективах грядущих гармонических реминисценций героев великого Флорентийца. В ближней перспективе гармонических стилей того же средневековья.

Но... Комедия-кристалл. Структурированное изделие мастерского склада и гармонического лада. И, наконец, русский восемнадцатый век как театр-книга Потемкинских деревень, жизнесценического реформаторства в квази-просветительских масках французского Просвещения, но парно рифмующийся (всего лишь рифмующийся) с Каролингским " авангардом". И все это тоже в перспективе с арт-жанрами золотого русского девятнадцатого перебеленного черновика "а вангардного" (и тоже русского) восемнадцатого? Гармонически и стилистически успокоенного.

Но... вс+ это спектакли, сыгранные для многосезонных повторений. Далее русский авангард первой трети двадцатого эпицентр Всего (для меня и в данном случае исторический центр). В виду благостного соцстиля как "образцовой" соцлитературы и соцжизни. Но с просветительски значимыми книгосооружениями книги"Академии", "БВЛ", издательства "Книга", серии "Литературные памятники". А также с вкраплениями неистребимой талантливости сами знаете кого. 5

Авангард(?) конца двадцатого в России театр-книга совпадающих образцов совжизней совкниг как арт-системы, в зятой в модусе "искусство-неискусство" и в роли "кванта-перевода" с века двадцатого на двадцать первый (Дмитрий Александрович Пригов, Лев Рубинштейн...) И потому не авангард вовсе пересмешничество, за которое, слава Богу, сейчас не убивают. Но и смеются все меньше. Анти тоже самое. После и во след.

Что будет после? Кто знает?! Выбор за читателем со-автором последней в XX веке вышеназванной условной "авангардной" книги с ее все так же (хотя и по-особому) сдвинутой пра-речью в ее жизне-литературных, театрально-жизненных насущностях и необходимостях. В высшей степени демократический выбор!

Но...выбор, лишенный изначалия лепечущих опытов Велимира.

10. И этот последний выбор в виду Велимировой жизнеречи последняя возможность восстановить книгу в трагедийный момент ее дисплейно-компьютерного исчезновения. Исчезновение книги как средства и способа быть(стать) книгой в ее единственно книжном пере-листывающем модусе. В матрице начала. В ее вещающей вещности.

11. Борис Пастернак: "Ни у какой истинной книги нет первой страницы". Ровно наоборот: только одна она и есть. Всегда первая, если это книга о книге о ее началах, о многих возможностях ее начать. Акт не факт! творения.Так жив ет авангард русский, футуристический, исторически определенный. Во славу материала и в нем. В первоматерии в перворечи. Единоначально-многоначально...

12. А все иное при любой степени сходства иное: квази-подобия, хотя и потрафляющие уму, склонному к исторически вымороченным узнаваниям. Хотя и не без культурологических эвристик по пути исторической памяти.

13. И что же? Авангард черновик культуры в его нескончаемых начинаниях...

ТЕХНОЛОГИЯ ПОСМОДЕРНИСТСКОГО ТЕКСТА
THE TECHNOLOGY OF CONSTRUCTION OF POSMODERN TEXTS

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Postmodern tradition gives birth to the technology of a new kind of text--text which is rewritten over again. A work, born for the second time, is an argument which allows the second author to become a postmodern philosopher. The twice written work belongs to classic writings , on the one hand, and to postmodern writings on the other. J. Baudrillard has studied a complex range of appearances which are related to this kind of technology - simulacrums as substituted pretenses which create a presence that appears more real than their originals. In the work of J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, "Anti-Oedipus, "the authors carry out the reproduction of the Oedipus myth. But the most interesting and radical experience of reproduction of simulacrums was performed in the "Post Card" of J. Derrida. The problem, which Derrida posed was quite academic--to research one of Plato's letters (the traveling to the tyrant of Ciracus). In the scientific world there is the opinion that this work is a forgery. Derrida accepted this opinion, but the next step he made was to try to write the original letter of Plato. The pathos of deconstructive activity consists of the recreation of classic texts. Derrida wants to create the letter of Plato. The postmodernist technique of research is the development of such kinds of re-creative and reconstructive acts of writing.

В произведении "Пьер Менар, автор "Дон Кихота" Х.-Л.Борхес повествует о некоем писателе Пьере Менаре, который взвалил на себя задачу "безмерно героическую, несравненную" - написать "Дон Кихота". Не иного какого-либо "Дон Кихота", "но именно "Дон Кихота". Описание некоторых процессов, сопутствующих сочинению этого отчасти странного произведения, составляет суть рассказа Борхеса. Его усилия специально направлены на то, чтобы показать, что речь идет о буквальном повторении первоисточника.

Подобные эксперименты и анализируются и ставятся в постмодернистских исследованиях.

Ж.Бодрийар исследовал комплекс явлений, связанных с такого рода технологиями как производство симулакров, предметов-подмен, суррогатов, которые выдают присутствие за отсутствие, но оказываются в некотором отношении более реальными, чем первообразы.

В "Анти-Эдипе" Ж.Делеза и Ф.Гваттари работа авторов сосредотачивается на воспроизводстве Эдипа ("Это еще не Эдип" - так они оценивают промежуточные этапы своей деятельности).

Однако опыт произведения симулакра наиболее радикально и последовательно предпринимается в "Почтовой открытке" Ж.Деррида.

Как будто бы задача, поставленная в этом произведении, строго академическая - исследуется одно из писем Платона, а именно то, в котором он обращается к сиракузскому тирану Дионисию с воспоминаниями о своем путешествии на Сицилию, чуть было не закон-

чившееся для него трагически. В ученом мире издавна сложилось мнение об этом произведении как о несомненной фальсификации, тем не менее на этом пункте Деррида начинает свое исследование, а не заканчивает его, как сделал бы классический ученый. Он говорит: согласимся, что это фальсификация, и тогда мы можем полагаться на то, что знаем, что собой представляет поддельное письмо Платона, но тем самым мы даем понять, что знаем и что являет собой *подлинное письмо* Платона. Следующий последовательно сделанный шаг - реконструкция текста письма - приглашение представить подлинное письмо Платона, написать его. Пафос деконструктивной деятельности состоит в реконструкции классического текста . Оно пишется наново. Оно пишется еще раз. Оно пишется всякий раз, когда обнаруживается фальшивка. Письмо Платона *пишут*. Но Деррида еще более усложняет свою исследовательскую задачу. Параллельно разворачивается история вернувшегося письма, которое было послано исследователем эпистолы Платона, и теперь, нераспечатанное, оно лежит на столе его отправителя. Среди множества отосланных отправителем посланий это единственное вернулось к нему, и задача состоит в том, чтобы вспомнить - *повторить* - на этот раз уже собственное послание. Это оказывается ничуть не проще, чем воспроизвести письмо Платона. Это тоже демонстрация процесса письма как воспроизводства, как знания, демнострация текстовой технологий. Текст воспроизводится единственным возможным способом, - он сочиняется. Повторение письма в технике difference или в технике деконструкции возвращает нас к классическим герменевтическим проблемам, с которыми работали и М.Хайдеггер и Х.-Г.Гадамер: это "онтологические затруднения, связанные с принятым наукой понятием объективности". Однако в случае, описываемом Деррида, речь идет об "объективности" того, кто пишет.Здесь острота герменевтического эксперимента достигает своего апогея. Историко-культурная фальсификация подделки не уничтожает, а, наоборот, укрепляет устои того, что фальсифицируется, ведь около подлинного текста возводятся леса дополнительных подпорок, и вся конструкция имеет структуру готического собора - распор стен собора перераспределяется на контрофорсы, которые с южной и северной сторон придают готическому сооружению до некоторой степени черновой вид, и вообще говоря, эти вспомогательные системы распределения тяжести являются "лишними" сущностями в спиритуальном теле. Тем не менее, именно они позволяют удерживать ту внутреннюю божественную форму пустоты, которая является сутью средневекового храма. Точно так фальсифицированное письмо Платона поддерживает то божественное (молчащее, пустое, в этом случае) пространство платоновского текста, которое даже осмотрительным академическим ученым *пишеться* в качестве подлинного платоновского письма.

В традиционнной герменевтике время, длительность для текста значения не имеет: речь идет о "классическом", как называл его Гадамер, тексте. Классический текст разворачивается пространственно, в поле множественных смежных комментаторских и маргинальных структур. "То, что называется "классическим", прежде всего не нуждается в преодолении исторической дистанции - оно само, в

постоянном опосредовании, осуществляет это преодоление. Поэтому классическое, конечно же, "вне времени". В постмодернистской системе текст - онтическое уплотнение, формальная причина многих других текстов, и в то же время их необязвтельный фрагмент. В постмодернистской структуре производства не текст, а письмо обладает достоверностью. Потому, как часто замечают постмодернистские "читатели", эти тексты пишутся не для тех, кто читает, а для тех, кто читает, чтобы писать, и потому критика в традиционном смысле - как работа с определенным содержанием, в котором имеется (или куда привносится) иерархия существенных, акцидентальных и вообще как либо иначе классифицируемых признаков, не имеет места в постмодернистском дискурсе. Письмо является подлинным источником постмодернистских актов. (В этом плане письмо Пьера Менара ничем не уступает письму Сервантеса, они являются равноценными и совершенными произведениями, ибо оба дают повод иному письму, они являются *описываемыми* объектами, и в силу этого - причиной письма). Письмо - это форма чистой длительности. В письме держатся, длятся. Письмо экспонирует автора, но оно не укоренено в нем, оно децентрировано и в постмодернистском письме текст пишется из множественных центров одновременно: текст пишется и тут же переписывается. Текст сохраняет форму письма, потому можно сказать, что в постмодернистском тексте присутствуют два автора (оба автора "Дон Кихота"). Текст постоянно пишется, ведется, в нем нет пустот, он непрерывен6 он постоянно расширяется, и в принципе, он анонимен, - и письмо Платона может написать за него всякий, кто возьмется за себя этот труд. В России есть опыт создавания таких текстов, которые трассированы следами вошедшего в них письма. Это прежде всего тексты орбэриутовского цеха. Можно применять к обэриутовскому письму самые различные стратегии чтения. Можно видеть в них некоторого рода абсурдистскую машину, производящую слова-псевдо-Логосы, и читать эти тексты в плоскости теории абсурда. Можно видеть в них развернутую программу апосмастического, т.е. принципиально фрагментарного письма, тогда открывается интересная перспектива исследования произведений обэриутов с точки зрения сосуществования онтических форм, не скрепленных общими онтологическими предпосылками. Можно придерживаться иронической стратегии чтения разрабатывать теорию маргинального письма, т.е. видеть как пишется обэриутовский текст на полях сплошь детерминированного текста довоенной советской официальной культуры. Но во всяком случае окажется, что этот текст не терпит пустоты, он повторяет один и тот же сюжет в одном произведении несколько раз по принципу апорийного суждения, где в качестве составных частей его выступают текст(как готовое произведение) и письмо (как процесс его создания).

"Существование нашей Вселенной образует три "ничто" или, отдельно сами по себе, три несуществующих "нечто": пространство, время и еще нечто, что не является ни временем, ни пространством.

23. Время, в своей сущности, едино, однородно, и потому не существует.

24. Пространство, в своей сущности, едино, однородно и непрерывно, и потому не существует.

25. Но как только пространство и время приходят в некоторое враимоотношение, они становятся препятствием друг другу и начинают существовать" (Д.Хармс. О времени, о пространстве, о существовании.)

"Все, что я здесь пытаюсь написать о Времени, является строго говоря неверным. Причин этому две. 1) Всякий человек, который хоть сколько нибудь не понял время, а только непонявший хотя бы немного понял его, должен перестать понимать все существующее. 2) Наша человеческая логика, и наш язык не соответствуют времени, ни в каком ни в элементарном ни в сложном его понимании. Наша логика и наш язык скользят по поверхности времени. Тем не менее, м.б. что-нибудь можно попробовать и написать если не о времени, не по поводу непонимания времени, то хотя бы попробовать установить те некоторые положения нашего поверхностного ощущения времени, и на основании их нам может стать ясным путь в смерть, и в сумрак, в Широкое непонимание." (А.Введенский. Серая тетрадь.)

"Теперь перехожу к Леониду Савельевичу Липавскому. Он не постеснялся сказать мне в лицо, что ежемесячно сочиняет десять мыслей.

Во-первых, врет. Сочиняет не десять, а меньше.

А во-вторых, я больше сочиняю. Я не считал, сколько я сочиняю в месяц, но должно быть, больше, чем он...

Я вот, например, не тычу всем в глаза, что я обладаю, мол колоссальным умом. У меня есть все данные считать себя великим человеком. Да, впрочем, я себя таким и считаю.

Почему-то мне и обидно, и больно находиться среди людей, ниже меня поставленных по уму, и прозорливости, и таланту, и не чувствовать к себе должного уважения.

Почему, почему я лучше всех." (Д.Хармс. Я решил растрепать одну компанию). У обэриутов отсутствуют слова-логосы,внеположные тексту. Потому всякий комментарий сам оказывается обэриутовским текстом. Всякое письмо записывается на "ленту Мебиуса", почему в сочинениях обэриутов не различить что внутренее, что внешнее, иронические знаки наносятся на текст первого порядка, и он изначально становится в оппозицию к самому себе. Письмо, которое находится в наибольшем соприкосновении со стихией языка, выталкивая и кристаллизуя структуру текста, в обэриутовском письме - стихия не разрушительная, но "учтенная", вписанная в текст. Пространство обэриутовского текста все заполнено, в нем нет пустот (ниш для комментария, маргиналии, цитаты, диалога). Текст совпадает с письмом. Язык как изначальное место текста, вместилище, как неготовое (неструктурирован-ное) пространство мысли как знак отсутствия предела непишущему внешнему наблюдателю. Возникает в этой связи единственный вопрос: как можно удержаться в этом режиме письма-жизни производства текста.

ЗНАНИЕ, ВЛАСТЬ, КАПИТАЛ И ЛИБИДО
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Философия склонна к поискам абсолютного действия даже после крушения универсальной парадигмы.В постклассическую эпоху вместо сознания стали утверждаться иные опоры объяснения,такие как труд и коммуникация,власть и либидо.Среди них наиболее сильные, впечатляющие изменения произвел психоанализ. Его представителями был обнаружен тайный исток "человеческого", генеалогия которого уперлась в инстинкты, считавшиеся преодоленными духом. Дом сознания оказался надстроенным сверху и оборудованным погребом: внизу располагался мощный парогенератор, производящий желания, а сверху-надзирающая и разрешающая инстанция, распределяющая и регулирующая давление пара наподобие клапана Уатта. Таким образом между самыми фундаментальными феноменами человеческого бытия обнаружилась весьма тесная связь, а философии пришлось иметь дело с плотной сетью сплетенной из разнородных нитей и капилляров, по которым циркулировала и обменивалась энергия либидо.

Кто господствует над этой энергией, кто держит в своих руках кончики нитей? Но и этот вопрос, вызваный прежними амбициями на абсолютное, уже не может считаться корректным: даже если есть нечто или некто использующий сеть различий для управления, то он настолько слит с нею, что не имеет иных органов и орудий и не обладает каким-то отдельным "сознанием" или "телом." Человек с его сознанием или бессознательным, с его доброй или злой волей, с его свободой и ответсвенностью и прочими субстанциальными качествами, человек наделенный "природой" или "сущностью", ориентированный вечными идеями или ценностями стал стремительно закатываться за горизонт и взамен его взошло нечто новое, что уже и светилом назвать нельзя, ибо это нечто аморфное, незаметное, и всепроникающее как сама повседневность.Положение современной философии напоминает физику начала века, когда исчезли система неподвижных звезд, а вместе с ними твердые масштабы и абсолютные измерения. Сегодня как кажется не существует универсального эталона и невозможны однозначные решения: философия перестает претендовать на управление обществом, не дает советов как жить и не ищет абсолютных истин.

Налицо кризис идеи человека, кризис ориентирования и как общее следствие - поначалу кажущихся рациональными отдельных критик - кризис культуры.Сравнивая классику и современность, нельзя не заметить распада абсолютных ценностей и легитимации множественности разнообразных форм жизни. Неудивительно, что причину нынешнего положения усматривают в релятивизме и нигилизме, в неве-

рии и беспочвенности. В новых условиях существования, когда разрушается порядок и власть кровно-родственных связей, когда деградируют религиозные, национальные ценности, человеку не на что опереться и он стремительно маргинализируется. Постомодернизм представляет собой, несмотря на кажущуюся необычность своих построений, в сущности старую стратегию превращения недостатка в достоинство, трансформации исторического и прагматического в трансцендентальное. Отличие стратегии определяется тем, что на место рыцарей веры, знания, труда или капитала на авансцену истории выдвинулся "номад" - новый тип кочевника, интеллектуального бродяги, философа-туриста, порожденный феноменом больших городов.

Путешествия фланеров и философов по коммуникативным джунглям современного мира однако не обнаружили ничего нового. Странствующие идеалисты все также сильно напоминали христианских миссионеров или колонизаторов. Хотя они не несли огнем и мечом истину, а искали её в экзотическом и историческом состоянии чужих народов, однако то, что находили было так сказать контрабандным товаром, миновавшим таможенный досмотр саморефлексии. Примером тому были В.Беньямин, А.Жид и др. интеллектуалы приезжавшие в социалистическую Россию в поисках воплощенной мечты как когда-то миссионеры, искавшие земной рай или мифическую страну пресвитера Иоанна на Востоке. И сегодня такой тип интеллектуальных туристов является достаточно распространенным так как с Запада приезждают в поисках либо русской идеи, либо особо изощренного постмодерна.

И все-таки в заметках новых "номадов" проявляется нечто новое, которое постепеннно проявляется при их прочтении и оно состоит в понимании того, что чужого в сущности и нет: везде чужое оказывается порождением своего и поэтому так похожим на него.Везде есть повседневность и, несмотря на отличие структур, можно сказать, что люди опутаны сетями её порядков гораздо прочнее, чем какими-либо политическими институтами, большинство из которых к тому же коренится в репрессивных отношениях жизненного мира.

Повседневность обычно представляется как совокупность норм, ценностей, традиций, обычаев, коммуникативных правил и символических образов, которые различают и запрещают или выделяют и рекомендуют обычные формы поведения, реагирования, ориентирования, словом, полагают то, что можно и нельзя, хорошо и плохо, красиво и некрасиво, истинно и ложно. Сегодня повседневный мир взаимодействия людей пристально изучается теоретиками с целью поиска оснований собственных концептуальных моделей и практиками ищущими более эффективных способов управления людьми. Большая пресса, реклама, литература и кино - все эти формы производства массового сознания стремятся найти путь к повседневности и ,если можно, паразитировать на доверии к её помогающим выживать нормам и символам или преобразовать повседневные привычки и желания в соответствии с производимыми материальными или духовными продуктами.

Ведущей структурой организации посведневного, а вместе с этим и культурного порядка современности уже давно выступает экономия и обмен. Это обстоятельство впервые ярко обнаружилось при анализе триадических схем гегелевской диалектики, в которых познание предстало в категориях присвоения и обмена, и о чем бы Гегель ни говорил после так называемого Иенского периода своей эволюции, все было отмечено печатью экономии, которую он оценил гораздо выше любви, связанной с даром и жертвой, прощением и покаянием и т. п. феноменами, с которыми он связывал большие надежды в своем раннем творчестве.

Это обстоятельство было отмечено разными мыслителями и кроме Лукача и Адорно также А.Кожевым, как оказалось пропустившем через свой семинар большинство из тех, кого причисляют сегодня к основоположникам постмодернисткого движения. Наиболее сильное влияние эти семинары оказали на Батая, который, по мнению Ж.Деррида,"воспринял Гегеля всерьез"[1], осмыслив его идею в тотальности и не нарушая последовательности и строгости её движения.Сутью господства у Гегеля выступает решимость оплатить его ценой собственной жизни. Рискуя жизнью, господин может выиграть наслаждение или погибнуть. Но истина господина заключена в рабе. Будучи опосредован рабским признанием, господин обретает собственное самосознание. Суть же рабского сознания, по Гегелю, заключается в его опосредованности "вещью", которую он однако может "орицать" не потреблением и наслаждением, а трудом и обработкой, тем самым табуируя наслаждение и откладывая потребление. И если марксистская критика сосредоточивала свое внимание на том, что господство рабского сознания вызвано тем, что именно раб производит то, что потребляет господин, то Батай высмеивает "экономическое" отношение раба к жизни. Раб дорожит и бережет то,что господин делает ставкой в игре. Если Ницше и не читал Гегеля, то в своей "генеалогии" до этого момента он как бы повторил написанное в "Феноменологии духа". Однако и далее, несмотря на расхождение в оценке случившегося, рассуждения Гегеля, Ницше и Батая остаются аналогичными. Гегель показывает "диалектическую" необходимость господства раба, состоящую в том, что господин "признает" правду рабского сознания и это приводит к тому, что он бережет жизнь, которая ему дана. Ницше в поисках "истока"современной морали приходит к тайной победе слабых над сильными и открытию зависти (Resentiment) в качестве источника христианской религии. Батай видит причину экономически-расчетливого отношения к жизни в уловке разума, который побеждает исходное и подлинное отношение к жизни как воле к власти. Благодаря хитрости разума жизнь перестает быть биологической, природной, она становится работой снятия

влечений и образования смыслов. Это экономческое отношение обескровливает и обессмысливает жизнь, сводя её к самосохранению, к круговому обращению, самовоспроизведению и цепочкам обмена.Подчиненная разуму жизнь утрачивает смысл и более того оказывается принесенной в жертву,по сути дела растраченной впустую. Поскольку господство оказывается мнимым и приводит к господству над самим собой, поскольку Батай в поисках изначального опыта свободы ставит на абсолютную суверенность, противопоставляя её господству, подчиненному рациональной экономии. Суверенный человек "делает то, что ему нравится, что доставляет ему удовольствие" [2]. Но такое бытие суверенности не может получить выражения в означающем дискурсе, который открывает смысл исключительно в полезности и целерациональности. "Человек,- заканчивает свою статью Батай,- всегда ищет подлинную суверенность. По всей видимости он имел её изначально, но, вне всякого сомнения, это было с ним не сознательно, так, что в некотором смысле он и не имел её, она уклонилась от него. И мы увидим, что он по разному преследовал то, что уклонялось от него. Ибо главное заключается в том, что её нельзя постигнуть сознательно, нельзя настигнуть её в поисках, так как искания удаляют от неё. Однако я склонен думать, что ничто не дается нам без этой двусмысленности."[3]

Насколько оправданы надежды на бессознательное? Они созревали по мере обнаружения ограниченности и даже опасности классического проекта рациональности. Разум,понимался то как объективный, то как субъективный, но во всех своих вариантах он утверждал постоянство и законосообразность, порядок и структуру, подчинял время и жизнь, свободу и экзистенцию понятию. Может быть одной из решительных хотя и не осознаваемых по своим философским последствиям попыток преодоления господства мысли и логики над временем и бытием была теория эволюции Дарвина. Исторические попытки объяснения развития природы были вполне аристотелевскими ибо в них предполагалась неизменность биологических родов и видов, отношения между которыми строились по схемам родовидовой логики. Дарвин преодолевает жесткое противопоставление материи и формы тем, что использует для объяснения изменения видов случайные отклонения на уровне индивидуальных особей. Кажущиеся аномальными, они в новых изменившихся условиях среды становятся условиями выживания и таким образом закрепляют изменение вида. С философской точки зрения важнейшим достижением Дарвина является принципиально новое понимание времени и жизни: если раньше они моделировались наподобие гомогенного пустого пространства ньютоновской физики, то теперь обретают собственую энергетику. Не понятие определяет время, а наоборот время вызывает мысль, порождает изменение смыслов.Это обстоятельство, как кажется, сильно повлияло на генеалогический метод Ницше, для которого идея зарождения во времени стала одной из главных и который подобно Дарвину, выводившему

происхождение человека из "обезьяны", т.е.из нечеловеческого,увидел исток морали в аморальном,закона в вине, а добра в нечистой совести.

Ницше подготовил переход и сам немало сделал для того, чтобы заменить рефлексивную философию, ориентированную на реконструкцию чистых идей, исследованием истории телесности. Он показал, что у каждого духа есть свое тело и что основой европейского духа является больное, перверсивное тело. С этим нельзя не согласиться. Даже мы, упрекающие себя за изнеженность и излишества, очевидно превосходим по части аскезы христианских святых, закапывавшихся в землю или проживающих на вершинах скалы, питающихся хлебом и водой. Кто из них, имевших по крайней мере греховные желания, смог бы так усердно сидеть за письменным столом, стоять у конвейера или так бессмысленно проводить время в пивной? Но работа над телом не сводится к ограничениям и выступает как производство новых желаний и органов.

Если классическая философия считала разум господствующей и контролирующей аффекты инстанцией в человеке, то романтическая установка разрабатывала своеобразную "метафизику экстаза", согласно которой спонтанная чувственность ближе к природе, она в принципе не подлежит искажающему воздействию власти и стало быть выступает опорой истины и подлинного бытия. Понятие бессознательного как модус экстатического и внерационального, как выражение стратегии воли к жизни, которую сковывают знание и мораль, первоначально разрабатывалось в русле этой традиции. Даже Ницше, проявивший удивительную проницательность в разоблачении механизмов фабрикации телесных органов, необходимых для существоания европейской цивилизации, выдвинувший проект культурной органологии,тем не менее не вполне освободился от идеализации своего Заратустры ибо мыслил его в дискурсе абсолютного и совершенного сверхчеловека, обитателя горних вершин.

Фрейд, казалось, освободился от метафизических установок и естественнонаучным образом приступил к изучению архипелага бессознательного. При этом главной его мыслью представляется подход к нему как к энергетическому базису, рациональное использование и расходование которого должно быть изучено и поставлено под контроль. Этим подходом определяются функции понятий желания и либидо, которые не исчерпываются, как думали некоторые исследователи психоанализа, возрождением понятия природы. В нём можно выделить два разных полюса: экспликацию динамики желания, включая цель и объект, исполняемый и отсутствующий;понимание либидо как первичного влеченияния в работе "По ту сторону принципа удовольствия", где этот процесс исследуется в двух режимах: эроса и танатоса. Изначальная энергия рассекается на два потока, задающих психику, телесность и их отдельные органы. Наиболее интересной аналогией выглядит характеристика этих влечений как бесконечного повторяющегося

процесса, имеющего кибернетический, т.е. стохастический характер. Бесконечное повторение при условии отсутствия единства танатоса и эроса указывает на нечто иное, а именно на то, что наслаждение - это прежде всего энергетический процесс. Именно в этом состоит своеобразие фрейдовского подхода к удовольствию, которое обычно раскрывается как чувство связанное с потреблением, созерцанием, пониманием, моральным удовлетворением и т.п.Желание выступает как либидо, как производительная сила способная к разнообразным превращениям и изменениям в самых неожиданных формах, и как энергия, канализируемая и используемая в различных системах для производства необходимых аффектов, т.е. превращаемая в нечто иное. Эта сторона желания описана Фрейдом при разьяснении принципа константности, соединяющего эрос и реальность. Именно здесь ярче всего проявляется сходство с Марксом, который использовал понятие рабочей силы в качетве основания общественной системы. Как и эрос она подчинена своему принципу константности,который реализуется в законе стоимости, обеспечивающем обмениваемость разнообразных продуктов труда. Другой режим энергии присущ либидо, которое, как кажется, не регулируется и не контролируется в рамках общественной системы труда или дискурса ибо это энергия смерти и разрушения. Но фактически эта энергия оказывается столь же позитивной как и та, что циркулирует по сетям порядка и используется для воспроизводства, но отличается лишь чрезмерностью поэтому тематизируется Фрейдом не как биологические регулярные ритмы, а как "химические" реакции, имеющие взрывной характер вызывающие страдание, и в этом по своим последствиям подобным "кризисам" Маркса. Таким образом нельзя считать, что Фрейда интересовал некий невыразимый или запретный предмет или содержание мечтаний. Для него самым важным было изучение преобразования энергии желания в разнообразных формах манифестируемого содержания от описания сновидений до научного и художественного творчества.

В этом и проявляются границы психоаналитического проекта, который требует дополнения смысловыми интерпретациями. "Но,- как отметил П.Рикер,- общую структуру, в которую можно было бы вписать фрейдовскую метапсихологию, наряду с чуждыми психоанализу герменевтиками, нужно создавать почти заново"[4]. Фрейдовский регрессивный подход, выявляющий в культурных феноменах следы архаичных желаний, является выражением попыток разоблачения сознания, начатых Марксом и Ницше. Классическим теориям культурного творчества, ориентированным на раскрытие роли высших ценностей, они противопоставили "генеалогический" и "социологический" методы редукции сознания к фундаментальным практикам труда и власти.Вместе с тем редукция не исключает проекции:сила овладевающая справедливостью в форме дискурса оправдания трансформируется из чистого насилия, аргументом которого является смерть, в право, которое хотя и остается правом сильного,

вместе с тем затормаживает и ограничивает прояление инстинкта агрессии. То же самое можно сказать и относительно морали. Ницше разоблачал её как способ выживания слабых и завистливых людей, Фрейд видел в ней ограничитель исходных инстинктов эроса и танатоса и считал её источником навязчивый невроз. Воля к власти угрожает существованию и поэтому для её обуздания необходимо культивирование чувства виновности, но последнее делает индивида несчастным и неудовлетворенным. Так противоречие основных инстинктов переходит на высших фазах развития в другие конфликты, которые в частности и задают динамику культуры. Поэтому психоаналитическая интерпретация художественого творчества должна быть дополнена изучением тех новых проблем, которые вызваны цивилизацией. Сети порядка, полиморфная техника власти делают механизмы сублимации исходной энергии все более тонкими и опосредованными. В этих условиях герменевтическая интерпретация и деконструкция, соединенные с критической рефлексией, выступающей по существу как метагерменевтика, позволяют не только эмансипировать человека от иллюзий и инфантильных желаний, а также от давления дисциплинарных пространств общества, но и контролировать стратегические ориентации, ценности структуры различия и дифференциации, определяющие цели, потребности, желания, вкусы и идеалы.

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ДОРА ФРЕЙДА / ЛОЛИТА НАБОКОВА (МЕХАНИЗМ ПРОИЗВОДСТВА ИНТЕРТЕКСТУАЛЬНОЙ АМБИВАЛЕНТНОСТИ)
FREUD'S DORA AND NABOKOV'S LOLITA: THE PROBLEM OF ARISING INTERTEXTUAL AMBIVILANCE.

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To compare two texts means obviously to practice intertextual mode of interpretation. However, such an enterprise proves in our case to be subversive of intertextuality. What emerges is a totally new textual model. The paper might be of relevance to scholars interested in interdisciplinary matters deriving part of its value from elucidation of a number of notoriously "unsolvable" puzzles of psychoanalysis and highlighting the way to overcome "post-modernism and its discontents".

Многочисленные комментарии, коими за последние годы оброс фрейдовский "Фрагмент анализа одного случая истерии" (случай Иды Бауэр, она же - Дора), требуют от каждого нового автора, обращающегося к теме, оправдать свое предприятие. Именно в ретроспективе становится особенно очевидно, что все имевшие место попытки разобраться с фрейдовским текстом, выходя за пределы сугубо текстуального анализа, были по сути попытками предложить новую модель эксегезы, так что в итоге данный текст превратился в оселок постструктурализма. Поэтому указать ряд моментов в тексте Фрейда означает поставить вопрос об адекватности постструктуралистской парадигмы текстуальной реальности и предложить более релевантную модель последней.

Наиболее важные комментарии были собраны Ч.Бернхаймером и К.Кахане в томе "Случай Доры: Фрейд - Истерия - Феминизм"/. Исходная предпосылка, так или иначе разделяемая всеми авторами, прекрасно оформулирована С.Маркусом: "В формальном плане текст Фрейда напоминает современный экспериментальный роман... Я особенно настаиваю на том, что текст Фрейда в первую очередь является выдающимся художественным произведением, а следовательно и читать его нужно учитывая это обстоятельство"/1,стр.64-65/. Странно, что никто не обратил внимания на парадокс, к которому неизбежно ведет такая установка. А дело в том, что формальные качества фрейдовского нарратива (амбивалентность, отсутствие "твердой" авторской точки зрения и т.п.) непосредственно связаны, а следовательно не могут быть изолированы от клинической неудачи Фрейда, каковую принято объяснять его недооценкой специфики женской сексуальности. Поэтому любое исследование причин фрейдовской неудачи - а именно на этом специализируется феминистская

критика, неизбежно грозит элиминировать амбивалентность, достигнутую на формальном уровне.

Тем самым фрейдистский "дискурс господства/подчинения" приобретает самодеструктивный оттенок. Э.Сиксу и К.Клеман /2/, безоглядно именующие истерию Доры бунтом против мужского господства, однако дискурс, предлагаемый как радикально феминистский неизбежно характеризуется с использованием таких терминов, как "бисексуальность" и/или "амбивалентность" (С.Герхарт, Ж.Роуз, М.Рамас). Дж.Гэллоп, указывая, что "бисексуальность - традиционный элемент истерии в теории психоанализа" /1,стр.219/, предпочитает говорить о некоей "иной" бисексуальности. Но вот только обосновать эту "инаковость" автору не удается. То же самое относится и к категории амбивалентности. Обе категории - основной признак симптомов истерии, в особенности - трансфера (Ubertragung, transference), истерического симптома par excellence.

Согласно Фрейду, его неудача в случае Доры была вызвана тем, что он вовремя не успел распознать трансфер. Общая стратегия комментаторов - вскрыть весь потенциал трансфера (а заодно и противо-трансфера). Дело в том, что трансфер, как неоднократно отмечал Фрейд, представляет собой не столько препятствие, сколько мотор психоаналитической интерпретации. В руках умелого аналитика трансфер в конечном итоге - основной инструмент, позволяющий достичь полного понимания прошлого пациента и соответственно корректировать его будущее. Вот почему истинная угроза дискурсу господства исходит отнюдь не от ориентированных на трансфер моделей интерпретации, но от пристального чтения фрейдовского текста, позволяющего вскрыть стратегию пациента, направленную на субверсию трансфера, на котором основана вся эксегеза. Как показали Маркус и Н.Хертц, основные признаки постмодернистского письма, образчик которого видят в тексте Фрейда, суть дериваты симптоматологии истерии. Идет ли речь о "незавершенности" или "многослойности" - все это не просто признаки стиля Пруста, Джойса или Фрейда, как утверждает Маркус /1,стр.64-65/, но прежде всего характеристики симптомов истерии: "Благодаря многочисленным каузальным связям каждая патогенная идея может оказаться мотивом для всего комплекса симптомов истерии" /3,стр.304/. Структура истерии - децентрирована: в том самом смысле какой вкладывает в это понятие Деррида. А это значит, что в каждом симптоме истерии присутствует интертекстуальное измерение [1]. "Каузальные связи", о которых говорит Фрейд, разумеется, суть "неправомерные связи" (falsche Verknupfungen), т.е. связи тропологические, а тропология, как прекрасно показал Х.Блум, есть основа интертекстуальности. Все это особенно очевидно в случае трансфера, который и есть ничто иное

как подобное тропологически-интертекстуальное движение (ср./3,стр.308-309).

Следовательно, моделью на которую ориентируется семиологическая версия психоанализа является истерия. По Лакану, "невротический симптом...структурирован на манер языка и, что важнее, он выявляет отношение человека к языку" /5,стр.151/. Согласно Лакану, "именно повтор в трансфере заставил Фрейда признать в тяге к повтору - принцип, потусторонний принципу удовольствия" /5,стр.85/.Тяга к повтору несомненно является мотором трансфера, гарантируя его семиотический статус. Тогда почему "страдающие неврозом навязчивых представлений живут в замкнутом мире" /6,стр.91/? Почему эти люди, вместо того, чтобы установить через свои симптомы "связь с реальностью, пускай и неадекватную", разрушают семиозис?

Только так мы можем объяснить ряд принципиальных моментов в тексте Фрейда, которые приходится игнорировать в ориентированных на трансфер интерпретациях, чтобы гарантировать когерентность последних. Однако за эту когерентность приходится дорого платить - платить упрощением стратегии Фрейда. Парадокс в том, что само представление о Фрейде как о "безответственном повествователе" - прмер этого упрощения: указанное представление - последний логический вывод, к которому ведет истерическая эксегеза. Текст его анализа Доры позволяет не только реконструировать его собственную интерпретационную стратегию, но и стратегию Доры, которая подвергается окончательной репрессии как раз в комментариях, выходящих из-под пера ее мнимых адвокатов.

Постулирование гомогенности двух текстов - Фрейда и Доры - общая предпосылка всех новейших комментаторов. Лакан в ходе своего "возврата к Фрейду" особо акцентировал "тождество теории и практики интерпретации" /7,стр.203/. Фрейд придерживался в данном вопросе прямо противоположной точки зрения: "путь интерпретации никогда не может быть тем же, что путь производства невроза" /9,стр.318/. Вопрос в том, остался ли Фрейд верен себе в анализе Доры?

Вопреки общему мнению я склонен ответить на данный вопрос положительно - как раз потому, что единственное, что удалось доказать Маркусу и Хертцу, эту формальную "истеричность" фрейдовского нарратива. Однако эта формальная особенность, по мнению авторов, является непредусмотренным эффектом, ускользнувшим от сознания Фрейда, далеким от его сознательных намерений. На мой взгляд, дело обстоит прямо противоположным образом. Ориентированная на истерический трансфер эксегеза является единственной возможностью гарантировать валидность интерпретации, ибо благодаря трансферу она укореняет позицию интерпретатора. Конечно, последний должен расстаться с рядом

чересчур амбициозных претензий, но игра стоит свеч: текст истерии требует интерпретатора, взывает к нему [2]. Поэтому выбор Фрейда в пользу данной интерпретативной модели был совершенно сознательным. А вот что осталось бессознательным, так это его профессиональная честность, о которую разбивались его попытки представить случай Доры как типичный случай истерии.

Наиболее характерным примером фрейдовской стратегии - и одновременно примером ее провала - является навязчивая озабоченность Фрейда источниками внушительных познаний Доры в сексуальных вопросах. Я особо подчеркиваю прилагательное "навязчивая", ибо не я первый его употребляю в данном контексте. Вопрос об источниках знания постоянно возникает в комментариях, он с равным постоянством оказывается вытолкнутым на периферию. Однако не следует забывать, что наш вопрос - вопрос не об источниках знания вообще, но об источниках устного, орального знания. И именно поэтому он стоит в самом центре всей эксегезы.

Настойчивость, с которой Фрейд акцентирует оральность Дориных познаний, объясняется тем, что оральности принадлежит фундаментальная роль в его концепции истерии. Поэтому чтобы обосновать свой диагноз, Фрейд вынужден настаивать на оральности Дориных познаний. Однако победа оказывается пирровой - и, как ни парадоксально, именно в силу отсылки к сновидениям.

Свой анализ Доры, первоначально озаглавленный "Сновидения и истерия", Фрейд рассматривал как продолжение капитальной "Интерпретации сновидений". В одном из писем Флису, параллельному анализу Доры, читаем: "модель сновидений - едва ли не универсальна, ключ к истерии лежит в сновидениях" /10,стр.233/. Однако именно оральность Дориных познаний подрывает диагноз Фрейда.

Поэтому как бы мы ни сформулировали проблему оральности, во фрейдовском контексте оборотной ее стороной всегда будет проблема реальности, которую Лакан оттого и назвал "неопределимой", что она по природе своей субверсивна по отношению к семиозису, функционирующему по символическим и имагинативным линиям. Одним из достоинств нашей реконструкции является тот факт, что она впервые позволяет внести ясность в вопрос, традиционно мучающий историков и теоретиков психоанализа, - в вопрос о мотивах, которые заставили Фрейда отказаться от поисков реальных корней "первичной сцены" и рассматривать ее сугубо как продукт фантазии. Ведь такой статус означает что "первичная сцена" не оральна, но визуальна, а это, как Фрейд понял уже в самом начале своей карьеры, в свой черед весьма существенно облегчает задачу интерпретатора: "Освободить пациента от визуальных патогенных представлений проще, нежели от слуховых,

оральных. Поэтому истерики, которые по большей части относятся к визуальному типу, доставляют аналитику гораздо меньше хлопот, чем страдающие неврозом навязчивых представлениий" /3,стр.282-283/. Анализ Доры - промежуточная стадия в развитии Фрейда. В момент написания своего отчета Фрейд был еще не готов полностью отказаться от мысли, что "первичная сцена" как-то связана с реальными событиями. Отсюда его акцент на оральности, которая все еще оставалась в центре его этиологии истерии. Однако неудача с Дорой, нужно думать, со всей остротой довела до его сознания опасность оральности для интерпретации, и следствием стал "великий раздел": истерия была полностью очищена от оральности, которая стала основным признаком невроза навязчивых представлений. Страдающие последним "не знают истинного текста своих навязчивых представлений..Этот текст следует искать в их снах, где он возникает в оральной форме - как высказывания" /9,стр.441/. Но достигнутое на уровне теории было нейтрализовано на уровне интерпретативной практики, так что анализ стал синонимом трансформации оральных обсессий в "визуальные представления" /9,стр.441/, синонимом трансформации невроза навязчивых представлений в истерию. Так что его текст (особенно при сопоставлении с анализом обсессий "Крысинного Человека", откуда взяты наши последние цитаты) позволяют говорить о том, что Дора страдала отнюдь не истерией, а неврозом навязчивых представлений.

Различие между этими заболеваниями было тематизировано Фрейдом по линии оппозиции активность/пассивность. Все истерические разрывы поддаются репарации с помощью трансфера. Без трансфера, как не раз подчеркивал Фрейд, нет истерии. Истерик может прервать анализ - но лишь для того, чтобы возобновить его с другим, менее стойким в трансфере аналитиком. Отсюда незавершимость анализа истерии, т.е. семиологический статус последней. Семиозис есть предотвращение "короткого замыкания" в дискурсе, отсутствием коего как раз и характеризуется трансфер.

Ссылки на трансфер возникают в его тексте как примечания, отсылающие к другим работам автора. Тем самым начинает работать механизм интертекстуальности - причем в своей самой фундаментальной форме интраили автотекстуальности[3]. Тот факт, что интертекстуальность изначально задана ориентированной на трансфер интерпретативной практикой, разумеется, не ускользнул от внимания. Я хочу подчеркнуть другой, игнорируемый, аспект проблемы, а именно тот факт, что сама возможность интерпретации как таковой напрямую зависит от наличия интертекстуального измерения. Ибо сравнение двух качественно различных величин (реальность и текст) - предприятие гораздо более проблематичное, нежели сравнение двух величин, различных лишь количественно (текст и текст). Вот почему валидность

интерпретации имеет предпосылкой не реальность, а текстуальность референта. как мы видели, фрейдовская эволюция концепции истерии шла именно таким путем, и руководствовался Фрейд этими самыми мотивами. Однако текстуальная реальность на наш взгляд определяется именно субверсией интертекстуального измерения, подрывом позиции читателя укрепить которую - цель ориентации на трансфер. Доказать этот тезис можно и не выходя за рамки текста Фрейда. Но сделать это можно и несколько иначе: более провокативно.

Одна из общих особенностей комментариев к тексту Фрейда - навязчивая озабоченность авторов Владимиром Набоковым. Так, Маркус дважды называет стиль Фрейда "набоковским" /1,стр.68,70/, а Шпренгнезер идет и того дальше, именуя Дору - "викторианской Лолитой" /1,стр.262/. Однако желающих углубиться в вопрос нет. Тема "Набоков и Фрейд" - по-видимости проходя по интертекстуальному ведомству, на поверку, как вскоре убедится читатель, оборачивается тотальным коллапсом интертекстуального измерения. Поэтому нужно отдать должное мудрости Маркуса, предупреждающего слишком резвых потенциальных исследователей темы: "Дора - не Лолита...Лолита - анти-Дора" /1,стр.78/.

Стратегия Фрейда по отношению к Доре дублируется отношением к Лолите Гумберта Гумберта. Главная забота последнего - убедить читателя в ее истерии. В этом деле Гумберт идет по стопам Фрейда, руководствуясь фрейдовской симптоматологией истерии. Любопытно, что Гумберт идет даже несколько дальше в истериизации Лолиты, чем Фрейд в случае Доры.

Гумберт пытается активизировать все формальные ресурсы истерии, пытается заместить "реальную" Лолиту - Лолитой "(интер)текстуальной". Поэтому читатель вынужден "оглянуться назад" и обратить внимание на ряд заявлений Гумберта, которые до сих пор он мог бы назвать случайными. Тем самым в ход пускается механизм Nachtraglichkeit, запоздалого понимания, принципиальный для истерической эксегезы и имеющий семиотический аналог в таких концептах как структуралистская теория "регрессивной семантической детерминации контекстом" (Мукаржовский) или постструктуралистская категория "рамки" (Деррида), одинаково нацеленных на упрочение интертекстуальности. Однако парадокс в том, что "если мы примем приглашение вернуться назад, к чему побуждает нас рамка" /12,стр.199/, то найдем мы не "интертекстуальную библиотеку", как думает Деррида, но ее развалины.

Прежде всего мы отметим, что несмотря на все усилия Гумберта, истерия Лолиты лишена одного принципиального момента, чтобы считаться "полноценной". По Фрейду, "истерию следует назвать

доведенной до предела любовью к объекту, истерик вуаоирует даже эпоху аутоэротизма объектными фантазиями, будучи не в силах расстаться с чем-либо имеющим какое бы то ни было отношение к любимому объекту, особенно привязываясь к местностям. Отсюда совершенно особая роль специальности в этиологии истерии...в противовес подвижности, непоседливости характерной для шизофрении" /6,стр.42/. Как раз такая подвижность, непоседливость прежде всего характеризует психическое состояние набоковских героев. Однако не следует забывать - и это пример фрейдистской диалектики - что истерическая привязанность к объекту не только не сковывает, но, напротив, является предпосылкой движения семозиса, достигающего своего апогея в трансфере, названном Фрейдом "практически бесконечной серией замен" /8,стр.104/. С другой стороны, подвижность шизофрении, через аналогичную операцию "снятия", оборачивается аналогом скованного движения, отличающего невроз навязчивых представлений, особенно в такой его форме как фобия. Скованное движение как невозможность или самодеструктивность интертекстуального возврата структурирует набоковский текст на формальном и содержательном уровне.

Вот тут-то связь между неврозом навязчивых представлений и шизофренией становится совершенно очевидной. Конечно, после Делеза и Гваттари мы более привыкли видеть аналог последней в истерии. Однако переписка Фрейда с Юнгом, содержащая богатейший клинический материал по нашему вопросу, побуждает принять именно нашу точку зрения. Особенно с позиций семиотики - с тех самых позиций, с которых предпринимались все пост-фрейдистские ревизии психоанализа, в частности ревизия Делеза/Гваттари. С точки зрения теории литературы семиозис так или иначе вводит интертекстуальное измерение. С точки зрения психоанализа семиозис по определению ориентирован на модель истерического трансфера. А вот что оправдывает аналогию шизофрении и невроза навязчивых представлений, так это как раз полное отсутствие трансфера. Это отсутствие есть "короткое замыкание" - интертекстуальности - к чему сводятся стратегии Лолиты и Доры, а с другой стороны - механизмы производства симптомов в шизофрении и неврозе навязчивых представлений.

Учитывая сказанное, становится ясно, что основная техника истерического интерпретатора есть навязывание тексту "секретов". Те же мотивы, которые побудили Фрейда отказаться от поисков реального референта первичной сцены, руководят и Гумбертом. В случае литературы "реальность" означает сосредоточенность на уровне содержания. На этом уровне быстро выясняется, что поддержать "секреты" Гумберту не удается: читатель раньше повествователя обнаруживает того, кто устроил побег Лолиты. Поэтому забота о спасении авторитета побуждает Гумберта переключиться на уровень формальный: в ход идут

интертекстуальные аллюзии, чтение превращается в дуэль эрудиций. Но беда в том, что по правилам игры, принятым самим истерическим интерпретатором, эти аллюзии могут быть признаны релевантными для текстуальной реальности лишь в том случае, если его пациент страдает истерией. В противном случае интертекстуальность не просто окажется неукорененной в тексте, но движение ее производства окажется движением ее самодеконструкции. В нашем анализе мы достигли точки, когда говорить об истерии Лолиты не представляется более возможным. Обратимся к этому самодеструктивному движению интерпретации.

Амбивалентность, по определению свойственная интертексту, имеет аналог в психоаналитической теории амбивалентной бисексуальности, ярко выраженной в "первичной сцене". Именно в фантазии амбивалентная установка выходит на поверхность. Эта установка есть смешение активности и пассивности, садизма и мазохизма, невроза навязчивых представлений и истерии в пользу последних терминов. Тем самым семиозису, как кажется, более ничто не угрожает. Но лишь теоретически. Ибо в клинике Фрейду было не уйти от вопроса, каким образом изначальный садизм превращается в мазохизм, невроз навязчивых представлений и/или шизофрения - в истерию? Характерно, что на протяжении всей карьеры ответ Фрейда оставался одним и тем же: такая метаморфоза может произойти лишь в результате влияния извне (см./13,стр.149,143/, /6,стр.192/). Тут речь о гомо- или гетерогенности бисексуальной и интертекстуальной амбивалентности для текстуальной реальности. Амбивалентность, понятным образом, может играть уготованную ей роль гаранта интерпретации только если она гомогенна тексту. Но признать за ней такой статус означает исказить текстуальную реальность. Отсюда постоянный конфликт между Фрейдом-теоретиком и Фрейдом-клиницистом, конфликт, столь поучительный как раз прежде всего для теоретиков литературы.

Первым шагом обоих наших интерпретаторов - как Фрейда, так и Гумберта - было суппонировать истерию в тексте, с которым они имели дело, т.е. установить континуум между текстом пациента и своим собственным. Поэтому собственный дискурс интерпретатора, вместо признаков истерии, обнаруживает признаки невроза навязчивых представлений.

Фрейд очень рано осознал, что для того, чтобы гарантировать семиотический потенциал истерии, эту последнюю необходимо очистить от схожих в ряде элементов симптоматологии заболеваний, которые, однако, угрожают семиозису изнутри. Характерным для этого невроза и для фобий является парализация механизма производства интертекстуальной амбивалентности, механизма тропологического, который, как известно из работ Х.Блума, является гарантом полноценной интертекстуальности. Однако по Фрейду, "...механизм синонимичных подмен не играет никакой роли в образовании фобии" /3,стр.322/". Апогей истерической интертекстуальности, достигнутый на путях идентификаций в трансфере, затем идентификацией Гумберта уже с

истерией Лолиты как на уровне содержания, так и формы - оказывается финальной самодеконструкцией истерического семиозиса, который не допускает "короткого замыкания" в дискурсе. Но именно такое "короткое замыкание" как парализация интертекстуального механизма уже заодно в словах Гумберта о том, что "эта Лолита, моя Лолита, полностью затмила свой прототип" /II,стр.31/. Поэтому интерпретатору остается только разыграть удивление когда имплицитный разрыв обернется ясным бегством - будь то Доры или Лолиты. "Разыграть удивление" - так можно охарактеризовать стратегии как Фрейда, так и Гумберта.

Как и для Гумберта, цель которую преследовал Фрейд было заполнить "пустоту души", т.е. попытаться освободиться от своего собственного невроза навязчивых представлений[4], превращающего мир - в "замкнутый мирок", через навязывание истерии Доре. Его неудача - свидетельство неадекватности ориентированной на трансфер интерпретации - текстуальной реальности. Но эта неудача как нельзя более поучительна особенно сегодня, когда интертекстуальность доминирует в гуманитаристике. Ибо неудача Фрейда показывает, что текстуальная реальность отнюдь не является медиумом интертекстуальных идентификаций (автор-образ-читатель-автор), как традиционно принято думать (и тут структурализм выявляет свою глубинную солидарность с традицией), но является тотальной субверсий семиозиса. Текстуальная реальность может быть адекватно определена как саботаж механизма производства интертекстуальной амбивалентности. Вот почему литературный текст является объектом, всячески сопротивляющимся интерпретации.

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[1] Ср. "Истерия есть транскультурное, интертекстуальное движение" (Maroussia Hajdukowski: - Ahmed. The Framing of the Shrew. //D.Shepherd (Ed.). Bakhtin: Carnival and Other Subjects. Amsterdam. 1993,p.182.

[2] Ср."...текст истерии *нуждается* (курсив мой. - В.Л.) в интерпретаторе..." (Op.cit.)

[3] По поводу этих диффиниций см. L.Dallenbach. Intertexte et auto-texte. /Poetique 27 (1976).

[4] См. самодиагноз Фрейда в его письме Юнгу: "Если Вы считаете себя истерической личностью, то я причисляю себя к типу невроза навяз-чивых представлений, для которого характерно существование в наглухо замкнутом мирке" /6,стр.91/.

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УНИВЕРСАЛЬНАЯ СЕМАНТИКА
THE UNIVERSAL SEMANTIC

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What may be the ontology which is based on phenomenological ground? Husserl rejected ontology from the sphere of phenomenological research as discriptive analysis of the immanent formations of consciousness because he concided that ontology research was not transcendental but transcendental eidetic sphere. So the subject of ontology is all transcendent esse are in a narrow sense - the concept of "transcendent subject per se". The sphere of the transcendent senses is constituated in similar order as sense (meaming) in semantic. In this way ontology should indicate what way essencially exist all transcendent esse. Ontology must become the universal semantic which demonstrates different spheres of senses in their connection with logos and with each other, i.e.ontology must come to light disclose the regions of sense and methods which constituate it's, take into consideration, if it possible, not only the sphere of transcendent esse but the sphere of dueable and diserable.

Онтология (как общая так и любая региональная) "имеет дело" с определенной эйдетической сферой, которой соответствует определенный предметный квазирегион (для общей онтологии это "предмет вообще"). Общая онтология сущностно описывает "предмет вообще". Но, т.к. предмет философии не дан, а задан, т.е. он ормируется в ситуции и по мере нашего разговора, то и онтология так же конституирует собственную предметную и эйдетическую сферы: трансцендентные сущности и трансцендентные предметности, которые в силу этого исключаются Э.Гуссерлем из области феноменологического исследования, как дискриптивного сущностного учения об имманентных образованиях сознания. Онтология относится к трансцендентно-эйдетическим дисциплинам и рассматриваемые ею сущности есть исключительно сущности трансцендентные. Однако это не означает, что онтология исследует то, что сущностно не принадлежит сознанию. Она сущностно описывает то, что носит трансцендентный характер. Подобный характер эйдетического содержания сознания задается активно действующим сознанием (поскольку никакие онтологиеские структуры бытия не способны воздействовать на человека), интенциональным предметом, которому придается трансцендентный статус и которым, в даном случае, является бытие, и символическим образованием, "символическим носителем" (Э.Кассирер), образом (т.е. эйдосом в первоначальном смысле этого слова), которым в данном случае является логос. Область (признаваемых в качестве) трансцендентных смыслов, которые описывает онтология, складывается в том же порядке, что и смысл

(значение) в семантике, с той лишь разницей, что в качестве предмета здесь предстает бытие или сфера трансцендентных предметностей, "предмет вообще","трансцендентное вообще", а в качестве знака - человек. В широком смысле к онтологии может относиться все трансцендентно сущее, а в узком - понятие "трансцендентного предмета вообще". Но поскольку понятие "трансцендентного предмета вообще" выходит за пределы возможного опыта и едвали может быть осмысленно сформулировано в форме чтойности (т.е. оно не способно удовлетворительным образом выразить искомую сущность, признаваемую в качестве онтологической), то онтология должна указать на способы формирования этого понятия. Все же "бытие" не сводимо к понятию трансцендентного предмета вообще. Поэтому онтологии следует указать на то, каким образом сущностно существует все трансцендентно сущее. Онтология должна стать универсальной семантикой, демонстрирующей различные сферы сущего в их связи с логосом и друг с другом, т.е. онтология должна раскрывать регионы смысла и способы его образования. Но способна ли она охватить дискриптивным анализом кроме сферы трансцендентно сущего сферу должного и сферу желаемого?

К универсальной семантике близка теологическая онтология, где универсальным означающим выступает бог. Он может пониматься также в качестве абсолютного знака, при помощи которого человек опосредованно (в данном случае ценностно) соотносится с миром, конституируя ту особую эйдетическую сферу, которую мы называем верой. Если бог выступает гарантом должного, нудительного отношения, то такое не прямое отношение к миру оказывается этически позитивно окрашенным, что приводит к совпадению онтологии сущего с онтологией должного. Нравственный гештальт превращает мир из данного в заданный.

III
METAPHILOSOPHY, OR VITAL MEDITATION ON THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY
МЕТАФИЛОСОФИЯ, ИЛИ ЖИВАЯ МЕДИТАЦИЯ КАК БУДУЩЕЕ ФИЛОСОФИИ

PARADIGMS OF PHILOSOPHIZING AND THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY

Stanley Rosen (Boston, Massachusetts, USA)

1. I have often been told that my view of philosophy is old-fashioned. Not only does it appear, according to my critics, that I am out of date, but even further, that I am a Platonist, an Aristotelian, a disciple of Leo Strauss, a renegade from the Strauss-school (and so simultaneously a Stalinist and a Trotskyiste!), a reactionary, an elitist, a soft-headed litterateur, a metaphysician, and mirabile dictu, as I was once accused by a Catholic Monarchist, a left-wing relativist. It would be tempting but perhaps a bit vain to conclude from these charges that I am all things to all men. In a less frivolous spirit, I suppose that each of these charges is the expression of some deeply held "paradigm" of philosophizing. The inconsistency of this particular set of paradigms allows me to hope that my critics are in the grip of various ideas fixes, not all of which can provide an accurate vision of what I am about. I want further to suggest that what has confused them is precisely my refusal to subscribe to a paradigm of philosophizing. And yet I insist that I am a philosopher. It now remains to try to explain how this differs from being the instantiation of a paradigm.

A paradigm is a model, that is to say, a formal representation of a theory, or of the presumed structure of an empirical state; but it is also in another sense an ectype or an eidos of a family of existing particulars. What could be meant by "paradigms of philosophizing"? Presumably there is no question here of an ectype or a species-form in the sense of the ontological presence exhibited within phenomenological looks that are gathered into a family by virtue of their common look. Furthermore, the use of the plural entails that there can be more than one paradigm of philosophizing, which of course raises the question of how we choose among them. We are here in the penumbra of the today still fashionable distinction between philosophy and metaphilosophy, a distinction that I find unintelligible.

The metaphilosophical level is presumably at once higher than and so legislative of the proper activity of philosophy as it addresses itself to the resolution of particular theoretical issues. Since this level is conceptually prior to that of the paradigm that is said to determine our philosophical convictions, it is presumably both prephilosophical and yet philosophical; or at least it must be both if there is anything philosophical about deciding how to philosophize. But how do we decide to philosophize? It cannot be in obedience to our paradigms, since we have not yet constructed them. Unless philosophy occurs by spontaneous combustion or, as Hegel scornfully puts it, as "shot from a pistol," one's paradigm, and so all of its consequences,must rest upon nonphilosophical considerations. We can "formalise" the metaphilosophical domain by defining it as the paradigm, but this in turn will be done either as shot from a pistol, or on the basis of meta-metaphilosophical considerations. Either alternat give places philosophy in the bondage of nonphilosophical criteria and decisions.

I prefer to say that what is called the metaphilosophical level is in fact nothing other than philosophy itself, which is so to speak already present before we begin to live it, in a way analogous to Aristotle's observation about thinking, namely, that we do not "begin" to think but have always already been thinking. This could also be restated in a rather prosaic but nevertheless true way by saying that one cannot "acquire" philosophy; one is either a philosopher or not. This does not require that one always philosophize actively, of course; the distinction between actuality and potentiality need not be abandoned simply because we are told that we live in a postmodern era, as the example of quantum mechanics also makes clear. I could also say that we do not possess paradigms of philosophy but are always in the process of constructing them; to which I would add that philosophically, they are all the same, differing only in the local dialects employed. It should be kept in mind that there can be no philosophical treatment of particular questions until we know what it is to philosophize.

Reactionary as it may sound, I prefer to think of philosophy as *a theia dosis*, a "gift from the gods," like the Socratic eros that possesses by descending from above and carries us upward to the hyperuranian topos in order that we may see accurately what lies below thanks to the celestial illumination. To those who dislike this kind of language, let us say instead is a way of seeing or understanding, namely, a seeing in the light of the whole, and not a method or a set of principles or official doctrines. If this is right, then there is no effective paradigm of philosophizing. It is impossible to formalise a way of seeing (which parenthetically is why what is called in America AI is an absurdity). What we formalise is always an artifact of vision which immediately obscures the operation of vision itself.

Metaphilosophy as it is popularly envisioned is nothing other than the contingent flow of history, or in other words fashionable dogma. I on the other hand have been suggesting that philosophy has no past, no present, and no future. These modes of temporal or historical existence are the domain of philosophical doctrines, schools, and movements, or of what are called in the academy "positions." Let me try to clarify this assertion with a brief reference to the contemporary view that philosophy is dead or that it has completed itself and that we now inhabit a post-Hegelian epoch of thinking. How would one demonstrate the truth of this view? The least one can say is that its proponents must provide us with a competent exposition of what it means to live in a pre-Hegelian epoch, and for that matter why we are not, precisely as post-Hegelians, dwelling within one or another of the already established Hegelian categories, and so reiterating the eternal return of the Concept even as we suppose ourselves to have made a world-historical advance to the post-historical state?

This requirement amounts to an exhaustive exposition of philosophy, which surely cannot be supplied in any way other than by philosophizing. I believe this means that philosophy cannot possibly be dead; the worst case is rather that it never existed. For if it existed once, then it must exist in order for us to come to terms with it; this coming to terms is philosophizing, and so this is something that can be continued by reactionaries like myself who have studied the postphilosophical statements and find them empty manifestoes of despair.The greatest spokesman for the end of philosophy in this century,and indeed the only great spokesman, is surely Heidegger. But with all his terminological gymnastics, Heidegger cannot free himself from the incubus of philosophy. The Heideggerian *Destruktion* is nothing other than what Socrates more prudently calls "*palin eks arches*" (once more from the beginning).

The demonstration of death, at least among competent physicians, normally takes place prior to the funeral. The putative corpse is subjected to a variety of procedures that are designed to establish the termination of life. These procedures are scientific or at the least empirically verified, not incantatory. If the establishment of a philosophical paradigm is not itself a philosophical act, then it amounts to an incantation; that is to say, it is an arbitrary act of historical contingency. and precisely the same is true of the incantations of postphilosophical paradigms or of "paradigm shifts."

The doctrine of the end of history belongs to a more general current of thought that is conveniently designated as postmodernism. In the case of the general as well as of the particular name, it is obvious that we are dealing with a philosophy of history, namely, one according to which philosophy is itself a historical creature. The same point could be made by saying that postmodernism

abolishes the distinction between philosophy and art, thereby subsuming the former under the category of historical perspectives or viewpoints. I reject this way of thinking and instead assert that philosophy is outside history just because it is the capacity to assume all perspectives or viewpoints.

This claim will once more be attributed to my Platonism or Aristotelianism. But the attribution is false and based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of philosophy. I will support this assertion with the assistance of Nietzsche, himself the great hero (or icon) of postmodernism, but one who at all periods of his working life referred to himself as a philosopher, and who conceived of philosophy in the Platonic sense of the prophet and lawgiver, not the ontologist. This form of Platonism is of course not peculiar to Plato. Nietzsche designates it with the expression "We Hyperboreans," which he derives from Pindar. The Hyperboreans dwell far to the north (even north of St. Petersburg) and are inaccessible by land or by sea. They are favored by lengthy sojourns of Apollo, the god of Socratic lucidity, who also plays a dominant role in the form of the sun in Nietzsche's most Dionysian work, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, a work in which, strikingly enough, Dionysus is never mentioned. The Hyperboreans, in other words, are outside historical (but not of course cosmological) time.

Let me expound one text with another. The sense of the references to the Hyperboreans is also exhibited in the famous image in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* of the vision of the gateway named *Augenblick*, that is, the entrance into the eternal return of historical time. This vision is accessible to Zarathustra, and so to us, from outside and above the gateway, in other words, from the mountain path and thanks to the light of the sun above. As is evident from Zarathustra's dialogue with the spirit of gravity, we may enter the gateway or not as we will. Alternatively, we may join the crew of the ship that takes Zarathustra away from the blessed isles, and which will not cease its daring journey to far oceans and lands even when the prophet disembarks to return to his cave on the other mountain top — or perhaps it is the same mountain top, one which Zarathustra will forever descend and ascend, like the sun that he greets each morning and that prefigures his "going down" with its own "going under."

In the same spirit, Zarathustra says that man is "the not yet fully constructed animal (das noch nicht festgestellte Tier)". Let us try to grasp this expression accurately. Man is the not yet fully constructed *animal*; hence he is an animal. Man is the animal that is not yet *fully* constructed; hence he is partially constructed. Man is the animal that is in the process of completing the construction that was begun for him by nature, but that nature alone will never finish. And indeed, "completion" is for man nothing more nor less than the act of engaging in the process toward completion; it is what Hegel calls "the infinite labor of the

negative," but of course with no fulfillment of dialectic in speculation. Completion is work toward completion; this is the completeness of man, just as it must be of the superman. But the Hyperboreans do no work; they issue prophecies and observe the results.The Hyperboreans are neither men nor gods, but philosophers, or in other words a personification of the philosophical dimension in human nature.

For Nietzsche as for every serious thinker, man of course has a "nature"; otherwise there would be nothing to overcome, nor would overcoming be distinguishable from going to ground (zugrunde gehen) in the sense of being destroyed rather than of reaching the foundation; I note that Zarathustra uses this "Hegelian" expression upon occasion. Philosophy has a foundation as obviously as man has a nature, namely, to philosophize. Philosophizing is the foundation of philosophy, not first principles, methods, rules, or even eternal beings. In order to be a Hyperborean, however, the philosopher must sacrifice historical situatedness, just as Nietzsche sacrificed it in his effort to see the whole, an effort that he misconstrued in a decisive and tragic way. Instead of attempting to complete the whole with the last perfection of his vision, he tried to create it *ex nihilo*. This emerges with a rare pathos in his last postcard to Burckhart when he states that he would much rather be a professor at Basle than God but that he never dreamed of indulging his ego to the neglect of the universe.

2. I turn briefly now to the question set by this conference on the future of philosophy. Simply as a convenience of exposition, let me distinguish between the Hyperborean and the immanent or historical standpoints. So far as "we Hyperboreans" are concerned, philosophy is safe from the vulgarisation made necessary by its prophetic or revolutionary character, and so by its dependence upon disciples. As soon as we shift our perspective to the ongoing historical moment, of course, where the spokesmen for the disciples predominate, the situation, as in the midst of any revolution, becomes altogether unclear.

We live in a generation of great foolishness, one in which the so-called philosophers have become spokesmen for what Nietzsche called "the rabble." Each age has its own foolishness, but nevertheless, some ages are more foolish than others. The great founding figures of our own generation — Husserl, Heidegger, Russell, Wittgenstein, and others as well — are all gone: "The Gods have flown away from this parlous time." Philosophy has descended from Zarathustra's mountain into the columns of intellectual reviews and even the newspapers that Nietzsche despised. To those who share Nietzsche's decadence but who have been diluted one more degree by the events of the twentieth century, the results of "left-wing Nietzscheanism" are sometimes diverting and even amusing. Perhaps it is the enervation of excessive amusement that leads me to hope, despite

everything, that we are approaching a recurrence of the night in which all cows are black, and so that we are on the threshold of a negation of the negation that will miraculously reveal itself as a new epoch of philosophy. Perhaps there is still room for the concept of the universal proletariat, represented today by the intellectual, a universality of comprehensive diversity, or as it is now called, differance, but which is thus indistinguishable from comprehensive identity.

I am no prophet, although I aspire to Hyperboreanism. I can also understand the dissatisfaction of serious thinkers with myths and metaphors. Unfortunately, there is no structure to openness, no mathesis universalis that guides us from one viewpoint to the next in our traversal of the whole. Everything has to be considered afresh: *palin eks arches.* Since he who would create must first destroy, it seems to me that the task of the spokesman for philosophy is today negative; more precisely, the negative task of the present generation is to destroy historicity. This is not a task that can be accomplished in ten pages; for a somewhat more extensive effort I refer my readers to my book *The Question Of Being* (Yale Press, 1993).

This task can also be expressed in much simpler and more immediate terms. Philosophy is rooted not simply in theoretical wonder but also in what I shall call existential shame. If we are incapable of perceiving the divine, if we cannot distinguish between the noble and the base, if we speak of "the truth predicate" instead of truth; if our effort to grasp what Nietzsche meant by Rangordnung leads us to a dissolution of the hierarchy of value, if we can no longer be ashamed of our low condition because spiritual energy has collapsed into narcissism, then of course philosophy is impossible.

I would like to suggest, at the risk of sounding censorious, that the task of the contemporary philosopher, assuming that there are any, is to induce shame in himself and his neighbors. All great philosophy is propelled by a moral outrage that is purified of the spirit of vengeance; at the level of the divine, it is propelled by shame purified of sentimentality. It might well appear initially that shame is just the quality for which we have no need. The sterilization of the nobility of democracy by a historicist shame before nobility suggests a quite opposite spiritual need. But I persist in my recommendation, and precisely as a democrat and partisan of freedom, which entails a distinction from tyranny and slavery, or in other words a Rangordnung of the spirit. Is it too paradoxical to speak of the need for shame in the face of shame? I myself wonder whether it is sensible to speak of nobility and shame in an age of decadence. Do we not require some more articulated program or techne to guide us into the future? Can it be that what we need is a paradigm for philosophising?

Perhaps. But I have nothing to offer except old wine for new bottles.

BEING AND LOVE: TOWARDS A KENOTIC ONTOLOGY

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I begin with a digression. Not by reason of subtlety of argument, nor excess of learning, nor again by reason of an obsession with the journey and not the end; but because, finally, in no other way can Being be approached, only indirectly. To take it face on is to lose it, to cause it to fragment into a miasma of hypostatic surfaces, tremours that obscure depth structures that conceal meaning, while Being itself irreducible in its mystery, eludes us, skirts our arguments and slips away unrecognised and unseen. It is only by digression, or ambient linearity, that we may creep up upon being, approaching it simultaneously from all sides, stalk its own crab-like traces, and finally, in a moment of pure grace, grasp Being in its transcendence that is at once emptiness and fulness, darkness and light, opacity and transparence.

In other words - I digress again - it is in the paradox of love that we can train our eyes to step aside and learn to see Being in all its unity and radical simplicity. But how to do that - how to learn that stepping aside or digression into comprehension? For we are straight-footed creatures who move easily from one point to another, who choose the crow's flight rather than the wheeling of the eagle; the surface tension of our mind commands clean parallelisms and the ideals of a bright linearity. How can creatures such as ourselves truly step aside from such mirror-reflections and surface seeing, into the asymmetry of ontological knowledge?

The thesis of the present paper is that love is the site of our stepping aside into seeing. It is only there that we find a configuration of kenosis and paradox that allows conceptual access to the inner structures of Being. In acts of love, whether as compassion, affirmation or forgiveness, the self encounters its own limits. Love is the liminal site of our own being, where the self puts itself at risk for the being of another, where the horizon of our own world becomes for a moment fused with the horizon of another's world, both infinitely strange to us and infinitely close.

Love then is always paradox and always transgression. Not to approach the limits of our own being for the sake of another is not to love fully; and to love fully is to go, guided by the alterity of the other, into a new place where we become strange even to ourselves. Love is to weep with Raskol'nikov at the Hay Market, and to beseech forgiveness. It is to offer forgiveness where reason demands revenge and to risk our own interests for the sake and well-being of others. Love therefore is always a mystery, and yet, as mystery, it enjoys a privileged place in our society. Those who love mysteriously and magnificently, such as Ghandi, Mother Teresa of Calcutta, Archbishop Desmond Tutu or even Nelson Mandela, stand out as living icons, symbols of hope and possibility, and

they speak to the common heart. Bùt they also redefine what it is to be human. Love in its fullest forms will always be at the margins of most people's experience, but at the same time it reflects a light back at us which illumines the deepest structures of our Being.

I propose therefore that ontological knowledge, learning to see being, is a process that begins in the phenomenological analysis of love, where love is simultaneously the transcendent potentiality of human kind, the transgression of [illegible] and also a visible, ordinary and earth-bound event, albeit one marked by mystery. While there is little scope [illegible] undertake a full analysis of this kind, we can nevertheless give the general contours [illegible] a phenomenological analysis of love would need to follow. In the first place we will need to [illegible] the character of consciousness itself as being an amalgam in which self and non-self (here referred to as I and Not-I) establish each other in a relation of mutual grounding. I propose to do this propositionally in the following way.

1a. The world begins for me when I perceive something which is not myself. In the instant that I know another, I come into the possession of myself as knowing act.

1b. The knowledge of something other than myself is at the same time the knowledge of myself as knowing act, and is thus my own self-knowing.

1c. The existence of Not-I is the foundation of existence as I. The existence of I, as knowing act, is the foundation of the existence of Not-I.

1d. I and Not-I coexist in a relation of mutual grounding.

1e. The relation of mutual grounding between I and Not-I constitutes an area of possibility. This habitable space we call consciousness.

In the second place we shall argue that the relation of self and non-self within consciousness is dialectical:

2a. I and Not-I coexist in a relation of mutual grounding, which relation constitutes the habitable space of consciousness.

2b. The existence of I, as knowing act, is founded upon the simultaneous existence of Not-I. Where Not-I does not exist therefore, I also does not exist. Where Not-I exists, so too does I.

2c. I exists where Not-I exists. Thus I is founded upon Not-I, and the existence of I is determined by what is not itself.

2d. The existence of I is founded dialectically upon its own non-existence.

2e. The presence of I is granted by its own absence.

The third stage in this analysis is marked by the emergence of the transcendent relation of I with respect to Not-I within the domain of consciousness.

3a. The manner of existence of Not-I within the habitable space of consciousness is that of flowering. Flowering means emergence as substance.

3b. The manner of existence of I within consciousness is that of shimmering. Shimmering means emergence as act.

3c. The dialectical relation between I and Not-I is expressed at the level of ontology as a substantial/non-substantial dichotomy.

3d. Not-I, which is substance, is contained by I, which is act.

3e. I is not contained by Not-I.

3f. The containment of Not-I by I is transcendence.

3g. I finds itself in a transcendental relation with respect to Not-I.

3h. The transcendental relation of I with respect to itself in the unity of I and Not-I is the freedom of I with respect to itself.

3i. I is necessarily free before itself.

Fourthly, we will now need to explore the character of the freedom which the self enjoys with respect to non-self, and draw out again its dialectical nature. The dialectical affirmation of Not-I by I in love is kenosis.

4a. The necessary freedom of I, which is the transcendental relation between I and Not-I within the sphere of consciousness, is expressed as the affirmation or occlusion of Not-I.

4b. I *must* exercise its freedom to affirm or occlude Not-I.

4c. Where Not-I is personal and is identified by I as Other-I, the affirmation of Not-I as Other-I manifests as love.

4d. The occlusion of Not-I as Other-I manifests as oppression.

4e. By exercising its necessary freedom to affirm or occlude Not-I, I discovers its own dialectical being.

4f. Where I affirms Not-I, it embraces its own dialectical relation to Not-I.

4g. The embrace by I of its own dialectical relation to Not-I as Other-I is kenosis.

Finally, love can now be read as a heightened state of being:

5a. The existence of I is founded dialectically upon the existence of Not-I.

5b. Through the affirmation by I of Not-I, as Other-I, the dialectical being of I is kenotically intensified.

5c. Kenotic being is intensified being.

A Brief Summary

Human consciousness is based upon the mutually grounding co-existence of I and that which is not I. The one cannot exist without the other, nor can the one be conceived of without the other. Neither is temporally prior to the other. The

being of I is therefore dialectical. I finds itself in a transcendental relation to Not-I since, as act, it contains substance but cannot be contained by it.

The transcendental relation of I to Not-I means that I is free with respect to Not-I. This is a necessary freedom which inheres in the very existence of I, which is always a coexistence with Not-I. This means that I can either choose to affirm Not-I or to occlude it, but it must exercise this choice. The being of I is therefore ethical.

Where Not-I exists in a personal mode, the manner of the affirmation of Not-I is love. But since I and Not-I coexist in a dialectical relation, for I to affirm the existence of Not-I is for I to undergo a process of kenosis or self-emptying. To affirm Not-I or to love Not-I in its personal mode is for I to embrace its own dialectical being kenotically. In affirming the other, it affirms the truth that its own existence is dependent upon the existence of that which is not itself. Love, which is onto-kenosis, or kenotic being, is therefore intensified being.

Conclusion

An attempt to read or understand Being through the dialectic of love stands emphatically within a twentieth century philosophical tradition which began with the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and has reached a peak in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. For Bakhtin, alterity configured as dialogue is the very condition of our understanding, of our language and hence of our self. For Levinas, on the other hand, alterity understood as relationality is the ground of subjectivity and occupies a space prior to ontology. Both these approaches, the one analytical from without and the other analytical from within are profoundly congruent with the brief exposition of *kenotic ontology* outlined above. The significant difference between Levinas and *kenotic ontology* however resides precisely in kenosis and the consequences which flow from this. In place of an opposition between ethical intersubjectivity and ontology for instance, which characterises much of Levinas' work, *kenotic_ontology* remains precisely ontology, but ontology which is transfigured by the realisation of the paradox of its own internal structure.

This talk began with a digression; and so its ending must be a return. But not a return to the place of our departure for that, in the meantime, has passed beyond us and is irretrievable. Rather our return is to somewhere we have never been before; and yet still it is a return. For in the paradox of love the circularity of our movement is a step into the future.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE EVERYDAY: A DIALECTICAL PARADIGM

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The paradigm of philosophizing offered by John Dewey involves a dialectical relationship between philosophy and daily life. Whatever the branch of philosophy, it must begin with everyday experience. Our practical need for a predictable world, for example, is the starting point for epistemology and philosophy of science. The importance of resolving conflicts in interests and conduct similarly is the field from which ethics springs. When everyday practice and common sense falter, philosophy responds by critically examining the experiences which have become problematic. Philosophical inquiry tries to analyze and organize the values, practices and perplexities which occasion the inquiry.

The dialectic between philosophy and the everyday is ongoing, changing with changes in concrete life as well as philosophical perspectives. The dialectic can be completed only in the sense that philosophy self-consciously reflect on its relationship with ordinary life and only insofar as ordinary life itself incorporates philosophical reflection.

I.

For an Ancient example of how philosophy is to be situated within everyday concerns, consider Plato's *Gorgias*. The dialogue begins with Socrates' questioning Gorgias about the nature of rhetoric and what the rhetorician professes to teach his pupils. It culminates in a heated exchange between Socrates and Callicles over the nature of justice, political rule, and who is best suited to govern. But these inquiries don't arise out of thin air. They are a response to Athenian moral and political life, in particular, the demise of the Homeric tradition and the social need for moral stability.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, philosophers Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau developed what have become the modern classics of political theory. These were an attempt to meet geo-political changes within and between European communities. As the feudal order gave way to a combination of bustling commerce and centralized power, a philosophical response was called for. A reformulation of political authority was needed to understand these changes and structure a coherent social fabric.

Concrete problems in legitimacy and legitimation, not insulated philosophical ruminations, created the climate for philosophies of democracy. Although core questions were similar to those with which Socrates and his interlocutors grappled, the philosophical answers were different. Change in the particular features of everyday life, including relations of economic and political power, generated new philosophical conceptions. Continued changes during the 19th and 20th centuries were the seedbed from which grew Marx's communist theory and Rawls' liberal theory.

In *After Virtue*, Alisdair MacIntyre articulates a contemporary moral crisis in America akin to that faced in Socrates' Athens. Unconnected shards of

different philosophical views confusedly inform our daily moral thought and action. Our thinking is ajumble with rights and duty theories, contractarianism, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. As a result, our personal and public deliberations lack coherence, and competition for our allegiance promises moral paralysis or violence.

But instead of examining the particulars of our 20th century situation, including different ethical standpoints, MacIntyre counsels a return to something like a Medieval life of virtue, until some reasonable solution presents itself. But this is not feasible. The communitarian ethic of virtue which sustained human experience in the Middle Ages is not a viable response to the pluralism engrained in American life. Appreciating the dialectic between philosophy and the everyday recommends embracing the plurality of moral viewpoints MacIntyre finds so disquieting. This is demanded by ethnic and religious diversity, political variety, and aesthetic multiplicity. The need for fresh theorizing is underscored by dramatic changes in the structure of family, community, work, and education.

The variety of moral values includes and is the product of the importance of autonomy in both everyday life and philosophical reflection. This is a concept that did not exist in either Socratic Athens or the Medieval Schools. It is witnessed daily in the unprecedented choices enjoyed by children and teenagers, as well as the inclusion of women and minorities as citizens. The very concept of civil rights and the entire liberal tradition in America attests to the power of the idea of self-determination. This is an idea which, together with the new social relations it has engendered, will not go away, no matter how much philosophers could wish it would.

Only by attention to the dialectic between daily living and philosophical reflection can philosophy clarify our everyday moral quandaries and provide direction in resolving them. The shift from meta-ethics to substantive, normative discussions over the last twenty years certainly stands as empirical evidence of Dewey's paradigm. Crises and dilemmas in everyday life have called philosophers from their preoccupation with such questions as the cognitive status of moral judgments and moral relativism. As a result, philosophy has clarified and helped resolve practical matters of privacy, punishment, euthanasia, and the just distribution of scarce medical resources.

II.

The view of philosophy as dialectically engaged with everyday life assumes that philosophy has a contribution to make to that life. It also takes the features of everyday life seriously, as a worthy basis for philosophical inquiry. As Dewey puts it, "Philosophy comes into existence when men are confronted with problems and contradictions which common sense and the special sciences are able neither to solve nor resolve".[1] As these problems and contradictions change, so must our philosophical attempts at comprehending and overcoming them.

Traditional metaphysics attempted to reveal a reality hidden from ordinary experience. This ultimate reality is thought to provide a stability and

unchanging truth lacking in the precariousness of ordinary life. But it is precisely in the vicissitudes of life as we live it and everyday language as we use it that Dewey finds the genuine challenge to philosophy. Because this life and language is changing, philosophy is itself an evolving practice.

As Dewey suggests, Greek metaphysics erred in deriving its sense of essential reality from the fixed, static character of grammar.[2] Thus we find Aristotle's preference for the contemplative life over the practical, as well as the fine arts over the practical. Indeed, Dewey criticizes the "contemplative" conception of philosophy itself embodied in theories which begin with mind operating "apart from any overt interaction of the organism with surrounding conditions".[3]

The starting point of inquiry is interaction — between people and nature, people and artifact, and one another. In interaction we communicate. We interrogate and thereby open things up to understanding and practical control. We intervene, discovering and resolving conflict. In everyday life we are in intimate communication with the things of our world and one another. Within communication, "All natural events are subject to reconsideration and revision".[4]

For Dewey, the real world is a changing world. Because the universe itself is unfinished, metaphysics itself must not be closed off. Put more broadly, philosophy must continue to evolve in response to the changing nature of reality as manifested in ordinary life and the specialized disciplines which deal with it.

This fits Dewey's understanding of meaning as use. To grasp the meaning of objects, we must see how they are used, literally as well as in discourse. As both mundane and specialized modes of inquiry discover new properties and relations of objects, objects are transformed. When placed in new relationships, objects' properties and meanings are altered. Philosophy examines how specialized disciplines and practices, such as science, politics, and art do this. But philosophy is not merely passive, recording this activity.

Philosophy itself repositions objects, social relations, and the disciplines it examines, placing them in new relationships. Thus, philosophy is transformative. As with all thought, it has a creatively constructive function.[5] For example, placing social and economic inequality alongside expressed political ideals of equality, philosophy transforms the way we understand and talk about race and gender. Similarly, by showing how scientific inquiry is socially enmeshed, philosophy erodes our view of science as pure investigation of ultimate reality. Instead, we conceive it as a cultural practice whose values, traditions, and authorities are sensitive to those of other cultural practices.

To be thoroughgoing, philosophy must be transformative by transforming itself. It does this by laying bare its relations with other cultural practices and questioning its ongoing formulations. For example, is the preponderance of white, middle-class males in universities responsible for the prevailing philosophical writing and teaching? Is the typical approach to questions in business ethics framed by the economic structures of our society or the position of professional philosophers within it? Almost all discussions in

business ethics, for instance, assume the legitimacy of the current arrangements of power and wealth.

Only by seeing itself in relation to current social structures and forces for social change can philosophy self-consciously transform itself rather than being unwittingly revised by these forces.

III.

To develop the paradigm of philosophy as response to ordinary life, I shall outline Dewey's conception of art and criticism of it. Art is chosen because it reflects and shapes cultural values, clearly bears the stamp of economic forces, and sharpens the blades of political debate. An additional strength of focusing on Dewey's understanding of art is the central role played by aesthetic experience in his philosophy. "To aesthetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what experience is".[6] In aesthetic experience we are fully alive, most completely engaged in meaningful interaction. Aesthetic experience crystallizes what makes any experience valuable in itself and not merely instrumentally good.

Dewey begins with the relationship of art to everyday life. Art is continuous with everyday life, Dewey argues, because everyday life is replete with aesthetic qualities. Whether we are repairing an automobile, walking in the woods, or carrying on an engrossing conversation, our everyday activities can be aesthetically rewarding. Only because daily living can be aesthetic is it possible for art works to emerge from it and return to enrich it. Works of art are different from ordinary life only in that our interaction with them reliably yields more of the defining features of aesthetic experience and in greater degree.

These features include interaction which harmonizes our doing and undergoing, our activity and receptivity. As conflict is undergone, the doing which resolves it uncovers new obstacles for perception and subsequent activity. The result is that the parts of experience mutually modify one another, yielding an integration of episodes marked by a strong, pervasive emotional quality. Punctuated by pauses, the experience flows yet elements within it retain their distinctive identities. Temporal unity is such that the "past reinforces the present" and the "future is a quickening of what now is".[7] Aesthetic experience is consummatory. The meanings of what has transpired are regathered, the implications drawn out as the experience unfolds. Small-scale, local consummations develop into an overall climax. Significance is rounded out in an experience that is complete in itself.

At the same time, such fully realized aesthetic experiences can enter into future interactions, as part of what we bring to them. This "funding" can include personal meanings, cultural movements and values, social conflict, or criticism of any phase of society.

Dewey's understanding grounds an indefinitely stretching horizon of content and therefore form. Nothing is in principle ruled out as legitimate form, style, medium, or technique in art. Because daily life is the seedbed of art, as the conditions of life change, so must art. This is why the sculpture of Moore and Giacometti must be so different from ancient Greek and Medieval statuary. This is why Picasso is not a duplication of Rembrandt. Because art is a response to

everyday life, philosophy of art cannot permanently fix aesthetic meaning, structure, or value. Change in aesthetic perception is a fact of daily life.[8] What we do and how we do it changes, evidenced, for example, by changing technologies. This informs what we perceive and the ways we perceive it. It would be foolish to think that the workings of art or even what counts as art should not alter as well.

This doesn't mean there is no stability in art, art theory, or philosophy. It means that philosophy must account for stability in these enterprises in terms of their dialectic relationship with everyday life's stabilizing features. Continuity in cultural forms, whether artistic, scientific, or philosophical, is to be understood philosophically as interacting with daily living.

In its dialectical relationship with the everyday, philosophy examines the play between everyday aesthetic experience, the art world, and criticism of art. Discussing changes in African- American music, Cornel West notes, "The old music can no longer sustain the rituals of everyday life among young inner-city people. Rap... does. It's an extension of the improvisational tradition in jazz - a union of the rhetorical and musical".[9] This is an example of how philosophy of art criticism would take its cue from changes in everyday life.

Old artistic forms don't inspire today's black youths; therefore, old norms of criticism are inappropriate. If we don't view the ordinary as criteriological, as making legitimate claims on what is valuable and substantive for philosophical reflection, then we are liable to condemn all new art on the basis of our cherished art theory or standard.

Art criticism which is not sensitive to changes in the common affairs of life will spin off into irrelevancies. The temptation for art critics is to fasten upon unchanging norms of technique or value and impose them indiscriminately on new art styles and forms. These norms are typically derived from established works, the old masters, or from an independent philosophical metaphysics. Philosophy's office is to disclose the limiting effects of such critical theory on aesthetic experience — hardening perception into routine and impeding openness to new forms of expression.[10]

As cultural critical activity rather than a form of knowledge, philosophy can mediate between a mode of inquiry, such as art criticism, and its subject matter. Pointing out the relationship between art and everyday aesthetic experience, for instance, can disabuse the critic from relying on tried and true formulae of interpretation or evaluation. Disclosing the social bases for categories such as fine and applied art or high and pop culture, can free critics from constricting preconceptions. Describing changes in the cultural conditions within which new art forms emerge can equip critics to deal with these forms on their own terms. Critics can then fulfill their function of "reeducating perception" of works of art and experience in general.[11]

IV.

The light philosophy sheds on art and the everyday is itself a paradigm for philosophy's relationship to all cultural enterprises, whether science or religion, politics or education. Philosophy can show how alterations in the forms of daily

life create change in these modes of inquiry, even as these modes of inquiry reorganize daily life. Change in family life and conceptions of childhood, for example, have altered law, social work, and education. Conversely, changes in these institutions have opened possibilities for family and the status of children in our society.

As suggested at the beginning of this discussion, philosophy must also reflect on itself and its relation to the everyday. As Dewey puts it, philosophy must see itself as responding to conditions and problems besetting its historical period.[12] Noting how philosophy has done this in the past may provide an object lesson for us today.

Plato's theory of art, for example, can be understood as a politically motivated response to the question of Athenian intellectual leadership. Plato offers the new rationality of philosophy as an alternative to the traditional wisdom provided by art. He does this in a time of troubled change, when Athens' traditions and stability were challenged by internal discord and military defeat. The implications of Plato's theory of art shift when the theorizing is seen in its dialectical relationship to the everyday.

Only when philosophy heeds its own relationship to daily living will it function the way Dewey envisions. Under such a self- understanding, philosophy "ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men".[13]

Perhaps the same approach should be taken toward Dewey's theory of art as experience and philosophy in general. Seizing upon the spirit of the American democratization and openness of experience, Dewey's philosophy is a reaction against elitist, contemplative philosophies which emphasize an eternal realm apart from common life. It champions daily living as the locus of intrinsic value, thereby subordinating all intellectual endeavors to its flourishing — including philosophy. The paradigm of the dialectic between philosophy and the everyday is self-referring. Dewey's own philosophical activity falls within the scope of his dialectical paradigm. When we situate Dewey's understanding of philosophy within itself, as consistency demands, we see how celebrating ordinary life as central is a phenomenon of democratic culture and institutions in America. Within this celebration, philosophy makes its contribution, even as it self-consciously appraises it. Whether this paradigm will prove timely in generations to come, only time and philosophical reflection on it can tell.

NOTES

[1] "Kant and Philosophic Method", *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, Vol.1, ed. John J. McDermott (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1973), p.13. Originally published in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, XVIII, (April, 1884).
[2] *Experience and Nature*, "Nature, Communication and Meaning" (New York: Dover, 1958).
[3] *The Quest For Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1929), pp.193-94.
[4] *Experience and Nature*, p.166.
[5] *Philosophy and Civilization* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1931), pp.24-25.
[6] *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1934), p.33.
[7] *Art as Experience*, p.18.
[8] *Art as Experience*, p.100.
[9] Cornel West, *The New Yorker*, Jan.17, 1994, p.41.
[10] *Art as Experience*, pp.229-30.
[11] *Art as Experience*, p.324.
[12] *Philosophy and Civilization*, pp.3-12.
[13] "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy", *On Experience, Nature and Freedom: Representative Selections*, ed. Richard Bernstein, Library of Liberal Arts (New york: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p.86.

THE IMPOSSIBLE ETHICS AND ITS CHARACTER. FOR A TRANSDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE

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1. I would rather begin from what the character of ethics should be today, if possible. First of all we must say that a definition of ethics in the widest sense must cover every type of behaviour. Good and Evil, the judgement of good and evil, value and negative value, are the consequence of the type of ethics and not vice versa. The ancient Greek word ηθοζ means custom, rule, habit institution: a behaviour, which constitutes a value according to a certain custom, can, therefore, constitute a negative value according to another custom. We can think for example of the different value of polygamy in comparison with monogamy in different civilizations. Consequently there is not only an ethics of love but also an ethics of hate: let's think of the various racism, totalitarianism, war, gangsterism and so on. In the same way there is an ethics of indifference, of disengagement of egoism, of aestheticism too. Bergson spoke of two sources of ethics: of a closed, compulsory, social ethics and of an open, individual ethics, an ethics of self-sacrifice, devotion and elan. The values of the former cannot certainly be the ones of the latter, on the contrary they constitute its contradiction. Obviously our approach makes it meaningless to wonder whether an ethics, that is a system of values which are positively thought, is possible today. Now the problem is: what ethics is possible today, and then which positive and negative values may be recognized in this ethics today? or, even more precisely: in the planetary age, what can a planetary ethics be, if it can be? The word ηθοζ means also character, disposition, nature, from the individual point of view. But that does not matter to our assumption because it falls within the most general meaning, the individual falls within the social. Instead the other fundamental meaning is important: ηθοζ means abode, sojourn, home, seat of men and peoples. Well then the abode, the seat, is always inserted, like Heidegger's temple in the earth, in a context, an environment. The ηθοζ , the custom, the behaviour, the ethics happen in this environment, in this context which cannot be ignored.

This environment presents itself under two forms, natural and social or, if we prefer, under a historical-geographical form. As to the natural physical planetary and cosmic aspect everybody knows that the fundamental question is the one of entropy and, linked with it, the one of the exhaustion of the world resources and reserves. It is useful to clear up some points on this subject. The question of entropy is not a merely theoretical question, not only an abstract interpretative pattern of reality and it does not only concern the field of the possible, but today it invests, with a pressing urgency, all human society in its structural economic and political aspects, in its behaviour and practice, in a word, in its ethics. For lack of space it is here enough to remember that the process of entropy is irreversible (Rifkin 1980) and that organisms, accumulating negative entropy from their environment create order at the expense of a great disorder in the world, so increasing the total entropy of the surrounding

environment. Moreover Lovelock (1988) stressed the mutual action between physical environment and biosphere and the interdependence of the ecosystems.

We come this way to what we can call the context the social environment even if this social context already constitutes the abode, the home of man, and precisely: man's way of life. We can define that as bourgeois-industrial-capitalistic system. It functions as if it were autonomous, independent of the natural context or rather, as if it were the absolute master, able to take decision and to effect any aim with the instrument of technics. This behaviour of industrial society produced a terrible acceleration of entropy, a very fast reduction of the available reserves and a consumption infinitely superior to the available of renewable energies. We cannot examine in detail the aspects of this situation in which industrial development appears by now as a destroyer of nature and life, on which it is founded itself. The biological environment-tree-animal equilibrium has reached a worrying state; they have spoken about a "boomerang effect" falling upon the industrial system itself. The progressive extinction of species, the hothouse effect the acid rains, the soil water, air pollution, the impossibility of discharge of wastes are the well-known consequences. In the present state of affairs there takes place the population explosion the population exponential growth: megalopolis, underdevelopment and criminality are the most evident effects. Genetic engineering comes in at this point arousing enormous problems of bioethics at social and natural levels.

Facing this world emergency the idea of a transition from this system with a high entropy to another one with a low entropy has necessarily come out. All that implies a different world idea, a new order and a different style of life. There is put forward a new alliance of man with nature. Man will be the caretaker, the keeper, the shepherd of nature. It can't be denied that the transition will be difficult but the political action and the involvement of people are mainly emphasized. The work of national and local governments, international treaties, interaction between transactor, public administration and public opinion through the environmental mediation negotiation risks estimation and theory of games, environmental movements and quarter organizations will contribute by means of participative democracy and social consent to the construction of a new way of life.

2. At this point as we have formulated all the question we may wonder what the present ethical condition of mankind is, if it is possible, to answer this question. We can take MacIntyre (1984[2]) as a reference. He denounces the failure of the modern project, the Enlightenment project of a rational ethics. The emblematic figures of this failure are the characters of the rich aesthete, of the therapeutist and the bureaucratic manager. Their presumed competence is a moral pretence. Their basis are contemporary emotivism and individualism, not principles or values. The paradoxical character of this situation is that emotivism and individualism make society an arena where everybody wishes not to be manipulated but tries to manipulate the others to carry out his own advantages, while the political institutions provide the structure that makes possible such an activity.

This present ethical state is indirectly confirmed by Packard's (1989) and Galbraith's (1992) analyses. American society, because of its advanced living standards, is exemplary from this point of view. The ultra-rich studied by Packard, so different from how pubic opinion thinks, are however the proof of a market society, of free enterprise and entrepreneurial spirit that is competitiveness and speculations, of cat-and-mouse game. For each spectacular success a lot of people fail. The concentration of wealth in the hands of few people produces an abyss between the 1% and the 99% of the population. Packard denounces the important problem of American society, the social tension which has come out and the implied responsibilities, and also presents some indications to build a better world.

Galbraith's research is more ramified and less circumscribed: his denouncement of the limits of the culture of contentment, in all its aspects and with all its consequences, is clearly uttered. Communism has failed but there are deep flaws in triumphant capitalism. A minority of well-off people owns the 51,8% of total gross income. The policy of contentment implies an economy based on the *laissez faire,* directed to the pursuit of a greater and greater profit completely centred on the short-term, justified by the persuasion that the market is able to solve its problems by itself. Galbraith reverses the current opinion about the role of entrepreneurs and managers, points out the bureaucratic peculiarity of all the system explains the financial devastation caused by company and estate takeovers, mergers and speculations, denounces the interested connection between economic power and military power. He shows the possible negative, developments of the system: a global economic disaster, a ruinous military action, the rebellion of the subclass. Unemployment poverty increase, degeneration of urban areas (criminality, alcohol, drugs) cannot be solved with the defensive self-segregation of privileged persons as it happened in Manila. The age of contentment will finish when the belief in comfortable welfare falls. The change must involve a mixed economy with the intervention of government and a long-term regulation policy.

3. The convergence of all these analyses shows the necessity of a turning point but all the offered solutions, even if with the diversity of means and methods, entail a responsible choice for the change. They all, in a different way, make an appeal to good will; intentionality is their peculiarity. The programmes of all ecologists wish for an individual transformation a human maturity, a change of the world conception, and therefore of values and habits, patterns and fife style. They appeal to the sense of responsibility, to self-criticism, volitive tension, wisdom. Politically and socially the importance of government resolutions id considered determinant: the Rio 1992 and Cairo 1994 international summits are the most evident proofs of this. To avoid the suicide of mankind, Lorenz (1983) already appealed to our sensitivity to value problems, to the education to beauty, to form and harmony perception, to love for all living beings, to pity for creatures, to solidarity.

A precisely detailed ethical programme is presented by Morin and Kern (1993). To resist to keep, to revolutionize is Morin's suggestion for a policy of man in the world and of a planetary responsibility which follows the gaining

awareness of danger. A radical reform of thought must restore rationality against rationalization, admit the loss of certainties and run the risk of uncertainty as the condition of reality; a moral reform must be founded on love and brotherhood, so that mankind leaves the ruinous project to dominate over the Earth and becomes its co-pilot. The Earth must lead through life, man must lead through consciousness.

All these authors are well aware of the difficulties of carrying out their prospects. Really everything happens on the plane of intentions, responsibility and decisions. The unalterable destiny of mankind is played only here. But we cannot hide that even in form of the most refined culture, human behaviour is caused by a fundamental passionateness, that an instinctive reactivity leads every behaviour of ours. We can say that the fundamental aspects which characterize human behaviour are two: thirst for power and herd spirit. On one hand avidity, ambition, egoism produce aggressiveness and collusions for the attainment of prestige, money, power. Nevertheless the goods and services we can enjoy are nothing in comparison with the ones on which we can exercise power. "Potiri rerum", the exercise of power, is therefore a negative, not positive act it consists in preventing others from the use and enjoyment of goods and services. What is important is power, not the object of power, what is important is a possibility, nothing but the action and the carrying out of power; power becomes power for power's sake, power as an end in itself. We are far from the freedom and autonomy of aesthetic life. On the other hand laziness, abstention from action, the choice of not choosing in order not to run any risks, conformity and indoctrination as peculiarities of herd spirit. The cunning of the individual is not an individual act, but the mad instinctive unreflecting immediate irrational mass behaviour. "Panem et circenses" are the consequences of both these figures: as divertissement of the masses from the terror of autonomy and of the responsibly of the choice, and as disengagement functional to power, so that this one can subsist as such. The same fate joins dominators and dominated.

Hegel had rightly recognized a single figure in the slave-master. The slave and the master are not opposite and different but identical. The slave is slave not as slave but because he is the slave of his master, and the master is master not because he is master but as the master of his slave. Otherwise said, the herd spirit is such exactly because it recognizes the necessity of the master, without whom he would not know how to subsist; while the master is such exactly because he recognizes the herd spirit, without which he could not be the master. Whatever pole we consider, slave or master, this pole is not independent; it draws its consistency from the relation to the other. The two poles feed each other, they are impossible without the mutual relation that constitutes them intimately. Thirst for power and herd spirit constitute them both. Slave and master are closed and alienated in the limits of a blind fate. A blind sentence has one to the other.

We can go out from this two-faced figure only with its overcoming. But mankind as a social collective body is stationary at this figure of slave and master. The overcoming can be indirectly realized, not from the inside but from the outside of mankind, therefore by the ecosystem where we are. It implies two

possible solutions: the elimination of mankind, the most likely event or the creation of a new mankind, able to co-pilot the Earth. Once more man is not the master of cosmos and so of his destiny. H. Spencer said that mankind is not yet mature for a social more advanced stage, that of solidarity overcoming egoism. Men are so engaged to make war among themselves that they forget the very world where they five.

Today the collective choice does not appear to take the leap towards the safeguard and collaboration with nature. Current world political choices confirm a market economy, governed by a relentless competition, completely centred on the short term whose only aim is the maximization of profit. There follows a total transformation of life in merchandise, where everything is turned into trade value, and an unbridled consumer's culture which take to a faster and faster destruction of the Earth. Strategies and tactics directed towards the strengthening of the distinction North/South between the rich and the poor, to maintain privilege, on one hand and the blind confidence in the progress of technics as a solution to all problems on the other hand, are in accordance with the. political-economic market choices. But capitalism whose aim is profit, to avoid the destruction of the Earth and therefore its own destruction is forced to perfect technics, neglecting profit and so contributing to its own destruction according to Severino (1993). All this confirms the pessimism of our analysis.

4. Is therefore mankind completely determined and is it the victim of an inexorable fate? The Earth is the only known planet which makes life possible and perhaps we are living alone in the universe; and even if we are not alone, today we know that we could not communicate with other intelligent beings in the cosmos because they would be at inaccessible distance before the end of the Earth. In fact the Earth constitutes an isolated system, which changes with the outside, the sun, only energy, subject to the irreversible thermodynamical process. Can no responsibility be ascribed to man because of the enormous acceleration of entropy?

At this point it is not a question of choice of absolute freedom, which institutes new causal sequences, that is a completely new and independent system of life of mankind. Now the question does not concern the well-known antinomy freedom-necessity; and the solution or the unsuccessful solution of this one, is not important in this case. Here it is a matter of a relative freedom, of a solution within the limits of a given situation, within the limits of a context that is the context of the planetary ecosystem where we are living. Man is not the creator or the absolute master of the world. Here the terms of the question are already given and with an urgency which does not admit any deferments: either mankind goes on with this system of life, which the Earth does not stand any more, and destroys itself, or changes it supposing that we have the instruments to build a new alliance with nature. However abstract the example may seem, it is not so, when we are in the city centre, in the main square, we can choose among given situations, namely the streets that branch off from the centre. Don't tell me that I arrived downtown because of determined reasons and, because of as many consequential reasons, "I shall have" to choose the fifth street and not another one. The choice is not always univocal that is it is only an apparent choice: we are

often uncertain among more than one alternative street. We can maintain that this situation is a product of a determinism too, but we cannot deny that what is determined is the freedom of a relative choice. This time, no matter how he has arrived here, because of free choice or determinism, man is at a cross-roads. We can say that man is conditioned to choose between survival or not. The first choice is difficult and painful its way is fraught with uncertainties, mistakes and, without doubt, failures, but it is a possible choice even if there are many reasons to think that it is unlikely. Mankind as an acting totality (as an acting totality determined "to choose" survival too) is responsible. Because it can also not choose it. This is what once was called tendency to evil. When we are speaking of mankind as totality, it is true, we forget the inner articulations that constitute this totality and that sociology, anthropology, biology, psychology and the other human sciences help us to understand. But this way of reasoning comes after. It concerns what we must do, how to do it and if we have the tools for it. At this point instead no alternative between optimism and pessimism is any larger possible and, in a pessimistic view too, the sole perspective is to work for a new alliance with nature, for a new world, even if without any guarantee. That means to give up every impossible science of future prediction, to acknowledge the dependent role of man in the cosmos and to rely on the unforeseenbleness of his fate. Therefore every pessimism is nothing but a methodical scepticism, which faces up to uncertainty with all its enormous problems and openly confronts the restlessness and anxiety of our enigmatical existence.

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HUMANIZING MAN. SOME PROBLEMS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

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It is an undisputed fact that the ideas of man, of his nature, his virtues, and destiny, underwent an essential change during the periods of renaissance and enlightenment. The medieval concept of man — considered mainly as a limited spiritual being in necessary relation to a perfect transcendent god — lost its universal validity for good. To a modern philosopher, even a Christian one, the humanity of man has become a separate problem from his metaphysical connections, that might be accepted or denied. A transcendent or immanent god may still be needed to explain the existence of the universe, but not to define either the specific essence of human being or the relations between man and the rest of the world.

Still there does not seem to be an universal agreement as to what really happened to the concept of man. Superficially we all feel that an important step has been taken towards spiritual freedom and independence of a self-defining subject, but this general notion does not stand a more minute inquiry as to any distinct features and undiscussed acceptance. Just a few questions to make this point clear: Is there mainly one universal concept of man in post-enlightenment philosophy, or is there a plurality of them, maybe varying not only with different authors, but even within the thought of a single philosopher? Is there still an unbroken tradition between enlightenment anthropology and our own thought, our understanding of humanity? Is it true that enlightenment had a profoundly optimistic view on the nature of man, or where does our own cultural pessimism come from?

I do not intend to give exhaustive answers to such big questions. All I try to do is to take some closer views and ask some precise questions about what really happened to the concept of man when the metaphysical umbilical cord that used to bind it to transcendence was cut.

First of all let us try to remember the main features of the generally, if not universally accepted medieval concept of man. We perceive a contingent, limited, composed being, corporal and spiritual, essentially dependent and imperfect regarding both, body and soul. Still there is an inborn longing for perfection, a specific human asymmetry between his physical and spiritual dimensions, his mortal and immortal destinies, his actual faculties and his freedom of will, which philosophically account for, and theologically are explained by original sin in all its ambivalence as the source of both, corruption and redemption. Man as an essentially unbalanced being aims to a point of perfection transcendent to him. Morally he is a responsible being, not in spite of his dependence on god, but because of it. There is a necessary link between human imperfection and moral fault, that cannot be superated without being accepted.

Of course this is not all what can be said about medieval anthropology, but I think these are points where it differs widely from our modem views both in

contemporary explicit philosophical concepts and our unreflected everyday way to consider ourselves and each other.

There is no need to enumerate, the strong points of medieval philosophical systems. Everyone who has seriously looked into scholasticism knows that you hardly can beat its logical stringency. Yet one of the weaker points must have been the ambigual valuation of human reason, which at the same time was considered as a very strong and a very weak means for attaining Truth (with a capital T). Maybe the conflict between the authority of human reason and the authority of Divine Revelation ought to be seen less as a conflict between theology and philosophy and more as a consequence of that ambiguity within medieval philosophical anthropology. In some cases logic turns out to be deadly, and probably the collapse of the medieval concept of man was brought about because scholastic philosophers themselves tended to give too much, and not too little confidence to the capacity of human reason.

Anyway, the main shift towards a modem evaluation of human nature was brought about by what may be described in theological terms as a recusation of original sin, or, philosophically speaking, as a new evaluation of the relation between human reason and absolute truth: the necessary existence of a truth unattainable to human reason is denied. Human nature is emancipated, its limitation, no longer a necessary imperfection or fault, is altogether questioned: "I do not know, if any philosopher has dared at any time to say: this is the limit that man can reach, and he cannot go further. We do not know what our nature allows us to become. Nobody of us has as yet measured the distance possible between one man and another." as Rousseau puts it in the first book of "Emile". Human perfection is no longer a contadictio in adjecto, but the aim of progress, the moral duty of a free being, a goal and a task challenging historical man to everlasting efforts — theoretically, at least.

So here we seem to have quite an optimistical notion of human nature: "There is no original corruption in the human heart. There is no vice in it, of which one could not tell, how it has penetrated into it." ("Emile", 2nd book) There does not seem to be anything strange about this statement except the fact that we find it in a book about education.

What is wrong with education? Nobody will deny the usefulness of giving children a training in social and cultural techniques. But this is professedly not what Rousseau's "Emile" is about. Rousseau's ideal pupil is not educated in order to fit into a social and cultural environment, but instead he is taught how to be a man according to human nature. He is educated against his cultural context, not in accordance to it.

How that? Is there any need to teach a being to conform with its nature, is it necessary to humanize man? As a Roman saying goes, you may chase away nature with a fork, anyway, it will always return. So why does Rousseau think it a twenty years' full time job and worth while, as it is, to educate a man according to nature? The reason is, nature is not any more considered as a starting point granted to everyone, but as a final degree of perfection which is easily missed and seldom reached, if ever. Or, to be more correct, nature does become this final goal without ceasing altogether to be a starting point, as well. Read the

very first words of "Emile": "Everything that comes out of the creator's hands is good, everything degenerates in the hands of man." How about optimism now?

But Rousseau, for all the importance he was to gain in modern philosophical thought, in political and pedagogical theory, is a single thinker, and actually influenced by his Calvinist background with all the deeply rooted anthropological pessimism of this creed, which, while he fought against it, he was never able to get quite rid of Let us see, if this diffidence is specifically his, or if it is shared by other heroes of enlightenment.

Just some famous and well known examples to remind ourselves of. How does Voltaire's "Candide" prove against Leibnitz that this is not the best of all possible worlds? By the universal diffusion of human meanness and stupidity and the impotence and uselessness of human goodwill. Or calling Diderot to witness: What shall we make out of Jaques' fatalism denying all possibility of human merit or virtue? Man is not even free to attain stoical virtue, for even if he knows that "It was all written above" he still will act according to his instincts and not his intelligence. Only a fool like the master of Jaques, who is led not only by fate, but also by his servant, can believe himself to be free. Or what shall we make out of that black and brilliant chapter of anthropological pessimism, "Rameau's Nephew"?

Looking at d'Alambert, what shall we find, but a profound ethical skepticism and a kind of anthropological atomism: "Man is only an abundant effect, a monster is only a rare effect, both are equally natural, equally necessary, equal as to the general and universal order of things. What is there to be astonished about? Every animal is more or less a man, each thing more or less an animal. What do you intend to say by your individualities? So I do not die? No, without doubt, in this sense I do not die. To be born, to live, to decease means to change form... And what importance is there in one form or another? Each form has its own happiness and misery. We are deminished by the cold and extended by the heat... The animal is under tyranny or anarchy." We see not only the concept of self-defining humanity denied here, man himself as a reality is seriously doubted.

Where do all these pessimistical notions come from? Why does it seem so difficult to affirm the essential goodness of man, while denying his natural corruption? Most philosophers of enlightenment will agree that there is no connection between man's moral perfection and metaphysical belief, and they will tell you that there cannot be any ethical merit, if any reward like immortality or eternal happiness is expected. Yet while the flaw of imperfection is removed from the concept of humanity there is still the same amount of actual human imperfection to be accounted for. Original sin taken away you must either shoulder the whole burden of responsibility as a free individual or deny human freedom altogether, finding some anonymous instance to take fault and merit away from humanity, or else deny that there is any such thing as good and evil. The choice is yours, just help yourself.

But let us return to "Emile": there are some interesting details I should like to point out. If there is need to educate a person to make him conform with his nature the reason thereof is not that he is still unperfect as a man while he is an infant or child: a child is something quite different from a man, Rousseau tells us in his introduction to Emile. Education means the prevention of cultural influences from the surrounding world, for man is good only if he is the good savage, subjected only by the necessity of things, uninfluenced by anyone save

the godlike pedagogue who assumes the role of providence: "There is no subjection as total like the one that assumes the semblance of liberty; thus the will itself is captured... of course he has only to do what he wants to do, but here he may only want what you want him to want." as Rousseau tells us most candidly ("Emile", 2nd book). That is a dear price to pay for the emancipation from a transcendent perfect being. Or, rather, two high prices: not only you are committed, body and soul, to an usurping man, your equal at the best, who keeps cheating you by arranging fatal meetings and coincidences beforehand (Rousseau does not keep the secrets from the reader, which he intends to keep from his pupil), but even the personal continuity of individual character is sacrificed to the system. The child knows nothing of symphaty or affection, he is an objective being in a world of objects, his only feelings refer to himself and are dictated by physical needs. The youth attaining sexual maturity becomes a social being all of a sudden, awakening first to sexual attraction, and only afterwards to friendship.

Now Rousseau was quite a keen observer, whenever he choose to be so. But I dare say there is absolutely no empirical experience in favor of such assumptions. Neither did the noble savage, uninfluenced by any culture and any relation to his fellow- men exist anywhere. We know that, whenever we choose to remember it, and yet we do forget it, whenever we prefer not to realize it. So there is not much reason to assume, that Rousseau might not have known it, as well, if he only had wanted to know. But what can be a serious reason for radically separating childhood from maturity, if not an effort to take some responsibility from us, not only for our actions, but even for our feelings? And what else could the noble savage, whom Rousseau is not even trying to make very attractive to us, stand for, if not as a proof, that the goodness of human nature at the beginning of things and the goodness of human nature after reaching the utter point of perfection is the same, identical, natural goodness, while all the evil lies in between? The trouble is, that the only visible and tangible reality is just the incriminated "in between" of the different existing cultural contexts.

But it would just be unfair to give all the fault to Rousseau. The fact is that you simply cannot emancipate man from the almighty will of transcendent perfection without accounting for the actual lack of freedom in humanity. Here you also have a choice of different solutions, and Rousseau went far in trying most of them.

You may call in fate or destiny, which is a kind of impersonal deity, an unfriendly, unfeeling and incomprehensible providence without any trace of ethical implication, that can be considered either transcendent or immanent to our world, it does not seem to matter much, which way round: even if you consider it an inborn part of human nature, once you introduce it tends to swallow up all freedom leaving you but illusion for your share. Rousseau seems only to admit it as the destiny of peoples in his "Social Contract" (2nd book, chapter 8), but not to consider it seriously as the fate of individuals, maybe it bears to close a resemblance to the Calvinist vision of a determining god. But there are philosophers contemporary to him who favour blind destiny, and I would not be surprised to find it at the roots of d'Alambert's atomism.

Then you can make your fellow man responsible for your deficiency of freedom. Rousseau makes ample use of it, and so does Diderot in his own way. Rousseau does even consider the life of a hermit as a possible way to flee human misery, if not to attain happiness, and asserts that God's happiness consists in his lone being. Rousseau had his full share of happiness in that idea. because none of his fellow philosophers would care to follow him there.

If you do not want to subject man to the iniquity of his equal there is still the democratical way open: the rule of the majority based on equal rights. Naturally this appears to be the most acceptable solution to all of us: everybody is partaking of sovereignty, and everybody has the same share of decisive power over the whole society. It sounds like freedom, but take care: Rousseau has been there before you, and he is the right man to discover some quite forbidding traits in democracy, too, at least in his own notion of it.

What happens to an overruled minority in a democracy? It cannot have its way, it has to give in to majority, it has lost this time and has to limit itself to the hope to be part of the majority next time. That might be what we think about it. Not so Rousseau in his "Social Contract"! The will of the majority has to be the universal will of society, that is, the true intention of each member of it. The disagreeing minority does not only loose the game, it must also admit of having voted the wrong way. It did not know its own will, so it must have been either ignorant or malignantly selfish. (4th book, chapter 2). Besides, in Rousseau's ideal democratic constitution you only have your share in the freedom of universal will of the civic body, there is no private freedom of self-determination, because it would be in conflict with the freedom of the republic as a whole. Civic constitution cannot coexist with natural human freedom. "His life is no more a simple gift of nature, but a conditional donation from the state." (Soc. Contr. 2, 5) "If no citizen is anything or can do anything, save through all the others, and if the power acquired by the community is equal or greater than the sum of natural powers of its members, then the legislature has reached the highest possible degree of its perfection." (Soc. Contr., 2,7). Each citizen has to be absolutely independent from all the other citizens, and, at the same time extremely dependent on the police, for it is the power of the state that makes the freedom of the citizen (Soc. Contr. 2, 12).

But if authority of one man over another is a thing to be carefully avoided in politics, what about authority in education? That is a real problem. There does not seem to be any human right to it, no wonder that we keep feeling uneasy with the pedagogical conjuring tricks throughout "Emile". You might have a practical right to authority in technical things owing to a greater degree of know-how. But if you intend to tech humanity to a human being you cannot be justified by practice, you either usurp authority by cunning or force, or proof it to be true. As far I could not detect a way of proving the truth of authority without recurrence to a transcendent principle. This difficulty seems to me to lie at the roots of most modern controversies about authority, not only in the field of pedagogy, but also in politics, religion and ethics.

I must apologize that I cannot offer any ready made solutions to any of these problems I tried to describe. But I have my share of the general deficiency of authority. I do not know a shorter cut to truth than anyone of you and must leave you to your individual points of view, which is, thanks God, a kind of freedom still left to thinking man.

A NEW PROGRAMME FOR PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE NEXT CENTURY

with special emphasis on its connection with epistemology and the philosophy of science.

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1. Nearly half a century ago, Helmuth Plessner, one of the founders of philosophical anthropology, framed the problem 'Is there progress in philosophy? [Is er vooruitgang in de wijsbegeerte?]'. The question is in many respects pertinent. Both straightforward answers 'yes' and 'no' are inadequate. If one answers 'no', it follows that philosophy is not a science, but then its claim to academic status must be questioned. If the answer is 'yes', however, it follows that sooner or later all philosophical questions will be answered definitely, as is the case in science which by definition progresses; but that answer runs counter to generally accepted notions of what philosophy really is.

2. Plessner was well aware of this dilemma. Instead of giving a clearcut answer, he therefore gave an elaborate and prophetic discussion of possible answers to his question. Looking back after nearly half a century, we now recognize in this discussion many topics which since 1946 have become central issues in philosophy, especially in epistemology and the philosophy of science in relation with philosophical anthropology. Science is now definitely recognized as *human* endeavour; the 19th century ideal of 'objective' knowledge which is supposed to unveil how reality really 'is', has been exposed as an obsolete and dangerous illusion. The subjective social and historical dimensions in the development of science are now seen as part of its essential basis. Science no longer attempts to establish truth (let alone Truth); the answer to the question "does it work?", the pragmatic effectiveness of a theory, of knowledge in general, is the crucial criterion whether the theory is valuable, whether the knowledge is trustworthy.

3. One of the results of this development is that the objectives of science and philosophy are no longer self-evident. The classical debate about the relationship between science and society, especially between progress in science and progress in society, often associated with Julien Benda's book on the treason of the intellectuals (La Trahison des Clercs), between personal life and politics, has acquired a new dimension.

In this paper we propose a new answer to the question concerning the objectives of philosophy: to give a contribution to the creation of man according to the intuitions about man that lie dormant in every individual. The basic assumption is, that in every single human individual lives an implicit, intuitive image of man. A new programme is needed for philosophical anthropology, with special emphasis on its connection with epistemology and the philosophy of science, to make this explicit.

4. Man (the 'humanum' in classical terms) is an infinitely rich and varied phenomenon. Any realistic programme for philosophical anthropology, new or old, is correspondingly varied. The human body is fundamentally important to any such programme. Accordingly, every philosophical anthropology has an essential and intimate connection with medicine. The first thing that must be said in this connection is that Plessner's question as to whether philosophy is characterized by progress or not, now must be discussed in a new perspective because of the immense progress which medical science has made in the last fifty years and will certainly continue to make in the next century.

5. The best way to begin the chapter on the body in the programme for philosophical anthropology is with a summary of the historical development of views on the human body. A concise and almost poetically apt expression summarizes the historical development of the philosophy of the human body in health and disease in three words: "in vivo" (400 bC — 1400), "in vitro" (1400 — today), "in numero" (2000 — ?).

In the first twenty centuries of scientific medicine in which something that we can call 'scientific medicine' existed, roughly between Hippocrates and the Renaissance, the human body was seen and experienced "live", as a living whole, a living entity in intimate relation with its (equally "living") surroundings. With the beginning of the modem era the science of the laboratory, where fragments of the body are studied 'in glass", took over and became the dominant paradigm. As a result of technical progress, the fragments that can be studied now have become so infinitesimally small that structures on the level of genes, molecules and atoms can be mapped and investigated. Nowadays, as a result of progress in computer science and technology, the data in which the information concerning the physico-spatial body are expressed, gradually come to replace the body itself. Instead of being an object in space, in the paradigm of scientific medicine the human body becomes a complex of "numbers" so intricate, that the human mind can no longer understand it, and only artificial intelligence can manipulate the data in such a way that the information is pragmatically effective. The human body now is fully expressed 'in numero'; all aspects that cannot be expressed in number, become scientifically irrelevant.

6. Current effects of this historical trend can already be recognized in many aspects of modem medicine. We mention three of them. 1) The myth of what is often called the "makability" of man, is coming every year closer to physical reality. "Natural death" is becoming an empty concept in the Western world — no one dies a natural death anymore; everyone who runs the risk of dying a natural death can be kept alive indefinitely — the quality of life being, of course, often so questionable that euthanasia is not only a blessing, but the only humane solution. 2) since the middle of this century medicine is becoming, for the first time in history, a man-made mass phenomenon. Very soon not a single person on earth will be able to live and die outside the influence of medicine. This new situation confronts doctors with responsibilities which they never before in

history had to face. 3) Not only dying, also being conceived and born are becoming industrialized processes. Very soon, man and woman will no longer have to do what they have being doing since Adam and Eve to give life to new children. Genetic counselling according to "politically correct" ethical values will become routine in the new artificial procreation.

Summarizing these three aspects we can say that Huxley's Brave New World, predicted to be realized about 600 years after the novel was published, will become reality within about 10% of this estimate.

7. From this elementary analysis, it can be logically deduced that medical practice will in effect continue to proceed along these lines for the simple reason that it is pragmatically effective and pragmatic effectiveness is the only criterion which science to-day has to measure its value.

8. If this were the whole story, the prospect for humanity would be bleak. Any attempt to divert the course of future history into a more humane mainstream for future history would then resemble Baron von Münchausen' attempt to lift himself from the water in which he is drowning by pulling himself by his own hair. In a more scholarly tradition this literary metaphor is echoed by the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga who has said: "History can predict nothing except that no great transformation in human life ever takes place in the form in which previous generations imagined that it would take place. We can be sure, that things always happen differently from what we *are able to* think" ['De historie kan niets voorspellen, behalve één ding: dat geen grote wending in de menselijke verhoudingen ooit uitkomt in de vorm waarin vroeger levenden zich haar hebben verbeeld. Wij weten zeker, dat de dingen anders lopen dan wij denken **kunnen**'. J. Huizinga: In de schaduwen van morgen].

9. But this is not the whole story. It is just a prediction based on the current prevailing concept of science. In that concept, physics is the dominant paradigm: a mechanistic deterministic paradigm. Just as Archimedes rightly predicted that he would be able to lift the whole earth provided he was given a lifting point far enough away in space, so we can 'lift' the apparently inevitable doom of a future world according to Huxley's prediction provided we have a 'lifting point' far enough — not away in *space*, but in *time*.

This contention is not just a piece of glossy SF (science fiction). The work of several old and new authors is relevant in this respect: First Plato, who has argued in the Meno and in other dialogues that every new child is not born 'out of the blue', as a "tabula rasa" as Locke 2000 years later thought. Instead, every human being brings with it memories of past lives, starts life with a history of a previous existence. A contemporary author who has worked out this philosophy in the framework of the political scene of the 20th and 21st centuries is Margaret Mead ("Culture and Commitment", 1970). As a result of three centuries of science and technology, the world is on the brink of wholesale destruction, she contends, and the accumulated wisdom of previous and now living generations is inadequate to stave off the coming disaster; which is only logical as it is the very same wisdom which in the past has produced it.

Yet there is "no reason for despair", she writes. The only condition which must be fulfilled to save the world is to acknowledge that coming generations themselves bring along the fundamentally new wisdom needed to keep the earth alive. After the era of the 'postfigurative' cultures, where the elders (living elder people and ancestors) were considered to hold the wisdom needed to run society, and of 'co-figurative' societies, in which contemporaries in the full bloom of their life had the power to determine what is true and good and what not, we must create a new, 'prefigurative' culture. Here neither ancestors, elders nor contemporaries but the as yet unborn children are normative for the ideal of Man in the future — provided these children are given the opportunity to realize what they bring along from the sphere from which they descend.

10. As a preliminary conclusion we claim that it can be logically deduced that the realisation of the idea of karma and reincarnation to-day presents the essential challenge to philosophy in the face of the 21st century. To critics who object that this is just a piece of soft New Age twaddle, we answer in the spirit of Hobbes' ethics (which is certainly not soft): the only real argument why anyone should behave morally, is self-interest; and only when I know that it is *me* myself who will come back in a next incarnation, I shall be convinced by moral arguments to stave off the coming disaster of destruction of the earth.

CRITICAL THEORY AND ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS: RE-ESTABLISHING PROPORTIONALISM IN ETHICAL DISCOURSE (abctract)

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In recent times, ethicists have struggled to propose moderate ethical positions which can sit between absolutist and situationist extremes. Even when these rely on eminent philosophies like those of Aristotle and Aquinas, these positions too often are left open to charges of being weak, ambivalent or inconsistent. Habermasian critical theory can help us to re-visit these attempts and to understand them in fortified fashion. In particular, a Habermasian gloss on the notion of 'right proportion' allows us to see within a theory of truth which does not merely build on, synthesize or complement competing theories, but transcends them to provide a new and superior form of knowledge.

AUTONOMY, OPENNESS, RECONCILIATION (ON SOME INTERNAL ETHICAL MOMENTS OF THEORETICAL PRAXIS)

abstract

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Inspired by the thoughts of Husserl, and some ideas of Heidegger and Hegel I am going to examine the following problem: If the responsibility for the scientific/philosophical mode of existence is itself a philosophical problem, thn which are those moments, and what are their functions,
within the theoretical attitude that reveal it always already in an ethical perspective?

Two types of conduct may be abstracted from a sketched genesis of theoretical attitude:

an attitude which dissolves itself in the autonomy of the object of 'theoria'; and,

one another attitude which sets an indifferent (or even empty) object in opposition to the autonomy of the cognizing subject.

These two types seem me to have alternating dominance in the history of theoretical attitude. Is it possible to characterize our present situation by the chaos of a rearrangement, out of which such an epoch is emerging again whose order is characterized by the dominance of the object and that of the community? Or there has been carried out a rearrangement in the last two centuries resulting such an order -our (post)modern world- , that unites within itself the two types of theoretical attitude and in this way it creates a final form of movement?

I do not want to answer these questions as historical ones concerning the character of our present age. Rather I make efforts to argue for the claim: the three different types of historical periods of theoretical attitude i.e. priority of object; dominance of subject's autonomy; and the processes of chaos or rearrangement are, indeed, the moments of a primordial historizing of theoretical attitude.

I intend to give an account of these moments as of motions , of gestures. The epistemological motions:

i. taking form of the situation of reflection, and the transcending of the object, of the world;
ii. a revealing backwards to the object;
iii. self-reflection of theoretical attitude, and its return back among the different potentialities for being;

are considered at the same time ethical moments, respectively:

i. autonomy as 'self-responsibility' of the cognizing subject;
ii. openness as dispositional revealing, or affectiveness;
iii. a return as 'reconciliation'.

CULTURAL RELATIVISM AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM

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This paper is concerned with what is somewhat ambiguously called cultural relativism; not, however, in the sense of a philosophical doctrine to be defended or refuted, but rather as a kind of philosophical problems to be dissolved. It is my contention that these problems, arise due to our intellectualist tendency to privilege some intellectual discourse or theoretical perspective.

Consider, for instance, relativism in ethics. When people have realized the existence of disagreement in moral judgements and the disparity of moral beliefs in different communities, as a fact of life and not just as a defect that should be remedied by finding 'the true and universal morality'; they have often felt themselves forced, from an intellectual observer's point of view, to accept some form relativism, although such views involve the risk of lapsing into scepticism and nihilism. The claim to absoluteness and universality, which appears to be a common feature of the morally convinced person's judgements about right and wrong, good or bad, appears to be unjustified, and to have only a kind of rhetorical function. But in admitting that, one does not want to leave the door open to an anarchism of "to each his own".

One source of the problem is the tendency, which is quite common today, to give an unjustified logical priority to some intellectual perspective. A certain philosophical or historical or sociological or scientific discourse is taken to be a discourse in which human life and action ultimately must be described and explained. For instance, the fact that human action and thinking always occurs in a historical and cultural context is erroneously taken to imply that we *must* understand human action in the historical or cultural perspective, that that is what 'understanding human action' ultimately means.

In the intellectualist perspective, this is taken to apply also to ourselves. Our moral notions and judgements are determined by the historical and cultural context where we belong. This means that the ethical point of view is subordinated to the historical or cultural perspective and it appears as though the dependence of our ethical notions on cultural context is a *necessary* dependence. It is as though we are somehow conceptually imprisoned in the moral notions of the society where we belong. It is as though we were acting and judging as we do in order to fulfil a future historical or anthropological account of our lives - an account which in some sense already exists and determines our actions.

So relativism in this sense, comes as the result of imposing normative claims about what it is to understand human action. By rejecting this normative claim, by questioning the *necessity* of the dependence of our notions on cultural and historical context, one does of course not deny this dependence as an empirical fact. What one denies is that this kind of facts is only kind of facts on the basis of which we understand people's actions.

If we want to understand someone's action, we *may* be satisfied with a psychological explanation or an account which places his behaviour in the cultural or historical context where he belongs, but this is not what understanding someone's action *must* be in the end. We must not understand the agent as an arbitrary member of a cultural or historical community. Opposed to this is the understanding of the action as the action of a conscious individual, or a person, and then one logically decisive thing is what the person actually *says* about why he acted as he did - whether what he says is an appeal to the moral norms of his society or not.

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To take another example: Were philosophers of past centuries mistaken in their great metaphysical claims and ambitions? Was Newton *wrong* in believing in absolute space and time? - Someone would perhaps be inclined to say: No, we have no right to judge the thinking of earlier epoches by the standards of our own. It would be unfair and historically naive to say, for instance, about Kant's claims to necessary and universal validity of his philosophical doctrine, that it was nothing but an attitude to a philosophical vocabulary. That is rather what we could say about someone who were maintaining a style of thinking like Kant's as a way of doing philosophy today.

But is not this a kind of historical or cultural relativism? If we are not permitted to make the general claims to necessity and universality that we find in traditional philosophy, were our ancestors permitted to make them? - Here we must be careful about our notion of the *language* in which we speak. In an important sense, the language of past centuries was not the same as ours even though many of the words and expressions are the same. *They were not used in the same way, and under the same circumstances.* It is important not to limit our perspective on language to its surface: to conceive a language as being merely a (conventional) system of forms of expressions. Our languages in the Western tradition are to a great extent the same as in earlier centuries in that sense, but the ways of using the expressions are in many ways essentially different, because the practices, historical circumstances and forms of life, with which language use is interwoven, are different. This is true in particular about the vocabularies of philosophy, science and ethics. Many of the practices and institutions of earlier times have declined and disappeared, and as a consequence thereof the content and the significance of words and expressions have changed. Many of the practices and forms of use of expressions, that form the basis of notions of our age, did not exist in earlier epoches. For instance, when the difference between physics, as an autonomous science and as natural philosophy did not exist, or when the difference was not as established as it is today, several conceptual differences that we can make today, could not be made and were not there until physics had developed as special autonomous discipline with is own characteristic procedures for observation, experimentation and calculation.

But again, does not that force us into an historical or cultural relativism? Am I not saying that our language and notions, and thereby the content and the truth of our statements, are relative to the cultural context were they belong? - Yes, but that must not be understood as a metaphysical statement, or as a philosophical thesis at all. It is not an answer to the *philosophical* problem about the nature of concepts, meaning and truth.

Here we have a good example of our tendency to read metaphysical significance into a statement *which is only summarizing certain historical facts.* The claim about the cultural relativity of notions is true only as a summary of certain historical facts. When we compare different epochs and cultures with respect to the way certain expressions have been used and the way certain notions arose and evolved, we find differences that we are inclined to describe by saying that they depend on their historical context. But we need not take the further step of making it into an answer to the metaphysical question of the general nature truth, or of the general nature of concepts or of language, by invoking its generality as normative or apriori. Questions of this general kind only belong to a metaphysical discourse, which has detached itself from the facts.

To generalize the statement about the dependence of notions on their cultural context into a philosophical doctrine, would be to exaggerate the historical perspective (as in historicism) or to think that the question of the relationship of notions to the epochs in which they are used, makes sense by itself detached from the context of historical investigation.

It is important to observe that the discourse of historical investigation, comparison and description is different from the metaphysical discourse. Historicism was the result of constructing a metaphysical discourse from the historical discourse, of making a certain historical perspective into something super-historical. The philosophical doctrine of historical relativism is the result of reading metaphysical claims into historical statements.

This is not to say that historical facts about the dependence of notions on their historical context of use, are of no relevance to philosophical problems about the nature of truth, of language etc. Indeed, they help us to see through and to get rid of certain prejudices and to recognize wild generalizations by reminding us of facts that reveal them as oversimplifications and fictions. But these historical facts must not be used as a basis for other and alternative wild generalizations.

In the historical comparison and in the description of its results, we will be using language, i.e. our language. We will be using and presupposing the notions and the words in the way they are actually and normally used by us. There is no transcendental point of view from which we could compare the notions and conceptions of a different age with our own as though they were just different vocabularies for expressing the same facts. *A 'way of thinking of another age' is for us always the results of a way of representing certain historical facts, mainly a way of investigating, interpreting and describing*

certain texts. But we must not talk as though our *own* way of thinking basically were such a representation too, which we happen to be applying now. That would be to anticipate the course of events.

* * *

This is, it seems to me, what is wrong with the stand-point which the American philosopher Hilary Putnam has called 'internal realism', and which is designed to make 'commonsense realism' compatible with 'conceptual relativism'.[1] Roughly, this stand-point means that we are within a certain conceptual scheme, which is manifests in the language we have, and when we are so, we are justified in taking its standards as absolute. If there are books and tables and colours in the world as we conceive it, then we are justified in asserting their existence absolutely, which is also what we are doing in practice, according to Putnam.

The problem with this view is that it gives a misleading idea of the sense in which we have language (or have conceptions of the world around us). Putnam's view makes it look as though we could question language in general, as though there could be a question of whether we are *justified* in having the language we have and whether we are justified in using words and expressions in the way we are actually using them - not just with respect to some particular communicative purpose, but for 'describing the world' in general.

But in what sense could there be a justification for our ways of using, say, the colour words, 'red', 'blue', 'white', etc. as we are actually using them in their everyday employment? In what kind of situation would we feel relieved and safe to hear a philosopher assure us that our ordinary 'realistic attitude', with which we normally make colour judgements, is correct and justified? Philosophers have hardly ever been respected to that extent.

People in general are not commonsense realists (any more than they are anti-realists or relativists), and for two reasons. First of all because people in general are unfamiliar with the *philosophical discourse* to which these classifications belong, and which is given a privileged position in Putnam's discussion. People in general have never learnt to have an opinion in 'ontological matters'. Secondly, as a description of the way we use language in practice and make statements about the world around us, it gives the wrong idea that we manifest some kind of intellectual stand-point, decision or choice. On the contrary, we have simply learned to use language the way it is actually used and in general not as a result of any decision or choice. We were trained in some of the practices, activities and ways of living that constitute our forms of life today.

We must not think as though 'our forms of life today' were ultimately an invention of the intellect, the realization of some philosophical views or doctrines (which perhaps are waiting to be written down). Putnam says that it is a mistake to suppose that the question "'Which are the real objects?' is a question that makes sense *independently of our choice of concepts*."[2] It is at this point that it is easy to go wrong, because what Putnam says here is quite correct within

the *philosophical* discourse. Within philosophy this kind of question has always been posed and answered within a certain posited grammatical scheme, or within a chosen perspective or view. For example, "To be is to be a value of a bound variable", is Quine's philosophical conception of existence. Every philosophical conception of 'what is real' is determined by some invented grammatical scheme, which by its claim to be general is bound to schematize and simplify the facts. The simplification often means that a boundary must be drawn between that which is mere appearance (and which must be explained away) and that which is the real.

Putnam's question 'What are the real objects?' does not exist in everyday language. If a question of this and similar linguistic forms occurs in non-philosophical contexts, it has a different sense. It might mean, for instance, what are the important and valuable things in some situation, or what are the genuine things of some sort as opposed to mere imitations or pictures of them.

We can perhaps speak with some sense about choosing 'conceptual schemes' in philosophy and in the sciences, or of choosing perspectives and styles of representation in the arts, but we misunderstand what it is for us to have language if we speak in the same sense about our 'commonsense conceptual scheme of the world' (like Putnam and others). It does not make sense to think as though *everything* could be given through descriptions, or pictures or representations, about which we could ask: "Does that exist?" or "Does this describe something real?". Being familiar with things and circumstances of our everyday world *is part of* what it is for us to have the everyday language.

Putnam's notion of 'internal realism' (and similar conceptions currently in vogue) applies at most to a conceptual scheme in the sense of a theory, determined by a constructed and delimited grammatical scheme, or to an invented story or narrative, which I could choose to employ or not to employ for some purpose. I have no such choice as concerns our language (or our ways of thinking) *in general* any more than I have a choice to be born at a certain time and place. Our language is inseparable from our forms of life, and like the latter it does not allow itself to be captured, commanded and controlled within a constructed representation.

NOTES

[1] Putnam, H., *The Many Faces of Realism*, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987.
[2] Putnam, ibid. p. 20.

ЯЗЫК, СОЗНАНИЕ И РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ
LANGUAGE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND REALITY.

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Any attempt to establish a fully adequate correspondence between rational thought and reality in itself well run up against the phenomenon of discourse-opacity at certain topological coordinates. hence we see the development of so many radical approaches in modern philosophy. These new approaches arise in response to discoveries about the nature of the correlation between language, conscoiusness and reality, in particular it's multidimensionality and multimeaning. So which comes first, language or consciousness? Does ontologically rooted experience of conscoiusness precede language structures and discursive practices, or on the contrary, does emprical discursive practice provide consciousness with it's textual corporeality. At the heart of this dilemma is the mythological syncretism presupposes not only a shift from myth to logos, but also an alternative shift from mith to eidos. If the first process involves a transformation of name-myth to word-token, then the alternative movement toward eidos represents a regression to the deep-seated archetypes of myth, which leads us again to the arreducibility of symbolism in language and the phenomenon of intuition in general

В качестве исходного пункта зафиксируем парадокс, конституирующий проблемно-смысловое поле философско-теоретической мысли XX века: мысли, основным инструментарием которой продолжает оставаться традиция рационально-понятийной дискурсии и основанных на последней разработке и прояснении рефлексивных процедур мышления. А именно - все попытки установления полной адеквации рефлексивного инструментария мышления природе реальности самой по себе, т.е. попытки сделать этот инструментарий полностью прозрачным для мысли, интенционально заряженной стремлением выразить истинное положение вещей, наталкивается на феномен "непрозрачности" дискурсии в каких-то совершенно неожиданных зонах или звеньях своего растянутого во времени и пространстве процесса. Так, уже Гуссерль при феноменологическом осмыслении языка обнаружил класс особых номинаций, непрозрачных для традиционной логики в силу их нередуцируемости к чистому семиозису и феноменологической самореферентности. Это открытие привело к появлению герменевтичесиой феноменологии Хайдеггера и Гадамера, к идее "семантического осадка" у Мерло-Понти, а в логике и аналитической философии - к полемике между Хинтиккой, Куайном и Кастанедой о возможности разграничения онтологии и концептуальной идеологии. Этот же феномен непрозрачности послужил мотивом таких императивов, как "Учиться видеть!" и "Назад, к самим вещами" в феноменологии Гуссерля, а также хайдеггеровскому тезису, согласно которому наука не мыслит в собственном смысле этого слова, так как самосознание цивилизации в XX столетии обусловлено ничем иным как опытом забвения истины бытия.

В своем стремлении устранить разрывы или, напротив, сгущения дискурсии с целью вернуть ей утраченную прозрачность номинаций и высказываний относительно природы реальности, философская и научная мысль XX века изобретает такие способы и процедуры рефлексивной техники мышления, которые, оставаясь в традиции рациональности, характеризуются предикатами "постклассические" или "неклассические" модели и типы рациональности, поисками новых типов рефлексивных процессов, разработками репрезентаций системы знания в виде фрейм, новых стратегий аргументации и обоснования и т.д.

Нас, однако, в этой связи должны интересовать лишь тот специфический ракурс, который тематизирован как исследование соотношения "язык-сознание-реальность", ибо именно в этом пункте интеллектуальные усилия мыслителей нашего времени позволили получить нетривиальные результаты.

Существо вопроса заключается в следующем: на роль медиатора между эпистемическими структурами и реальностью претендует прежде всего онтологически укорененный опыт сознания, опыт, предшествующий всякому вербально-предметно-содержательному слою сознания, т.е. слою, на базе которого и реализуется сама возможность рациональной дискурсии, озабоченной самотождественностью и непротиворечивостью своих дискретных шагов и дедуктивных систем. Но точно с такими же абсолютистскими притязаниями выступает на интеллектуальной сцене современности и философия языка, особенно постструктуралистская теория дискурсивных практик.

Отсюда и вырастает основная дилемма в разрешении обозначенного выше парадокса "прозрачности-непрозрачности" рефлексивно контролируемой дискурсии: имеем ли мы действительно онтологическое первородство мыслящего опыта сознания или перед нами всего лишь очередная метафизическая иллюзия, которая должна быть подвержена освобождающей процедуре деконструкции? Что чему реально предшествует как условие возможности - опыт сознания дискурсивным практикам или, напротив, дискурсивные практики являются подлинной основой всякого опыта сознания? Либо, отправляясь от феномена сознания, мы должны вывести, или показать возможность любого типа дискурсивных практик, либо, наоборот, исходя из тезиса "все есть Текст", показать идеологический ангажемент онтологического опыта сознания .

Выйти из этого замкнутого круга мы можем только одним путем: ответив на еще более предваряющий вопрос - что лежит в основе возникновения подобной дилеммы? Нам известна только одна ситуация, в которой между сознанием, языком и реальностью еще нет никакого зазора. Это - ситуация Мифа. Между тем сама возможность рационально-рефлексивного мышления и обусловлена ничем иным, как расщеплением мифологической сращенности языка, сознания и реальности. Что же происходит в процессе все более углубляющегося дифференцирования этих некогда неразличимых феноменов? Схематически этот процесс можно отобразить следующей графической моделью:

Итак, исходя из предложенной схемы, суть дела представлена следующим образом. Процесс расщепления первоначального синкретизма языка, сознания и реальности предполагает не только сюжеты сценария, обусловленного переходом от мифа к логосу (десакрализованному и качестве рациональности), но и сюжеты сценария, обусловленные движением от мифа к эйдосу. Причем последний вид движения оказывается диаметрально противоположным по отношению к первому: если движение к логосу представляет собой овнешнение, манифестацию, превращение мифа-имени и слово-знак (что является инструментальной основой рациональной дискурсии), то движение от мифа к эйдосу есть процесс регрессии, т.е. движение вглубь мифа и за его пределы к бездне апофатической стихии, границей перехода к которой и оказывается зйдос как таковой.

Дилемма приоритета между сознанием и языком как раз и обусловлена тем, что смысловая, или ноэматическая стихия языка скрыта за материальным слоем фенемы и графемы. Именно поэтому смысловая, или эидетическая сфера в лучшем случае проявляется в языке в качестве его символизма. Напротив, смысл трансцендентально-эйдетической редукции в том и заключается, что посредством эпохе и "заключения в скобки" мы очищаем сферу чистого смысла, или сферу эйдоса как ноэтико-ноэматической структуры сознания, понятого именно онтологически в качестве феномена.

Однако если бы суть дела исчерпывалась только данными дистинкциями, то дилемма как таковая не возникла: слишком очевиден в таком раскладе онтологический приоритет сознания. Но вся острота дилеммы в том и состоит, что эйдос вовсе не есть структурный элемент сознания, даже феноменологически очищенного. В качестве границы движения от мифа к апофатической бездне эйдос представляет собой феномен свернутого первичного Имени (А.Ф.Лосев), а еще точнее - одну из ступеней той самой "лестницы именитства ", что является водоразделом между творящим первоистоком и меонической природой инобытии. Или, что то же самое, природой фактичности физической реальности. Поскольку сфера первичного имени не хулится материей имязвучия, постольку подлинно постигнуть его смысловую энергию можно только мистически, в состоянии гиперноэтического экстаза (своеобразного аналога феноменологической редукции). Вот почему сферу инобытия с равными основаниями можно истолковать и как сферу манифестации Сознания, и как космический текст, ключи от кода к которому ищут как "потерянное Слово" или забытое имя Бога.

Герменевтическое истолкование смысла дилеммы "сознание - язык" позволяет понять еще один феномен, архетипически проявляемый и столь же архетипически сокрытый в истории мысли. Речь идет об архетипе отступления и возврата Первоначала. Основная интенция фило-

софской мысли - выразить, или сделать прозрачным для дискурсивного мышления абсолютное первоначало. Однако каждый раз, циклически и ритуально, такое первоначало ускользает из горизонтали дискурса в дорефрексивную вертикаль под-текста, что намекает на какую-то непроговариваемую, хотя и подразумеваемую реальность. В процессе становления рациональной дискурсии (т.е. движения от мифа к логосу) творящее начало отсекается и удаляется из горизонтали дискурса в вертикаль под-текста, - той реальности, которая всегда подразумевается, но никогда не может быть выведена в дискурсивное измерение без антиномий и парадоксов. Наличие такой антитетики рационального дискурса и является главным способом проявления "непрозрачности" дискурсиано-рефлексивных процедур мышления. В точке расцепления имени- мифа с сознанием и реальностью возникает неустранимый средствами языка-знака онто-логический зазор. Такое архетипическое отступление творящего начала в глубину под-текста, т.е. рефлексивно непросматриваемую реальность, позволяет заново осмыслить многие фундаментальные идеи в истории философской мысли. И тогда на место профанного толкования самой философии как сугубо дискурсивного мышления, или особого рода познания, мы обязаны поставить эзотерическую трактовку философствования как процесса ритуального, челночного движения между онтологически укорененной и сокрытой Истиной и истиной, явленной и экспицитно развернутой в познавательном процессе. Так, первый ритуальный круг философской мысли начинает свое движение от интенционального слоя сознания к "природе вещей", а заканчивается формированием трансцендентальной установки как синонима подлинно философского мышления. На место сознания природы приходит интерес к природе самого сознания.

Второй ритуальный круг задан траекторией, которую можно описать формулой: от сознания деятельности - к деятельности сознания. На место метафизики вещного универсума приходит философия процесса.

Третий ритуальный круг рождается в ходе углубленных феноменологических исследований и продолжается в герменевтике, структурализме и русской религиозной философии. Отныне онтология смещает акценты: она скользит от сознания бытия к бытию самого сознания, а также от чистого семиозиса к символизму языка. Философия сознания и философия языка определяет стиль неклассического философствования в XX веке. Вместе с тем третий ритуальный круг возвращает философскую мысль к мифоподобной чеканке "истины бытия". Чем закончится это возвращение нам, современникам, неведомо. Наша задача скромнее: "пока мы не вникнем в то, что есть, мы никогда не сможем принадлежать тому, Что будет" (Хайдеггер М. Поворот//Время и бытие. М., 1993. С.258).

ПРЕДИКАТИВНАЯ РЕФЛЕКСИЯ В МЕТАФОРЕ
THE PREDICATIVE REFLECTION IN THE METAPHOR

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The paper disscusses the metaphysical stability of the predicative direction to the metaphoric focus. This is the stability of the predicative direction to the "virus" of the Identification. The "virus" manifests itself by power sindrome of the constitution by means of the Ego irrelevant position in the predicative direction. It is the direction to the "affectation of me" as a phenomenon of response to the predicativity of the Being, i.e. the direction of the metaphysical stability of predicate to reflection phenomenon.

Thus, the stability to the "virus" of Identification is determined by us as metaphisical Taboo of Being, and the principle of Identification - as the Simulation of the Method.

The phenomenon of the predicate is connected with inducing action of removal of the metaphysical Taboo from Being. The removal is the weighing of Being with the aim of constitution of a section of Metaphorization in predicative reflection phenomenon as a phantom section of mediated functionality.

Simulation of Method by the principle of Identification makes concession to the stable focus of the Metaphor in Being phenomenon as to a principle freely executing the direction of philosofy to methdological displacement independently of the conceptual claims. We call this principle the Absolute Principle of Metaphorization.

Hierarchy of the principle limited by the discurcivity of Identification relates to Metaforization Absolute principle allows to render harmless the philosophy methodological inquiry from the perception mechanism, that postulates the temporalization by means of Identification.

Тема доклада, обозначенная "Предикативной рефлексией в метафоре", сохранит правомерность кворума из трех фундаментальных понятий, если с замещением одного, она прозвучит как Рефлексия Бытия в Метафоре. Эта подстановка предполагает ту ясность контекста, которая напоминает о метафизической устойчивости понимания предиката, скрытой от феномена наблюдаемости в абсолютной метафористичности удержания в ней побуждающего действия предиката.

Релевантность побуждающего действия предиката к философскому смыслу конституирования наделяет его вмешательство в феномен Бытия притязанием на оценивание той сокровенной части метафизического Табу, латентная прозрачность которой обезврежена от феномена наблюдения под иллюзией покрова. Это притязание на оценивание Табу имеет оправдательный шанс только как принцип редукционизма, исходящий из сведения к неопределенной двойственности метафорического фокуса метафизической устойчивости предиката.

Отнесенность действительности предиката к феномену конституирования как к воздельванию сказуемости Бытия, прикрывает собой его метафизическое Табу. Однако это действие, наполняющее своей безоговорочной категоричностью метафорическую субституцию Бытия, претендует на аксиологический смысл не только наличием факта конституирования феномена оценки: оно имплицитно подтверждает принцип двоичности философских категорий в отношении сокровенной метафизической предикативности. Это удвоение шокирует своей слепотой двояко.

Во 1-х, по факту притязания на снятие метафизического табу с Бытия. Во 2-х, тем, что сам механизм снятия, предъявивший в лице Возможности и Действительности качество темпорального "домостроя" всем категориальным структурам, отредуцировал эти структуры к предмету собственной их состоятельности задолго до терапевтической релевантности к понятийности, что не вошло в компетенцию отреагирования на само снятие. Факт предъявленности на состоятельность был равен феномену в уже конституированной Пифагором Двоице по ее априорному качеству вхождения в исторический контингент.

Позитив этих двух выделенных нами фактов наблюдается по их безальтернативности как Обезвреживанию метафизического Табу Бытия от снятия с него покрова с помощью такого категориального парного механизма.

Это было предисловие, которое теперь позволяет нам сохранить за собой право только иметь в виду ясный онтологический контекст, установленный за терминологической подстановкой формулировки темы и таким образом, акцентировать конституирование функций "взвеши-вания" Табу на предмет дискурса только с альтернативной подачи предиката и уже только относительно него сдвигами как естественной, так и эйдетической установок на фиксирование той или иной предметности.

Подача или посредство предиката, их дань актуализации, то есть парадигматичной иллюзорности действия и его силовой атрибутике, связанной со снятием метафизического Табу, относится к феномену конституирования в механизме опосредования по факту конкретизации метафорической досказуемости в концентрированном в ней Бытии.

Тот вывод, что предикат конституирован как призрачный по опосредованной функциональности участок метафоризации, совершенно ясно освещает проблему Метафоризации как проблему Абсолютного принципа, свободно исполняющего установки философии на методологические сдвиги независимо от концептуальных претензий. Независимость проявляется как отреагирование на устойчивый фокус мета-

форы любых методологических редукций. Сам же факт отреагирования на эту независимость и есть рефлексия.

Рефлексивный исход методологической обращенности к ее абсолютному контексту связан с тем, что если сказуемость вводится в органическую телесность "аффекцией меня"[1], то сам феномен сказуемости как неорганическое тело предикативности вводится в действительность аффекции наличностью спонтанного факта отреагирования, что конституирует феноменальную позицию сказуемости как Пустотность рефлексии, то есть как пустотность методологического усилия по отношению к метафизическому Табу. По суггестивному индикатору рефлексии слепая видимость аффекции, восполняющая Пустотность рефлексии содержательной иллюзорностью мира, той содержательностью, которая отождествляется с восприятием, определяет свое сингулярное место.

Таким образом, мы можем говорить о предикативной рефлексии как о термине, который способен усилить ясность феномена наблюдаемости в отслеживании критериев, устанавливающих за рациональностью степень объективации, иначе говоря, дискурсивности того или иного феномена аффекции.

Чтобы за короткое время доклада прописать сингулярный контекст предикативной рефлексии, тот, что дразнит красным платком разъяренную аффекцию, суженную до проблемы восприятия, нужно максимально точное обозначение границ этих степеней объективации.

Нулевая степень, фиксирующая сам рефлексорный индикатор, может быть связана только с невозможностью предиката.

Эту невозможность сам контекст философского усилия диктует как априорность, объективирующую качество письма. Фактом, определяющим эту нулевую степень феномена рефлексорного индикатора, является то, что схема, ориентирующаяся на него, то есть схема аффекции, на-зываемая восприятием, использует априорное дометодологическое средство как попытку наделить слепую видимость нарративного участка участка Идентификации Я со схемой восприятия силой сингулярного места.

Этот факт рационализации априорности по схеме идентификации, то есть рационализации априорности из-за невозможности ее предиката прямой повод для внедрения механизма Идентификации в рефлексивную Пустотность предиката.

Из этого можно сделать вывод, что с помощью феномена рациональности объективация априорности через рефлексивную Пустотность предиката дает толчок схематизму, приводящему к механизму Идентификации.

Схематизм оттолкнувшийся от устойчивого фокуса Метафоры допущением априорного качества в виде Яйности (у Декарта это звучит как "мыслю"), собирая темпоральность как несущийся снежный ком, создает иллюзию Метода.

Его Симуляция на почве функционирования с помощью предметности наделена тавтологической по тотальному характеру апелляцией к спасению собственной инерции инерции Метода, так как связана с отреагированием проблемы Я на самообъективацию. Эта Максимальная степень, то есть Метод, в отличие от нулевого феномена рефлексии, напротив, пытается сбросить постулаты со своего схематизма в худшем случае на математическую априорность, в лучшем на Вещь в себе.

Это и есть тот принцип, который запускает феномен рефлексии в методологическую канву. Его максимальная степень по констатации отклонения от нулевого феномена рефлексии необратимо обречена на постулирование самой себя, что в наше время обнаруживает общефилософскую методологическую исчерпанность принципа идентификации по отношению к Абсолютному метафорическому Табу метафизики.

Проблему идентификации предиката, то есть априорного человеческому феномену определения Я, герменевтический аппарат поимел в Парменидовском тождестве Бытия и мышления, откуда и произошел контекст рациональности.

Именно рациональностью европейская традиция постулировала проблему Абсолюта в тождестве Бытия и мышления Абсолюта не как устойчивого метафорического фокуса человеческой разумности, а лишь допущением его априорного качества.

Идентификация, являясь методологией рациональности, обнаруживает два методологических контекста. Первый вводит предикативную рефлексию по принципу бумеранга: предметность кончается на субъекте так же, как субъект интендирует собой объект. Это нарративный контекст принципа Идентификации.

Другой контекст гуманитарный. Он связан с проблемой конституирования человеческого феномена, то есть с проблемой антропологической экзистенции.

В этом контексте парность Идентификации, о которой мы говорили в онтологическом предисловии, ограждает себя текстуальным пределом философского дискурса от проблемы Существования. И очертив пространство ловушки, заговоренная дверь нередуцируемого к текстуальности Я обозначает вход в лабораторию по отработке необратимости Идентификации, то есть спекулятивную Симуляцию Метода.

Мертвая видимость "аффекции меня" в предикате зафиксировала на рефлексивном индикаторе восприятия живое место, которое определяет условность восприятия как схематичную видимость аффекции по отношению к априорности рефлексивного акта. Присвоенные рациональностью установки на идентификацию предиката как на принцип или отождествляющий Ego с персонифицированной телесностью, или изолирующийся от проблемы Я субъект-объектными успокоительными процедурами, закрыты на амбициях, имеющих дело с сущностями мерт-вых смыслов, эффектных из-за присвоения

рефлексивным отреагированием предикативной метафорической Пустотности.

Эффективность этого Присвоения обнаруживает в принципе Идентификации абсолютный по устойчивой релевантности к предикату "фокус" Метафоры, который держит в постоянной зависимости от сингулярности своего Пустого места и нулевую степень объективации феномена аффекции, то есть рефлексию, и максимальную, то есть принцип Иденитификации.

Зарегистрированный Метафорой перед входом в царство аффекции, принцип Идентификации окончательно сработал как четко отлаженная программа по сборке темпорального конвейера исторически линейных тусовок.

Другими словами, понимание постановки вопроса о Метафоризации как Абсолютном принципе свободы значительно снижает заряд скептицизма по поводу затянувшейся методологической петли на Абсолюте в связи с внеисторической парадигмой проблемы Идентификации, довлеющей только в условиях устойчивого метафизического Табу.

Его абсолютная функция связана с хранением непредикативности в сундуке неприкосновения соблазна к Вещам и Вещей к соблазну, дабы понимание смысла существования не было заброшено рефлексивным условием, конституирующим априорность, в темпоральную бесконечность.

Понимание проблемы Существования на уровне отслеживания его функционирования вне интерпретаций какими-либо традициями может конституировать только пособник, на которого предметная Ego-Иден-тификация делает ставку.

Таким образом, принцип Идентификации обнаруживает внеисторическое место своей методологической исчерпанности по факту сопутствия Абсолютному принципу Метафоризации. Хотя исторический предел Идентификации можно очертить XX веком, который в лице феноменологии предъявил Метафоризации свое фиаско на сеансе спиритизма по вызыванию духа картезианского Меня для постулирования в качестве темпорального исхода.

Но даже и тут зависимость Идентификации от устойчивого фокуса Метафоры обнаруживает за феноменологией тавтологический шарм: постулирование Ego в качестве релевантного к интендированию места Идентификации выхватывает сингулярную цель феноменологии как безотносительную к предикату, отсылая к предмету сингулярности рефлексию.

Этот факт допущения суб'екта к предикату, вынесенный, однако, за скобки, и сохранил, таким образом, иллюзию покрова, споткнувшись этим фактом о метафизическое Табу Бытия. Абсолютный принцип Метафоризации дал методологизированию пример автономии от забеганий вперед.

История не допускается к абсолютным метам: Абсолютный принцип метафоризации надтемпорален в отношении истории, он лишь осуществил здесь установку на очередной методологический сдвиг, явившись на более высоком уровне повторением силовой Аристотелевской попытки обнаружить тождество Возможности с Действительностью.

Причина идентичного финала этой продублированной историей попытки одна: в непредъявленности нам, оппонентам Гуссерля и Аристотеля, определения понятия "действительность". Ее имение в виду, постулируемое принципом Идентификации, насколько механизм рефлексии сработал априорной помехой, стало выражать не саму "реальность", выставленную Аристотелем за пределы Бога, а Гуссерлем за пределы Я, а только факт ее непонятности.

Непонятность "бытия нас самих"[2] в "естественной рефлексии", чем феноменология и озадачила философский мир, дает достаточный повод для определенных выводов. Механизм Восприятия ограничил метафорический смысл конституирования игнорированием этого смысла.

Схема аффекции конституировала отношение к миру, не насыщенное вообще пониманием того, что даже если субъект аффекции не Я, а Alter Ego или объект, то действительность никому не мешает, потому что ей некому мешать.

Априорность Я мертва не потому, что она перестала функционировать, а потому что априорному "составу преступления" вменяется отработанный Идентификацией, исчерпавший свою самообъективацию, механизм Восприятия.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ

[1] Термин Гегеля.

[2] См.: " Естественная рефлексия, которая делает видимым сознание, (остающееся) анонимным в своем живом функционировании, еще не делает понятной эту работу,.. Особенно чувствительным образом эта непонятность затрагивает способ бытия нас самих." Э.Гуссерль. Амстердамские доклады II. Логос, N5,М.,1994,с.11.

СЕМИОТИКА КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНОГО СИМВОЛИЗМА — РАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ ГРАНИЦА — ТЕКСТ И ОНТОЛОГИЯ. THE SEMIOTICS OF CONCEPTUAL SYMBOLISM — THE BOUNDARY OF RATIONALISM — TEXT AND ONTOLOGY.

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В любой области человеческой культуры, в большей или меньшей мере, используется то, что обычно называют рациональным мышлением. Поэтому определение границ как рационального познания, так и концептуальных возможностей представления его результатов представляют собой нетривиальную задачу.

Границы как между интуитивным постижением и рациональным познанием, так и Непознанным, являются предметом осмысления только с точки зрения рационализма. Для интуитивного постижения рационализм является "болезненной" формой (как результат слабости духовной) "чистого" знания, проникновения, постижения сущности вне опосредования понятием и символами.

Сам символ приобретает статус понятия, если он наделяется семиотической квалификацией, т.е. синтаксическим, семантическим и прагматическим уровнями определенности. Работая с понятиями, мы обычно "забываем" их символическую природу, отождествляя с их денотатами. Причина такой "онтологической редукции" ("синдром Пигмалиона" по выражению Л.Синга) в том, что семиотическая природа понятия ярко проявляется только в семантическом аспекте. И хотя символизм наиболее очевиден именно на семантическом уровне, игнорирование других уровней семиотической репрезентации препятствуют пониманию сущности концептуального символизма: символизм - это не только семантика.

С учетом этого обстоятельства основное семантическое отношение - отношение репрезентативности - может рассматриваться как отношение между некоторым содержанием и формой его представления. Такое удвоение "сущностей" (ради повышения операционных возможностей) означает семиотическую объективацию, т.е. введение категории вещи через ее противопоставление "среде", т.е. всему, что этой вещью не является.

Расширение бинарных операционных возможностей и способность к собственно семиотической триадической квалификации синтаксического, семантического и прагматического уровней представления появляется тогда, когда понятие вещи определяется через новую концептуальную модальность - понятия свойства и отношения. В концептуальной структуре классической физике и, например, православной теологии вещи, свойства и отношения наделяются различным онтологическим статусом. Но в современной физике происходит процесс переосмысления концептуальных основ фундаментального знания в направлении теологических концептуальных структур. Возможен и встречный процесс модификации теологических концептуальных структур, свидетельством чему являются известные дискуссии между А.Энштейном и Р.Тагором, Д.Бомом и нынешним далай-ламой.

Квалификация различных видов (модальностей) определенностей существования в параметрической общей теории систем позволяет провести соответствие между определенностями бытия в теологии и современной физике. Такого рода различение модальностей определенностей возможно только посредством категории вещи, свойства и отношения. Тем самым границы той определенности, которая достижима в рамках рационализма, в этом случае осмысливаются через категории вещи, свойства и отношения. Остается открытым вопрос о возможности осмысления сущности рационализма и его границ на категориальной основе, отличной от вещи, свойства и отношения.

Именно семиотический подход ориентирован на репрезентацию не содержания рассматриваемой сущности, а ее формы. Акцент на формальном аспекте, в противоположность описательно-художественному подходу, который апеллирует к нашему "образному мышлению" (Арнхейм), едва ли способен транслировать сущность содержательной информации. Хотя по определению "интуитивного постижения", оно принципиально не охватывается рациональным мышлением, "формализм" семиотического подхода может способствовать определению концептуальной демаркации между научным и религиозным знанием. Так, интуитивное постижение, кроме описательно-художественного, может быть представлено в качестве синтаксического аспекта семиотической репрезентации. В синтаксисе символ представляет только сам себя: интуитивное постижение не опосредуется еще чем-либо и символизм невозможен, т.к. он излишен. В теологии различение катофолического и апофатического богословия имеет семиотическую основу: апофатическое - это апелляция больше синтаксису, чем семантике, а катофолическое - это, конечно, семантика.

ФИЛОСОФИЯ КАК ОБЩЕЕ ДЕЛО
PHILOSOPHY AS AN ORDINARY ACTIVITY

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Aleksej Ivakin (Odessa, Ukraine)

The question about the correlation between consciousness and being contains the ability to unite all the philosophical disciplines and conceptions. However, for realization of this ability it is necessary to consider the question from the point of its development, its ascent from abstract to concrete.

The consideration shows that the question consequently assures the form of three philosophical paradigms:

1. "I — Being", 2. "Man — Being", 3. "Consciousness — Being".

The movement from one of the paradigms to another is not throwing aside the preceding paradigm but its dialectical negation. As the result of the movement three well-known Kant's questions are united in one general problem: "To know in order to practically realize the hope!"

Since the Common Task of the mankind - the necessity of solving global problems - had really appeared, the philosophy will have the tendency of the integration its conceptions too. The philosophy itself becomes the Common Task.

Вопрос о соотношении сознания и бытия, известный как основной вопрос философии, способен объединить все философские дисциплины и направления, если рассмотреть его в развитии, в восхождении от абстрактного к конкретному.

В процессе такого восхождения данный вопрос принимает форму трех парадигм (и трех последовательных этапов) философствования:

1. "Я - Бытие", 2. "Человек - Бытие", 3. "Сознание - Бытие".

Движение от одной парадигмы философствования не есть отбрасывание предыдущей, а ее диалектическое отрицание. Начало "Я - Бытие" содержит в себе цель, стремление выяснить, на что человек может надеяться; этап "Человек - Бытие" решает, каким образом мировой Логос может превратиться в логику и теорию познанию, а этап "Сознание - Бытие" выводит нам к практическим схемам решения этого взаимодействия. В результате такого движения три знаменитых кантовских вопроса синтезируются в одну всеобщую задачу: "Знать, чтобы практически осуществить свою надежду!"

Поскольку у людей в форме глобальных проблем реально возникло Общее Дело, постольку и философия как форма сознания, вырабатывающая исходную жизненную позицию человека и универсальную методологию достижения стоящих перед ним целей, в конечном итоге будет стремиться к интеграции, к единству своих концепций, критически отрицая при этом те из них, которые перед лицом Общей Угрозы и Общей Задачи утрачивают свой мировоззренческий и методологический смысл, и в то же время извлекая из них присущие им рациональные зерна. Философия сама становится Общим Делом.

АМЕРИКАНСКИЙ ФИЛЬМ "ВАВИЛОН-5" И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ УКРАИНСКОЙ ФИЛОСОФИИ
THE AMERICAN FILM "BABYLON-5" AND THE PERSPECTIVES OF UKRANIAN PHILOSOHY

Андрей Беличенко (Киев, Украина)
Andrej Belichenko (Kiev, Ukraine)

The main problem of this article is the difference between the author's "own" and "native" Ukranian philosophy. Ukranian philosophy does exist, but does not have its own history. The author thinks that any philosphy is a crisis. The author believes that Ukranian philosophy will develop in the direction of its own crisis and find its own original "land."

1. Проблема прогнозирования будущего - дорога в одну сторону. Что есть в философии такого, что обеспечит не только узнавание в будущей философии самой себя, но и в обратном порядке, что Сократ действительно знал к чему все придет?

2. Украинская философия выпадает из западных философских стандартов: нет ни великих имен, ни большой истории. Однако украинская философия не "бесхозна". Хайдеггеровская забота о бытии ни для кого не стоит так остро, как для тех, кто *веками* уповал на свободное размышление о себе. Век власти и век порабощенности - два совершенно разных времени. А значит и философии.

3. Вопрос о жизни любой философии - это прежде всего вопрос о ее смерти. Славянские (нерусские) культуры были поставлены на грань вымирания исторически. Плата за величие русской философии - нищета ее собратьев по крови. Лишь та философия "перспективнее", какая ближе к смерти. Русская философия больна сейчас отсутствием своей смерти.

4. Украинская философия нуждается скорее в своем Фрейде, чем в своем Шестове. Развитая психологическая жизнь украинской философии (обиды, фобии и пр.), "прославившая" нас во всем славянском мире, еще нуждается в своей философской апологии.

5. Именно эта апологетика и станет украинской философией, или даже украинской эсхатологией. Русская мысль сказала много задушевных слов об эсхатологии, не испытав на деле ни своих мыслей, ни своих чувств. Она была слишком благополучна для этого. Наша философия в мировой философской драме - лицо без слов.

6. Как Вий, наша философия с некоторым сожалением нарушает молчание свое. "Спасибо" - ее ПЕРВОЕ слово.

НРАВСТВЕННЫЙ МИР ЧЕЛОВЕКА И ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ ИЗОБРАЗИТЕЛЬНОЙ ПАРАДИГМЫ
THE ETHICAL WORLD OF MAN AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ILLUSTRATIVE PARADIGMS

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Andrej Zibmuli (St. Petersburg, Russia)

В познании и особенно объяснении мира трудно переоценить роль изобразительной парадигмы. Поясняющая иллюстрация способна сделать исследуемый объект ясным и наглядным, а философский дискурс - целостным и убедительным. Поясняющие изобразительные модели дают возможность ухватить структурное своеобразие, количественные соотношения и динамические характеристики изучаемого объекта - какой бы сложной природой этот объект ни обладал.

Нет сомнений, что нравственный мир человека относится к наиболее сложным объектам философского постижения. Именно поэтому изобразительная парадигма здесь может оказаться просто незаменимой. Правда в том лишь случае, если при помощи нее удастся передать нелинейную природу, динамику и многомерность отображаемых явлений. Насколько же это возможно?

Что касается *нелинейности* нравственного мира, - дело тут не только в том, что теоретически, и практически невозможно обнаружить границу между нравственно-положительными и нравственно-отрицательными явлениями. Что между "добром" и "злом" простирается зона нравственно-неопределенных оценок, своего рода "нейтральная полоса". В свою очередь и области, объединяющие безусловно-положительные или безусловно-негативные явления, не могут быть признаны гомогенными. Интенсивность значения добра и зла в этих областях нарастает по мере удаления от "нейтральной полосы":

То есть нелинейность нравственного мира может быть изображена по аналогии с видимым спектром электромагнитных излучений, про который известно, что за названиями различных цветов есть определенная объективная реальность, и что, к сожалению, существуют случаи субъективных ошибок и дальтонизм.

Динамику нравственных явлений, в частности, динамику нравственно-психологических установок можно было бы попытаться изобразить с помощью векторов. В простейшем случае, когда мы рассматриваем атомарное отношение "Я - ТЫ", направление и величина векторов служили бы характеристикой позиции, занимаемой нравственным субъектом /"Я"/ по отношению к другому /"ТЫ"/:



Проблема нравственного выбора, фрустрация, трудноразрешимость межсубъектных конфликтов - все это следствия *многомерности* нравственно-ценностного мира. Как можно изобразить многомерность на плоскости? Один из вариантов, который, как представляется, должен неплохо работать в анализе нравственной многомерности, предлагается ниже. Каждую нравственную ценность, признаваемую субъектом, можно показать в виде лепестка одной общей замкнутой кривой, циклоиды. Например, так:

СПРАВЕДЛИВОСТЬ ЧЕСТНОСТЬ



ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬ ГУМАННОСТЬ

Или так:

СВЯТОСТЬ ИСТИНА ДОБРО



ПОРЯДОК КРАСОТА

Теперь вполне наглядными оказываются различные варианты согласованности/рассогласованности этих и других ценностей-ориентиров. Становятся понятнее нравственно-психологическая и социокультурная деструктивность ситуаций, когда субъект придерживается безоглядного долженствования в какой бы то ни было одной ценностной сфере - искусстве, религии, науке, морали, праве - или попирает ценности хотя бы одной сферы. Становятся зримей рассуждения о нравственно-психологической цельности субъекта, средствами сохранения которой выступают великодушие и духовность.

ЯЗЫК ЕСТЕСТВЕННЫХ НАУК КАК ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКА ВНУТРЕННЕГО МИРА ЛИЧНОСТИ
THE LANGUAGE OF NATURAL SCIENCE AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SUBJECTIVE INNER WORLD

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It is shown that the concepts of natural science and the concepts, characterizing the inner world of human personality, have one and the same origin - consciousness. These concepts not only penetrate into each other but influence each other to such extent, that the application of the language of natural science - mainly of theoretical physics - to the description of personality states becomes inevitable. First steps of this approach are presented.

Внутренний мир личности является чрезвычайно сложным образованием, воздействие на которое осуществляется двумя принципиально различными способами: путем чувственного восприятия и словом. Последнее является весьма эффективным, поскольку оказывает воздействие изнутри. После каждого значимого для личности слова ее внутренний мир изменяется в той или иной степени, она переходит в новое состояние, причем невозможно как вернуться в исходное, так и оказаться в любом наперед заданном, поскольку для этого было бы нужно располагать полной информацией о текущем состоянии внутреннего мира. Таким образом, слово играет роль того, что в квантовой механике называется "наблюдением".

Квантовая механика базируется на так называемом принципе неопределенности Гейзенберга, состоящем в том, что мы принципиально не можем узнать ничего достоверного о поведении микрочастицы как таковой. Можно строить сколь угодно глубокие и остроумные теории относительно ее поведения, однако, при попытке их экспериментальной проверки мы неизбежно столкнемся с тем обстоятельством, что наблюдение влияет на результат. Единственный известный способ "наблюдать" состоит в том, что световой (электромагнитный) квант взаимодействует с интересующей нас микрочастицей, а мы фиксируем результат этого взаимодействия. Сам же квант по своим параметрам и характеристикам суть также микрочастица, и после такого взаимодействия и квант, и исследуемая микрочастица "двигаются" (существуют в пространстве и времени) иначе, чем до взаимодействия. Т.е. дальнейшее поведение микрочастицы неопределенно, определено с некоторой вероятностью, зависящей от условий наблюдения. В частности, вероятность определенного в дальнейшем движения равна единице, если воздействие на микрочастицу в процессе взаимодействия было равно нулю, т.е. иначе говоря, мы именно никак не воздействовали на частицу, а, значит, никак не повлияли на ее дальнейшее поведение, но, значит, и

не узнали даже есть ли она в данной точке. (Узнав, повлияли бы на ее движение). В физике этот парадокс имеет и количественную меру, связанную с постоянной Планка h.

Нетрудно видеть, что описанный процесс наблюдения имеет точный аналог во взаимоотношениях людей, упоминавшийся в самом начале, - это есть не что иное как воздействие словом на внутренний мир, состояние человека. Таким образом, создается впечатление, что понятия, применяемые для описания внешнего мира, могут быть использованы и для описания внутреннего.

С другой стороны, можно показать, как присущие исключительно сознанию понятия "проникают" в физический мир окружающей реальности в том смысле, что такое проникновение приводит к объективно наблюдаемым результатам экспериментов.

Можно предпринять попытку устранить различие (или по крайней мере указать на возможность такого устранения) между внутренним и внешним мирами, между образами, моделями, существующими в сознании и функционирующими по законам этого сознания, и объектами внешнего мира, функционирующими по законам этого внешнего мира, познать которые мы принципиально не можем. Последнее, впрочем, не является препятствием ни для познания в традиционном смысле, когда оказывается достаточно сделать прогноз *наблюдаемых* (т.е. возникающих в сознании) результатов на основании имеющихся в сознании моделей, ни для познания-отождествления себя с миром.

Сказанное выше означает, что внутренний и внешний миры переплетены чрезвычайно тесно, и при всем желании отделить "объективный", "материальный" окружающий мир от "субъективных", "идеалистических" представлений о нем, находящихся в сознании, не удается. Это становится тем более сложно, чем большее число сознаний начинают обладать одинаковыми или сходными представлениями о мире. Количество (сознаний) переходит в качество (объективность существования).

Для описания и познания окружающего мира сознание может использовать только те понятия, язык и приемы, которые присущи именно сознанию, но не окружающему миру. Имеются ли они в сознании изначально или возникают в нем в качестве реакций на раздражения, поступающие из внешнего мира, - давний, интересный вообще, но не важный для дальнейшего вопрос. Важна лишь активная роль сознания в познании. Не "отражение", но творение. До какой степени "воплощающимся в материю" считать такое творение - также интересный, но также отдельный вопрос. По-видимому, следует признать, что все свойства (в том числе и в первую очередь физические) окружающего мира, которые сознание "наблюдает", с которыми оно манипулирует в поисках закона, закономерности, присущи именно внутреннему миру. Именно проекция внутренних свойств, стремлений, тенденций познающей мир личности на этот окружающий мир, именно увязывание этих свойств по законам логики (различного уровня), регулирующим обработку информации, есть то, что происходит, когда человек (сознание, личность) пытается описать (познать) окружающий мир.

Наиболее явственно это происходит в ниаболее абстрактной и добившейся наибольших результатов естественной науке - теоретической физике.

При этом оказывается, что не только такие явления, как те, что происходят в мире микрочастиц, имеют аналоги среди явлений, присущих сознанию, но и более привычные, знакомые практически всем понятия такие, как координата, скорость, ускорение, масса, сила и др. имеют непосредственное отношение к свойствам и состоянию личности. Одни и те же слова - заряд, потенциал, напряженность, поле, энергия - применяются и в физике, и в психологии и социологии не случайно. И "законы", которые наше сознание "навязывает" окружающему миру, присущи этому миру лишь в том же смысле, что и, например, понятие "время".

Представляется небезынтересным установить аналоги соответствующих понятий и применить "законы природы", познанные сознанием (т.е. порожденные им самим), к самому сознанию.

Человека и человеческое сообщество уже пытались изучать, используя закономерности конкретных (преимущественно биологических) естественных наук (Г.Спенсер). Принципиальное различие состоит в том, что в этих попытках объекты соответствующих наук признавались объективными, первичными, независимыми от человеческого сознания и происходила импликация свойств этих объектов на человека. В других случаях (психоанализ) сознание исследовалось в отрыве от именно логических структур, которое оно может создавать, что приводит зачастую к достаточно произвольному толкованию свойств сознания (З.Фрейд).

Идея описать человеческую личность с помощью приписываемых ей коэффициентов, формул, законов, взятых из физики, может показаться тривиальной, если относиться к ней как к возможности или как к наукообразной игре. Однако, развиваемый подход базируется на том, что это - не возможность, а необходимость. Если считать, что именно сознание первично (по крайней мере в теоретическом познании мира), то именно то, что создано каким-то одним сознанием на основе имеющихся в нем понятий для описания окружающего мира и передано для восприятия, обработки и развития другим сознаниям, только и можно использовать для анализа сознания как такового.

Итак, законы природы, в наиболее формализованном, абстрактном ("сознательном") виде сформулированные Ньютоном, Омом, Планком, Эйнштейном и другими, есть лишь своеобразное переложение законов, описывающих свойства человеческого сознания, личности человека. И поскольку поле деятельности теоретической физики разработано как в качественном, так и в количественном

смысле довольно значительно, у нас появляются широкие возможности для построения теории человеческой личности, теории сознания.

Каких результатов можно в принципе ожидать после более или менее подробного построения такой теории? Вероятно, целый ряд ситуаций, в которые попадает личность, целый ряд состояний и законы их изменения можно будет описать количественно, а, значит, дать количественный прогноз для каждого конкретного человека, если использовать именно его параметры. (В настоящее время такие попытки иногда предпринимаются, но говорить о систематическом и обоснованном подходе, пожалуй, трудно).

Но это не все. В физике известны прецеденты, когда успешное использование тех или иных абстрактных математических структур (порожденных сознанием) для описания наблюдаемых явлений приводило к успешному поиску явлений, отвечающих определенным свойствам именно самих этих структур (волновые свойства света, периодическая система элементов, теория групп в ядерной физике и др.). Нельзя исключать такую возможность и здесь. Возможно обнаружение новых свойств сознания, личности, взаимодействующих личностей, и это тем более вероятно, что согласно развиваемому подходу сознанию свойственно "навязывать" внешнему миру именно СВОИ свойства. Таким образом, оказывается возможным объединить науку о внешнем мире с наукой о внутреннем мире человека и использовать получаемые результаты в обеих областях.

Ограниченный объем доклада не позволяет продвинуться достаточно далеко и подробно описать некоторые напрашивающиеся аналогии. Обсудим лишь самые первые и основные физические понятия, связь которых с внутренним миром человеческой личности и будет обсуждаться.

Пространство внутреннего мира человеческой личности - это пространство ее состояний, между которыми имеется то или иное расстояние. Это, собственно, явствовало уже из самого начала, когда мы говорили об аналогиях с микромиром. Такое пространство является гильбертовым, и для него может быть развит соответствующий формализм. Однако, как и в физике, возможны некоторые "классические" приближения, конечномерные евклидовы пространства. Их мы и рассмотрим.

Назовем ролевым пространством следующее: выделим социальные роли, которые можно обозначить словами (например, отец, спортсмен, специалист, влюбленный и т.д.) и сопоставим таким ролям оси, на которых можно нанести шкалы (при работе с кокретной личностью необходимо, чтобы эта личность сама выполнила градуировку осей, для чего ей следует предоставить набор общеизвестных примеров личностей, из которых ей предлагается выбрать определенное их количество, расставить их в порядке нарастания соответствия данной роли, пронумеровать и впоследствии указать

свое место в этом ряду). Если построить несколько таких осей, то личности можно приписать несколько соответствующих чисел. Они и будут характеризавать "координаты" данной личности в ролевом пространстве.

Состояние личности будем описывать радиус-вектором r, компонентами которого являются координаты на осях ролевого пространства. В естественных науках, как правило, рассматривается трехмерный мир, и для описания положения материальной точки мы без колебаний выбираем обычную систему трех взаимноперпендикулярных осей. Сколько и каких осей следует выбрать здесь? Это зависит от желания и конкретных условий. И как в физике зачастую рассматривают одномерные или двумерные движения в случаях, когда остальные координаты сохраняют неизменные значения, так это можно сделать и здесь.

В качестве простого начального шага можно предложить также три оси, соответствующие эмоциональной, интеллектуальной и физической компонентам состояния личности. Вообще говоря, осей (т.е. измерений ролевого пространства состояний) может быть и больше. Проведя градуировку осей, имеет смысл перейти от положительных "баллов шкалы" к положительным и отрицательным. Это упростит действия по аналогии с обычной системой отсчета. Понятно, что каждая личность, исследование которой предпринимается, будет иметь свои шкалы и свое положение начала отсчета.

Производную r по времени t естественно назвать скоростью изменения состояния $v = dr/dt$, а вторую производную - ускорением, т.е. скоростью изменения скорости $a = dv/dt$.

Можно попредставлять себе, как они меняются с течением времени - эмоциональная, интеллектуальная и физическая компоненты состояния личности, как "едет" точка r в пространстве с системой координат, как может замедляться, ускоряться и поворачивать точка r, описывая некоторую траекторию. Интересно отметить, что возможно несколько временных масштабов рассмотрения: часы, дни, годы, жизнь - подобны ли протекающие в них явления, подобны ли траектории?

Задание начальных значений координат еще не позволяет предсказать положение системы в последующие моменты времени. Необходимо задать еще и все скорости изменения состояний в данный момент времени, т.е. указать тенденции: легче или тяжелее становится на душе, как меняется интеллектуальная активность и физическое состояние. И это для каждой из N личностей, составляющих систему.

Если удастся каким-то образом *связать ускорения*, т.е. изменения скоростей с течением времени, *с координатами и скоростями*, то мы получим "уравнения движения" - формальную математическую структуру в виде дифференциальных уравнений, решив которые можно определить зависимость $r(t)$ по начальным значениям величин $r(0)$ и $[dr/dt](0)$. То есть, располагая указанной связью, мы, зная начальные

состояние и устремления человека, укажем, какое у него будет состояние и устремления через время t.

Выбор этой связи может происходить по-разному. Современный формализм теоретической физики в описании механических явлений базируется на некотором постулате - так называемом принципе наименьшего действия - ниоткуда не следующем, однако позволяющим весьма последовательно получить дедуктивно конкретные уравнения движения.

Но поскольку постулат этот есть порождение сознания, пытающегося отразить природу, кажется небезосновательным предположение о том, что снаружи, во внешнем мире, ищется именно то, что уже имеется внутри.

Лень как стремление достичь результата с наименьшими "трудозатратами", как стремление избежать монотонных действий типа перебора или повторяющихся операций, является характерным свойством творческой, созидающей личности. Мечты о волшебной палочке, по мановению которой воля материализуется без изменения состояния (в том числе и внутреннего) личности, в том или ином смысле присутствуют в культуре любого типа.

В описании материального - внешнего - мира, природы, в частности механических явлений эта концепция связывается с понятием массы - меры инертности тела - его стремления сохранять состояние покоя или состояние равномерного прямолинейного движения, которые мы не всегда умеем различать.

АЛЕКСЕЙ ЛОСЕВ: ПРОРЫВ В НОВУЮ РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ
ALEXEI LOSSEV : BURSTING INTO THE NEW REALITY

Семен Гальперин (Москва, Россия)
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Modern science understands the world through concepts which limit the sense of phenomena and objects. This is the paradigm of logical-concpetual thought. Alexei Lossev offers quite a new approach: the essence of a thing is unique and unitary, but can manifest itself in a great many different ways. Here essence of a thing is left as a mystery, but a thing finds itself as a symbol. It has categories of difference and identity. The meeting of these divergent categories creates an eidos which is seen through the mind's eye as a quality of sense. Thus a new model of reality is formed — the symbolic paradigm.

Everything has its name connected to essence through the energy of sense. Here dialectics is used as a logic of symbol. Its appearance offers the chance for the unity of different branches of knowledge: the synthesis of science, religion, art.

The historical role of unified knowledge lies in the fact that it seeks to expose the fallacy of theories based on a division between various branches of knowledge.

Symbolic reality helps to resore the percention of the world as it really exists, in the magnitude of its Unity.

В 1919 году в Царихине вышла на немецком языке книга под названием "Rubland". Среди материалов сборника, отражавших культурно-духовную жизнь России, была статью Алексея Лосева "Русская философия" объемом в два авторских листа. В ней двадцатипятилетний философ выделил главные особенности самобытной философии, дал е характеристику, попытался предугадать судьбу:

"...Русской философии, в отличие от европейской, и более всего немецкой философии, чуждо стремление к абстрактной чисто интеллектуальной систематизации взглядов. Она представляет собой чисто внутреннее, интуитивное, чисто мистическое познание сущего, его скрытых глубин, которые могут быть постигнуты не посредством сведения к логическим понятиям, а только в символе, в образе посредством силы воображения и внутренней жизненной подвижности...

...Русская самобытная философия представляет собой непрекращающуюся борьбу между западноевропейским абстрактным ratio и восточно-христианским, конкретным, богочеловеческим Логосом и является беспрестанным, постоянно поднимающимся на новую ступень постижением иррациональных и тайных глубин космоса конкретным и живым разумом...

...Самостоятельная русская философия, поднявшаяся на высокую ступень апокалипсической напряженности, уже стоит на пороге нового откровения, возможно, также и новой кристаллизации этого откровения..."[1)]

Фундаментальные труды Алексея Лосева, созданные им между тридцатью и сорока годами, в расцвете творческих сил, со всей полнотой выразили то, о чем писал он в своей ранней программной статье. Судьбе было угодно, чтобы эти замечательные работы, в которых как раз и кристаллизировалось откровение, предчувствуемое глубоко верующим мыслителем, долгие десятилетия находились под запретом, а некоторые так и оставались в рукописях в архиве ученого. Они все по-настоящему лишь сейчас выходят в свет прежде всего благодаря усилиям вдовы философа, его верного соратника Азы Алибековны Тахо-Годи. И нам дана возможность прикоснуться к тайне, оставленной нам в наследство, переживать ее неисчерпаемость, созерцать ее красоту.

Выявлению и обсуждению неисповедимых тайн сущности вещи, ее полагания (бытия), первого зачатия мысли посвящена работа Лосева "Самое само", обнаруженная в его архиве в 1990 году и включенная в третий том работ А. Ф. Лосева. Написанная замечательно живым языком, в котором строгость логики сочетается с парадоксами диалектики, а холодный блеск ума - с благодатным порывом чувства, она заслуживает особого внимания.

Всякая вещь хранит тайну своего бытия и разгадать ее невозможно. если мы даем вещи определение, то тем самым о-пределяем границу ее смысла, устанавливаем предел ее значимости. В действительности вещь не есть ни один из ее признаков, ни все они вместе взятые. Можно лишь констатировать, что всякая вещь исключает полное совпадение с чем бы то ни было, и это просто невозможно выразить так же абсолютно. Кстати, наука на это и не претендует. И мир вещей, и мысль об этом мире сводятся наукой к той или иной системе фактов, явлений (феноменов), каждому из которых соответствует свое понятие. В целом все это представляет собой логико-понятийную парадигму (модель) реальности. В этой модели имеется ниша наук о природе (физики, химии, биологии и др.) и для наук о человеке (антропологии, психологии, социологии и др.). Предел научного мышления сводится к пределу применимости понятия; именно здесь следует искать корни современного гносеологического кризиса. [2] Ни наука, некогда провозгласившая устами Ф. Бэкона тождество истинности и полезности, ни философия, выросшая из пеленок протестантизма, где даже Бог оказался понятием, никакой изначальной тайны вещи просто не чувствуют.

У Гегеля реальность и познание реальности сводятся к единой цепи категорий, начинающийся с "ничто" и завершающийся "абсолютным знанием". В этой цепи "сущность является", а "явление существует" - и только. Но и то, и другое принадлежит полю понятий, в которое явленная вещь сама по себе никак не вписывается. Если же последовать совету гуссерлианцев и рассматривать ее как чисто смысловую данность, наглядную целостность, то тогда остается лишь примитивная описательность, лишенная познавательной ценности, где исследователя вообще не интересует природа явления (последнее даже объявляется важнейшим достижением феноменологического подхода).

Лосев предлагает вернуться к исходной позиции: считать, что данная вещь есть именно она сама. Это относится и миру в целом.

- Где этот мир? Каковы его свойства? Существует ли этот самый мир? - спрашивает он. - На все вопросы я могу только сделать указательный жест, и - больше ничего. Вот он, этот мир, говорю я, показывая рукой на все окружающее. Каков он, этот мир? Вот он каков, говорю я, продолжая пользоваться тем же самым жестом".[3]

В логико-понятийном парадигме подобные действия выражают абстрактное мышление. Именно так поступает ребенок, не ведающий еще о неисчерпаемости мира. Но природная любознательность заставляет его задавать свои "почему?" - и мир начинает понемногу разворачиваться перед ним как бесчисленное множество осознаваемых проявлений. Однако то же самое относится к любой вещи. Она дана в какой-нибудь конкретной значимости, но ее можно рассматривать в разных точек зрения, стало быть, она способна обнаружить бесконечное количество своих интерпретаций, не теряя, естественно, при этом свою индивидуальность, свою самость - самое само. Сохраняя всякий раз тождество внутреннего (самости) и внешнего (явленности), вещь предстает как символ бесконечности. Отсюда главный постулат Лосева: "Самое само дано только в символах (каковы бы ни были эти символы)".[4] Отсюда и обобщающий его вывод: "Все существующее (логика с ее категориями, природа с ее вещами и организмами, история с ее людьми и их жизнью, космос со всей его судьбой) есть только символы самого самого, или абсолютной самости, т. е. одни только символы абсолютной самости и существуют... Не быть символистом - это значит быть или только рационалистом, или только эмпириком. Но разум со всей его логикой и наукой есть только абстракция живого бытия, и чувственный опыт с его наглядностью и непосредственной реальностью есть только абстракция живого бытия".[5]

Лосев не делает никаких исключений для осмысления выявленной им реальности, напоминая, что символическими являются даже рассуждения о самом самом: оно остается непознаваемым и дологическим. Если мы хотим зафиксировать первое движение мысли после этого самого самого, то должны предложить некое первое полагание. А это не что иное, как бытие. Самому самому не свойственна категория бытия. Но именно оно лишь и способна связать с ним вещь, которая есть символ, стало быть, вообще есть. И вот тут-то и выявляется тайна первого полагания мысли:

"Чтобы был ум, требуется тайна его первого зачатия, и тайна эта уже не есть тайна только ума... Это тайна самого самого и тайна его эманирования. Она - абсолютно неразрешима, но она в то же время и абсолютно необходима... Она являет себя как тайну, и она ощутима как тайна, без всяких надежд на разрешение, но зато со всяческой надеждой на оплодотворение ею любых проявлений разума и смысла вообще".[6]

Из всего этого следует, что наряду с исторически сложившейся в общественном сознании онтической логико-понятийной парадигмой реальности существует алогическая символическая парадигма с непрерывно-сплошной текучестью становления и физиономической выразительностью ставшего, с изначальной апофатичностью (допредметной и докатегориальной сверхмыслимостью) и катафатичностью (вездесущим выразительным проявлением энергии смысла). Содержательную бедность и смысловую несостоятельность законов тождества и противоречия аристотелевской логики, которые пытается снять гегелевская диалектика понятия, здесь заменяет платоновская диалектика понятия, здесь заменяет платоновская диалектика "одного" и "иного", бытия и небытия. Лосев приходит, рассматривая их отношения, к исчерпывающим характеристикам инобытия, числа, границы, выявляет смысловую основу противоречия и противоположности. Вполне закономерным представляется его вывод: диалектика - логика символа. Он предлагает возвратить в философский обиход категорию "эманация", отсутствующую у Гегеля, естественно, не связывая ее ни с какими физическими аналогиями типа "рассеяние", "распыление". Это - "определение самой вещи в ее абсолютной явленности всему иному".[7)]

Эманация бытия - это и есть первый полный символ, который позволяет охватить и представить главные проявления самого самого (сущности):

- сущность в своем бытии есть смысл;
- сущность в своем инобытии есть явление;
- сущность в своем становлении есть существование;
- сущность в своем ставшем есть вещь;
- сущность в своем для-себя-бытии есть действительность;
- сущность в своей эманации есть выражение.[8)]

Тайна бытия распространяется и на сферу смысла. Однако он проявлен: смысл бытия есть все то, что можно помыслить (почувствовать, представить, высказать и т. д.). При уточнении оказывается, что смысл вещи есть то, чем она отличается от всего прочего, т. е. сама категория различия. Надо искать в вещи то, что делало бы эти различия ею самой, при этом сохраняя себя, объединяясь в слитное, нераздельное единство. А ведь это не что иное как тождество! "Различие есть бесконечный символ тождества, и тождество есть бесконечный символ различия".[9)] Они раздельны, обособлены в своем становлении, но встретившись, образуют цельнораздельное единство, устойчивую мыслимую предметность - эйдос. "Эйдос есть самотождественное различие, данное как ставшее, как наличное бытие, как определенное качество, т. е. как ставшее, как наличность, как качество смысла".[10)]

Этим определением заканчивается лосевское "Самое само", труд, который по праву может считаться вершиной русской религиозно-философской мысли в сфере онтологии на пороге третьего тысячелетия от рождения Христа. Если каждая вещь имеет самое само, то все вещи вместе также образуют нечто, что есть оно само - абсолютную самость. Но поскольку каждая вещь - символ своего самого самого, а оно входит в абсолютную самость, то и каждая вещь оказывается символом абсолютной самости. Лосев не только избегает по известным причинам собственного имени этой "абсолютной самости" - Бога, он даже не делает прямо напрашивающегося вывода, что цельнораздельное единство абсолютной самости - в гармонии Всеединства и Всеразличия: Единого Бога и тваримого мира. И все же эзотерическая, божественная основа бытия выявлена им четко и однозначно.

В непосредственно примыкающей к рассмотренной выше другой ранней работе "Вещь и имя", впервые опубликованной в 1993 году, Лосев осуществляет диалектическую развертку качества смысла: "голый, пустой, изолированный, отвлеченный смысл выявляет себя в понятии... т. е. смысл=тезис, алогическое бессмыслие=антезис, понятие=синтез".[11)]

Далее понятие выражается словом. В слове-понятии символическая реальность не может быть раскрыта: символ здесь всего лишь термин, слово - знак вещи, условно передающий ее значение: вещь является тем-то. Здесь лишенное рельефности поле.

Между тем смысловое содержание слова не ограничивается его понятийной формой. Слово способно выявить себя в умной смысловой энергии, становясь ликом. В энергии смысла выявляется личностное начало всякой вещи, и утверждается оно как личность, но не в субстанциальном, а в умном (смысловом) отношении: энергия сущности явления в имени. Имя оказывается нижней ступенью диалектической последовательности, последним уровнем инобытийности в нисходящий пирамиде символической реальности.

Понятие, определяющее вещь, - тоже имя, но нарицательное, устанавливающее отношение: "общее - единоличное". В нем энергия смысла не проявлена в отличие от имени собственного, где именно она создает нерушимую связь: Единое-единственное-единичное, становится реальным средством общения с обладателем имени. Здесь ясно ощутима эзотерическая природа имени, корни христианского логизма (всякая вещь таит скрытое Слово, в котором сотворен мир; Слово воплощено в Абсолютной личности - Ипостаси Сына) и православного энергетизма (тварный мир причастен Богу не субстанциально, а энергийно).

Итак, в символической реальности осознается изначальное равенство непостижимой для человеческого ума Тайны и благодарности Божественного откровения. Но каким образом может это отразиться на научном подходе? Неужели его можно соединить с религиозным? Ответ однозначен: и можно, и должно. Необходимо лишь отказаться от иллюзии, доставшейся нам от эпохи Просвещения: смысл всему на свете придает сам человек. В основе нынешней теории познания (теории отражения) нетрудно разглядеть изначальное свойство человеческого ума - его интенцию (направленность на исследуемую вещь). Отражение - лишь осознаваемый ее результат. в Символической реальности всякая вещь способна вы-ражать: в ее имени явлена энергия смысла, личностное умное начало. "Энергия смысла" современным образованным человеком понимается лишь как своеобразная метафора, поскольку общеизвестна механическая основа термина "энергия". Между тем, то, что ныне в науке именуют "энергией", всего лишь триста лет тому назад Лейбниц называл "мертвой силой". Зато впервые

применившей это понятие Аристотель относил его, как неоднократно отмечает в своих работах Лосев, к принципу становления смысла.

Привыкнув к представлению, что чувственно воспринимаемая реальность существует в пространстве и времени, мы уже давно не думаем о том, что невидимый мир смысла, окружающей эту реальность, проникающей во все ее закоулки, не подчиняется пространственно-временным зависимостям и ограничениям, и поэтому энергия, образующая смысловые связи, действует с неотвратимой и бесконечной силой в отличие от ее механического аналога. Это она мгновенно формирует экспоненту в любом свободно развивающемся процессе[12] и дает результат "дважды два - четыре" в привычной таблице умножения, проявляя интенсивность любого соединения, включая "произведение масс" в ньютоновском законе всемирного тяготения; воспроизводит цельнораздельное единство числа в степенном ряду, как и в любом волновом процессе; выявляет механическую содержательность элементарного электрического заряда[14], одновременно предлагая осуществить "голубую мечту" современной физики - расшифровать мировые феномелогические постоянные.

Символическая реальность, раскрываемая Лосевым, формирует основу задумываемого им с юных лет цельного знания - синтеза религии , науки, искусства с проявлением равноправия алогического и логического в единстве веры и знания - ведении. В современных условиях при этом появляется реальная возможность выработать новую стратегию развития науки, включая фундаментальные исследования; ускорить технологический переворот с учетом экологической целесообразности; существенно сократить сроки получения образования при одновременном кардинальном повышении уровня знаний; ликвидировать отчужденность человека от внешнего мира, раскрыв смысл его творчества как продолжение миротворения, сотворчества с Богом.

Историческая роль цельного видится в том, что оно вскрывает ложность начальных посылок, оправдывающих любое расчленение: смысловое соединение универсально и вездесуще. Символическая реальность воссоздает восприятие мира человеческим разумом, очами таким, каков он есть на самом деле - во всем величии Всеединства.

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ПО ТУ СТОРОНУ ФИЛОСОФИИ: Λογοζ, μνθοζ, πραξιζ КАК КОСМОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ГОРИЗОНТЫ ФИЛОСОФСТВОВАНИЯ

BEYOND PHILOSOPHY: Λογοζ, μνθοζ, πραξιζ AS COSMOLOGICAL HORIZONS OF PHILOSOPHIZING

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Philosophy...a pasture of sense among the stones of conceptions...the hardened lava of language, spread about the thicket of myth...Philosophy...the resonant echo of the Word that shook the Earth...the resounding gong of texts that can be re-casted in all things...Philosophy...the best man's love of the wedding of wisdom...Truely one cannot betray the place of Meeting...

1. The rise of philosophy is a stage that is necessary on the path "from myth to logos." In the history of European cultural tradition this path was formed as the process of consciousness' transformation in the direction from the sacred and emotional method of understanding the world to the secular and reasonable one. However, transformation is not the only possible way of movement from myth towards logos, it seems that more *fruit*ful is the way that is leading to the immediate meeting between myth and logos.

2. Philosophy is a kind of activity that provides insight into the life of concepts. The conception is living inside language. The meeting between meth and logos is a necessary stage on the way of linguistic sense's advent into the world: the world ("praxis") senseless in itself, has no ability to perceive sense directly (cf. problem of hermeneutic circle). Directly in the world there abides only the language that was born in the womb of the myth; the texts ascended from language's depths ("linguistic") are woven into the non-linguistic ("reflective") texts of the world, giving them a sense. However, not all texts composed according to the rules of language are linguistic; some arise due to "the human being dwelling poetically on this earth," (Holderlin).

3. The task of philosophy is to prepare the meeting place between myth and logos. In this sense the persons of John the Baptist and Joseph of Nazareth were the living pictures of philosophy. The most important function of philosophy is not simply critical but cathartic; the permanent crisis --the judgement and interpretation--the discordance of opinions ofthe world, crying out in the desert of reflection--the world judement on the threshold of world insight. The mission of philosphy is to clear obstructions of spontaneous praxis' reflection, to realease it in the places that are albe to insure the myth's *full*-value, which would make it worthy to accept the Logos, sense to the world.

Философия ... Пастбище смысла среди каменьев понятий... Остывшая лава языка, разбросанная в зарослях мифа... Философия... Гулкое эхо Глагола, всколебавшего землю... Звенящая медь текстов из

которой можно отлить и то и другое ... Философия... Любовь шафера на свадьбе мудрости... Воистину месту Встречи изменить нельзя...

1. Возникновение философии - необходимый этап на пути движения "от мифа к логосу". В истории европейской культурной традиции этот путь сложился как процесс трансформации сознания в направлении от сакрально-эмоционального к секулярно-рациональному способу ориентации в мире. Однако, трансформация отнюдь не единственно возможный способ движения от мифа к логосу: более плодо-творным представляется путь, ведущий к непосредственной встрече мифа и логоса.

2. Философия - род деятельности, способствующий мироосмыслению со стороны жизни понятия. Понятие живет в языке. Встреча мифа и Логоса — необходимый этап на пути явления смысла в мир: мир — "праксис" — сам по себе лишенный смысла, не способен вос-принять смысл непосредственно (ср. проблему герменевтического круга). Непосредственно в мире обретается рожденный в лоне мифа язык: исшедшее из недр языка ("языковые") тексты вплетаются в неязыковые ("рефлексивные") тексты мира, осмысляя их. Однако, далеко не все тексты составленные по правилам языка — языковые: "поэтически жительствует человек на этой земле" (Гельдерлин).

3. Задача философии - приуготовление места встречи мифа и Логоса. В этом смысле олицетворение философии - образы Иоанна Предтечи и Иосифа Обручника. Важнейшая функция философии не просто критическая, но катарсическая: перманентный кризис — суд и интерпретация — мироосуждение в преддверии мироосмысления — философия призвана к расчищению завалов рефлексии самодеятельного праксиса, высвобождению в нем мест способных обеспечить полно-ценное обитание мифа, достойного приятия Логоса, несущего смысл миру.

IV
PHILOSOPHY AS ART & ART AS PHILOSOPHY
ФИЛОСОФИЯ КАК ИСКУССТВО И ИСКУССТВО КАК ФИЛОСОФИЯ

ART AS A SIGN OF PLENITUDE

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In the development of the history of what Baumgarten named Aesthetics in the middle of the XVIII, we notice from the beginning, from ancient classical Greece, a chain of philosophical effort to distinguish beauty (in general the field of "that which is aesthetic") from the truth and the good. The successful culmination of this effort is widely attributed to Kant, in his three "Critiques". However, when in modernity these three concepts are seen not only as being different, but as disociated, art critics are obliged to look at the problem of the relationship that may exist between them. If indeed the relationship between truth and good is clearer, debate continues on the terms on which beauty is related to each one of these. As a consequence of this arises the problem of the possible or impossible moral autonomy of art, understood as a work of art which may be beautiful in the highest degree independent of the good or evil (and the resulting truth or lies) which it has integral within itself. Intimately bound with this can be found, as a more relevant fact, the initiating role of art.

The text which follow has been written bearing in mind the arts which, like architecture, are less figurative, leaving to one side those which are based on argument (literary, cinematographic etc.) which illustrate an immediate content of a more expressive moral nature. For this we refer to the study "Art and Morals" by Juan Plazaola.

Truth, goodness and beauty

The mere fact that these questions are continually being asked show that in a work of art man has always perceived, together with its beauty or aesthetic values, something of truth and goodness (or their opposites). The habitual form of speaking of *form* and *content* of a work of art, tries in a certain way to refer to this reality. However, this does not mean to say that it is in the form that the aesthetic values reside, and in the content that truth and goodness are transmitted, but it is in general that the recognition of the form and content in art are inseparable. The truth and the good which a work of art takes on, it presents in an ineffable way, through the sense aspect of the artistic medium: the collection of sounds, colours, material, etc.. At the same time the beauty which is presented affects not only the senses but the whole spiritual dimension of man (the material beauty and the spiritual beauty which many philosophers distinguish between).

This is so because in each art isolated sensations are not perceived in an isolated way (light, sound, pressure) but as specific episodes, call these objects or representative persons, inhabited space, human actions, etc. in particular situations and with a culmination of cultural and transcendental references. It is not in vain that it has been shown that significance presides over the phenomenon of perception, structuring sensations; if this is so even in habitual perception, how much more so then in the artistic one. In works of art man does not grasp as much with colours or isolated sounds which capture and have a beauty of their own unlinked to any significance (although these can also be appreciated) but through the structuring of these that make reference to, quoting the words of López Quintás, interwoven environments of great significance to man. The beauty of these therefore far exceeds simple or complex material beauty.

That is to say, unembodied beauty is not found in art, even when beauty (or the substitutive aesthetic value) is the determining note of the artistic value of a work of art. Beauty is always the beauty of something; the knowledge that that something is indispensable to know if it is beautiful.

Although our natural tendency (as habitually expressed in language) leads us to find beauty in that which is physical, and truth and goodness in that which is spiritual, in the same way that we can speak of material beauty and spiritual beauty, we can find equivalent truths and goodness, material and spiritual. The simple sense knowledge captures the material truth of beings. Comfort has come to be a material good. Truth, goodness and beauty are different manifestations of the same material beings and or spiritual beings. Man, and all reference to that which is human (the world made human) participates simultaneously in all of this.

Formal expression of artistic truth and beauty

It is a characteristic of art that the truth and the good which are present within it are "found" by the artist in the creative play with the expressive medium itself of the art form concerned (constructed or sculpted material, pigments, series of sounds, etc.) It is possible, therefore, and indeed most often the case that the artist cannot express in words (concepts or discursive thought) that which is the truth which has been found and much less the truth which has been searched for before carrying out the work. He who tells the truth tells the good which it manifests or produces. Furthermore, for the aesthetic fruition of the work it is not necessary that the spectator experience do this. However today it often happens that the spectator is not sufficiently educated (nor is the artist in his own art form) to produce this deep aesthetic fruition of the work. To help him the figure of the critic emerged some time ago.

It seems then that it is the critic who is entrusted with the mission to express in words the "content" (together with the role of bringing to our attention the sense values of the work); it is appropriate however to clarify some aspects of this position. His expression, in words, is in fact one reality among many of the multiple interpretations which a object work of art can have in addition to the many other possible ones, among which is that of the author himself in his period of history and

in future periods. And it must always be considered to be an approximation, in the knowledge that this does not substitute in any way the work of art itself. The audience, supported by the conceptual expression of the "content" and alerted to the values of "form" should therefore return with a new direct perception of the work, in order to attempt to aesthetically capture, as one whole, its message.

The spiritual character which elevates man and which is traditionally recognised in art, is based precisely on this integral and harmony of function of the sense aspect (concerning the senses and emotions), with the intellectual aspect and the volitive aspect of man. Many philosophers have found in art, especially from the modern age onwards, a paradigm of what authentic human existence should be (Bergson, Dewey). For a fleeting instant, which is how long an aesthetic experience lasts, and in the field of fiction, man reaches the plenitude he searches for in life, often without finding it. This plenitude is born of the integration of beauty, truth, and goodness, present in the work, which constitute perfection. Everything is captured unitarily, with admiration and profound sense enjoyment.

But the importance of art is not in the provisional and precarious plenitude which it provides. Its true importance resides in that by the adhesion whichits aesthetic value awakens in man, it drags with it (by the unity of the human in the person) the adhesion of intelligence to the truth which is intuitively felt within it (even though its expression may not be very clear) and the adhesion of the will to the resulting good. Some philosophers have in part pointed out this phenomenon, starting with Plato in whom we find how beauty awakens interest and helps man start the journey towards the good, arduous to achieve.

This is, fundamentally, the social and individual "utility" of art where we can find numerous philosophical reflections (a educative role recognised by Schiller, and López Quintás among others). The latter is reinforced by dealing with a medium of expression which is almost universal and easily shared. A non utilitarian utility, if it is possible to express it thus. Because it is an immediate consequence of being, of the essence of that which is artistic and by virtue of being linked to securing the transcendental end of man and therefore, his true happiness. Seen in this light art does not have an end in itself, it is to serve the end of man. An end which it preanounces, sensed, by the person who it addresses and whose journey it initiates. Art then is an anouncement, a sign of plenitude.

Failed works of art

However we know that not all the works of art which have the appearance of a work of art (by virtue of having been elaborated using the signs particular to the art in question) are indeed art. This sign of plenitude fails for various reason.

Firstly, those works of art which do not reach a certain "aesthetic" level should be mentioned. Given that art is considered as beauty, sublimeness, expression, etc., on the condition that we always have a reference up to a certain objective point. Within the possible audience conveniently ready, at least among artists and critics, at least in posterity, if not contemporary, these values awaken admiration, adhesion and sense enjoyment. In practice we find that this objective is not reached for two reasons:

because the artist sets out to answer back to these values (the art of the ugly for example) or because, in spite of good intentions, they are only reached in a very small part.

It seems clear that the anti-value aesthetics have a place in partial aspects of the work such as the shadows of the picture which bring out the colour and light, or at least the forms, but as a whole art seems to ask for positive aesthetic values. In certain cases (and conceptions of art) the work is also efficient if it awakens repulsion, rejection: but this demonstrates that even more important than awakening a positive or negative sense or emotional reaction, it is the connection which this reaction maintains with the "content" of the art. If the repulsion is produced with regard to something which is intuitively felt as something in the work which is false and evil, the result of the artistic experience, if it can be called this, it is obviously positive, on the condition that it permits the conscience to awaken to its opposite.

But what interests us most is that consequently, and given the existence of objective truths and goodness for man, a work of art which presents lies as truth or evil as good remains frustrated as a work of art, even though it does this "aesthetically" to a degree. With this the artist will have demonstrated that he has the "technical" capacity for art, but will have failed in the process of that work in particular, as in this case he has mistaken the implicit "recognition" in the process of creation. The artistic materials have not been eloquent for him, he has not integrated all the elements. The result is the equivalent of showing the beauty of lies and evil, or of a partial and relative truth and goodness, which are understood to be global, which would be a false beauty.

Even works of art which present truths and goodness, but fail to do so "aesthetically" can be said to be works of art, because in these cases the contents were foreseen: they are not elaborated "in and with" the form. They have no artistic essence at all. In these cases it often happens that the spectator, even though he is ready to recognise the value of the truth and good which the work presents to us, experiences a certain sense rejection, motivated precisely by that lack of integration with true senses values. Perhaps he does not reject the beauty of the truth and the good in the intention of the artist but he does reject it in practice.

What we are affirming does not suppose that the artist have previous knowledge regarding the truth and goodness of the contents implicit in the work, as we have established previously but that he be ready to admit these when they "appear" to his intuition through the sense medium of his art. A contrary predisposition on the part of the artist, in his intellect or will, which persist in spite of everything, may make him fail in the attempt. This forms part of the sincere act of the artist and is for him a moral duty to his art, similar to not accepting predetermined orders which he does not agree to. In this sense, if the artist is sincere, to himself in the first place, the exercise of his art, more so the better artist he is, betters him as a person and inititates the start to accede to truths and adhere to true goodness. And with him his audience also.

The morality of art

The conclusion with regard to the problem as oringially posed is clear; art is not morally autonomous. And this is not because of extrinsic convictions but because of the essence of art itself. Given that, as we have already explained, the morality of art does not come from a conscious adhesion to goodness on the part of the artist, prior to the creative act, but from the humility on his part to recognise it when it presents itself, due to the natural link with the aesthetic values of the significant material of the art itself. In practice, errors arise, because the tendency towards a coherence of truth, goodness and beauty is not, in human regard, infallible. But generally speaking, and with regard to principle, we can say that in a way similar to that where the true scientist will find natural truths which are compatible with the most absolute truth, the sincere artist will find beauty in harmony with truth and goodness. He will find them more easily the better artist he is.

It must be made clear that what we are referring to is the work of art in particular, whose nature depends in each case on the possible influence which it may have on the audience (influence, but not determinism) or othe author himself, and not the moral responsibility of the artist, for which depends on logically his conscience, intentions, will in the act or in the cause. However from what we affirm we can deduce the moral importance which the effort the artist makes to be a good artist, in addition to having knowledge of the truth and to be good.

Another consequence derived from what is stated is that the relevance of the truth and the good well expressed in an ineffable way in a work of art, its greater or lesser degree, can influence the artistic category of the work, as the aesthetic value is a manifestation, different to that which is intelligible and the lure of the voluntary adhesion, of the same reality. In the great classical tradition, from Vitruvio, the temple is the paradigm of architecture, and in decreasing progression the other public buildings and individual private homes, according to the category of their function. With the arrival of modernity it has often been argued that a simple house can be as great a work of art as a palace. Indeed this could be so; there are relevant examples in this regard to be found in the history of architecture. But it seems just that the most important theme and architectural extension provide greater possibilities, independent of whether the best use is made of them or not, to achieve an elevated artistic category.

Beauty, truth and goodness in architecture

In the case of architecture, considered as art, its formal expression is given by the definition of a multiple spatial structuralization (with reference to all the human senses) by the disposition of materials and/or energetics, static or mobile, which provide for certain human activities. These tactile, visual, auditative, etc. spaces of penetration are referred to by their use by man in certain individual and social functions.

Architecture has a spatial beauty (in which this wide sense includes the formal), inseparable from its constructive truth and its utility and comfort. The material itself, in the form and disposition demanded by its nature and rules of construction (in accordance with its reactions in a natural medium), is a plastic configuration of space,

and allows, facilitates or makes difficult the actions required to move, see, etc. natural to the human action in that space. We are speaking of, as you may have already guessed, a physical beauty, and its accompanying truth and goodness, considered in a material aspect.

But the fact of inhabiting does not only imply necessities such as breathing fresh air, heat, humidity, views, accessibility, physical rest, etc. A room for a family or an individual, and the protection of professional and social activities throughout human life covers innumerable cultural, spiritual and transcendental aspects which architecture should also satisfy; by virtue of having spatial-physical expression they can also be represented by architecture, they can be induced, facilitated or made difficult, even symbolised. This good of a spiritual nature, which responds to a spiritual dimension of man and his action and also has a spatial translation possesses therefore a possible spiritual and material beauty corresponding to the true being of man and society. Thus, one same disposition of a determined material, responds at the same time to physical, psychic and moral requirements of human habitation. Its beauty, or ugliness is beauty or ugliness of a physical, psychic and moral good or evil in the unbreakable unity of the architectural work.

Architectural beauty

The beauty of architecture is therefore far from being a question of an exclusively visual pleasure (and even less only formal). The architectural is an all enveloping environment which affect all the senses. It is grapsed in ecstatic contemplation and in full activity; in the abstract concept and in the temporal sequence. An expression of this is the fact that in all the theories of architecture which have arisen in history, the responsibility of beauty has been allocated to many varied factors.

Together with *eurhythmia*, united to classical *symmetry* and *proportions*, is the complex concept of *decorum*, demanded by the dignity of the case, which ranges from harmony with the natural environment to respect for the religious rites and customs of society. We cannot stop seeing in them concrete references to the truth and the good.

Subsequently, in addition to introducing the concept of the *sublime*, with reference to the infinite and liberty, was the complex question of *character*, capable of awakening in, man emotions coherent with the destiny of the buildings, first invoked in the name of art.

More recently, the respect for the nature of new *materials* and their *constructive systems*, as well as the *accomodation to the function* have been considered as factors or even determiners of formal beauty. We have reached a point of banishing from the field of the artistic every work which does not follow the spirit of the time (the so called *aesthetics of the machine* of the XX century).

As a reaction to the excesses of these positions, the recovery of the *historical memory* of architecture itself (and in particular of its stylistic signs), has also been revindicated as an "aesthetic" question. And in terms which are even more arguable, the *apparent negation of order and of constructive values*, is set up as an artistic revulsion in some trends with pretension to the new vanguard.

More well meaning trends today defend a *minimalism* of the medium and formal (geometric) *abstraction* is taken to the most subtle extremes. Meanwhile there is

already talk of new *fractal orders and geometry*, more in tune with the definition of some natural phenomena.

Use and behaviour

In architecture beauty awakens in man, perhaps more than in any other of the plastic arts an orientation towards behaviour. The work forms a means of using it satisfactorily, in the material and spiritual sense. Man experiences pleasure or repulsion towards determined uses and even towards persons or institutions represented by them. But further on from this he feels the impluse to his own free action, carried out with pleasure what could have otherwise seemed arduous and difficult. The social utopias throughout time propose ideal cities, also ideal in their form in the hope of achieving social reform. Studies have been carried out to measure the extent to which they have contributed to the progress of real urbanism.

The building allows or also makes difficult the spatial appropriation on the part of its inhabitants, concerning its own identity. In the formal definition of architecture there should be included as an additional condition, the respect for the capacity of personalisation of the work by its user. The concept of the total work of art, which arose at the beginning of the century hoped to, together with the integration of plastic arts, extend design to all the material medium which surrounds man, there being a risk of abuse, by the interference this supposes by the artist of personal privacy, which demands this appropriation. Except in prior accord of assimilation on the part of the user of the aesthetic ideas of the architect, it is necessary to have this margin, demanded in a natural way.

The moral responsibility of the architect goes therefore further than the opinion regarding any one of the aesthetic preferences. If his architecture is to be art it should be open to the truth and goodness of the living of man, alone or in society. Even being far from a reformist intention, through the beauty of space architecture can and should elevate human behaviour, contributing thus to the happiness of humanity.

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CULTURAL IDENTITY OF WORKS OF ART (abstract)

Curtis L. Carter (Milwaukee, USA)

In contemporary western aesthetic theory it is common to arguethat the cultural identity of works of art is to be found intheories of art linked to the history of art (Arthur Danto), toinstitutional determinations occurring within the art world (GeorgeDickie), in culturally emergent properties (Joseph Margolis), or inreference to the practices of art making surrounding a particularart medium (Noel Carroll).

Particularly in the United States, heavily politicizeddiscourse centering on multicultural issues has insisted that thecultural identity of works of art be grounded in such concerns asgender differences, sexually differentiated communities, and ethnicdiversities such as African American, Latin American, NativeAmerican or Asian American. In other parts of the world, thereemergence of fervent nationalisms have brought to the forefrontthe claims of nationalism with respect to the cultural identity ofworks of art.

All of these varied approaches contribute in important ways toour understanding of the identity of works of art, and will need tobe taken into account in developing a full theory of the culturalidentity of works of art. Yet there is an important aspect of theidentity of works of art that seems not to find a satisfactorysolution when we limit our thinking to the accounts of identityfound within these various approaches. It is, and has been forsome time, a matter of fact that works of art readily travel fromtheir cultures of origin and are welcomed and appreciated by thepeople of other cultures who, by limitations of birth, geographiclocale, and education, have not had the opportunity to participatein the culture of origin of the work of art. This would apply toart transferred as "trophies of war," such as the Napoleonicconquests that brought treasures from across the world to Paris orto the now disputed treasures appropriated during World War II byvarious nations, the diplomatically negotiated acquisitions such asthe Elgin Marbles now in the British Museum in London, as well asto commercial and touristic transactions.

My contention is that a theory of the cultural identity of artworks must include provisions to account for the fact that theyretain their interest and worth as they travel beyond theirimmediate context of artistic and cultural practices, whetherinitially based in artistic, ethnic, national, or other concerns.

Apropos of this problem, I advance here the hypotheses: firstthat works of art do retain their identity in important respectswhen transferred from one culture to another thus allowing fortheir global appreciation and understanding; secondly that positingtranscultural or universal features of art works offers a betterhypothesis to account for the fact that art works retain interestand worth when travelling out of their cultures of origin than theprevailing theories noted here; and thirdly that the culturalidentity of works of art is open rather than closed in essence,thus allowing for the fact that works of art may incorporate newproperties into their cultural identity resulting from theirplacement in a new cultural setting. The case of the Elgin Marblesand other examples from recent history will serve as a basis toexplore these issues.

FRACTALS: THE AESTHETICAL DIMENSION OF THE NATURE

Maria Antonia Castro Santos (Pamplona, Spain)

> "The thought, taken in its felt more general to include the art, the philosophy, the science - taken at the same time in its meaning more general - is the search of what is invariable in a world in fluctuation".
>
> C.J. Keyser. Mathematical Philosophy

The center of the artistic reality in the visual arts and even auditive throughout the history have been the geometric proportions and the numbers. The geometry constitutes the structure that underlies under the forms so much of the painting, as of the sculpture or of the architecture. This formalization of the matter is a real language, that puts us in touch with what is spiritual and what is transcendent.

The spirituality in the art emerges when the relationships enclosed in the natural forms, or created by the artist, awake logic or affective resonances in the one who look at them. If the perception of these relationships is conscious, we practice the Aesthetics: science of the harmonious relationships, discipline that deal with of what is beautiful.

Art, as philosophy of the art, it is the deepening and search of the sense of the reality; it is the presentation of a not accessible reality to all, that the artist is able of showing and transmitting through his deep sensibility.

The geometer that conceived the Pyramids, the architects and philosophers of the century of Pericles, Piero de la Francesca, Alberti, Leonardo da Vinci or Jacopo da Barbari, believed that in the living nature and in the art, was resounding indefinitely the law of the number. The architects, Bramante, Rafael, Michaelangelo, Vignola, thought in the same way and also believed that the complete knowledge of the Geometry together with the deep study of the Science of the Space, were indispensable to those that with the chisel or the cord had to create or fix the forms.

Pitogoras had observed that not only all geometric concept, had as corresponding, an arithmetic and parallel law, but all harmony was depending on a proportion, on a numerical relationship. Having the order and the beauty of the Universe its origin or its explanation in the numbers, the philosophy of his school were summarized in the idea of the Number as essence or symbol of all the things. It was not in the substance of the phenomena but in its structure where his disciples - as afterwards Plato - were locating and were looking for the reality.

It is surprising to prove how the modern Math, the physics of the Relativity and of the quanta, the infra-atomic Chemistry of Bohr, Rutherford, Braggs, agree with this conception. A new theory of numbers has been elaborated on a purely abstract base - the theory of sets of Cantor. This theory, because of the calculation of the classes and to the calculation of the relationships of Peano, Frege, Couturat, Russell (that form with the Logistics name a common branch to the Math) permitted to reconstruct of the manner more general the Arithmetic, the Algebra and the Analysis with the Identity principle exclusively; and these Cantor numbers , cardinal or ordinal, defined as classes, classes of classes or types of order resuscitate the concept of platonic number.

With the theory of groups, end and coronation of the modern science the already foggy frontiers among the pure Math, the Physics, the Logic and the

Theory of the Knowledge have been thoroughly erased. The mathematical theory of functions becomes a simple chapter of the propositional functions that, at the same time, form part of the abstract theory of the relationships of the new Logic.

It really seems to have come true now the dream of Pitagoras and of Plato: the complete synthesis of the sensitive universe in ideas-numbers. This live with the understanding of the universe under some natural quantities that are transcribed through the numbers. Indicate this that we are returning again to the classic world? Or rather, on the contrary,? to a greater deepening of the geometric reality and therefore of the formal reality?

We are arriving to the crest, inaccessible until the moment, of the conception of a universe whose parts are complemented and harmonized mutually in an immense symphony in a way and colors that is going beyond the classic conception of the reality: where the parts are not clear and different forming an all closed and ideal, but all form part of all as manifestation of the complexity of the daily life. This complexity is governed by a different order: Chaos.

The Theories of the Chaos and the Fractales emerge as a compendium of these new mathematics advances of sets of classes and classes of classes; they are geometry that belong to the nature formal world, and they are materialized in a new cultural expression. Expression as testimony of the understanding of the reality of his time.

It has been discovered scientifically - thanks to the computer, that it has made possible the geometric visualization of the fractals that these geometry result from the application of very simple mathematical formulations that answer to the reality textures without explanation until now, as for example the geometric generation of a fern leaf. Now it is known that its geometry stems from an concrete math expression, which corresponds to an inherent law of physics.

Benoit Mandelbrot in his work "The fractal geometry of the nature" asserts: "he clouds are not spheres, the mountains are not circles, and the bark is not smooth, neither the lightning travels in straight line". Unlike to their predecessors, Mandelbrot investigating of IBM in Yorktown Heights, professor in the University of Yale - developed a new type of math which is able to describe and analyze the irregular structure of the natural world, and he invented a name for the new involved geometric forms: fractals. They are a principle that could be key element of some new natural mathematics and of a new natural geometry, in the same way that the straight line is a constitutive element of the Euclid's geometry.

We witness the recovery of a new order based on the nature, as search of a symbolism and some contents lost in the rationalist and abstract world we are attempting to leave. The art can not recover this order but with the logic of what is natural The nature is not only a superior level of complexity, but a different level that we must arrive to understand. For that we ought to study the forms that Euclid left out, and to investigate the morphology of what is amorphous.

The mathematical concept of fractal reflects a hierarchic principle of organization that measures processes of creation of figures based on the self-similitude, in which each unit, by minimal that she will be, carries implicit the information of the total. Hierarchic principle that is observed inherent in the Nature and in the Man, expressed similarly under a law of similarity with a supreme Being. The ancient principle of the fact that the macrocosms reflects

the microcosm gets new life back with the discovery of the theory of the complexity, where the fractals are midway between the chaotic geometry of the nature and the Euclid's perfect orders geometry.

At the beginning of this century the man had been crushed aesthetically for the first phase of the mechanization and by its heavy intermission in all the political, cultural and social manifestations. It seemed an irreparable divorce between the beauty and the modern life; they believed that they were condemned and the humanity with them to the perpetual ugliness.

As a consequence, of that the bet on new artistic manners, on new spatial languages, emerges as the manifestation of the structural changes in the society and the economy of the last times.

These changes express the moment of disorder in which we find . This insecurity state provokes a formal and conceptual relativity climate, and this conceptual disqualification creates the need of seeking other meanings, new architectural codes.

The general situation of the current culture is the disappearance of the idea of an absolute linguistic structure. The only thing it can be produced in the absence of a universal meaning structure is the fragmentation: cause of both the deconstructivism and the post modernism .

The fractal geometry introduces us in a formal structure that is revealed us not as a succession, but as an assembly of "worlds in rotation" perceived simultaneously. It is a process where a form is self-organized to find the subtlety of the nuance, and at the same time, the place that occupies in the complexity of the "all".

While the postmodernity has answered with the difference, the fragment and the dispersion, this geometry answers with the meticulous reproduction of a measure, with the expressiveness of the rhythm, not only as rhythm but as scale, as of different scales that stem from their relationships.

It is not about the abandonment of the material concretion and the abstraction as expressive forms, since within the representation, the imagination is already a form of reality abstraction, it is a form of art where the imagination is disfigured to be converted into texture, to abandon its representative nature; where it is disintegrated in a texture of which color stains, parts dispersed, etc... emerge. Where the abstraction is made imagination and each part has its identity within the life of the joint.

The fractal geometry is produced with independence of the means. It is moved between the order and the chaos, the nature and the artifice, the matter and the signs; it connects what is figurative with what is abstract.

It is the texture that materializes the internal structure of the daily life complexity. It is to make philosophy which geometry philosophy considered as one of the fine arts insofar as it cooperates with them in the amplification and concentration of our sense of reality, as real resistance strategy against the unrealization; since art and philosophy are equally cultivate of the attention toward the reality and not distraction exercises.

The romantic conception of art as anti-fiction, does not take place in the area of what is fictitious, but it is an instrument to obtain reflection and attention experiences. When we introduced ourselves in the world of art, as access way toward the reality, we enrich our experiences without they stop being our. The art is experience.

OUTSIDER ART

Joan Crystal Pearlman (New York, USA)

The term "Outsider Art" was brought into the "artspeak" lexicon in 1972 as a book title on the subject by Roger Cardinal, a British art historian. The term was originally meant to be the English equivalent of the term "Art Brut," coined by Jean Dubuffet in 1945 to describe works he was collecting created by individuals seen to be outside established society (primarily inmates in mental institutions) who had not had academic art training or exposure to art theory and ascribed Art World values. Art Brut means art which is "raw" or "uncooked", and in a catalogue for a 1967 exhibition, Dubuffet elaborates:

> The aim of our enterprise is to seek out works that as far as possible escape cultural conditioning and proceed from truly original mental attitudes.[1]

Cardinal then summarizes:

> Only art that embodies an authentic "purete Brute" (raw purity) can be expected to convey anything like a true dynamism. All other kinds of art are so to speak "cooked"--according to the fastidious recipes drawn up by the chefs of culture.[2]

According to an article in *Raw Vision, International Journal of Intuitive and Visionary Art*, assembled by John Maizels, editor, Dubuffet believed that the purest among them would not consider themselves artists, or feel they were producing art. The term "Art Brut" was later adopted by the Collection de l'Art Brut in Lausanne which does not permit its use except for the I works in its collection or works it officially designates.[3]

Because the name "Art Brut" was prohibited from use, the term "Outsider" was substituted with the intention of being the English equivalent. However, according to Maizels, since the term does not have the protection of exclusivity, it has often been mis-used to refer to almost any untrained artist. He notes:

> It should be synonymous with Art Brut in spirit and meaning, referring to that rarity of art produced by those who do not know its name.[4]

The article proposes an agreed upon vocabulary of compiled definitions to clarify meanings and distinctions among related sub-categories which spring from the theme of self-taught. The following summary refines how these related concepts diverge from outsider:

Neuve Invention, refers to artists of comparable impact, but with greater contact with society and awareness of their creations as art works; some try to earn a living from their art. Dubuffet realized the need for this category, and acknowledged these artists in his "Annex Collection," added to the Collection de l'Art Brut in 1982. This concept is closer to the American use of the term Outsider Art.

Marginal\Art Singulier artists are similar to Dubuffet's Neuve Invention. Their art is close to Outsider both in appearance and expression. Usually self-taught, the artists are in the margins between Outsider and mainstream art.

When the terms *Visionary* and *Intuitive Art* are used together, they can encompass the categories described and almost everything in the field including

tribal, urban folk, third world art. It also includes *Visionary Environments* - buildings, and sculpture parks built by intuitive artists such as Simon Rodia.

Contemporary Folk Art has a crossover with Outsider Art, but with its own traditions and a different psychic flow. This point will be returned to later.

Naive Art refers to untrained artists, often sophisticated amateurs, who depict realistic scenes in detail, sometimes using fantasy images.[5]

Because these sub-categories intersect, hard and fast definitions and boundaries are subject to controversy.

It is not yet clear whether *Raw Vision's* distinctions will prevail over what has become the broader, more common usage of the term Outsider Art, especially in the United States, where it has been extended by gallery owners, curators, writers and Outsider Art Fair organizers to include or encroach upon the related terms defined. A composite, more inclusive (albeit tentative) definition offered in the exhibition catalogue for Parallel Visions (1992-93) reflects the way the term has evolved in America:

> These outsiders have usually been self-taught individuals, sometimes mentally disturbed who have created their work while isolated generally from mainstream culture and particularly from the complex infrastructure of the art world, that is, from galleries, museums, and universities with which mainstream artists are regularly associated.[6]

As terminology goes, Outsider Art has had a problematic history. Writers, lecturers and collectors have pronounced the term an unfortunate choice, and have criticized it on many fronts.[7] It is denounced for connotations which promote separation of its practitioners and exclusion from mainstream high art by the very act of labeling. Yet, conversely, it is sometimes disparaged for being too inclusive, a catchall term for all manner of autodidact artists.

One approach to describing Outsider Art would emphasize the importance of identifying the aesthetic bonds and commonalities shared within the category. Yet, Outsider Art is not a category that is coextensive with a period in the development of art history where artists communicate and influence each other or respond to public acclaim, critical theorizing, or benefactors' tastes. Still, there are some recognizable similarities that are often cited: the obsessive-compulsive detail, the "horror vacuii," use of bold coloration, a visionary tone, use of repetition and childlike rendering. While these characteristics appear with frequency, there are also many counter-examples of simple, spare images, abstract graphic power, subtle coloration, and strong, sure rendering (e.g., Bill Traylor, Joseph Yoakum, Martin Ramirez). While neither necessary nor sufficient characteristics unto themselves, or, even unique to Outsider Art, as long as the category remains viable, they could provide an optional beginning point (with caveats) for an aesthetic description.

There are also numerous issues raised concerning the categorization process. First, there are political implications in assuming that the prevailing Art World tastemakers have the power to define who is "outside" and who is "inside," based on mental states of the artists, class differences and race. If a primary contributing factor for inclusion in the category is the mental state of the artist,

it could be argued that the category be limited to the art of the psychotic. If not, how far should it extend (should we include the neurotic vainly trying to cope with the pressure of civilizing trends)? The lingering notion of the romanticized "mad" artist is reinforced in a 1993 book reviewing new evidence for the association of "madness" with genius, a link more pronounced in the arts than other fields.[8] If the outsider category were to cover all "mad" artists, then it is close to becoming another category, the art of the insane.[9]

When consideration of the artist's status (or lack of it) is a measure, then, at the very least, an artist must be of marginal status - outside the "mainstream" - to be considered an Outsider. "Marginal", in the case of Outsider Art, has been construed to include psychotics, certain African-Americans (usually poor, old and/or isolated), religious visionaries, angst-filled misfits, prisoners, and reclusives. If marginal societal status of the artists is to be a primary condition, there is the problem that many, even most artists are living the lifestyle of a marginal person, either by circumstance of marginal financial means, or by choice of a lifestyle that is decidedly not mainstream. Concession that the artmaker must live a life distinctly on the edges to be considered an Outsider means that works in a style similar to, say, an obsessive-compulsive Outsider created by a self-taught "insider" would not qualify.

Race has been used to justify the inclusion of a number of African-Americans on the grounds that racism has excluded them from the dominant culture, thus denying power, opportunities and resources. Critic Lucy Lippard calls this a mixed blessing which allowed for continuance and development of ideas and images that would have otherwise "been swept away in the mainstream."[10]

Many question whether Outsider Art should remain in a separate category at all, or be absorbed into the broader category of "Art," where it could expand the parameters of art itself. This, of course, would mean surrendering to current tastemakers' style and criteria of judgment, and to a loss of the information provided by the categorizing which adds interest and a sense of currently valued authenticity for viewers and collectors having to do with knowing the art comes from a personal truth and an "uncooked" source of inspiration.

Labels are arbitrary; at best, they can describe. They can also mislead and affect how we anticipate, experience and value the art. Here, connotations can cut two ways. They can promote disregard for what is not yet acceptable to the gatekeepers of high art, or they can rouse interest in an art that falls under the umbrella of the "other," and has (like tribal art) its own intriguing aura and associations.

These are some of the controversies revolving around the term and concept of Outsider Art which reveal the issues of hierarchies, inclusion-exclusion, and the political implications of identification according to status of the artist. While one can question the accuracy and appropriateness of the term, it may, by now, have a life and connotation of its own comparable to the use of the term "Gothic Art," which we no longer associate with its root Germanic tribal meaning. It has also been defended on the grounds that it tells in one word the story of this art

more meaningfully than any other." And, alternative terms such as "self-taught" or "visionary," which may becoming more favored, have also been faulted for being broad, narrow, unfocused, etc., by writers on this art who are almost inevitably caught up in what has come to be called "term warfare".

One of the strongest arguments for including Outsider Art under the folk art umbrella is that the artists share the characteristics of being self-taught and non-academic. *The Museum of American Folk Art Encyclopedia of Twentieth-Century American Folk Art and Artists* included most of the known Outsiders side by side with memory artists such as Grandma Moses and fiddle-playing wood carvers such as S. L. Jones. Also, courses on Outsider Art are taught in folk art institutes and in college programs in folk art.[12] Yet, traditional folk artists and Outsider Artists are far apart regarding their intentions. Traditional folk artists intend that their art work decorate or be displayed. The tradition of decorating utilitarian objects is more closely associated with the European model based on the art of the peasant classes who handed design traditions down through the generations. In the United States, which initially did not have a peasant class or many skilled artisans, folk art style of original character sprang up to reflect American needs, experience and ingenuity, and went beyond tradition-based form, particularly in the portraits. Outsider Art, on the other hand, springs from an impulse or obsessive need to create, unrelated to the Art World trends or even peer admiration. while no artwork can help but relate to the artist's cultural background in some way, Outsider Art is generally idiosyncratic. In pure form, it is made without the creator's intention to produce an Art Market object or even a socio-political statement, although visionaries often convey strong spiritual proclamations. But as Outsider Art gains a following of buyers, galleries and critics, artists are giving more attention to marketing their work.

As in most aesthetic categorization, boundaries are disputed and definitional, political, and language usage debates are part of the intellectual dialogue. What artists or artworks should be included, and what constitutes the definition of Outsider Art (if it remains a category) should cause scholars to continue to refine their thinking and debate their conclusions.

In the meantime, the art continues to present itself with visual eloquence as more and more of the Art World and general public respond to its power." Besides the strong aesthetic qualities, the images in Outsider Art evoke a deep psychic response (raw, basic, preintellectual) in viewers. One could speculate on the concordance between creativity and emotional instability, and conclude that this response is given new freedom by those artists who are not as bound by societal conditioning, restrictions and rewards, and do not renounce their deepest impulses. As writer and gallery owner Randall Morris says:

> This art is about magic. It is about the unexplainable powers a human being feels no matter where in the world he or she comes from that cause him\her to make art from deep within the soul. It is about a power that has no regard for art school. or cultural background. or age. or religion... When it is right (like any art), when accomplished in

execution, authentic in intent, and unique in point of view it packs a force that instantly reminds us that art began as magic, and still has the power to be important magic.[14]

This takes us out of the realm of term wars, and puts the emphasis where it belongs - on the art, on its impact and scope, and on its contribution to the field of aesthetics.

A version of this paper is to be published in the forthcoming Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, Garland Press, New York.

NOTES

[1] Jean Dubuffet quoted in Roger Cardinal, *Outsider Art* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972) 26.
[2] Roger Cardinal, *Outsider Art* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972) 26.
[3] John Maizels, "Raw Vision's Definitions", *Raw Vision, International Journal of Intuitive and Visionary Art* (London: Vol. 7, Summer, 1993) 18.
[4] Ibid. , 18. [5] Ibid., 18-19.
[6] Maurice Tuchman, *Parallel Visions*, eds. Maurice Tuchman and Carol S. Eliel (Los Angeles County Museum of Art, and Princeton: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 10.
[7] The term has been criticized among other places, in talks and papers presented at symposia at the Museum of American Folk Art (on Thornton Dial, Sr.) and the Phyllis Kind Gallery (on Outsider Art) in 1994.
[8] Kay Redfield Jamison, *Touched With Fire, Manic-Depressive Illness and the Artistic Temperament* (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1993) .
[9] For a thorough review of this category see, John M. MacGregor, *The Discovery of the Art of the Insane* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
[10] Lucy R. Lippard, *Mixed Blessings, New Art in a Multicultural America* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990) 58.
[11] Gene Epstein, "Who Are the Outsiders?", *Outsider Art Fair* (New York: Sanford L. Smith and Associates, Ltd., 1994) 6.
[12] The Institute of the Museum of American Folk Art and New York University offer courses on Outsider Art in the certificate and Master of Arts degree program in folk art.
[13] In Europe, besides the Collection de l'Art Brut in Lausanne, there are the Outsider Archives in London and Art, Musee d'Art Brut Neuilly-sur-Marne near Paris. In America, The American Visionary Art Museum will open in 1995 in Baltimore, and The National Museum of American Art in Washington, D.C. displays Herbert Hemphill's bequested collection of Outsider Art.
[14] Randall Morris, Colin Lynch Smith and Caroline Kerrigan, "Outsider Art", *Outsider Art Fair Catalogue* (New York: Sanford L. Smith and Associates, Ltd., 1993) 4.

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THE EFFECT OF LEGAL PRACTICE ON AESTHETIC THEORY: THE CASE OF COPYRIGHT

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Piracy! An outmoded concept perhaps, but at this moment the United States and China are approaching a trade war over the issue of illicit reproduction of copyrighted materials, chiefly computer software and compact discs. The notion that ideas constitute property to be traded and sold is not universally accepted and has a rather short history. Intellectual property emerged as a concept in the sixteenth century with the invention of the printing press, but was not legally defined until the first British copyright law, the Statute of Anne of 1709. Described as *An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the authors' or Purchasors of such Copies during the Times therein mentioned,* the law actually protected booksellers, licensed by the Crown, against competitors who printed low-priced reproductions [Jaszi 1991, Woodmansee 1992].

We are accustomed to noticing the social consequences of legal change and have come to think of the law as instrumental to the achievement of even ethical as well as political ends (viz 1954 U.S. School Desegregation decision Brown v. Board of Education, 1964 U.S. Civil Rights Act). Of late, we have been acutely conscious of both supportive and restrictive legal interventions in the artworld, provision for the construction of art on the one hand, and for its prohibition on the other. Within the verbal and visual artworlds, there is also considerable interest in the depiction of the law in process, and that interest has made its way into jurisprudential theory by way of the Literature and Law Movement [White 1984, 1990, Levinson 1982]. But we have seen little discussion of the impact that law has made on the cultural concepts that are the foundation of aesthetic theory, concepts such as art, work of art, artist, originality and the various genres of artmaking. I believe that legal and aesthetic theory are mutually influential, borrowing from one another's formal and methodological principles, for example, in comparable enterprises of assessment and interpretation. I propose in this essay to examine one historically interactive conceptual formation through an analysis of the law of copyright. My focus will follow the impact of law upon aesthetics, although I take equally seriously the reverse effect as well as the internal contextual history that might be ascribed to each of these theoretical disciplines in isolation from one another.

Aestheticians conventionally trace the origin of their subject matter to Alexander Baumgarten's 18th century coinage of the term to designate a science of sensible experience. Coupling aesthetic pleasure with a theory of the beautiful and the sublime, modern aestheticians did not confine their interest to those artifacts identified as works of art, but included the natural world, intellectual objects, and the realm of the spiritual. However, their attention to aesthetic creation (genius) on the one hand and aesthetic judgment (taste) on the other eventually narrowed the scope of aesthetic theory to those human-made objects meant for aesthetic contemplation. Few contemporary judges would deny the status of (fine) art to works produced before that time or refuse to call their makers artists; yet neither concept (artist, work of art) has the place in the cultural landscape prior to the 18th century that it came to occupy

thereafter. Modern aestheticians tend to obscure this historical discontinuity by speaking exclusively of developments *within* the aesthetic tradition, where only the nature of art and artists needs analysis - their existence and even their universal and timeless exaltation being presupposed. I will argue that modern understanding of these concepts is partially shaped by developments in copyright law.

As noted above, the first copyright law had to do with the control of commerce. Manuscripts, literary or otherwise, were in fact commodities, objects whose marketability depended upon the labor of an assortment of craftspeople - paper makers, typesetters, tanners, stitchers and binders, along with the writers who penned the text. But almost no one lived by the work of his pen alone, and those who did were generally subsidized by court patronage. Writing was a craft, and the suggestion that ideas be purveyed for profit, where contemplated, was repudiated with horror. In Germany, Martin Luther had preached that knowledge, being God-given, must be freely dispensed [Woodmansee 1984]. Yet publishers did pay an *honorarium* to writers whose work they printed as a mark of esteem which bore no relationship to the exchange value of the work. Profit derived from the sale of copies of the work went exclusively to the publishers, who also bore the expense of dissemination. Publishers were licensed by the Crown, (and after 1640 in England by the House of Commons) [Feather 1992], which granted a monopoly over publishing in exchange for "a promise of rigorous self-censorship, including the suppression of treasonous and seditious materials" [Jaszi 1991]. With the growth of a reading public and accessible technology there was money to be made in pirated copies, and so the officially sanctioned Guild of Stationers sought a legal remedy.

The new legislation conferred proprietary rights not on the stationers, but upon the writers, who continued as before, however, to sell their manuscripts together with the "right of first publication" to publishers for a lump-sum payment. The mention of "authors rights" betokens a dawning recognition of a unique relationship that holds between a creator and a work, but not yet a clear appreciation of the uniqueness of the creative act. The right identified in the legislation of 1710 was a trade right, and it was not until 1814 that an author's right "to be treated as the creator and owner of literary property" was defined by English statute [Feather 1992]. According to Martha Woodmansee [1984], this "romantic" recognition derives from the impact of Edward Young's 1759 essay "Conjectures on Original Composition". There Young denounces the prevailing view that writing demands a mastery of rules drawn from classical literature and instead affirms the writer's essential genius as the source of his work. One who "reverences himself" and does not depend upon "borrowed riches", Young says, will find that the works of his mind "will stand distinguished; his the sole property of them; which property alone can confer the noble title of an author; that is, of one who...thinks and composes; while other(s)...only read and write."

This heroic view of the author (of genius) who produces something utterly new and unprecedented is the Wordsworthian legacy that assigns to the creative artist sole responsibility and (therefore) exclusive credit for the work that leaves his hand. It is a view that has of late been challenged by Michel Foucault and others who regard the author as a social fiction or rather a conventional linguistic device for the location of texts. The Foucaultian position, were it to gain currency, might once again render copyright privilege otiose, since there would be no one to benefit from the advantages

conferred, but that seems an unlikely prospect at present. In fact, the romantic view prospered for well over a century, and with it a switch in the comparative agency of writer and publisher. The publisher produces a "mere material thing" that can be boxed and baled (and reproduced). As such, he is an agent of dissemination, while the author who is the originator and creator of the intellectual object, expresses it in a form that grows organically out of his own being. Integrally united with his unique identity, this work cannot be alienated without doing grave harm and injustice to its legitimate proprietor.

The concept of authorial proprietorship may have received additional endorsement from the seventeenth century idea of individualism that permeated social thought and that ascribed to the person ownership of all his faculties and capabilities [MacPherson 1962]. The author is then the natural owner of his creative talents and rightfully holds power over their disposition, a view distinct from that of an earlier time which represented the writer as simply an instrument of transmission which receives its inspiration from a higher source. Copyright thus came to sanction the authority implicit in authorship.

"Authorship" became an ideology, but, as Jaszi points out, as copyright law developed, new terminology marked new reifications [1991]. The term "work" is invoked (as distinct from "copy") to signify an abstraction that "receives physical manifestation in a particular 'copy' or 'copies'". Embodied in this tendency is a tension that is evident in the elaboration of copyright law in the United States. The impetus of American law is given in the U.S. Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 8) "Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for a limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." With this simple enunciation the Founders evinced conflicting interests in proprietary control and public access. Excessive protection of the first defeats the achievement of the second; and so the bulk of copyright cases have dealt with interpretations of "fair use" and "infringement". Once again, the advent of new technologies has multiplied the possibility of achieving new translations, new transcriptions and variant productions of an "original work", and the courts have been required to determine what constitutes a significant enough departure from such "works" to be regarded as an independent "work" notwithstanding substantial commonalities. Courts have therefore been forced to make essentially aesthetic judgments: Is a replica of a photograph the same as or other than the original photograph?
Recent instances of "appropriative" art (e.g. Sherry Levine's images of Walker Evans "Dustbowl" portraits) are paradigm cases for aestheticians [Sartwell 1994].

Courts and other administrative agencies have also had to make decisions that define "work of art" inclusively or exclusively to rationalize treatment of particular contested items. Is a picture that advertises soap or a circus less worthy of copyright than a "pictorial illustration" that has no such function? "A rule cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the paintings of Degas" [Jaszi 1991]. In the wake of such difficult choices, the Romantic connotations of authorship that stress originality and creative genius have been severely eroded, leaving behind only minimal novelty and ordinary skill. Although in a much-cited copyright case (Bleistein v. Donaldson LIthographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 1903), the court expressly disqualified itself from

making aesthetic judgments, in this as in other cases, the ruling nevertheless set a precedent that has influenced not merely subsequent judicial decisions, but also aesthetic attitudes.

Effectively, the authorial concept has been so expanded that little remains of its romantic exaltation, and, correlatively, the "work" has been elevated for commercial distribution. Another famous American case (Alfred Bell & Co. v Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 191 F. 2nd 99 2nd. Cir. 1951) is said to incorporate such a "minimalist" and "demcratized" vision of authorship that there is "no sound basis for distinguishing between oil paintings, art reproductions, motion pictures, lamp bases, poems, and inflatable plastic Santa Clauses." Jurists typically do not profess to be connoisseurs or qualified to make aesthetic assessments, but the necessity of reaching a conclusion in a particular case compels them to decide; and in deciding for the sake of justice, they may decide injudiciously for the sake of art. The law cannot distinguish the aesthetically trivial from the possibly revolutionary and could not set aside a judgment to achieve or avoid one or the other even if that were possible. Thus faced with an evident derivation as in the recent case against the rock group "Two Live Crew", the court declared its rendition of the tune "Pretty Woman" a parody, thereby denying copyright infringement while modifying a literary genre. Whether future parodists will be influenced by this judicial intervention remains to be seen, but it seems plausible that the popular culture, from which art ebbs, might take note.

Since both art and the law are vehicles of and contributory to cultural values, it should not surprise us that there are confluences where one imposes upon the other. At the substantive level we are certainly familiar with instances where a legal injunction has affected aesthetic judgment (e.g. the charges of pornographic display made against the Cincinnati Museum for showing the photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe) and instances where a work of art influenced moral and judicial behavior (e.g the publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*). I have attempted here to argue for similar intercourse at a higher (meta) level of theory. A subject of another essay is the influence of aesthetic theory on the formation of legal concepts. In this essay I have focused on the manner in which the law, in both its judicial and legislative form, has left its mark on aesthetic theory.

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ART AS POWER: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF AESTHETICS

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This paper argues on a theoretical level that aesthetics may be taken as a social science in order to explore certain aspects of the ways in which perceptual and social reality are created. The focus is on the role of aesthetic activity during periods of radical social change, such as in the years immediately following the October Revolution. The main point under discussion is that there is an aesthetic dimension in the very fabric of social life which must be understood if the aims, paradigms of activity, and types of structures characteristic of a given society are to be understood. Furthermore, there is a direct connection between aesthetic values, ethical values, and morality in a given society such that aesthetic qualities, for example, innovation, imagination, uniqueness, and beauty, are revealing of such larger social issues as personal initiative and responsibility, attitudes towards authority and law, a sense of public discipline and submission to power, freedom of opinion and action, and the willingness and ability to think and act creatively in public life. These issues are key to understanding the nature of a particular society, the ways in which it functions, and the seeds of its possible decline.

The public institutions, organizations, and structures of a given society present only one part of the picture in an investigation of its field of possibilities for democratic development. A society comes to life, so to speak, in respect to the values which give a concrete content and orientation to the ways in which it is publically organized. The importance of aesthetic values in this regard is that they possess the power to generate the perceptual reality and perceptual knowledge which underlie both conceptual knowledge and the pre-cognitive reality in which people live and carry out the activities of their daily lives. Aesthetic activity may thus serve either to legitimate, or to subvert a particular social order.

KANT, MUSIC AND THE MODERN SYSTEM OF THE ARTS

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The standard, now familiar story is that by the middle of the eighteenth century what Paul O. Kristeller called "The Modern System of the Arts," which is to say, the "fine arts" as we understand them, was fully formulated and in place, including within its boundaries what the nineteenth century came to call "absolute music." Without absolute music within those boundaries, the fine arts as a class, in the modern sense, does not yet exist. But with Kant, however, so I shall argue, the question of absolute music is never conclusively resolved. And it was Kant whose influence in this regard pervaded philosophical thought in the first half of the nineteenth century. To say that in the third *Critique* absolute music did not succeed in coming to be seen, decisively, as one of the fine arts, is tantamount to saying that for *philosophy*, for *aesthetics*, it had not — that important is that work to the philosophy of art, as the culmination of eighteenth-century thought, and the continuation of same in the first of the century to come. The conclusion, then, must be that as music, in Kant, had not decisively achieved the status of fine art, the standard and familiar story of the "modern system" must be revised. That music had *not* achieved such status is the argument of the present paper.

The question for Kant was not nearly as straightforward as it may appear from his rather confident sounding statement in the *Anthropology* (1798) that "it is only because music serves as an instrument for poetry that it is *fine* (not merely pleasant) *art*." [1] For if this statement is to be credited, 'Kant *had* made up his mind to exclude absolute music from the modern system, and done so merely on the basis of its lack of representational content, which a poetic text could supply in the case of vocal music, that alone, then, to be designated fine rather than agreeable art. But in the third *Critique* it is clear that Kant is far from so simple a statement of the case, and has pushed the question of absolute music far beyond *merely* the question of "representation" or "content": indeed to the question of "form" (the later date of the *Anthropolgy* not implying a later view).

What is most familiar in the literature of the third *Critique*, with regard to music, is the question, in §14, as to whether single musical tones can be beautiful, or, at their best, merely agreeable. We might call this the first stage of Kant's argument, and it turns on whether individual musical tones are perceived as having form. For it is only through the perception of form — the conscious perception of form — that the free play of the cognitive faculties, and hence the pleasure in the beautiful can arise.

The notorious passage in which Kant expresses his view on this matter is rendered as follows by Kant's earliest English translator (of the complete *Critique of Judgment*), J.H. Bernard (1892): "If we assume with Euler that colors are isochronous vibrations (*pulsus*) of the ether, as sounds are of the air in a state of disturbance, and-what is more important — that the mind not only perceives

by sense the effect of these in exciting the organ, but also perceives by reflection the regular play of impressions (and thus the form of the combination of different representations) — which I very much doubt–then colors and tone cannot be reckoned as mere sensations, but as the formal determination of the unity of a manifold of sensations, and thus as beauties."[2] The next English translator to attempt the complete third *Critique*, James Creed Meredith (1911), gives a very similar reading of this passage, except that the crucial phrase Bernard has as "which I very much doubt" is given by Meredith the exactly opposite sense, "which I still, in no way doubt"; [3] and he is followed in this by the third *Critique's* most recent English translator, Werner S. Pluhar, who has it, "and which, after all, I do not doubt at all." [4]

To doubt or not to doubt is the question, and it arises simply because of textual variation. The first and second editions of the *Critique of Judgment* have it Bernard's way, *gar sehr zweiflel* the third edition Meredith's and Pluhar's, *gar nicht zweifle*. [5] Is the third edition's version a correction or a misprint? The smart money, these days, seems to be on the former, and I will adopt that assumption since, for one thing, as Theodore E. Uehling has pointed out, it accords better with what Kant has to say later on.[6] So we may take it that Kant has decided, in the first stage of his argument about absolute music, that individual musical tones, since they have consciously perceivable form, as regular perturbations of a physical medium, can be beautiful. As yet, however, he has said nothing of their being *fine art*. That is yet to cane.

A second stage of the argument can be discerned in §51, where Kant frames the question of whether or not Euler's vibrations can be taken in as objects of perception present to consciousness or whether we merely register their effect. The details of Kant's argument need not detain us here. What does interest us is Kant's conclusion, with to music. of the two alternatives, that Euler's vibrations are objects present to sense, or are felt merely in their effect, Kant concludes:

> The difference which the one opinion or the other occasions in the estimate of the basis of music would, however, only give rise to this much change in the definition, that either it is to be interpreted, as we have done, as the *beautiful play of sensations* (through hearing), or else as one of the *agreeable* sensations. According to the former interpretation, alone, would music be represented out and out as a *fine* art, whereas according to the latter it would be represented as (in part at least) an *agreeable* art.[7]

Uehling has called attention to the significance, in the above passage, of the phrase "as we have done," which implies that Kant has already, presumably in §14, treated music as the beautiful play of sensations, and thus implying, as well, that he has opted, there, as here, for the view that Euler's vibrations are present to sensible representation.[8]

Of interest too, I think, is the phrase "in part at least," which suggests that, for Kant, the question of whether or not music (or anything else) is a fine art may not always have a categorical "yes" or "no" as an answer: that, in other words, something can be art-like, or, rather, art in one respect but not in another. I shall return to this thought in a moment.

In any event, it appears that, in §51, Kant has plumped for music as a fine art on the basis of his decision that individual tones have a perceivable form as Euler's vibrations. This brings us to the third stage of the argument.

It would be curious indeed if Kant, or anyone else in the eighteenth century, should let the question of whether music is a fine art turn *merely* on whether it has perceivable *form*. For the *même principe* (as Batteux called it) that holds the fine arts together is representation; and Kant, for all of his emphasis on form, has not rejected it. So although it may seem as if, in §51, Kant *has* let form do the whole job for him, that impression is quite dispelled in §53 and §54, as we now shall see.

What, then, is the "representational content" of music, for Kant? He begins with a platitude of his time: the "representation" of the emotions through musical "representation" of passionate human speech. But to it Kant adds the distinctively Kantian notion of the "aesthetic ideas."[9] It will not be necessary for present purposes to fully explicate this difficult notion. Suffice it to say that it is through the evocation of the aesthetic ideas that "representational content" becomes integrated into works of the fine arts in the way appropriate to them *qua* fine art. They do not constitute an expressible content-they are "unutterable." An expressible content is what gives birth to them — but must not be confused with the aesthetic ideas which are the true, inexpressible content of the fine arts as fine arts. It is the aesthetic ideas that, for Kant, satisfy the demands of the *même principe*.

But something else is necessary for the aesthetic ideas to constitute, on the "representation side, a work as a work of fine art. The evocation of the aesthetic ideas is a necessary but not sufficient condition. What must also happen is that the aesthetic idea provoke the free play of the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding. And this, we learn in §54, the aesthetic ideas in music cannot do; in absolute music they ultimately have their pay-off not in the free play of the cognitive faculties but merely in a physical feeling of bodily well being. "In music the course of this play is from bodily sensations to aesthetic ideas (which are the Objects for the affections), and then from these back again, but with gathered strength to the body."[10] And the conclusion to be drawn from this failure of the aesthetic ideas, in absolute music, to engage the free play of the cognitive faculties, is that like "jest," music "deserves to be ranked rather as an agreeable than a fine art.[11]

We now have the apparent contradiction of Kant saying in §51 that music *is* a fine art because sounds exhibit perceived form as Euler's vibrations and, contrariwise, saying in §54 that music is *not* a fine art but an agreeable art because its aesthetic ideas engage only the body and not the imagination and understanding in free play. But the proper response to this apparent contradiction, I suggest, is to recognize, as Kant seems to license us to do in §51, that the answer to "Is it a fine art?" is not necessarily a categorical "Yes" or a categorical "No" but quite possibly a "'Yes' in part, 'No' in part." The answer that Kant gives to the question of whether music is or is not a fine art is neither

"Yes it is" nor "No it isn't"; it is that absolute music is art-like in respect of form but not in respect of representational content. And hence it is not *fully* a fine art: it is art-like in one respect and not art-like in another. Furthermore, in seeing this we can now understand more fully his statement in the *Anthropology* that it is the addition of poetry that makes music a fine rather than an agreeable art. For the aesthetic ideas in poetry, unlike those in absolute music, can engage the imagination and the understanding in free play. This is the Kantian way of saying that poetry makes music *fully* a fine art, and not just a fine art in respect of form, by giving it the representational content it lacks without a text.

Kant, then, was not so much indecisive in how he viewed absolute music as decisive in placing absolute music in an indecisive position; half fine art, half not; fine art in respect of form, agreeable art in respect of content; fine art-like but not fully fine art — not, in short, categorically one of the fine arts. And so large does the figure of Kant and the third *Critique* loom, retrospectively over eighteenth-century philosophy of art, prophetically over that of the nineteenth, that from the philosopher's standpoint, if Kant did not conclusively make absolute music a fine art, that must be taken as the judgment of his century as well. The making of the modern system of the arts was left philosophically unaccomplished, the failure of absolute music to be philosophically understood as a full-fledged member evidence of that as yet unaccomplished task.

NOTES

[1] Kant. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Mary J. Gregory (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 114.

[2] Kant. *Critique of Judgement*, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1961), p. 60.

[3] Kant. *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), p. 66.

[4] Kant. *Critique of Judgement*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), p. 70.

[5] See Pluhar's footnote to this passage, ibid., p. 70n, and Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., *The Notion of Form in Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1971), pp. 22-26.

[6] Uehling. *The Notion of Form*, p. 25.

[7] Kant. *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, trans. Meredith, p. 190.

[8] Uehling. *The Notion of Form*, p. 25.

[9] For a more thorough exposition of this point see Peter Kivy, "Kant and the *Affektenlehre*: What He Said and What I Wish He had Said," in Kivy, *The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 250-264.

[10] Kant. *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, trans. Meredith, p. 199.

[11] Ibid. Kant's full thought here is expressed as follows: "In jest (which just as much as the former [i.e. music] deserves to be ranked rather as an agreeable than a fine art) the play sets out from thoughts which collectively, so far as seeking sensuous expression, engage the activity of the body."

WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND ART?
Main Interrelations Between Philosophy And Art

Bohdan Dziemidok (Gdansk, Poland)

It is commonly accepted that philosophy and art (and literature in particular) are closely related. However, our comprehension of the problem is vague, incomplete and often shallow. It is worthwhile, therefore, to reflect on what we really do know about interrelations between philosophy and art. Hence the Ingarden-inspired title of my paper, in which I wish to concentrate mainly on formulating basic questions that need to be answered. Before that, however, we must recognise the fact that the notion of "philosophy" is used in this context in a number of meanings and that identical questions can generate different answers depending on what one takes "philosophy" to mean.

As regards the question we are after, philosophy is often understood very broadly as a general mode of perception, of comprehension and of understanding reality (and human life in particular), that is as an individual Weltanschauung or the Weltanschauung of an epoch. Thus understood, philosophy is by all means something different from a specialised and relatively autonomous human intellectual activity which purposefully aims to formulate and answer the most general questions concerning the concept of being, human existence, knowledge, language, etc.

To gain a more complete knowledge of relations between philosophy and art we need to address the following questions:

1. a) Is art in a global meaning (including actual works of art) capable of only expressing and reinforcing the Weltanschauung of an epoch or of a social group or of an individual artist, or is it also capable of creating, evaluating and negating the Weltanschauung? Does art only communicate a Weltanschauung or does it create it as well?

b) Is art only a form of expressing and popularising a philosophy or is it capable of creating a philosophy on its own when it comprehends philosophical problems and tries to reflect on them or perhaps solve them employing to this purpose its own specific means?

2. What is special about art's own form of philosophizing and what are the capacities of particular realms of art in this field?

3. Assuming art is capable of expressing and influencing not only the epoch's Weltanschauung but also philosophy in the narrow meaning of the term, can all realms of philosophy such as not only axiology, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of life and history but also metaphilosophy, methodology, philosophy of science or philosophy of language function equally well in art?

4. Do particular realms of art have equal capabilities with regard to expressing philosophical ideas, or are the capabilities of literature, drama and film, for instance, better in this respect than those of architecture, music, or abstract visual arts?

5. Provided one can speak of philosophical values of art, do they, at least in selected realms of art (eg. literature), contribute to the value of an artwork, or are they of extraartistic or secondary importance only?

LITERATURE — HEART AND MIND

Frances Berenson (London, Great Britain)

Tolstoy is undoubtedly a giant of literature. He, himself, believed that "it is in the capacity of man to receive another man's expression on feeling, experience those feelings himself, that the activity of art is based".

Yet, for many philosophers, the fact that we respond emotionally to works of fiction constitutes a big and logically intractable problem. R.T. Allen recently expressed the difficulty very succinctly: "The phenomenon of emotional responses to fiction is for most philosophers..., something that could not be admitted to be what it is but which had to be analysed as something else, ... either a non-emotional response to fiction or an emotional response to non-fiction".

The paper explores various possibilities of approach to this perennial problem and suggests that the solution may reside in a "marriage" between analytic philosophy and phenomenology.

IMAGINATION WITHOUT STRINGS
A virtual look in the future of the visual arts

Jos de Mul (Rotterdam, The Netherlands)

Few things are as precarious as the prediction of the future. Chaos-theory has taught us that even totally determined systems characterised by a 'vulnerable dependence on the original situation' exclude long-term prediction. Moreover, if we presuppose that in human history chance always play a essential role, it will be clear that we would live in a fool's paradise if we think we can foresee the future of our culture. Of course it is possible to extrapolate actual developments to the future, but which of the present tendencies, and which of the factors that are still non-existent at the present will be decisive in the future, only can be subject of bold speculations.

What have just been said especially goes for the domain of art. After all, art has made developments in the past hundred years that hardly could have been predicted at the end of the nineteenth century. For that reason it is not without diffidence that I will present some reflections on the future role of the visual arts in the exploration of virtual space. Because - as I have just stated - predictions always are extrapolations of past developments, before making a virtual jump in the future, as a kind of run-up I will do some steps backwards in time.

1. The future of Futurism

Eight years ago, when I stayed in Venice for a while, I visited the exhibition *Futurismo & Futurismi.* Its main goal was to show the development of the futurist movement in Italy, as well as its international influence. One of the paintings exhibited was *The city rises*, painted by Umberto Boccioni. This large painting - it's about six square meters - dates from 1910-11 and is generally regarded as one of the milestones of futurist visual art. With regard to my subject Italian Futurism - often regarded as the first avantgarde movement in modern art - for more than one reason is a good starting point.

In the first place the futurist movement was one of the first successful media-events in modern culture. The birth of Futurism coincided with the publication of Tomasso Marrinetti's *Futurist manifesto* on the front page of the French newspaper *Le Figaro* on 20th of February of 1909. On that very moment not one single futurist artwork was made, let alone there would be something like a futurist movement. Long before McLuhan Marinetti realised that "the medium is the message" and that thanks to the mass-media information becomes reality. Thanks to the publication of the *First Manifesto of Futurism* the futurist movement was put into existence and many painters, authors, movie-directors, architects, designers etc. joined the movement.

Not only the way in which the futurist movement came into being anticipated present day mass media, but also the modern life propagated by the futurists in many ways foreshadow our everyday-reality. The futurists glorified modern technology and the experience of reality and beauty it caused. "Up to now", Marinetti writes the *First Manifesto of Futurism*, "literature has exalted thoughtful immobility, ecstasy, and sleep. We intend to exalt aggressive action, feverish insomnia, the racer's stride, the somersault, the punch and the slap. We affirm that the world's splendour has been enriched by a new beauty: the beauty of speed. A racing car whose hood is adorned with great pipes, like serpents of explosive breath - a roaring car that seems to ride on grapeshot - is more beautiful that the *Victory of Samothrace*"[1].

In *The city rises* of Boccioni the wild whirl or vortex that carry along the city and its inhabitants seems to symbolize the force of technological progress. This "psycho-physical flux in which time and space pursue one another in a circle"[2] not only is a metaphor of a new aesthetic experience, but more generally it expresses what we might call the futurist sensibility that has changed twentieth-century culture in a very radical way. In a manifesto published in 1913 Marinetti remarks that the new means of communication, transport and information will have a decisive influence on the psyche of twentieth century man. According to Marinetti these new means of communication, transport and information require "an acceleration of life to today's swift pace", an adaption of man to modern technology. He foresees "multiple and simultaneous awareness in a single individual".[3] It has been said that the attempts of the avantgarde movements in the first part of our century to integrate life and art have failed.[4] At least with regard to Futurism this thesis seems to be untenable. The prophecies of the futurists has been realised on a scale that even exceeds their wildest and most aggressive fantasies. Not only they got the wars they - being enthusiastic but not always accurate readers of Nietzsche - asked for to clean the world (and they got them in a lethal abundance), but also they got the technological world and the futurist sensibility they propagated. This technological world changed from a futurist prophecy into everyday reality. The high-tech means of communication, transport and information, that today are being connected via electronic highways to a worldwide interactive network, gives us a first glimpse of the futurist sensibility that will characterize human life in the next century.

2. From fiction to faction

In order to elucidate the role that the visual arts might play in the further development of futurist sensibility, I will bring to memory three developments in the history of art since the Renaissance. In addition, I will extrapolate these developments to the culture of the next century.

a. A case: the development of physical space in landscape-painting

In the first place I like to bend our mind to the role the visual arts have played in the exploration of *physical* space since the invention of the central perspective. The Dutch philosopher of culture Ton Lemaire in his book *Philosophy of the Landscape* - written in 1970 - has shown how the suceeding stages in the development of landscape-painting mirror the development of the exploration of physical space. According to Lemaire the painting of the Renaissance not only is characterized by the unveiling of physical space, but at the same time in Renaissance painting man appears as a subject standing opposite to the unveiled landscape: "The representation in central perspective of the landscape is an act of liberation and of the becoming autonomous of the modern individual. Or, when we put it more sharply, it is in one single act that the individual posits itself as an autonomous individual and the world appears as landscape. Man from the Middle Ages has to throw the outer world out, has to recognise it in its otherness, in order to become conscious of itself and recognise himself as an individual. For that reason the individual and the landscape appear at the same time in Renaissance. They are the poles of a primordial unity that fell apart". [5]

Lemaire in his book sketches the main stages of the further development of modern culture by describing the corresponding stages in the development of landscape-painting. After the stage of *exploration* of the landscape in the Renaissance the landscape-painting until Romanticism shows the *settlement* of man in the unveiled profane space. Especially in the Dutch landscape of the seventeenth century we see how modern man cultivates the landscape and makes it into the scene of its activities. However, as the demythologisation - I refer to the process of 'Entzauberung' as it described by Max Weber -and the subjection of nature by means of modern technology was put into effect, the other side of the process of modernisation, the growing *isolation* of the 'autonomous' individual, also comes to the fore. Romantic painting not only shows us the desire of modern man to reconcile with nature, but also his impotence to realise this reconciliation. In my view it is no coincidence that the feeling of the sublime - in Kant's terminology: the negative lust ('negative Lust') that springs from the disharmony between imagination and reason[6] - especially is connected with landscape-painting. The paintings of Caspar David Friedrich without doubt are the most fascinating examples of this stage of development of modern culture. After a short-lived last attempt of *reconciliation* of nature and culture in the impressionist picturing of the public space of the nineteenth century suburb, the isolation of the modern individual in nature becomes a fundamental *alienation*. In the metaphysical, surrealist and magical realist landscapes of the twentieth century we have arrived in an ominous and dehumanized world, in which every hope of reconciliation of man and nature seems to have disappeared.

b. The spiritualisation of Art

It is remarkable that after the Second Worldwar landscape-painting looses its prominent place in the visual arts. It might be that this disappearance of landscape-painting mirrors the disappearance of landscape in North-Western Europe. At this moment the biggest part of Europe consists of cultivated nature. Coming closest to nature at this moment are the so called wastelands, parts of cultivated nature that for one reason or another escape technological control. However, as sensible as this may sound, today I would like to direct our attention to another factor that in my view is as important (though it may be argued that the reason for this is that it is closely connected to the disappearance of natural landscape).

When we look at the history of modern art we see a remarkable shift in the visual arts from the exploration of physical space to the exploration of spiritual space.[7] This development has been described with foresight by Hegel in his *Ästhetik*. According to Hegel the world-history, and also, as being part of it, the development of art, is characterized by an increasing spiritualization. Whereas the era of symbolic art - Hegel's mentions the pyramids in ancient Egypt as example - is characterized by a predominance of the material aspect of art over the spiritual, and later on - in the golden era of Greek sculpture - by a momentary balance of the material and spiritual components, in modern art (in Hegel's terminology: romantic art) the spiritual gains a predominance over the material aspect. An indication for this spiritualization of art we find in the modern shift towards more spiritualized art forms such as perspective painting (that is not, like architecture and sculpture, three-dimensional but only gives the illusion of three-dimensional space), music and above all literature. In Hegel's view especially the art of the novel have to be regarded as the exploration of the inner, spiritual space of human subjectivity.[8]

Hegel's prediction that modern art will be characterized by an ongoing spiritualization not only throws an elucidating light on the development in the twentieth century of specific art-forms like serial music, in which the organisation of the musical material is not based on natural phenomena, but on sheer cultural rules (Schoenberg), the philosophical novel (Musil, Kundera) and conceptual art[9], but also on the connection between the visual arts and the computer. In my view we do not exaggerate when we assume that this connection opens the perspective of a *new* Renaissance, that will consists of the *exploration* of and *settlement* in *virtual space* unveiled by modern electronics. In the culture-industry and I'm thinking especially about the professional flightsimulator's, computer-games etc. - this exploration of this spiritual space already is taking place, and without doubt many other domains will follow soon.

The thesis I would like to defend is that, because of the exponential growth of the world population in the next century, man with regard to its living space increasingly will depend on virtual space. Not only the stream of communication and information increasingly will use the electronic

highways vice-president Gore of the USA is propagating so enthusiastically, but also transport of persons. The first human steps in cyberspace - in their clumsiness comparable with the first steps on the way to physical space at the end of the Middle Ages - are the computerprograms that enable us with the help of digitalized photo's and computer-animations to see paintings, buildings and even whole cities from all possible angles. Here we find ourselves situated on the very threshold of the realisation of an old dream of mankind: travelling in time. The computer programs mentioned enable us to walk in fifteenth century Florence or in Athens 450 before Christ. As often the realisation of this dream takes an all together other route than it was predicted. In the case of travelling through cyberspace we do not really return to the past, but we enter a reconstructed reality, created by a collective of computer-programmers, visual artists, architects etc. For that reason the multimedia-reconstruction of the past, no less then the historical novel (like Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe*), will always bear the hallmark of the present. To use Gadamer's terminology, in this case there is a *fusion of horizons*, and the outcome of it - like the alloy - always is more then the sum of the parts. If we consider the present state of the art in the digitalization of the past, this form of travelling appears to be a meagre surrogate. But the further technological unveiling of virtual space - the perfection of sound and the holographic image and the addition of tactile experience and smell - will enable the multimedia-tourist of the future even without leaving his or her chair to experience the most exotic places in space and time in a manner that will be more authentic and more realistic that 'real' experience.

c. The virtualization of reality

In order to elucidate this I will dwell on a third development that characterizes modern culture. When we look around us we notice that in this century reality increasingly is shaped according to the aesthetics of the mass media. Walter Benjamin already in 1936 (in the year the first issue of the illustrated magazine *Life* was published) has argued that in the era of technical reprocibility the *copy* becomes the standard in the production of art.[10] Artworks are made in consideration of their reproduction. In the era of mass media no longer the *aura* - that is: the cult-value of the unique artwork, that is present only here and know - is decisive, but the exhibition-value of the copies. On the one hand the loss of aura might be considered as a loss of reality (though this judgement may be motivated by a kind of ontological nostalgia), on the other hand the copies unveil a fascinating new world. Moreover, Benjamin also noticed in a very early stage of their development the ideological value of the mass media. Although he invested his hope in the revolutionary potence of the new media (as we find this in the movies of Eisenstein), he also realized that these media also could be used by the establishment for reactionary goals.

Like Benjamin foresaw too, this development in the last decades has not been restricted to art, but goes for the whole of society and culture. A recent documentary on the Dutch television about the intervention of USA soldiers in Somalia 1993 offered a good example of this. Not only the moment of the actual invasion was chosen in a way that it could be broadcasted live on prime-time, but also the camera-crews and directors already were waiting on the beach to ascertain that the invasion was staged and filmed in an aesthetic and ideological sound way. And as Benjamin also foresaw for the present generations of politicians a professional presentation in the mass media (Reagan in the USA) or the control over these media (Berlusconi in Italy) is no less important than the actual policy.

I'm not willing to go as far as Baudrillard does when he states that nowadays every reference to reality has disappeared, because the massmedia in stead of being means of reproduction have become means of disappearance, but to me it is clear that in the near future we will inhabit a space that increasingly is fit out according to the criteria of virtual reality, and in which the distinction between fact and fiction no longer will be univocal. After all, whereas the artists in the Renaissance unveiled the physical space by means of *fiction*, the virtual space is the *product* of scientific - that is: objectified - fiction. The work of the multi-media artist in the post-representative era will be characterized by *faction*, fiction that ontologically as well as practically will function as reality.[11] The demythologization of space that took place in modernism here changes dialectically in a digital re-mythologization.

3. Homo zappens

Whether the coming world of faction also will be a world of satis-faction, of course remains a question. On the one hand in the case of virtual space we enter a fascinating new world , but on the other the leaving of the old physical space will be felt as a painful loss (comparable to the loss felt by the people in the Middle Ages during the exodus from religious space). Moreover, the Odyssee in Cyberspace, starting with exploration and settlement may, like the one in the physical world, result in isolation and alienation.

However, techno-utopists believe that the new interactive media possess big aesthetic and democratic potentials. According to them these media not only make the culture of the whole world worldwide available with one single touch of the keyboard of the computer, but they will also realise the dream of the avantgardes by making artists of all people and enabling them to design their own virtual life-space according to their own interests and taste. Moreover, the techno-utopists believe that the interactive media will lead to the 'electronic agora', an immediate democracy following the old-athenian recipe. When we consider the positive experiences with usernet - the interactive computer network most of you may be acquainted with - there is some reason for optimism[12].

However, we may not forget that the introduction of television in the fifties was accompanied with comparable utopian expectations, and as we know, these did not come true in all respects, to say the least. It is not unthinkable that the cyberspace we are entering in spite of its staggering variety will be characterised by an aesthetic and political uniformity. Pessimists, inspired by the genealogical writings of Foucault, even predict the coming of a worldwide electronic panopticum, that will exceed Orwell's Big Brother fantasies in all respects. When we watch the first commercial steps in cyberspace in the USA - such as electronic shopping and the SEGA-channel in the USA, we have to admit that indeed there is some ground for pessimism too.

But regardless of the fact whether the coming virtual world will be full of creativity and democracy or will turn out to be the completion of nihilism, that is: sheer 'furnishing of the void', it will not be - as McLuhan thought at the beginning of the epoch of television - one global village, but instead a staggering network of virtual villages. Marinetti foresaw that man of the future will be one with exchangeable parts and a "multiple and simultaneous awareness". I foresee that the homo zappens, an amalgam of carbon and silicon, will inhabit the world. This homo zappens will, wound in its electronic cocoon, simultaneous stay in multiple virtual worlds. Without doubt somewhere in one of these worlds traditional art still will be made. However, the question remains whether we have to look for this traditional art in one of the innumerable virtual museums or in the section extinct professions of the annual virtual fair.

NOTES

[1] F.T. Marinetti. "The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism", in: P. Hulten (ed.). *Futurismo & Futurismi*, Venice 1986, p. 514.

[2] M. Calvesi. "Umberto Boccioni", in: P. Hulten (ed.). *Futurismo & Futurismi*, Venice 1986, 429.

[3] F.T. Marinetti. "Futurist manifesto" (1913), in: P. Hulten (ed.). *Futurismo & Futurismi*, Venice ,1986, 516-519.

[4] See e.g. P. Buerger. *Theorie der Avantgarde*, Frankfurt a/M 1974.

[5] T. Lemaire. *Filosofie van het landschap*. Baarn, 1970, 24-5.

[6] I. Kant *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Theorie-Werkausgabe, Vol. X. Frankfurt 1968, AB 74v.

[7] See J. de Mul. "Landsfchaft in Sicht". In: F.-A. Hettig en Th. Meyer zu Slochteren (ed.). *Verwantschaften Düsseldorf Rotterdam*, Rotterdam/Düsseldorf, 1993, 12-35.

[8] G.W.F. Hegel. *Ästhetik*, Berlin/Weimar 4,1984, 87, 581.

[9] See J. de Mul. *Echo's from a last God. Beyond the End of Art* (forthcoming).

[10] W. Benjamin. "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter sein tecknischen Reproduzier-barkeit". In: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 12. Frankfurt a/M, 1974, 471-508. Zie ook: J. de Mul, "Fotografie als metafysica". In: O. van Alphen en H. Visser (red.), *Een woord 8voor het beeld. Opstellen over fotografie*, Amsterdam, 1989, 68-104.

[11] Vgl. T. Druckrey. "From wasteland to toxicity. Reordering Nature as Information". In: F. Gierstberg en B. Vroege (red.).

[12] Vgl. H. Rheingold. *The Virtual Community. Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier*, New York 1993, 14-5, 276v.

NARRATIVE AND MUSICAL CLOSURE IN *THELMA AND LOUISE* AND *THE PIANO*

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In the nineteenth century, the first theme in a sonata or simphony was widely considered to be "masculine," and the second theme, "feminine." The feminine theme in the piece generally appears in a less stable key than the masculine theme, and often serves to increase harmonic, melodic and rhythmic tension. The drive toward final closure in the piece is accomplished through subsuming this second theme and key into the orderly key of the masculine. A similar principle is also found in dramatic music of the time, in which socially unacceptable female characters like Venus (in Tannhaüser), Carmen, or Delilah are treated with unstable music that resolves to the more stable music associated with the masculine (or domesticated feminine) when the unacceptable character is killed or destroyed.

Yet in some contemporary films made and/or scored by women, the narrative and musical closure ordinarily associated with the death or defeat of a socially unacceptable female character is resisted or revised to the character's advantage. In one film, narrative closure is subverted by musical open-endedness; in the other, musical and narrative closure are subverted by memories of the beauty of the unresolving music and the power of the silence heard throughout most of the film. Through music and through silence, both films present challenges to logocentism.

In *Thelma and Louise*, written by * and directed by Ridley Scott, the title characters, while largely sympathetic, are also women who transcend the boundaries of what is acceptable female behavior — or male behavior, for that matter. Yet the choices made by these typical women with ordinary names and lives are particularly striking and shocking because they are highly unusual ones for women. Louise (Susan Sarandon) shoots a man who attempted to rape Thelma (Geena Davis) when he talks back to Louise as she holds him safely at gun point; later, as the two women attempt to escape the law, thinking no one would excuse the shooting, the married Thelma has sex with a drifter. After the drifter steals Louise's life savings, Thelma robs a convenience store at gun point. When a police officer stops them for speeding, they force him at gunpoint to get into the trunk of his car before he can use his police radio. When a trucker makes crude comments and gestures to them on the road, they invite him to join them at a reststop, and when he refuses to apologize they shoot his 12-wheeler full of bullets until it explodes into flames. Because escape ultimately becomes impossible, Thelma and Louise are faced with the choice of incarceration or death. As in the operas mentioned above, these socially unacceptable women wind up dead; narrative closure is achieved, and the social order is restored. But these deaths have different implications than the operas mentioned above, because they are freely chosen by the heroines themselves: Thelma and Louise

decide to drive off the edge of the Grand Canyon rather than submit to the system. On of the most interesting aspects of this ending is its lack of tragedy. Many viewers saw the heroines' final choice as Thelma and Louise themselves viewed it: as liberation from a system incapable of understanding their social situations and motivations. For some viewers, as a matter of fact, the character's suicides seemed exhilarating. (Although it could certainly be argued that Thelma and Louise deserve to be incarcerated, certain extenuating circumstances — the implication that Louise had been sexually abused earlier in her life, a series of accidents and continuous bad luck, the suggestion that the women saw no choice but to do what they do, and the fact that both Thelma and Louise are "nice ladies" who, under normal circumstances, would never seek to hurt anyone or anything — all make it seem likely that the women will be unfairly judged.)

The lack of tragedy and sense of exhilaration at the film's end is underscored by the musical score, supervised by Kathy Nelson. The songs selected for the opening of the film are largely country songs sung by women (or by men, when the heroines are not alone together but relating to men). These simple, stable songs could represent the propriety, predictability and stability of the women's original lifestyles. As the women gradually become wilder, stronger and more decisive, however, the score turns to harder, more forceful rock songs sung predominantly by men, songs that are more likely to resist the simple diatonicism, regular phrase structure and closure of the country songs. There is also a recurring motive in the film, a single guitar motive that comes to be associated with the women and their condition, a motive irregularly phrased and with imprecise pitch and tonality. The women also become less talkative and more reflective as the film proceeds; their feelings are expressed through the guitar motive and rock songs. The guitar motive is heard at full volume as the women are deciding to end their lives. Then, as Louise presses the accelerator to the floor and drives off the cliff, the motive is accompanied by gospel music in the major mode, transcendent and triumphant but with often unresolving harmonies. As the credits to the film are then listed, Glenn Frey sings, to a rock beat,

Until we find a bridge to cross forever
Until this grand illusion brings us home
You and I will always be together
We'll never walk alone.

Thus while in many traditional operas and films the demise of unacceptable women is characterized by both narrative and musical resolution or closure, the narrative closure represented by the deaths of Thelma and Louise is diminished by the lack of musical closure in the final, transcendent music.

A much different situation, narratively and musically, is presented in *The Piano* (1993), written and directed by noted Australian film director Jane Campion and with music by Michael Nyman. Here a woman turns from what is throughout the film a position of rebellion to a more traditional life at the film's end. And while this traditional life might be viewed with ambivalence by some

viewers, *The Piano* is a more optimistic film than *Thelma and Louise* in that the rebellious heroine chooses life. In the film's opening, the heroine Ada (Holly Hunter), a woman with an "illegitimate" daughter Flora (Anna Paquin), is married off by her father to Stewart (Sam Neill), an Australian land developer. Two extraordinary aspects of Ada's character are her strong will and her refusal, since she was six years old, to speak. Because she is silent, and although she uses sign language and occasionally writes messages, she avoids to some extent what Lacan and certain French feminists would call the "Law of the Father" — and the dialyzing, objectifying world that patriarchal language has constructed. Because she is both silent and willful, people are compelled to pay extra attention to her, to struggle to "hear" and understand her; both her child's father and Stewart himself claim to "hear" her thoughts speaking to them. (Both are frightened by this phenomenon.) Further, Ada's silence combined with her willfulness lends her a nobility that contrasts sharply with the idle chatter of other women, and that makes it uncomfortable, even if it is deemed necessary, to contradict her wishes. While we ordinarily associate female silence with passivity, Ada's silence seems a defiant reaction to a culture that seeks to tame and contain her will.

Although she does not speak, Ada is very expressive. Her primary mode of expression — a mode she can hardly bear to be without — is her piano playing. (Her mind's voice, which the viewer can hear, says " I don't think myself silent; that is because of my piano.") The music she plays is haunting and beautiful but resists closure in its irregular phrase structure and unresolving harmonies. Her music is described by a local woman as "strange," as music that “creeps into you”, a music not "plain and true." Unfortunately for Ada, Stewart trades her piano for land to Baines (Harvey Keitel), another man of European background but who has taken on many of the ways of the Aborigines (a people that Stewart attempts to exploit). Baines buys the piano only because he is enchanted with Ada and her piano playing; he requests piano lessons from her for erotic, rather than musical reasons. During the course of the lessons, Baines arranges to "sell" the piano back to Ada, key by key, if she will allow him to do certain things to her while she plays her music--things like touching and kissing her bare neck and shoulders, looking under her dress, touching her leg, etc. At the beginning, Ada submits to the arrangement only because she wants her piano back so desperately. (At one point, she lapses into a rather boisterous rendition of Chopin's A major Prelude to get Baines to stop what he is doing.) But as Ada plays and Baines caresses, Ada is eventually moved, and her music becomes more and more intense and erotic. Before Baines asks to make love he has second thoughts about the arrangement; he has come to love Ada and does not wish to make a "whore" of her. He decides to give her back the piano and asks her to stay away from him unless she can return his feelings. As Baines spends time alone, severely depressed without her, Ada realizes she wants him and she returns to him and makes love. The passionate lovemaking is accompanied in the score by her passionate piano music. Stewart finds out about the

lovemaking, forces Ada home and nails all the doors and windows shut so that she cannot escape. Although miserable, Ada is so erotically charged that she eventually begins to touch and caress Stewart's body, although she will not let him respond in kind. Stewart decides to unnail the doors and windows when Ada agrees tnot to speak to Baines. But when Ada attempts to send Flora with a message to Baines on a pianor key, a message indicating her heart belongs to Baines, the daughter, who loves her mother dearly but is angry at her, gives the message to Stewart instead. As Stewart receives the message and runs toward home and away from the aborigines working with him, one of the aborigines, who are associated with music throughout the film, complains that his small instrument suddenly refuses to "sing." On his return and to Ada's and Flora's horror, the enraged Stewart threatens Ada's hand with an ax, demanding that she renounce her love for Baines. When, although struggling and terrified, she repeatedly refuses, Stewart chops off one of her fingers. (This act is foreshadowed by a performance for a play put on by the local villagers, in which "Bluebeard," in reflected shadows on the wall, "cuts off" one of his wife's hands.) With a will as strong as Ada's, violence is the only way to contain it; and this violence is particularly destructive because it strongly inhibits her ability to play the piano, and thus robs her of her voice and much of her identity and power. The music accompanying this violent act is Ada's own piano music, now loud and extremely intense, and a music that now conflates instability, eroticism and violence. When the brutal act is completed the music softens and dies out, but without resolution.

Following this incident, Stewart hear's Ada's mind's voice demanding that he release her. Frightened by this strange form of communication, disappointed, embarrassed and ashamed, he eventually decides he wants nothing more to do with Ada. Ada sails off on a boat with Baines, Flora, and the piano. During the course of the voyage Ada insists the piano be thrown overboard. Her feet are entangled in a rope attached to the piano (as if she is not separate from it), and she is pulled into the ocean by the piano's weight. Apparently because she has lost her ability to express herself, she at first resolves to die in the sea. But suddenly she begins to fight for her life ("What a chance!," says her mind's voice; "What a surprise! My will has chosen life!"), and she manages to untangle herself and to swim to the surface. In the final scene she is living happily in a lovely house with Baines, Flora and a new piano. Baines has manufactured a metal finger for her, she is teaching piano, and is slowly learning to speak. At one point Baines, on seeing Ada practicing her speech, surprises her and kisses her adoringly. Ada responds with pleasure. The scene is accompanied by Ada's piano music, but the music is now played calmly and simply, and ends with a sense of musical resolution or closure.

One would not want to deny Ada this happiness after all her frustration and trauma, but there is nonetheless a sense that she has been tamed and domesticated, has submitted to the status quo. Her wings have been clipped ("I've clipped your wings, that's all," Stewart explains after he chops off her

finger) and the defiance and integrity represented by her silence, as well as the enchantment expressed by her unstable and unresolving music, have waned. Although Baines is presented as an loving and sensitive man in the film, he had won Ada's love by withholding from her one of the most important things in her life, and by manipulating her in ways that ultimately results in violence to both her reputation and her physical well-being. Yet although Ada has chosen to find happiness in an imperfect world and state of affairs, the music most likely to stay with the film's viewer is not the simple musical closure associated with her happiness but the passionate, chaotic music associated with her resistance. So although Ada accepts and even learns to appreciate narrative (and musical) closure, her resistance lives on in the memory of her beautiful music. And what will be remembered as most distinctive about Ada's character is not her speech at the end of the film, but her silence. With a hint of ambivalence about her final situation, Ada's "mind's voice" suggests at the end of the film that at night, she thinks of her piano and herself in a still and silent ocean grave, and that it is this silence that allows her to sleep:

There is a silence
Where hath been no sound
There is a silence
Where no sound may be
In the cold grave
Under the deep deep sea.

Through music and through silence, both of these films challenge social norms and strong tendencies toward closure, as well as the logocentrism so highly characteristic of our culture.

DANCE: HOW FAR BEYOND DETACHED ACCEPTANCE?

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While the functions of ritual and recreational dance have seemed fairly well determined (and not always relevant to aesthetics), the function of dance intended for an audience has been subject to considerable debate. Is it enough for the viewers to be simply charmed by watching beautiful bodies moving harmoniously in time and space? Or do their movements need to be justified by serving to tell a story? Or can those movements serve a still higher purpose by conveying a message of social or political importance? Even if they can function in one of the latter ways, should they? Might they not be betraying the distinctive role of dance by making it into just another kind of drama or just another kind of lecture?

Historically, western theatrical dance has varied in its approach. Following the decorative *ballet de cour* of the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, some choreographers urged that dance could be more serious, could portray dramatic characters and situations. But in time, problems were encountered; some ideas were difficult to portray without words. How does the body say "This is the man who stole my wallet and married my sweatheart"? The solution was simple. Easily recognizable gestures conveyed the narrative facts; dancing, with a special vocabulary of attractive movements, was relegated to separate, emotional scenes of hate or love, sorrow or rejoicing.

The 1930s found a way to bypass the dualism. Doris Humphrey claimed then that dancing should consist of "moving from the inside out." Starting with emotions, one must find the bodily movements that portray those emotions, and then stylize the movements so that they do more than just convey the facts. As Rudolf Arnheim suggested, they can evoke "the kind of stirring participation that distinguishes artistic experience from the detached acceptance of information."

But while Humphrey, Martha Graham, and others founded what became known as the American "modern dance," the classical ballet developed in its own way, sometimes inventing its own forms of dramatic expression, at other times eliminating the story line to let the formal patterns of the dancing take over.

As the twenty-first century approaches, both abstract and dramatic genres have evolved in individual directions. In the first category, the works of George Balanchine remain the landmarks. In his *Chaconne* (1976), for example, dancers graciously parallel the lines of Gluck's music; their movements are gentle, a sense of harmony prevails. The elegance of the ballet vocabulary with its characteristic qualities of balance and control creates an atmosphere of refined beauty and serenity. Only the occasional threat of of a virtuoso demand for daring interrupts the serenity, and the skills of the dancers quickly resolve the danger.

But Balanchine's musical choreography was not limited to such visions of reigning tranquility. In *Agon* (1957) the sharp, disjointed pulses of Stravinsky's music led the choreographer to make his dancers fill the stage with strong, percussive, apparently disconnected motions. Yet the turbulence was always strictly disciplined; classical order prevailed.

However, while classical ballet continued to thrive, other forms of abstract choreography were emerging. Where Balanchine's works were directly inspired by music, those that Merce Cunningham began to create in the 1950s were deliberately unrelated to the sounds that accompanied them. He believed that "the two arts could exist together using the same amount of time, each in its own way, one for the eye and the kinesthetic sense, the other for the ear." Also unlike the classicists, Cunningham's dances were not built on principles of symmetry and harmony. Often he would have each dancer on the stage doing completely different movements. The point, he claimed, was "not just to be complex, but to open up unexplored possibilities."

By our time, the transition from abstract to dramatic dance has gone through various stages. One phase can be seen in Humphrey's *New Dance* (1935) where the final section contrasted a succession of soloists moving in phrases of 7, 7, and 10 with an emsemble moving in a steady beat of 4/4, symbolizing the assertion of individual identity. The antithesis was resolved at the end of each 24 counts with the individual moving in harmony with the group.

More explicitly dramatic were many of the works of Martha Graham, based on plays like *Clytemnestra* (1958). While the plot remained that of Aeschylus, the structure of the dance avoided simple chronology to show the queen, already in Hades, reviewing the tragic events of her life. Far from the peaceful realm of *Chaconne*, tension abounded. But the music of Halim El-Dabh, while clearly related to the dancing, was not the determining factor. Rather, the powerful emotions of the characters — lust, jealousy, eventually resolved in the acceptance of fate — impelled their movements.

Becoming prominent in the 1980s, Meredith Monk chose to use movement along with voices, both speaking and singing. She also used changing sites for a single work, often transporting the audience from one place to another. The locales could vary from a theatre to her own home to a deserted part of an island. The movements of the performers varied according to the needs of the scene: sometimes soft, sometimes violent; sometimes jagged, sometimes lyrical. Monk refused to be bound by a single technique or style.

Yet another structure was seen in *Still/Here*, produced by Bill T. Jones in 1994. For this, Jones used not only dancers and actors, but also men dying of AIDS who discussed their tragic plights on video screens placed next to the live performers. Audience reactions differed widely. Was Jones presenting a theatrical work? Or was he using an art form to call attention to the victims of today's society? Severely castigated by critic Arlene Croce, *Still/Here* provoked a small uproar among dance audiences. It seemed the choreographer was asking for more than the "stirring participation" Arnheim had defined as the essence of

artistic experience." Jones appeared to be wanting his audience to get passionately involved, to go home and do something about the problem.

When does a dramatic choreographer go too far? Certainly we do not want to see dance works that elicit only "detached acceptance of information." But when does a message take over the narrative to such an extent that the dancing appears to be used simply as the means to a utilitarian end?

Dance movement is not ordinary movement. It is manipulated, stylized. Yet stylization can take many forms. Most obvious is the balletic use of technical virtuosity, often displayed for its own sake but also used for expressive purposes — such as a series of violently whipping *fouettés*, done by a heroine to chase away her rival. Other genres chose different approaches.

The modern dance, while based on naturally expressive gestures, did not present them in their usual form. Though not calling attention to the skills of their dancers, choreographers enhanced the shape and rhythm of their movements beyond the need for communicating information. Later, some of the post-modern generation began to experiment with simple, ordinary movement. How could this be stylized? Without the constrictions imposed by music or drama, the choreographer was free to have his dancers simply walk but to do so in any combination of tempos and directions, intriguing their audience with apparently impulsive shifts of speed or path.

Could propaganda be so stylized? In Kurt Jooss's *The Green Table* (1932) it certainly was. As enemy diplomats met, supposedly to make peace, they stiffly gesticulated their opposing demands until only the figure of Death emerged as the victor. More realistic, less rhythmical movements would have presented the information with far less impact. Yet choreographers have occasionally been tempted to dispense with all but the slightest devices of stylization in order to insure the clarity of their message. The consequence for their audience might be fervent committment. It might also be boredom. It would not be stirring participation.

If we are concerned with dance as art, then, recruiting can go too far. Which is not to claim that it must be completely avoided. On the other hand, do we really have much to gain from purely idyllic abstraction? Perhaps a misleading image of an impossible world of peace and harmony? Or is that world worth keeping in mind?

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PHILOSOPHY AND DANCE IN DIALOGUE

Search for embodied thinking reflecting on western philosophy and dance

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The phrase "philosophy of dance" emerge from dance literature from time to time, used by dance scholars, dancers, choreographers, dance teachers, critics and even philosophers. "Philosophy of dance" has been given different meanings depending on the context where the label "philosophy of dance" has been used. There are fragmental statements, articles and books dealing with "philosophy of dance", though there has been no dance research area or a discipline called "philosophy of dance", not even an agreement on the use of the phrase.

Philosophers and philosophy have been criticised that the phenomenon of dance is neglected in philosophical considerations as one of essential human activities.[1] Levin finds the biggest hindrance to the consideration of dance in the cultural and traditional misunderstanding of the human body. Western philosophers have been unable to find a way to reconstruct the cultural understanding the human body, because the philosophers themselves have been inhibited from experiencing/comprehending their bodies.

Dealing with the arts, philosophers and aestheticians have passed by dance, mainly seeing it as just a curious detail. But dance is not totally forgotten in philosophy: there are a few philosophers and aestheticians during this century, who have dealt with dance in their writings.

The French poet and philosopher Paul Valéry was the admirer of dance and wrote a philosophical novel on dance with the title *L'âme et la danse,* and some articles and newspaper critiques of dance. American aesthetician Susanne K. Langer was committed to constructing a system of art theory including the art of dance in *Feeling and Form,* published in the 50's. The English philosopher David Best exposed sport, physical education and dance as different intentions of human movement in his *book Philosophy and Human Movement* published in the 70's. The American Dance festival has published a conference report *Philosophical Essays on Dance,* which consists of six invited philosophers' presentations on dance, with a discussion by a panel consisting of both choreographers and critics. The Canadian philosopher Francis Sparshott wrote a book of the philosophy of dance with the title *Off the Ground,* which was published in the 80's.

These philosophical approaches to dance do not form any continues discussion, but are fragmental texts in the contexts of many kinds of dance forms, each with a unique historical and cultural situation. Just like music, 'dance' is an open concept which may refer to Western ballet, modem/contemporary dance, social dances and the multiple dance traditions outside of Western world. Even if there is temptation to believe in an orginal,

universal dance, dance phenomena are more or less separate processes formed by the life-world, society, cultural and historical situation. Therefore one cannot create a philosophy of dance covering "all dances", an effort, which was attempted by Francis Sparshott without a positive result.[2]

Instead of creating a new art theory as "the philosophy of dance", phenomenologists have discovered some common issues which combine dance and contemporary philosophical discussion and therefore give grounds for a philosophy of dance. I would also like to point out that one may find inherently philosophical thinking and wisdom inhabiting in dance traditions outside the traditions of philosophy.

Phenomenological approaches to dance

Phenomenological approaches to dance are involved in Western art dance, particularly dance modernism, which does not mean that phenomenological approaches to different dance phenomena are not possible as well. As early as in sixties Maxine Sheets-Johnstone published a book with the title *The Phenomenology of Dance* . Despite the title, the book is based mainly on Susanne Langer's art theory and concepts of dance, rather than a knowledge of phenomenological philosophy. The phenomenologist David Michael Levin has written since the 70's some articles on dance emphasising phenomenology as a useful method to understand dance. Sondra Fraleigh in her book *Dance and Lived Body* searched for common topics and themes which unite modem dance and existential phenomenology together. Verena Köhne-Kirch's doctoral thesis *Die "schöne Kunst" des Tanzes. Phänomenologische Erörterung einer flüchtigen Kunstart* analyses different elements which constitute dance as a work of art. The philosopher Susan Kozel in her doctoral thesis *As Vision Becomes Gesture* reflects on dance through Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.

Particularly Levin, Fraleigh and Kozel have argued for phenomenological understanding and phenomenological concepts as tools to illuminate dance. Levin says:

> "...phenomenology is unique in putting an understanding of the human body right in the centre of its field of vision; and second, that the phenomenological approach is so far the only approach which has truly appreciated the sensuous human body just as it is actually lived, and which has seriously attempted to articulate this appreciation as faithfully, as rigorously, and as sensitively as it possibly could. The phenomenology of dance ought to be viewed as absolutely fundamental to our philosophical understanding of the body."[3]

Contrary to aesthetics in general, the perspective into arts has been from *an audience member's* standpoint. Phenomenology allows a new perspective to dance, the perspective of *doing art,* the dancer's and choreographer's perspective as an experiential and communicative process.[4]

According to Kozel, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology provides for dance a new philosophical framework, which is not hostile to the essence of dance. Instead of either philosophy conquering dance or dance eliminating the need for philosophy, philosophy should shed light on dance and dance in turn questions

philosophy.[5] Therefore dance and philosophy in dialogue might lead to new thoughts and methods in both philosophy and in contemporary dance and dance education [6].

A phenomenological understanding of the body

Phenomenologists, particularly Merleau-Ponty, have emphasised the body's significance in human existence. In the framework of tradition 'thinking' is intellectualised, while embodiment has been treated as a physical and organic substance. Overcoming the dualistic understanding of the body, phenomenologists have used the concept 'lived body', which refers to an inherently inseparable unity of spirit and flesh, in other words, human as thinking, sensing flesh. It means that the body is not an instrument of the mind, nor is it connected to it; it is not a vehicle for directed sensation. The body is the primary self, which means that my body is related to what and who I am, therefore as lived, the body is history projecting into future.

Before we begin to reflect in the mind, we have existed as bodies and known the world on the bodily level. We should say, we are bodies rather than, we have bodies.[7] In Merleau-Ponty's words "my body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my 'symbolic' or 'objectifying function'.[8] Thus the body has its own way of understanding.

Merleau-Ponty and phenomenologists stress human belongingness to the world; we are born from the world, but at the same time thrown into the world. According to Levin "we live in a social world, we inhabit this world. But the world also inhabits us."[9] This means, that as the gestures, postures, and bodily attitudes of others gradually inhabit my own body, shaping me, I am absorbing cultural values and values in society through my body and in my body. Obviously those values are rarely reflected on, because they are not necessary conceptualised but lived as bodies.

As bodies we carry these values into communication with other people. Communication means that "in so far as I have sensory functions, a visual, auditory and tactile field, I am already in communication with others."[10] 'Mere is no inner man, but through her/his body the human communicates with others all the time. We might refuse to communicate, but the refusal is still a form of communication.[11]

We have absorbed social rules and morality *as bodies* in the socialisation process from the very beginning, before we can reflect on the process. The body is shaped by its society and vice versa, our bodily way of being, with habits and routines, carries on the values and morality of the society.[12] Because our worldview is tightly linked with our embodiment as attitudes, the projects of change, reforms in society or in an individual life, must take place on the bodily level as well.[13] Therefore when I ask myself how I think, I should think about how I live through and in the body and what kind of values I carry in my body. Some dancers have thought about these questions of an individual body and

social embodiment very profoundly, which means through their bodies and in their bodies.

Transforming bodies

Dance is the most physical art form. It concerns deeply one's own body. When dance and art are not understood strictly as an aesthetic project taking place only on the stage, but as a dance project concerning an individual's way of living and her/his worldview, dance is one way to meditate on questions in life and communicate them to the audience.

Unlike ballet, which has an established vocabulary, in contemporary modem dance movements and gestures generate reflective process with constantly changing lifeworld. According to the Japanese dancer Kazua Ohno dance begins with daily gestures. To become a dancer takes five years. During those five year students learn to listen to their own individual bodies and to the social, cultural embodiment and communication through and in bodies. Kazua Ohno says:

> "During those five years, I teach him to analyze and organize his own body gestures, while deepening his consciousness of life. Throughout the learning process it is essential that neither of these directions be neglected and that the body itself be situated at the heart of the dilemma. During these lessons, a number of questions come up concerning wisdom in everyday life, self-respect and respect for others, the understanding of nature. Certain other themes are essential: the joy and pain of living, the wounds which life has dealt us or others, the gifts and ravages of nature...What is really important is how you are going to deal with all the thoughts about life, which this evokes, and then how are you going to approach the serious reality of life itself." [14]

Philosophical reflection emerges from choreographers' and dancers' bodily working process, in learning dance and doing a dance piece. The question is, do we find and identify 'philosophy' in the artistic process and product, particularly when dancers' and choreographers' work on bodily level, rather than after performing reproduce and translate "thinking" on the a conceptual linguistic level, which is usually demanded of dancers. Dancers and choreographer(s) weave an entity out different elements: movements, gestures, musical space, lights - simply a work of art - in which they inhabit spatially and temporally as long as the performance takes. Therefore thinking is embodied, transformed flesh as spatial-temporal moment shared with the audience with understanding or passing by.

NOTES

[1] Levin 1983, 87; Sparshott 1988, 6.

[2] According to Sparshott, dance could not articulate permanent or evolving structure. Sparshott 1988, 403.

[3] Levin 1983, 90-91.

[4] See also Parviainen 1994, 18-19.

[5] Kozel 1994, 178.

[6] 'Dance' in this paper refers to modern/contemporary dance. When speaking of other dance phenomena I will mention it specifically.

[7] Merleau-Ponty 1992, 102.

[8] Merleau-Ponty 1989, 140-1.

[9] Levin 1990, 38.

[10] Merleau-Ponty 1989, 353.

[11] Merleau-Ponty 1989, 361.

[12] This does not mean, of course, that we are totally constructed by society.

[13] Critique has exposed how we are controlled through our bodies by society in the meaning of body politics. All too rarely the critique continues towards thinking about what kind of society, then, our bodies need and require. Levin 1990, 43.

[14] Viala 1988, 176.

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THE OVERCOMING OF PARADIGMS: FROM FORMALIST FILM THEORY TO ANDREI TARKOVSKIJ

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1. Time in Formalism: The Overcoming of the Concept of *Einfühlung*

In the centre of all Formalist film theory we find the idea that the montage of different scenes produces cinematic time. Montage creates a conflict between different shots: and time, as a purely functional relationship *between* shots, arises out of montage as an abstract element.

The central figure in Formalist film theory is Sergei Eisenstein whose aim was, in accordance with Formalist theory, to overcome "intuitive creativity" through "rational constructive composition of effective elements." (Eisenstein, 1988, p. 175) In a Futurist manner, Eisenstein designs artistic activity as the process of organizing "raw material".

A large part of this cinematic theory is based on the principle of *ostranenie.* The principle of *ostranenie* as it appears in Eisenstein's cinematic theory implies that there exists a conflict within every shot: between an object and its spatial nature or, for example, between an event and its temporal nature.

To combat, as Eisenstein says, "intuitive creativity" by basing one's aesthetic strategy on the combination of raw material (as are, for example, shots) is in agreement with another main Futurist-Formalist project: the ambition to overcome an aesthetical theory of *Einfühlung.*

We are provided here with a further aspect of the concept of time in Formalism. Cinematic time should no longer be seen as an element that can be perceived "emphatically" but it exists "as such". It is not "real time". It exists as a quality that can only be experienced as an artistic-technical device.

Accordingly, Eisenstein insists that the result of cinematic montage will never be represented by a certain "rhythm", by a certain regular pattern of series of shots. The reason for this is that such a cinematic "rhythm" as a temporal quality of film still relies too much on, so Eisenstein's expression, "artistic feeling". In "The Montage of Film Attraction" (1924) he writes:

> A rhythmic schema is arbitrary, it is established according to the whim or the 'feeling' of the director and not according to mechanical periods dictated by mechanical conditions of the course of a particular motor process. (...)
> The audicence of this kind of presentation is deprived of the emotional effect of perception which is replaced by guesswork as to what is happening. (Eisenstein, 1988, p. 48)

Eisenstein quotes even Theodor Lipps, the first theoretician of the aesthetics of *Einfühlung,* to make plain the absurdity of some of Lipps' points when applied to theory of cinema because, so Eisenstein finds, Lipps' theory would only rely on the "emotional understanding of the *alter ego* through the imitation of the other" (ibid, p. 49). Finally, this would only lead to the "tendency to experience one's own emotion of the same kind" (ibid). This means that the rhythm that we

"feel" in cinematic time is an illusion in so far as it is the rhythm that we transfer from our own being into the films that we see.

For Eisenstein as for Formalist film theory in general, time is a matter of montage which creates not even rhythm. The images which are linked through montage provide no subject for *Einfühlung.* Montage, like poetry, is not at all "thinking in images".

The Formalist ideas about montage are inspired by Viktor Shklovskij who criticizes in his manifesto "Art as a Device" Potebnja's conception of poetry as a "thinking in images". Potebnja's conception, so Shklovskij finds, leads to the creation of *symbols* as the main aesthetic occupation. For Formalism, however, artistic activity does not consist in the *creation* of symbols but in the reorganisation of their constellations:

> The more you understand an age, the more convinced you become that the images a given poet used and which you thought his own were taken almost unchanged from another poet. The works of poets are classified or grouped according to the new techniques that poets discover and share, and according to their arrangement and development of the resources of language; poets are much more concerned with arranging images that with creating them. Images are given to poets; the ability to remember them is far more important than the ability to create them. (Lemon and Reis, 1965, p.7)

An art which consists only of symbols will be artistically expressionless like algebra; the task of Formalist artists is to "deautomatize" the fixed schemes of automatization. In the first place this means to retransform symbols into "things", into "material", and to capture then, by means of the artistic camera shot, original constellations of this material. The different shots will then be assembled through montage out of which *time* flows as a dynamic cinematic notion. Cinematic time is not "staged" like in theater, but it is seized through unusual combinations of diverse material.

By means of this particular concept of time in cinema Formalist film theory undertakes the task to combat (exactly like Formalist literary theory) naturalism and impressionism simultaneously. Formalist film theory finds that the "image" is always the photographic image which is nothing other than a simple reproduction of reality. In this way it corresponds with both naturalism and impressionism because both of these artistic tendencies had their particular ways of seeing things as, generally speaking, "they really are". Formalist cinematography believes to have discovered a means to overcome the concepts of "image" of both schools. The theoretician B. Kazanskij writes in "The Nature of Cinema":

> The naturalists severely limited the problem of art to the reproduction of reality. Impressionism was a definite, almost technical way of seeing things 'as they are,' eliminating the attraction toward any kind of personal feeling, evaluation or fantasy. And since for them the genuinely visible was the genuinely paintable 'planar' phenomenon of the world, in drawing mere 'naked reproduction' did not constitute an significant problem, since skillful hand motion did not enter into their aesthetic method. Thus, their artistic method was theoretically 'photographic.' (Eagle, 1981, p. 108)

The strong point of cinema is that it does not need to rely on "the mechanical copying of 'nature, ' [on] the purely technical reproduction on the screen of some real object" (ibid, p. 110) as does, in a Formalist view, photography. Cinema has the capacity to "transform nature" all by relying on the *verfremdende* effect of montage. In Formalist film theory the motto *"ostranenie* against (impressionist or naturalist) *Einfühlung"* has become a matter of *time.*

Further on Eisenstein's and the Formalist's visions of an 'intellectual film' developed into the direction of a cinematic semiotics in which some critics miss a kind of original expressiveness. Having overcome symbolism, shots for Formalists are no symbols but signs. A shot cannot exist isolatedly as can a symbol; it can only exist as a sign within a larger organism created by the director and his film montage. Consequently, an object in a film is not represented but denoted. Within Formalist, and in particular Eisenstein's cinematic structuralism "meaning" is produced through the fact that every sign *functions* within a certain timely structure. Shots become now functions.

It is well known that Tarkovskij combated several of Eisenstein's main ideas though it has rarely been examined how he proceeded with this project in particular. Ivanov states correctly that one of Tarkovskij's aims was to emphasize the significance of the shot as a means of representation of objects and not of their denotation and that he therewith overcame Eisenstein in a remarkably effective way (Ivanov, 1985, p. 300). Ivanov notes also, however., the immense difficulties we meet when trying to describe Tarkovskij as being directly opposed to Eisenstein since Tarkovskij combats *like Eisenstein* symbolism (ibid, p. 291). The truth must be looked for in a new concept of cinematic time that is proper to Tarkovskij.

2. From a Formal Structure to the 'Logic of dreams': Tarkovskij.

The concept of time in Formalism is the one of a "non-staged" time that is produced exclusively through montage. This means that for Formalism cinematic reality is neither *staged* nor does the director try to transfer reality on the screen by means of any kind of direct intuition (as it was intended., for example, by impressionism); nor does Formalism adhere to naturalist concepts.

Also Tarkovskij refuses impressionism as an art which, as he writes in *Sculpting in Time* "sets out to imprint the moment for its own sake" (Tarkovskij, 1986., p. 192) and as an ideology which he finds artistically insufficient. He equally rejects the "staged", painterly, arrangement of shots as it is common in the films of Fellini. Mikhail Romadin writes about Tarkovskij's relation to Fellini's aesthetics: "Fellini's method, where each scene is put together in the same way as a painting is on canvas, was (...) unacceptable for Tarkovskij. What will you have if, instead of a figure drawn on canvas by the artist we see a live actor? This is a surrogate painting, a 'live picture'." ("Film and Painting" in

Tarkovskaja, 1990, p. 145) The 'live picture' remains a transfer of an idea to reality which lacks reality and, as we will see, which lacks time.

To analyze Tarkovskij's artistic strategy of expressing reality and time (or a timely reality) through film we should look at one of his statements of an apparently rather simple kind:

> I once taped a casual dialogue. People were talking without knowing they were being recorded. Then I listened to the tape and thought how brilliantly it was 'written' and 'acted'. The logic of character's movements, the feeling, the energy - how tangible it all was. How euphoric the voices were, how beautiful the voices. (Tarkovskij, 1986, p. 65)

There is "feeling" as well as "rhythm" in this conversation but this rhythm is not staged by the director. As a consequence, it cannot be duplicated through "imitation". Tarkovskij derives everything that he appreciates in this dialogue by means of observation. This means that the circularity of an aesthetics of *Einfühlung* that Eisenstein mocked at in regard to Lipps' aesthetic theory does not apply to Tarkovskij's taped conversation because the reality Tarkovskij captures is not "staged reality". It has neither been produced by an "artistic feeling" nor will it be perceived through the imitation of an empathical rhythm.

In fact Tarkovskij's procedure when taping this dialogue is neither realist nor impressionist. Would it then be right to say that what Tarkovskij did is similar to what Eisenstein and the Formalists propagated as the "capturing of raw material"? The temptation to say so is great because, obviously, Tarkovskij records the dialogue of the persons "as it is", without altering it aesthetically in the slightest way. Everything is due to, as he says.. pure "observation". However.. Tarkovskij does not capture "reality" in the way Eisenstein suggested to capture material. The reason for this is that his concept of cinematic time is fundamentally different. Formalist time exists only as and through the relationships between different shots: the shots themselves have no "inner" time. Consequently, a Formalist would condemn the dialogue taped by Tarkovskij because it represents for him a realistic, "naked reproduction" of reality which comes very close to the kind of aesthetics that Kazanskij has attributed to photography. Photography, so Kazanskij claims, is "stupid, dry, and boring, like statistics, because it has no choice and is incapable of generalization. It is obliged, like a mirror, to reflect everything that lies in the field of its lens." (Eagle, 109) (Is this kind of photography somehow voyeuristic?) Also through Tarkovskij's taperecorder no selection and no artistic "dynamization" of the matter provided by reality takes place. However, Tarkovskij still perceives in this single scene a fascinating rhythm and a brilliantly 'acted' scenario.

The reason for this is that for Formalists a single shot (of which photography seems to them a caricature) is static and mechanical because it contains no time. As we have seen, for Formalists a dynamical notion of time arises only through the montage of several shots. For Tarkovskij, on the other hand, also a single shot *has* time; it contains a, as he says., kind of "dynamic of the mood".

It is interesting that Tarkovskij tends to define this kind of dynamic quality by using conceptions that are similar to the ones used by Formalists. Eisenstein saw the cinematic quality of a shot in the fact that it contains an inner conflict "between an event and its temporal nature". This conflict was supposed to be produced through montage. It is slightly confusing that also Tarkovskij points to the importance of the "unusual combinations of, and conflicts between, entirely real elements", *(op. cit.,* p. 72).

Eisenstein's conflict is based on the principle of *ostranenie,* of the "making strange" of the filmed reality. Tarkovskij, however, "makes things strange" not by transferring a scene from "real time" to "abstract time". Tarkovskij refers to a domain which he understands as an intermediary between abstractness and concreteness: the dream. In principle this means that the impressions Tarkovskij wants to create do not follow the kind of abstract logic by means of which montage tried to produce cinematic time but they are founded on what Tarkovskij calls the "logic of dreams".

We will examine this concept by concentrating on the example of the taped dialogue. If the dialogue was "brilliantly acted" though obviously nobody really acted, does this not remind us of a dream? At least it is obvious that we also, while dreaming, do not act. The action is no action: it is not guided by motives, nor are there any results materialized by consuming "real" energy. The action proceeds like all alone, and in this aspect it is quite reminiscent of a game.

The idea of dream as an action which implies no "real" action has since time immemorial fascinated philosophers. Hamann writes in his *Schriften* : "Mir scheint die Ansicht gewisser Philosophen, die der Menschenseele im Schlaf einen höheren Grad zuschreiben, von großer Bedeutung sein. Die Fähigkeit, die Zukunft zu entschleiern, ist nach ihrer Ansicht dann am stärksten, wenn die Seele nicht damit beschäftigt ist, sich in Bewegungen und Handlungen des Körpers umzusetzen." (Hamann, 1921, p. 371) So for Tarkovskij the problem of realism that we encounter in "staged" dialogues is solved not by refusing staged action and by working exclusively with raw material but by letting actions be non-actions that do not follow the logic of experience of everyday life.

The kind of action that cannot be seen, from an exterior point of view, *as an action* because any neutral, position outside the dream is inexistant confronts us with new problems in regard to the phenomenon of *ostranenie.* For Formalist theory, even of the later phase, the definition of an exterior point of view from which the author can observe and redescribe reality, is immediately linked to this device. Boris Uspenskij's definition of the interior and exterior points of view make this point clear. Uspenskij writes in *A Poetics of Composition:*

> The external point of view, as a compositional device, draws its significance from its affiliation with the problem of *ostranenie,* or estrangement. The essence of the phenomenon resides primarily in the use of a new or estranged view point on a familiar thing... (Uspenskij, 1973, p. 131)

The thing is "made strange" by looking at it from the outside. The object of everyday life becomes an object of aesthetic interest because an author looks at

it. The distinction between inside and outside is a necessary precondition for "making a thing strange" through the device of *ostranenie.*

We should now say that Tarkovskij's *ostranenie* is the *ostranenie of* the "absolutely strange". It is a new aesthetic quality which has not simply turned over the logic of "real" everyday life by converting it into an "unreal", *verfremdete* world. Tarkovskij's expressions do neither *represent* the "real" nor do they *symbolize* the "unreal". They remain in the domain of the "improbable" between symbolization, representation and *verfremdete* expressions and this is what gives them their "strange" character. Through this "device" Tarkovskij overcomes cinematic metaphorism and symbolism. The "zone" in Tarkovskij's *Stalker,* for example, does not, as he says, "symbolize anything, any more than anything else does in my films; the zone is a zone, it's life, and as he makes his way across it man may break down or may come through." *(op. cit.,* p. 200) However, the "zone" remains *strange* just because it claims, in such a tautological way, the absolutely self-sufficient state of being only what it is. The metonymical tendency of showing the detail only for the detail's sake, and which has so often been praised as an efficient device to overcome cinematic symbolism (see Ivanov, 1985, p. 291), has permeated the deepest levels of Tarkovskij's cinematic philosophy.

One cannot insist enough that the "logic of dreams" is, like *ostranenie* in Formalist film theory, a matter of time. In Tarkovskij's films the "unexpected combinations" of real elements have their dreamlike effect only because they take place in the time of dream. What is the structure of this time?

It is better to say that this concept of time possesses a basically non-structural quality. The time of the dream is produced through experiences which come to us through memory, which means in the first place that they come to us as experiences which have no temporal structure. We might remember a certain day in our life but, so Tarkovskij asks, "how did this day imprint itself on our memory? As something amorphous, vague, with no skeleton or schema. Like a cloud." (p. 23) The vagueness of these kinds of memories is a timely vagueness, this means that the memories lack a "skeleton" in the form of an abstract temporal structure. Tarkovskij wants to seize these "memories" by using the expression of dream.

In film "dream" is a matter of time but for Tarkovskij this does not imply to make a given piece of reality strange by shifting it from one timely level to another. This concept of dream existed in Formalism and was understood as a kind of *ostranenie* which stylizes "normal" time into the "non-normal" time of dream. The Formalist theoretician A. Piotrovskij wrote about this kind of stylization: "It is possible to produce a shift of normal time relations, motivated by a 'dream' or by 'intoxication', but these stylized features (...) are always necessarily perceived as artificial and not organically cinematic; they soon become irritating." ("Toward a Theory of Cine-Genres", in Eagle, 1981, p. 137)

Piotrovskij makes an interesting point concerning the importance of "organicalness" in Formalist film theory. Formalism freely juxtaposed "raw material" up to a point that, being confronted with the result of *ostranenie* and montage, we are unable to perceive, as Eisenstein declared, a "feelable" rhythm. However, it seems that for Formalists there still remains a quality of timely "organicalness" that they strive to perceive even in the most *verfremdete* kinds of films. A restricted logic of cinematic time reveals here also the limits of the Formalist concept of *ostranenie.*

This is the reason why Piotrovskij finds that the "time of dream" that is produced through a dreamlike stylization on the level of time can soon become "irritating" for the spectator. This irritation is a matter of feeling or *Einfühlung* into the logical organism of different time levels in film. Formalist film (in spite of its theoretical elaborations of the principle of contrast and juxtaposition) still clings to an organical concept of time that is based on the clear definition of ("normal") temporal levels and their respective deviations; and Tarkovskij's innovation consists in a deconstruction of even this concept.

In the dialogue that Tarkovskij taped the "logic of the character's movements" and "the feeling" do not exist in regard to an organical whole; the rhythm that Tarkovskij perceives so clearly in these dialogues does not exist in regard to any "normal" or "non-normal" time. It exists as such, all alone, creating its own rhythm and "feeling". In this sense Tarkovskij claims that "rhythm" as a temporal quality has not been produced through montage but is a kind of rhythm of no-rhythm that produces an original quality of cinematic time: "Rhythm, then, is not the metrical sequence of pieces; what makes it is the time-thrust within frames. And I am convinced that it is rhythm, and not editing, as people tend to think, that is the main formative element of cinema." *(op. cit.,* P. 119)

The deconstruction of the process of *representation* in Tarkovskij functions only because Tarkovskij's anti-symbolist and anti-realist concepts of the shot are accompanied by a theory of time that functions accordingly. Were his detailed shots that insist so much on their nonsymbolical quality not supplemented by a parallel theory of time, Tarkovskij would have remained there where the Formalists had arrived: at a cinema of signs that are held together through the abstracting work of montage. However, Tarkovskij could break this paradigm by designing a logic of dreams.

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ПОСТ-АДЕКВАЦИИ КАК ОДНА ИЗ ФОРМ ФИЛОСОФИИ СОВРЕМЕННОГО ИСКУССТВА
POST-ADAEQUATIONS AS A FORM OF MODERN ART PHILOSOPHY

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POST-Adaequations are the experience of modern aesthetic analysis, philosophic and poetic penetration into the essence of the 20th century's *artephenomena* and *artefacts*, many of which do not yield to the customary discourse-based art-critical or aesthetic analysis. They necessarily require other forms and ways of comprehension and study, congruent to the level of their *artebeing*. For the *stromata* of this century's artephenomena and artefacts are an intricate mixture of many diverse and often mutually exclusive phenomena pertinent to various levels of the recipient's psyche - from primitive physiological to superconscious and mystical. Adequate to many of them as well as to the artephenomena created on their basis and addressing them are, as a rule, not formal logical descriptions but verbal structures of higher levels: particularly, poetic (vers libre, blank verse, and even classical verse to some extent), associative series of different orders, flow of consciousness, conceptual constructs, etc. POST- adaequations and POST-philosophic aesthetics are an attempt to approach the modern level of philosophic analysis. This is a system of special image-based and utmostly concentrated structures created in the process of meditative immersion in artephenomena and concentrated contemplation of artefacts; a verbal fixation of the experience of aesthetic penetration which is integral, as any other aesthetic process (aesthetic perception in this case), in unity between its extraversion and introversion, a deep, almost religious faith and childlike game ingenuousness, almost academic seriousness and shattering irony, intellectualist tendency toward essence and bucolic naivete and primitive, enthusiasm for absolute truth and sceptical nihilism, strict logic of an analytic mind and strong emotion, paradoxical and absurd in principle.

POST-adaequations are an aesthetics of the aesthetically-non-aesthetic, a new science-non-science, art-non-art, a poetic aesthetics of the poetically-non-poetic. Here everything is lost and acquired. POST-adaequations are POST-aesthetics!

XX век - знаменательный и трагический век в истории Культуры. Это - ее последний век. Культуры с большой буквы в ее средиземноморско-европейском варианте - Культуры как *одухотворенной* цивилизации. Культуры - носительницы Духа. Это - век встречи и противостояния Культуры и ПОСТ-культуры (ПОСТ-), идущей ей на смену, - супертехнизированной, компьютеризированной цивилизации, изгнавшей Дух и оставленной Духом.

XX век - это последний век *Искусства одухотворенного* и первый век бездуховных *арте-фактов* - плодов атомно-компьютерной цивилизации, обоготворившей ВЕЩЬ и материю, ТЕЛО и телесность и отринувшей Духовное, нравственное, эстетическое, да и собственно человеческое в его традиционном гуманистическом смысле. Художественно-вне-художественная культура (= анти-Культура) нашего столетия - это конгломерат, причудливая смесь, мозаика из все еще ярких кубиков смальты Культуры и бесчисленных поделок и отбросов новейшей цивилизации; поделок, однако, не лишенных значения и своеобразных смыслов, во многом, правда, непонятных носителям Культуры; тем, кто еще - в Культуре.

Ибо ПОСТ — это приципиально ИНОЕ ! Это не просто *после* во временном или каузальном смыслах. ПОСТ — это внесмысловое завершение, алогичный конец логического развития; это - плод, впитавший все, но являющий собою нечто, отрицающее все, его питавшее. ПОСТ — это отрицание и утверждение одновременно. Отрицание Духа и Культуры; утверждение чего-то ИНОГО, неведомого, почти недоступного представителям традиционной Культуры. Может быть, начало триумфа глобальной бездуховности или, напротив, ПРЕД-чувствие каких-то принципиально ИНЫХ форм космической духовности?

Художественно-вне-художественная культура-анти-культура нашего столетия - это "строматы" (греч. - лоскутное одеяло) из множества *аван-гардных ликов Культуры - арте-феноменов*, завершающих развитие мно-говековой истории европейско-средиземноморской культуры, начала которой теряются в исторических глубинах Шумера, Вавилона, Древнего Египта, и из бесчисленных уже, хотя и часто эфемерных, неустойчивых, мгновенно возникающих и исчезающих *арте-фактов - иероглифов ПОСТ-культуры.*

Арте-феномены нашего времени, особенно такие столпы авангардного искусства как Кандинский, Пикассо, Шагал, Клее, Миро, Матисс, Малевич, Мур, Дали - последние носители Духа и, отчасти, предтечи (в этом один из парадоксов нашего века!) новой эпохи бездуховной ПОСТ-культуры , пророки *Апокалипсиса Культуры.*

Арте-факты - принципиально отринувшие Дух и все духовное произведения и поделки ПОСТ-культуры (хотя объективно далеко не всегда лишенные духовности).

XX век - интереснейшее энергетически-смысловое поле для культуро-лога, философа, эстетика. Но это - особое поле и оно предполагает от-нюдь не только и не столько традиционные формы исследования, но - нечто принципиально иное. Это хорошо ощутили многие крупные философы (не говоря уже о художниках, писателях, поэтах) нашего столетия, отказываясь от строгого формально-логического мышления и все активнее включая в свои философские произведения опыт и формы художественного мышления,

эстетического сознания. В качестве наиболее ярких примеров можно указать на Хайдеггера, Дерриду и их многочисленных учеников и последователей. Разум, привыкший к строгой и одномерной логике аристотелевско-гегелевского толка, безнадежно запутывается во многих их опусах и пассажах. Однако дух, живущий в свободных мирах искусства и многомерного эстетического сознания, чувствует себя в текстах этих философов как рыба в воде, питаясь не столько их буквой, сколько самой невербализуемой плотью, явленной тем не менее в словесных текстах. Думается, что традиционная одномерная формально-логическая философия изжила себя в нашем столетии практически полностью, ибо сущностные основы бытия, как ныне видится уже многим, не поддаются ее инструментарию. И названные выше, как и многие другие, философы ищут сегодня ИНЫЕ пути проникновения в анализируемые феномены, в частности, активно используя наработанный веками опыт художественного неформализуемого выражения. Философия все теснее смыкается с искусством, осознав наконец-то глубину его отнюдь и далеко не только "чувственного" (как казалось классикам немецкой эстетики Нового времени) опыта.

Искусство, однако, или точнее то, во что оно ныне превращается, кажется, напротив, стремится оставить свою традиционную миссию неформализованного ***выражения*** Духа и уходит в сферы, пока мало поддающиеся более-менее адекватному пониманию. Оно требует ныне, пожалуй, в еще большей мере, чем собстенно *бытие*, нетрадиционных форм и способов проникновения в его глубины (там, естественно, где они есть, ибо сегодня, как никогда прежде в истории культуры, создается бесчисленное множество внекультурной и внехудожественной во всех смыслах шелухи, которая не имеет не только никакой глубины, но и вообще ничего, на что стоило бы обратить внимание или чему стоило бы посвятить хотя бы одно слово).

ПОСТ-адеквации - один из возможных путей такого *иного* проникновения, *иного* исследования. Это опыт современного эстетического анализа, философско-поэтического проникновения в суть арте-феноменов и арте-фактов XX века, многие из которых практически не поддаются обычному дискурсивному искусствоведческому или эстетическому анализу. Они необходимо требуют особых форм и способов исследования-постижения, конгруэнтных уровню их арте-бытия. Ибо *строматы* арте-феноменов и арте-фактов нашего столетия - это причудливая смесь множества разнообразных, часто взаимоисключающих явлений, обращенных к самым разным уровням психики реципиента - от примитивно физиологических до сверхсознательных и мистических. Адекватными многим из них, как и созданным на их основе и обращенным к ним арте-феноменам оказываются, как правило, не формально-логические описания, но вербальные структуры более высоких уровней - в частности, поэтические (верлибр, белый стих, отчасти даже

классический стих), ассоциативные ряды различных порядков, поток сознания, концептуальные построения и т.п.

ПОСТ-адеквации, ПОСТ-философская эстетика - это попытка выхода на современный уровень эстетического анализа; это система особых образных предельно концентрированных структур, возникших в процессе медитативного погружения в арте-феномены и сосредоточенного созерцания арте-фактов; словесная фиксация опыта эстетического проникновения, коорое, как и всякий эстетический процесс, *целостно* в единстве своей экстравертности и интравертности; глубокой почти религиозной веры и детской игровой непосредственности; почти научной серьезности и всерасшатывающей иронии; интеллектуалистской устремленности к сути и буколической наивности и примитива; пафоса абсолютной истинности и скептического отрицания всего; строгой логики аналитического ума и принципиальной парадоксии и абсурдности сильного чувства.

ПОСТ-адеквации -
это современная философия современного искусства,
это эстетика эстетически-анти-эстетического,
это новая наука-не-наука, искусство-не-искусство,
поэтическая эстетика поэтически-анти-поэтического.
Здесь все утрачивается и все обретается.
ПОСТ-адеквации - это ПОСТ-эстетика!
Если ПОСТ-культура - это ПРЕД-культура будущего,
которая будет уже не Культурой,
но чем-то совершенно ИНЫМ,
то ПОСТ-адеквации - ПРЕД-эстетика,
нечто иное, чем эстетика (но близкое ей по функциям),
этой ПОСТ-культуры будущего.
И возможна она только на основе
ростков этой ПРЕД- в современном ПОСТ-.
Сегодня ПОСТ-адеквации это
больше - поэтические вопросы, чем ответы;
больше - проблемы, чем их решения;
больше - гипотезы, интуитивные прозрения,
чем концепции; но
без первого не бывает и второго,
которое, возможно, не так уже и необходимо....

ИНОЙ объект требует и ИНОЙ дескрипции. Еще древние греки знали: *подобное познается подобным*. Отсюда - *ПОСТ-адеквации*.

Адеквации - это почти понятно - попытка отыскания адекватных форм вербального выражения переживаний, проникновений, понимания современных арте-феноменов и арте-фактов.

ПОСТ — не столько понятно, сколько сегодня привычно - это вроде бы из того же ряда, что и *пост*-индустриальное общество, *пост*-неклассическая наука, *пост*модернизм и т.п. В моем понимании - это от *ПОСТ-культуры*, осознаваемой как плод научно-технического

прогресса нашего столетия; как скачок в сознании и материи куда-то; как стремительный процесс становления чего-то ИНОГО: нового неведомого *менталитета*, иной мыслительной *пластики*, иной *структурности*, иных *форм выражеия* ; иной *пространственности* и иной образующей ее *телесности*.

ПОСТ-культура сменяет Культуру и несет с собой и в себе все ПОСТ-. В том числе и свою ПОСТ-методологию *целостного* философско-поэти-чески-медитативного проникновения в феномены ПОСТ-культуры и их вербально-визуальной репрезентации в форме своеобразных *симулакров* на плоскости бумажного листа с помощью буквенных знаков.

Уже сейчас очевидно: ПОСТ-объекты, или арте-факты, в основе своей *иррациональны*, даже тогда, когда они создаются с помощью вроде бы строго продуманных, логически выверенных, математически просчитанных рациональных концепций, как в концептуализме, например. Ratio выступает здесь медиумом иррационального, дискурс - аналогом абсурдного. В этом - парадокс и закон нового менталитета - ПОСТ- !

Отсюда результативный метод проникновения в ПОСТ-объекты - внесознательное переживание, глубинное погружение, медитация, contemplatio. А для ученого - попытка последующей вербальной фиксации обретенного опыта, практически не поддающегося вообще какой-либо формализации. Я называю результат этой вербализации *ПОСТ-адеквациями*, или *неадекватными адеквациями* того, что по природе своей не может иметь адеквации.

Что есть сие ? Философия ? - да и нет. Эстетика ? - да и нет. Искус-ствознание ? - да и нет. Поэзия ? - да и нет. Ирония ? - да и нет. Эк-фрасис ? - да и нет. Импрессионы ? - да и нет. Ассоциации ? - да и нет. Игра эстетствующего сознания? - да и нет. Это - одновременно все из перечисленного и неперечисленного еще и НИЧТО из этого. Во всяком случае, это более серьезно, чем может показаться неискушенному в художественно-эстетическом опыте сознанию.

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Конкретные примеры ПОСТ-адеквaций.

из: ПАУЛЬ КЛЕЕ (1991)

1. Ночные цветы раскрывают неслышно
бутоны на зов серебристой луны
и звон мелодичный их венчиков хрупких
тревожит мои беспокойные сны.

В них птиц золотистых струится мерцанье
и профиля нежного светлая прядь
тревожит пространство иных измерений
как бриз взбудораживший водную гладь.

И видятся всюду не жизни биенье,
не плотная грубая ткань бытия,
а легкие вспышки ушедших мгновений,
да тающий в синем туман забытья.

2. В садах космических блуждает
иероглиф человека;
он в поисках себя покинул этот мир;
и в хаосе идей
и слаженных созвучий
уже едва слышна его виолончель.

3. Глаз художника - луч, устремленный в глубины всего,
что встает на его каменистом пути;
и сквозь толстые непроницаемые покровы вещей
он стремится узреть их смысл и суть, понять,
что в хрупком горле птицы - не щебет,
а хорал вселенской жизни;
что в маленьком цветке, невзрачно голубеющем
средь трав, - знак бесконечных хороводов звезд,
ликующих во славу
Духу, призвавшему их в бытие;
что в странных на песке оставшихся
следах от птиц иль крупных насекомых
записан новый
завет космического бытия и нам необходимо
его прочесть для сохраненья жизни
на вверенной нам крошечной Земле.

4. Линия бровей протянулась сквозь время,
на ней как на веревке бельевой
пришпилены глаза, носы и ртов глухие очертанья
и темная слеза, застывшая давно
на правильном овале полуистершейся щеки...
То маски.
Магические образы того, что токи
и поля, и ритмы пульса жизни
таинственных мистерий древних лет
несет в наш век, забывший
о своих истоков и началах.
Черты лица уходят в толщу лет,
их сглаживает мощный пласт
событий, и действий, и смертей,
дающих жизни импульс,
но проступает
в граните бытия борозд негленных сеть
до времени замысленного лика
и сквозь неровный свет свечей
и дым голубоватый фимиама
мерцает в полумгле
на красочных личиных,
всплывающих то здесь то там из мрака
нам застящего всякий свет вещизма...

5. KLEE - это символ
мистических вибраций бытия;
магическая формула анимации
древних архетипов;
иероглиф иных смыслов
феноменального мира.

6. Вот знак живой струится сквозь пространства
в зеленую метель
как черный жирный росчерк
десницы Демиурга
в забытьи небрежно пробежавшей
по скрижали космического бытия.
И в мире нашем
пристанище себе находит вдруг
среди рисунков детских
и садов и домиков
и странных птиц трехногих
но бескрылых
живущих средь листвы
шумящих партитур и хрупких дворцов
возникших из мечтаний и снов и грез поэта
поющего о таинстве любви.

7. тонкая лестница к глазу Луны
хрупкий на ней
силуэт человечка на спичечных ножках
из прутиков сложенный детской рукой
в песочнице старого парка
в утренний час золотистого осени сна
и оставленный там
а в ночи вдруг ощутивший
прилив неземных притяжений
и устремившийся вверх
на призыв еле слышных мелодий
властного лунного света

8. есть в древней книге
тайная страница на которой
пропущена одна невидимая нить
строки со знаками
неведомыми миру и средь них -
один ушедший в пустоту
таинственных пространств
семантики межбуквенных движений
и напряжений смысловых полей
ПРОЧТИ ЕГО!
и книга бытия
сама войдет в тебя
во всех своих значеньях
и тайных смыслах древнего сознанья.

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СЛОВО В РУССКОЙ ПОЭЗИИ: ПАРАДИГМЫ И ДИСКУРСЫ
WORD IN RUSSIAN POETRY: PARADIGMS AND DISCOURSES

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Поэзия — искусство гармонического слова, и в своем докладе я хочу показать, как русские поэты разных эпох воссоздавали образ самого слова, как он менялся, разделяясь на "слова" в бахтинском понимании (именуемые также "дискурсами"), — в зависимости от религиозного, художественного или сообщительного их использования. Я хочу также проследить, в какие парадигмы складываются образы деятельного и живого слова в отличие от слова мертвого и пустого.

Эти связи и разделения в такой формулировке впервые высказал Гумилев в стихотворении "Слово — это Бог") и ставит проблему поэтического творчества в онтологических перспективах. Сопоставление человеческой деятельности с творением мира Богом имеет обоснование в русской религиозной философии ("Бог творит творцов") в работах Н. Лосского, Н.Бердяева, о. С. Булгакова и др. Следуя своему предшественнику В.Соловьеву, они разработали учение о Божественной Софии, которая является откровением Слова-Логоса как второй ипостаси триединого Божества. Эти идеи, вместе с оригинальной мыслью Н.Федорова о назначении искусства служить моделью в общем деле воскрешении мертвых, легли в основу литературной практики и идеологии символизма. Более подробно я остановлюсь на некоторых положениях статьи В.Иванова "Границы искусства", который в тех же перспективах проанализировал моменты зарождения и воплощения художественного произведения, изобразил этот процесс схематически и заглянул за пределы человеческого творчества, — туда, где происходит сотрудничество человека с Богом-Творцом. В эту схему я вношу две небольших поправки, учитывающих результат творчества, т.е. воздействие его на жизнь.

"Божественный глагол" и "Глагол времен" также является образами религиозного слова-дискурса, побуждающего к творчеству (у Пушкина) или всеразрушающего (у Державина), но деятельного в обоих образцах. Сравнение двух "Памятников" того и другого поэта

позволяет увидеть образы деятельного художественного слова в представлении каждого и их отношение к слову пустому, бездеятельному. По мысли Ахматовой эти два перевода из Горация должны сопоставляться, помимо оригинала, с "Песнью древнеегипетских писцов", которую она перевела и в которой выразилось изначальное отношение к тому, что "тверже пирамид", т.е. к письменному слову, имеющему священно-магическое действие. Поиски такого слова отмечают творчество многих русских поэтов — от Лермонтова ("Из пламя и света рожденное слово") до Гиппиус ("... одно слово, в котором вся суть") и даже до футуристов, с их "словом, как таковым" — тоже деятельным, но свободным от любых подчинений. Ахматова в стихах о "царственном слове" возвращает поэзию к ее исходным мотивам, к долговечности "Памятника", а Г.Иванов объединяет религиозное и художественное слово в хрупкое "торжество", после которого "Рассыпаются слова, и не значат ничего". В советское время "Божественный глагол" превращается в приказ и лозунг, а художественное слово — в подчиненную им пропаганду. Однако, даже такой "агитатор", как Маяковский, знает силу иных слов. Когда "срываются гроба", это может происходить из-за массовых расстрелов, но, может быть, также из-за того, что в гробах начинается посмертное шевеление, предшествующее воскресению.

Образ слова воскресшего и воскресающего является главной внутренней силой романа Пастернака "Доктор Живаго". Фамилия героя, его профессия (поэт и врач), начало и конец романа, его композиция, соотношение между прозаическим и поэтическим словом — все говорит в пользу этого утверждения. Живаго умирает в прозаическом эпилоге, но после этого воскресает в заключительной стихотворной главе книги. В важнейших строках этой главы поэт объединяет "образ мира, в слове явленный, и творчество, и чудотворство", формулируя таким образом вековую традицию русской поэзии, о которой идет речь в моем докладе.

ПРОСВЕТ (комментарий)
GLEAM (commentary)

Анатолий Барзах (С.-Петербург, Россия)
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Some principles of the poetry analysis are considered. The contradiction between traditional scientific and existential approaches roots in a difference between their objects: text and sign for "science" and experience for "existential approach". But poetical thing is an event rather than pure collection of signs. It exists only as performed, experienced one. Its analysis is possible only when this thing is created in the analysis itself as something which is not only described but demonstrated too. So, a poetical utterance is a performative utterance and adequate analysis should be also performative. We attempt to show the possibility of such an analysis beyond the framework of a "poetical criticism" where one tries to create the second poetical thing, similar in experience to the initial one. We don't conceal a logical, semiotic stage which elucidates the incompleteness and curtailment of the "first impression" and at the same time tries to retain its bewildered misunderstanding. Thus, the scientific and existential approaches reveal themselves as two stage of the general process of emergence of the poetical thing. But they can't be completely united, there is the gap, the chink, the gleam between them. This specific structure of "double impression", uncomplete reconciliation of two different representation of the unique thing proves to be fundamental and universal for the aesthetic experience, for the poetical thing and is analysed in detail.

1. Речь пойдет о некоторых принципах анализа литературного произведения. Вовсе не универсальных - таких претензий у меня, естественно, нет: я просто хочу попробовать разобраться в том, что я пытаюсь делать. В каком-то смысле это заранее обреченное на неудачу занятие: я не могу, да и не хочу писать иначе, чем я пишу, не могу стать другим, чтобы иметь возможность со стороны посмотреть на это. Этот "анализ" неизбежно соскользнет, неудержимо, на глазах соскальзывает в свой собственный объект, сливается с ним, не раскрывая его, не рассказывая о нем, но показывая, исполняя.

1.1. И все же попытка эта не бессмысленна. Уже само усилие разорвать круг самоповторений, само осознание этого круга позволяет хотя бы на миг - не вырваться, нет - но различить некий проблеск на стыке чуть-чуть не притертых полукружий: просвет. Надстраиваясь над непосредственностью исходных "аналитических" порывов, вновь попадать в их плен, до конца все же с ними не совпадая.

1.2. Наконец, данный текст правомерен хотя бы потому, что я не собираюсь изменять самому "жанру" - а подобные попытки методологической рефлексии от него в принципе неотделимы: он всегда неумолимо впадает в размышление о себе самом, не может не быть о себе самом - для того, чтобы вообще быть о чем-то, быть чем-то.

2. Начиная разговор о литературном произведении, мы оказываемся перед традиционной дилеммой "научность" - "экзистенциальность". Первое впечатление, что это действительно непреодолимая альтернатива. "Экзистенциально" Тынянов пишет роман, "научно" - статью. А нередко прекрасные ученые-филологи поэзию как поэзию вообще не чувствуют и уж заведомо оставляют соответствующие переживания за скобками, даже если они и есть - что, естественно, не мешает их профессиональным занятиям. С другой стороны, попытки "экзистенциального" подхода к литературе оборачиваются, как правило, восторженным импрессионизмом, произвольными медитациями, "идейным" анализом. Против такого подхода и боролись формалисты, точнее, против его экспансии в науку и претензии на окончательную, главную истину. Действительно, каждому - свое: у этих противоположных подходов разные задачи и даже, на первый взгляд, разные объекты.

2.1. Основные объекты научного анализа - текст и знак. При этом текст понимается как соединение знаков, трансформирующее, в свою очередь, собственные компоненты; он и сам может трактоваться как некий гипер-знак (так, например, поступает В.Н.Топоров, рассматривая Петербургский текст русской культуры, который, формально, есть совокупность даже не знаков, но отдельных текстов). И такой подход не нуждается в обосновании: знаковая природа слова, языка - очевидна. Однако, сама констатация знакового отношения уже свидетельствует о несамодостаточности того, что в это отношение включается. Знак есть знак чего-то; чего-то иного, чем он сам. Таким образом, основная задача подобного анализа - дешифровка, перевод, конструкция (с любой, как положительной, так и отрицательной приставкой). И в пространстве смыслов, куда транспонируется произведение, оно может становиться значительнее автора, а критик возвышен там над художником, лучше него понимая его создание (причем это может быть как Добролюбов по отношению к Островскому, так и Леви-Стросс по отношению к Бодлеру).

2.2. Подходы, претендующие на экзистенциальность, стремятся постичь некую истину искусства, рационально до конца не препарируе-мую, или же обсудить нечто насущное, соотносимое с рассматриваемым текстом - достаточно радикально расходясь в представлениях о том, что же это такое. В любом случае в их основе лежит стремление удержать, отразить переживание, связанное с обсуждаемым произведением - будет ли это нравственное, религиозное, интеллектуальное, чисто эстетическое переживание, но именно и прежде всего переживание.

2.2.1. Я не хочу углубляться здесь в анализ понятия "переживание", а буду апеллировать к более или менее устоявшимся интуициям. Что не избавляет, конечно, от необходимости максимально полной феноменологической экспликации этого "понятия". Большое влияние на меня оказала концепция переживания, разрабатываемая В.Б.Меласом, где такая экспликация фактически впервые произведена. Однако, будучи с самого начала

противопоставлено чисто логическому анализу, переживание, вообще говоря, и не может быть им адекватно схвачено. Оно должно быть каким-то образом внедрено в сам текст, стремящийся его понять, должно в нем воспроизводиться, его структура должна быть не только описана, но и показана. Повидимому, определение переживания может стать лишь результатом, но не предпосылкой: переживание не должно быть рассматриваемо как неподвижно данный объект - тогда мы вновь вернулись бы к чисто научному подходу.

2.2.2. Итак, экзистенциальное содержание - это не набор высокопарных сентенций о "мировых проблемах", не особые "экзистенциальные темы", которые выделяла как ядро и определение лирики Л.Я.Гинзбург. Экзистенциальное содержание литературного произведения - это особое переживание, состояние просветления, потрясения, обретение "слезного дара". Казалось бы, таким восприятие бывает лишь при первом знакомстве с произведением. Но истинно поэтическое переживание - каждый раз новое, каждый раз "опять впервые". Только этот остаток "первого впечатления" в нем и имеет экзистенциальный смысл. Сохранить переживание поэзии - значит сохранить "первое впечатление", "дрожь новизны".

2.2.3. Переживание ничего не "означает", ни на что вне себя не указует, хотя с необходимостью содержит в себе смысловые (знаковые) элементы. Более того, оно не направлено на предмет искусства, но в каком-то смысле в нем самом содержится, открывается нами в нем, а не только им в нас самих: открывается отдачей себя. Иначе говоря, объектом анализа, эстетическим объектом вообще становится не некий предмет, существующий где-то, независимо от меня, и не мое представление, не образ, возникающий исключительно в моем сознании, но событие, причем событие, происходящее со мной, здесь и сейчас.

3. Событие поэзии есть переживание, поэзия о-существляется лишь будучи исполненной, лишь как исполняемая: переживаемая (и даже просто: произносимая вслух). Поэзия есть лишь в акте ее исполнения, она и есть этот акт: "Поэтическая материя существует только в исполнительском порыве" (О.Мандельштам).

3.1. В лингвистических терминах поэтическое высказывание, таким образом, есть высказывание перформативное, не описывающее некое "положение дел", безразличное к самому высказыванию, с высказыванием не связанное, но создающее его актом своего произнесения. Поэтический знак означает, в конечном счете, лишь сам себя.

3.1.1. Перформативный, событийный характер поэтического высказывания отчетливо проявляется (предъявляется) в отмеченной целым рядом исследователей особой роли дейктических средств языка в поэзии, то есть тех языковых средств, в состав значения которых входит идентификация объекта через его отношение к самому речевому акту и его участникам. В число этих средств включаются личные местоимения первого и второго лица, глагольные формы настоящего времени, указательные местоимения и

др. Замечательным примером поэтического дейксиса, призваным погрузить стих в описываемую им ситуацию, отождествить его с ней являются слова "так", "такой", "столько" и т.п. в изобилии представленные в стихах И.Анненского.

3.2. Но этим отнюдь не утверждается, что поэзия вообще ничего внетекстового не описывает: это была бы заумь, которая в чистом виде вызывает - по крайней мере у меня - весьма ограниченный интерес. Например, для стихотворения того же Анненского "Мучительный сонет" имеется отчетливая, находящаяся вполне вне стиха ситуация, описываемая, а не предъявляемая им: "Едва пчелиное гуденье замолчало, / Уж ноющий комар приблизился, звеня..." Тут имеется в виду совершенно реальный, даже слышимый комар. Но, во-первых, важно не просто присутствие, наличие этого кровососущего насекомого, но овеществленное в нем переживание назойливой экспансии внешнего мира, мучительного напряжения потерянности, выматывающего дрожания на грани - центральных "мотивов" поэзии Анненского. Далее, важно, что здесь имеется не отвлеченная констатация, но именно овеществление, проекция этих переживаний, впрямую не именуемых, но реконструируемых в контексте всего творчества этого поэта. То есть в состав данного "объекта" входят не только сами указанные переживания, но и тот факт, что они материализованы, и то, что сам этот факт есть проявление фундаментальной "вещности" мира Анненского, и то, что они свернуты, редуцированы, не явлены непосредственно, но узнаются лишь после анализа всего творчества Анненского, как результат его сжатия, сокращения. Наконец, "комар" нужен как слово, обыденность, просторечность которого (особенно в сочетании с эпитетом "ноющий") контрастирует с ожиданием, диктуемым заглавием: "мучительный" звучит почти пародийно в связи с комаром, а сонет - это классическая форма, предуведомление о которой в заглавии заранее настраивает на несколько чопорный лад. (Притом, что ожидание это в какой-то мере оправдывается торжественным ритмом цитируемых строк и выспренней риторичностью строк последующих: "Каких обманов ты, о сердце, не прощало..."). Ситуативная фиксированность является важнейшей характеристикой этого "поэтического предмета" - на фоне совсем иного статуса слов и предметов, встречающихся далее; она значима сама по себе, значима в первую очередь для переживания специфической неровности, неоднородности стиховой ткани, столь существенной для поэзии Анненского - то есть значимо само наличие ситуативной фиксированности не в меньшей степени, чем развертывание самой этой ситуации, ее представление, уточнение и т.п. Таким образом, первое впечатление картинной описательности начальных строк "Мучительного сонета" по меньшей мере неполно, хотя и необходимо, и неустранимо. Связь с внестиховой ситуацией приобретает сугубо внутренние функции, то есть она сама становится отчасти имманентна стиху.

3.2.1. В приведенном выше эскизе иллюстрируется один из главных методологических принципов, коренящийся в событийной природе поэтического текста: стремление рассматривать поэтические

"вещи", "явления" сами по себе, а не как про-явления чего-то иного, указание на что-то иное, знаки. Даже когда такое указание есть, на первый план выходит сам факт наличия стрелки, во вне направленной - а он уже равен самому себе. Разгадка может оказаться менее важна, нежели само переживание таинственности, необъяснимости, более того, эта необъяснимость по сути дела никаким объяснением до конца исчерпана быть не может, всегда останется некий сдвиг, перебой: как в "Поэме без героя" А.Ахматовой или "Мастере и Маргарите" М.Булгакова - хотя с углублением знания сама необъяснимость приобретает качественно иной характер.

3.3. В вышеприведенных рассуждениях о первых строках "Мучительного сонета" чувствуется явный ореол невольно иронической нелепости: когда говорится о "ситуативной фиксированности" комара, о тонких и сильных переживаниях, "материализованных" в нем. Анализ и "объект", казалось бы, непоправимо расщеплены. Но это не просто случайная стилистическая глухота; дело в том, что подобная вычурность, несоблюдение меры, на грани - и даже за гранью - безвкусицы весьма характерны для самого Анненского, неотторжимы от целостного переживания его поэзии - по ту сторону оценок и пристрастий. Он - "такой". Таким образом, сами эти рассуждения приобретают перформативный оттенок, "разыгрывая" данную особенность поэтики Анненского.

3.3.1. И все же это прежде всего стилистическая глухота. Мы должны услышать, выявить эти вычурность, выспренность, неровность как присущие Анненскому черты, чтобы эта на первый взгляд - в первом впечатлении - случайная небрежность предстала "исполнением" того, о чем она повествует - при сохранении ею, неисчерпываемости логическим анализом самой ее неадекватности: а иначе сам анализ лишался бы "объекта": анализ может быть правилен лишь будучи правилен не до конца.

4. Возможно ли адекватно отразить уникальное событие "поэтического предмета", удержать переживание? А избавляясь от него, мы избавляемся от самой поэзии, оставляя голый текст.

Необходимо сотворчество: переживание - это всегда творческий акт, создающий нечто доселе не существовавшее. Разговор о поэзии может быть адекватен своему предмету лишь в той или иной форме обладая им - что в данном случае означает: создавая его в себе самом.

4.1. Напрашивающийся для этого путь - создание текстов о "предмете" с установкой на художественность, "поэтическое литературоведение" - попытка моделирования рассматриваемого "объекта" воспроизведением на другом материале самого поэтического переживания. Именно так "анализировал" литературу И.Анненский: он, кстати, и именовал свои этюды не "анализами", а "отражениями", подчеркивая тем самым их жанровую соразмерность образцам.

4.2. Этот метод чреват - как и всякий экзистенциальный подход - произвольностью, он рискован и претенциозен, да и не больше ли говорят "Книги отражений" об Анненском, чем о

Достоевском, Тургеневе, Чехове? Логическая, аналитическая работа здесь отодвинута в тень, вынесена за скобку.

4.2.1. Конечно, переживание поэзии возможно и вне рефлексии - именно таково оно в первом впечатлении, еще до вникания, артикуляции. Но наивность первого впечатления иллюзорна: в снятом, редуцированном виде и в нем участвуют наши знания, наше присутствие, наша ориентация в иерархии контекстов. Мнимая непосредственность переживания - не что иное как свернутость, редуцированность неявно формирующих его предпосылок. Кроме того, переживанию всегда свойственна неполнота, то есть игнорирование каких-то, весьма порою важных аспектов своей "темы". Эти сокращенность и неполнота важны прежде всего сами по себе; само их наличие, их глубина, степень и т.д. ощутимо меняют содержание переживания (ср. знаменитые многоточия в стихотворении Пушкина "Ненастный день потух"). Но, ставя перед собой задачу создания "поэтического предмета" - а, стало быть, и высвечивания, удерживания его неполноты и сокращенности - мы должны иметь в максимально возможном объеме то, что подвергается редукции. Только тогда эти "пробелы" могут стать тем, чем они должны быть; только рефлексия создает ту наполненность пустоты, без которой она и была бы не более чем пустотой - в лучшем случае многозначительностью - но не просветом; "провалом", а не "промером". Но все обретенное в рефлексии должно быть вновь утрачено, оставив лишь тень, имя, "ощущение тяжести" - вот что - даже не видится, - но пред-видится в этом просвете: и чем больше утрат - и предшествовавших им обретений - тем больше шанс этот блик заметить: "...только размер потери и / делает смертного равным Богу".

Сокращенность и неполнота "поэтического предмета" претворяются в разговоре о поэзии в неизбежную неполноту и неадекватность формулировок, в неисчерпываемость предмета анализом, в неустранимый зазор между переживанием и рассказом по его поводу.

4.2.1.1. И потом, не надо жалеть вычеркиваемое: за гранью выносимого в свет текста должно остаться нечто, в самом тексте только предчувствуемое, придающее ему дополнительную энергию сокращенности, дрожь нереализованности - и статья об экзотических мотивах в творчестве поэта-акмеиста может быть втайне комментарием к собственному, никому не известному стихотворению - и это тоже войдет в ее ткань, преобразит ее.

4.3. Создавая свой собственный предмет, которого нигде нет как чего-то заранее данного, разговор о поэзии сам становится перформативен. Он и должен быть таким - как и сама поэзия - чтобы стать адекватным ей. Его перформативность, таким образом, тоже по-своему "перформативна".

4.4. "Поэтический предмет", таким образом, - это не "чистое" переживание, но и не знак - и не их синтез: скорее, просвет между ними.

5. Тем самым обнаруживается неправомерность исходной оппозиции: семиотический, семантический анализ должен

надстраиваться над первым впечатлением, не теряя его из виду, пытаясь его удержать и вновь возвращаясь в его неустранимое недоумение.

Конструируя поэтический предмет, мы проходим две стадии, обнаруживаемые и в структуре самого поэтического переживания. И даже в нынешнем сокращенном изложении мы уже не раз натыкались на ту же фундаментальную структуру "двойного впечатления" - начиная с оказавшегося неточным исходного представления о несовместимости экзистенциального и научного подходов и кончая мнимо точной описательностью первых строк "Мучительного сонета" и неожиданно уместной стилистической неадекватностью анализа этой описательности.

5.1. Но полной согласованности "семиотики" и переживания достичь не удается, они остаются чуть-чуть неподогнаны друг к другу, возникает перебой, надрыв, как это было и в других случаях воспроизведения той же структуры в этом тексте - возникает переживание "просвета", неповторяющего повторения, нетождественного дублирования, силуэта, просвечивающего сквозь неплотную завесу.

5.2. На принципиальное значение такого рода двойственности в литературе настойчиво указывали формалисты (ср. "остранение" Шкловского, деформирующий характер "конструктивного фактора" Тынянова). Об основополагающей роли "двойственности чувств" при восприятии искусства говорил Выготский. Сопоставление "просвета" с этими концепциями - отдельная задача. Есть ли здесь что-либо новое? или это просто очередное переименование? Будем надеятся, что это все то же "нетождественное дублирование" старых идей, то же "нетождественное дублирование", о котором оно само, и если и повторяющее их, то так, что в возникающей паузе, синкопе и можно угадать некий проблеск, ту самую "дрожь новизны".

Два взгляда, два впечатления, два подхода к одному и тому же не должны совпасть полностью: тогда щелочка захлопнулась бы и все опять погрузилось бы во тьму.

6. Попробуем для начала вникнуть в понятие - точнее, в переживание - просвета. Попытка рефлексии - заведомо безнадежная - и тем более неизбежная - возвращает нас все к той же парадигме сокращения и повторения: она столь же обречена на неудачу и столь же настоятельна, как и само мое намерение объясниться, которое и порождает данный текст.

Я буду говорить не о виртуозных набоковских тенях, отражениях, обманах, не о сокуровском расщеплении зрения и слуха, смысла и интонации, не о картинах Эльстира, дарующих новое зренье герою Пруста, не о научных терминах в стихах Кушнера, совмещающих контекстуальное размыкание с имманентизацией - но об увиденном, пережитом мною самим: о шуме волн, шелесте дождя, тени птицы - именно эти впечатления дали некогда толчок тому предчувствию понимания, которое я тогда же обозначил словом "просвет" - именно таковы были "первые впечатления" просвета. ... Ночь. Берег моря. Слышен перестук, странный, булькающий,

гомонящий шум - птичья речь: это невидимые во тьме волны накатываются на берег и отступают, загребая гальку... ... Лунная дорожка на море, но самой луны не видно, на небе облака; где-то над заливом она выглядывает в прореху - и вот, море светится, как будто изнутри, само по себе... ... Поздняя осень, темно, но фонари еще не зажгли; и слышен бестолковый тревожный шелест, поскребывание - это, я знаю, мелкий дождичек топчется на опавшей листве, слабый, неосязаемый: и оттого этот шелест как бы сам по себе, и непрозрачный воздух наполняется неотчетливым беспокойством и тревогой...

Что же особенного в этих переживаниях? Почему они вызывают такую реакцию: почти счастья, но смешанного с тревогой, нехваткой, беспокойством - и все же кажутся наполненными внутренним светом и какой-то непреложностью? Обратим внимание на ключевую роль непонимания в этих переживаниях: мы не сразу осознаем, что это именно дождь и именно листья, есть мгновение тайны, чуда, абсурда, разрешающегося "узнаванием": ах, вот оно что, это ведь дождь, всего лишь дождь. И этот шум, и эта лунная дорожка, и этот шелест осознаются - хотя и с ощутимой задержкой - как знаки своего рода: знаки камушков, перекатываемых прибоем, луны, дождя. При этом материал "означающего" здесь не остыл, его "внутреняя форма"не автоматизирована, он переживается не только функционально, как избранный, скомпонованный для чего-то, но и сам по себе.

Мы имеем достаточно богатую картину, целостность которой взрывается ее явной несамодостаточностью; возникает противоречие между "очевидной" автономностью данного контекста и его напряженной тягой вовне. Самое поразительное, что эта вовне направленная интенция так и остается недозаполненной, мы не можем получить исчерпывающего ответа на вопрос о существовании чего-то сверх непосредственой данности, "разгадка" не может нас полностью удовлетворить, успокаивающая сигнификация не может снять тревогу и беспокойство: мы присутствуем при рождении чего-то, не сводимого ни к данности, ни к знаку; отрицание самодостаточности контекста не сводится лишь к обнаружению сигнификационной функции: контекст разомкнут и "разгадка" не в силах его замкнуть вновь, он разомкнут - в ничто, вернее, в то, чему нет имени. Это и есть, в сущности, просвет: вот эта непритертость сигнификационной "крышки" к странной дыре в бытии.

Итак, мы имеем два конфронтирующих впечатления: первое, недоумевающее, сомневающееся, даже, возможно, ошибочное, и второе, утвердительное, озаряющее, уравновешивающее - при отчетливом временном зазоре между ними. В первом впечатлении я не могу понять "в чем же дело", я болезненно переживаю свою отторгнутость от смысла, внятно сознаю неполноту слепой данности, знаю, что есть что-то сверх и вне, напрягаюсь в усилии не просто понять, но вспомнить, узнать - потому что чувствую, что это "сверх", это "вне" - что-то очень обычное, известное (ведь столь обыденна вся ситуация в целом: ночь, берег моря...). Так силятся вспомнить забытые черты, забытое имя, забытое слово - то самое,

которое "среди кузнечиков". Иначе говоря, уже в рамках первого впечатления "означаемое", еще не представ как нечто определенное, как бы неявно присутствует,как бы обладает каким-то недифференцированным, невнятным, "ослабленным" предсуществованьем ("на кончике языка"): я физически ощущаю эту дышащую, колышащуюся массу, "шевелящийся хаос", который и предопределяет томление, напряжение, тревогу, то самое сгущение мига перелома, которое так хорошо знакомо нам по стихам Анненского: "И стали и скамья, и человек на ней / В недвижном сумраке тяжеле и страшней..." Именно на фоне этих переживаний разгадка и кажется слишком тривиальной, чтобы претендовать на полное закупоривание зияющей "дыры бытия". Загадочность, таинственность оказываются присущи ситуации совершенно обыденной: к простоте данности ничего не добавлено, не внесено самоэкзальтацией или поэтической рефлексией - она взрывается изнутри, тянется куда-то за грань, непонятность составляет ее неотъемлемую часть, встречает нас лицом к лицу, застает врасплох.

Но вот на смену первому приходит второе впечатление: все вдруг проясняется, удивление оказывается вроде бы беспочвенным, тайна - разгаданной, и, однако же, это не так. Сама эта разгадка ничем не предуготована, предшествовавший ей поиск ни на шаг к ней не приближал: "имя не приближается к нам постепенно. Мы ничего не видим - и вдруг возникает то самое имя, ничего общего не имеющее с именем, которое нам мерещилось" (Пруст). Как будто бы не все сказано, не все угадано - хотя на самом деле вполне очевидно, что все, без остатка (очевидно - логически, но не в переживании, конечно). Этот разрыв, скачок, немотивированность пришествия второго впечатления не позволяют поставить после него точку, как после некоего резюме; логика бессильна, непонятность не преодолена. В свою очередь для "второго впечатления", вводящего нас в ясное сигнификационное пространство, непонятной становится сама непонятность. Мы предстоим этой немотивированной загадочности без малейшей надежды на ее рационализацию.

Важно, что угаданный предмет ("означаемое") не дан нам непосредственно: луна не появляется на небе после того, как мы поняли, что это ее свет видим мы на потемневших волнах залива. Еще и в силу разного бытийного статуса "загадки" и "разгадки" последняя не может полностью исчерпать первую: мы вынуждены постоянно повторять, возобновлять найденное решение. Не следует забывать и о инерционности всякого переживания (в данном случае - переживания загадочности): оно продолжается и тогда, когда утрачен его "повод": "и в руке остается ощущение тяжести, / хотя кувшин наполовину расплескался, пока его несли домой".

Два последовательных переживания, два сменяющих друг друга впечатления не могут быть (в конечном итоге) представлены как два последовательных этапа постижения ситуации, не могут быть до конца синтезированы. Второе впечатление не может быть соединено с первым, вернее, в этом соединении всегда остается осадок неадекватности, неустранимый зазор, надрывающий самый принцип

сигнификации, поскольку именно процесс сигнификации и является ядром "второго впечатления".

Конструкция двух рассогласованных, до конца не совпадающих представлений одного и того же и в совершенно иных ситуациях порождает то же удивительное переживание узнавания-неузнавания, ощущение неполноты, недостаточности любого знака, невозможности исчерпывающего знания даже того, в чем только что был вполне уверен, неадекватности любого имени - переживание просвета. Особо следует подчеркнуть непреложную обязательность второго - логического, "семиотического" - "впечатления" для возникновения этого переживания; просвет возникает лишь после логоса, это после-, а не до-логическое, он возникает лишь как невозможность до конца залатать "дыру бытия", как переживание этой невозможности - но не как погружение в ее тьму. Без аналитичности "второго впечатления" - нет и просвета, а есть лишь предчувствие, беспредметная интенция, томление на грани. Да, просвет - это поражение, бесплодность попыток "правильного" именования - но его нет вне этого риска, усилия и - срыва. Когда дверь распахнута настежь - она распахнута в пустоту. Лишь после тщетных попыток захлопнуть ее мы начинаем - с тревогой и радостью - различать слабый свет между ее неплотно прилегающими друг к другу створками - тот самый свет, про который мы и ведем эту сбивчивую речь.

Но и без первого впечатления, без его загадочности, бесформенности, ошибочности - без этого непонимающего и не желающего понять первого впечатления переживание просвета невозможно, и потому так важно для меня восстановить, удержать его; потому я и начал разговор о просвете с тех "пейзажей" - первых впечатлений самого просвета.

Переживание просвета сверхсемиотично. Неустранимое расщепление "означаемого" и "означающего", незаполняемая до конца интенция поиска чего-то потустороннего, неизлечиваемое непонимание - все это превращает переживание просвета в переживание преодоления сигнификации вообще. Вернее, речь может идти лишь о некоем порыве, намеке: выйти буквально за рамки сигнификации - тем более, если речь идет о литературе - невозможно, то есть, конечно, возможно, но это путь в молчание, в пустоту, сэлинджеровское изгнание. Десигнификация просвета заранее обречена на поражение - уже своей неразрывной связью со строго сигнификационным "вторым впечатлением", означивание которого тоже, как мы убедились, в проигрыше. Поражение, обреченность, угроза тьмы и молчания столь же неотделимы от просвета, как и свет, и счастье: мы в опасной близости от пустоты, от "тумана, звона и зиянья". "Выпуклая радость узнаванья" сопрягается с тревогой и страхом. Что это за невыразимый остаток? что там, за гранью, где нет Знака, нет Слова - а, значит, по нашей, здешней логике - нет ничего? Дверь захлопнута, остался лишь просвет. Но так ли ярко сияние за этими дверьми, как говорит Симеон Новый Богослов, не встретит ли нас там "тьма и скрежет зубовный"? Десигнификация чревата ужасом, тем самым, который описывает Набоков в

одноименном рассказе, герой которого "увидел мир таким, каков он есть на самом деле", когда "связь с миром порвалась" и "остался только бессмысленный облик, - как получается бессмысленный звук, если повторять, долго вникая в него, одно и то же обыкновеннейшее слово" - а ведь это "повторительное остранение" является одним из самых простых и ярких механизмов создания просвета. Указывая путь ("некий свет" пушкинского странника) в "другое, другое, другое" десигнификация, просвет грозят ввергнуть в молчание, в безумие, мы вновь и вновь должны начинать это карабканье, это восхождение на грань - чтобы в очередной раз сорваться с нее.

7. Итак, подход к поэзии, который (с большим или меньшим успехом) я пытался, пытаюсь реализовать можно было бы назвать просветлением первого впечатления: удержать это недоумевающее, непонимающее переживание - что это за странные звуковые повторы в такой демонстративно "прозаической" прозе Набокова? что кроется за этими выспренне-фрагментарными "так" у Анненского? за цинично-отчаянным коверканьем классических цитат и безудержным многословием Бродского? - восстанавливая сколь возможно полно его семантические, структурные, контекстуальные связи - и возвращаясь вспять, чтобы оставить лишь их тени, лишь мандельштамовскую вложенную в руку записку с совершенно определенным, но погруженным во "внутреннюю тьму" текстом, вновь и вновь обнаруживая те "таинственные несовпадения, в которых скрыта красота" (Пруст) - сознавая неадекватность анализа переживанию, тем самым тайком "исполняя" то, "о чем невозможно рассказать".

НЕКЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ЭСТЕТИКА КАК САМОРЕФЛЕКСИЯ АВАНГАРДА И ПОСТМОДЕРНИЗМА В ИСКУССТВЕ
THE NON-CLASSICAL AESTHETIC AS THE SELF-REFLECTION OF THE AVANT-GARDE AND POSTMODERNISM IN ART

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Эстетика всегда была философией искусства, своеобразной онтологией чувственности, феноменологией выразительных форм. Как свидетельствует В. Татаркевич, ее традиционные понятия складывались из философского осмысления искусства, красоты, формы, творчества, мимезиса, эстетического переживания. Классическая фстетика основывалась на "аполлоновской" и "фаустовской" душе культуры.

Но понятие авангардистской "анти-культуры", постмодернистская игра в "конец культуры" называет пёреосмысление, переигрывание традиционных понятий и подходов. Неклассическая эстетика исходит из "леверкюновской" души культуры, перенимает парадигмы многих современных наук - от лингвистики и семиотики до психоанализа и синергетики. Она преодолевает ренессансно-просветительские, баумгартеновские идеалы.

Неклассическая эстетика воспроизводит и осмысливает такие принципы современного искусства, как полиперспективность, эксцентризм, эквилибризм, чудесность, ирония, трансгрессивность, шизоидная диалектика сакрального. Феномен эстетизации безобразного привносит в ее поле идеологемы злодеяния, страха, отвращения, маразмирования, некрофильности и т. п. Эти "негативные" категории постклассического эстетического сознания позволяют найти соответствующие номинации для художественных реалий, необъяснимых традиционными терминами старой "эстетосферы".

В современной эстетике исповедуется неклассический принцип "недвоичности" в том смысле, что на границе недвоичного существует какая-то тайна в области несозданного, неизвестного, потустороннего. Иначе говоря, неклассическая эстетика является стратегией разнообразного, пространством неопределенного в "путешествии вовне формы" (Р. Бабовал). Она становится своеобразной неомифологией, саморефлексией современного искусства как текстопорождения "хаосферы".

THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN BEING IN PHILOSOPHY AND ART OF THE 20th CENTURY

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The period of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century was the turning-point of history of European civilization and European culture. In this period the main principles which were the basis of the long historical development of European culture were called into question and revised. Firstly, changes took place in the understanding of human essence and connections between man and the world. The conception of man was revised most radically in two main spheres of culture simultaneously — philosophy and literature.

In the first place, the history of European literature should be analysed and models of human individuality which determined the characteristic features of various periods of European culture should be discovered. The analysis should be based on the obvious relationship which exists between the evolution of literature and that of man as such, between verbal creative work and human metaphysical characters.

The myth was the first form of the verbal creative work. It's principle characteristic is the absence of the "author", myth creating subject. The man in the myth is not detached from the rest being but is in close relations with all parts of reality. This inseparability of man from the world brings about near total negation of human freedom, because the man in the myth appears as a not independent connecting link between two poles of being: eternity, Absolute —and irrational chaos of time.

Man could realize his freedom only in the Middle Age literature, in the universum of the World born from Christianity. In that time it was only freedom from the being, freedom of negation of world of flesh and matter. But Medieval literature established man not as an individual, not as unique person but as a kind of universal "human essence", as a universal spirit opposing the terrible strange being.

The Renaissance brought much more significant changes in man's mentality. It was this epoch where man began to understand himself as a separate universe living under his own laws and quite independent of the "external" reality. The universe of person, however, which was discovered, created by the man of Renaissance seemed to him whole and invariable. Because of this all the diversity of personal manifestations was reduced to a limited set of the *characters*, i.e. schemes of human external behaviour.

The Age of Enlightenment brought an important change in the idea of human individuality. The latter progressively became understood as liable to changes, human ability to analyse his own internal world lying in the basis of the said process. It was precisely this internal analysis, reflexion that had

broken the integrity and simplicity of the character and made personal individuality changeable. Thus we have a new type of man, the reflecting one. It was *The Confession* by J.J. Rousseau that made the beginning of the new period of human individuality evolution, the novel by Lev Tolstoi having been the conclusion. Tolstoi's role in elaborating the model of reflecting man consists in his having proved existence of strict psychological laws, in conformity with which the man draws internal reasoning of his behaviour and all his life[1].

Common knowledge of the said "laws" has made personalities rather standard and unified. Instead of doing deeds in conformity with his own direct and unreflexed moral impulse coming from his irrational depths, the man fits available common substantiation methods for his deeds. As a result, the man remains having practically nothing really individual and his own in his personality; not only his every deed but also his thought and emotion turns out to be subjected to the set of patterns in common use.

The question arises what could be the way to find out the rest of human individuality in the soul? Reflexion has turned human interiors into a set of mechanical schemes; but the same reflexion can penetrate even deeper and find the "source of power" feeding the mechanism of psychological substantiation of deeds. Such is the area of metaphoric consciousness, area of the most innermost, unreflected and hardly conscious soul motions, never realized in determinate psychological ideas and deeds but lying at the basis of all the ideas and deeds. In 20th century literature, Marcel Proust was the first and the most consistent investigator in the field (among the others, J.Joyce, V.Woolf, W.Faulkner should be mentioned). They have opened the epoch of liberated word, funny realized freedom potential the word concealed. The epoch of really free man formation was thereby opened, the epoch of man with a completely new type of individuality.

Emancipation of the metaphor has blown up old structure of verbal creative work and led to destruction of the traditional disposition "man vs. world". Metaphor, disincarnating monosemanticity of our notions, creates new language, the meaning of which (as formulated by H.Ortega y Gasset) is not in depicting things but in presenting them as being realized. Instead of a thing`s image given as formal result of representing subject`s activity, in this new language constructed on the basis of metaphors the realization is given of an individual life action of "I". This is the break-through from the world of the "I" knowing itself as only universal subject into the world of real being, absolutely original in any manifestation[2].

The man`s individuality that has been discovered here is quite different from that discovered by Renaissance.

Traditional image of an individuality in European culture was the man as a subject, the man as an atom subjected to external necessity and concealing all the most genuine in the depths of his subjectivity.

The image of individuality lying at the basis of the 20th century literature is all different. This is especially well expressed in the French *nouveau roman*, where they radically refuse the notion of subjectivity, the opposition of the man as a subject and the world fully independent from him[3]. Associations and metaphors envelop each phenomenon or thing; this is no longer refraction and distortion of .the objective reality in the subject's consciousness but reality revealing of true sense of each phenomenon and its interrelationships with all other phenomena in the world. Individuality and originality of the world appearing in literary text is the individuality and originality of separate "dimension" (or separate "facet") of objective being as such.

The new "model" of man in the literature correlates with the new philosophical conception of man which had emerged in the beginning of the 20th century.

From Plato to Hegel in the history of European philosophy the conception of man based on the following principles was prevailing. First, it was presumed that man is a separate part of reality, independent of everything around one. Secondly, a rational cognition was regarded as the only form of relationship between man and a surrounding world. The founder of this philosophical conception of man was Plato but it had gotten the most radical and complete form in Leibniz's philosophy (in his conception of soul as a monade). A characteristic feature of the model of man was that time was not considered as fundamental property of human essence. Time was only an external form of displaying and revealing that content (full knowledge of the Universe) which was kept for ever in man's soul.

The formation of new conception of man in the end of the 19th century began from principle revising of significance of time for the definition of human essence. The founder of the new conception was A.Bergson. It was Bergson who for the first time had assumed that time (*durée*) is the main characteristic of human being, is the essence of man. It was very important that Bergson had formulated just one more principle which later become central in the development of the new conception of man. In the book *Matter and Memory* (1896) Bergson had proposed the unfamiliar theory of consciousness. In accordance with Bergson`s idea it is necessary to reject traditional interpretation of cognitive images as certain "duplicates"(copies) of real objects. The image presented in consciousness is the same real object, an act of formation of cognitive image in consciousness is not more then a formation of special connections into all systems of real phenomena; the connections distinguish one phenomenon from the rest and so give to it status of cognitive image. In this conception a strict opposition between the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the material, being inside consciousness and being outside it had been wrecked[4].

Apart from Bergson`s ideas the phenomenology of E.Husserl had great influence on the formation of the new philosophical conception of man.

The main principle of phenomenology was similar to the main principle of Bergson's conception, that was the unity of the consciousness and the world of objects which was presented to consçiousness.

It was the followers of Bergson and Husserl who drove the new conception to complete form in the beginning of the 20th century. Among them M.Heidegger and Russian philosopher Semjon Frank have to be mentioned as the creators of the new philosophy based on a new interpretation of human essence. The ideas of Heidegger and Frank are very similar, but it is interesting that Frank had formulated all principles of a new conception of man earlier than Heidegger — in his books *Object of Knowledge* (1915) and *Soul of Man* (1917).

Frank`s conception of consciousness is based on the notion of the absolute being which is understood as "pan-unity" (*vseedinstvo* — the term of V.Solov`ev`s philosophy). World being (absolute being) is a concrete unity of all possible properties and states and this unity realized through infinite system of connections embracing all elements of being. In this respect a consciousness of each man is a particular system of connections into the absolute being, it realizes "pan-unity" only in a particular, limited form.[5] The first definition of man in this sense is that a man is equal to being as such, that a man is "self-being", is representation of absolute being to itself. From this point of view traditional understanding of consciousness as contained in human body and separated from rest being is absolutely wrong. According to it each consciousness exists all over the world, it penetrates all elements of being and by this it gives unity and coherence to being[6].

Since being obtains the unity and becomes absolute being only through human being, ontological description of structure of the Absolute may be carried out only through description of phenomenal structure of human being. Thus Frank's conception was founded on the same principle which would be formulated later by Heidegger: true ontology is phenomenology of human being (idea of fundamental ontology). This principle was clearly realized by Frank in his books *Soul of Man* (1917), and *The Incomprehensible* (1939). Analysing phenomenological levels of human being Frank affirms that each of them corresponds to certain level of unity and coherentness of being as such. In the description of the phenomenological levels Frank uses notions which are very similar to notions used in Heidegger's analysis of human being ("misery", "anguish", "anxiety" and others).

Similarity between Frank's and Heidegger's philosophical conceptions is obvious, but there is one question solved by the philosophers in very different ways. This is the problem of ontological status of nothing. For Heidegger the irrational dialectics of Being and Nothing is the main point in description of human being[7]. The latter appears as the boundary between Being and Nothing, therefore the most important features of human being are endness ("being to death") and timeness. In contrast to this, Frank in his conception denies ontological reality of nothing[8]. As a consequence such phenomena as

death and evil become inexplicable and incomprehensible in Frank's philosophy. An identity of human being and absolute being leads to unwarranted optimism in understanding of future of man and mankind. In accordance with Frank's ideas (and in accordance with traditional utopianism of Russian philosophy) man must become equal to God and must overcome all imperfections of his being. Only in the latest works Frank revised this aspect of his conception and came to a more realistic and more pessimistic understanding of man and his future[9]. A valuable contribution to development of the new conception of man was made by Ivan Iljin. In his book "Hegel's Philosophy as a Doctrine about Concreteness of God and Man" (1918) Iljin carried out radical revaluation of significance of Hegel's philosophy (most important ideas of Iljin's work were repeated later in well-known lectures of A.Kojeve). Iljin affirmed that human being was the central element of ontological structure of reality, that main contradictions of reality were embodied in human essence and a human life. This affirmation led to a radical moral doctrine which was expressed by Iljin in the well-known book "About Resistance to Evil by Force" (1925). In accordance with Iljin's ethics each deed of each man has absolute significance for existence and development of reality and each man must take full responsibility for all events occurring in the world.

The new philosophical conception of man had great influence on development of European culture in the second half of 20th century. One of the most important examples of this is a creative work of Andrei Tarkovskij.

The principal theme of Tarkovskij's films is an immense responsibility of man for all world, for all being. Each man has absolute significance in the world and is a unique "dimension" of being. Already in his first film *Ivan's childhood* (1962) Tarkovskij eliminates a strict boundary between the objective and the subjective in a man. Boy Ivan is represented in two planes of his life: in the external reality of war and in the inner world of his memories and dreams. Both of them are equally important and to an equal extent are *real* aspects of his being.

In the film *Andrei Rublev* (1966) Tarkovskij expresses very clearly his view of interaction between an artist and reality. An artist ought to live and work in accordance with his subjective apprehension of reality, however his point of view has to be in natural conformity with inner laws of reality. An artist is a man which ought to overcome contradiction between the objective and the subjective;he is involved into being, submits to influence of being and at the same time he imposes his "subjective" values on being and so gives new senses to being.

This theme was continued in the film *Mirror* (1974). The main idea of the film is a mutual complementarity of man and world; a man is understood here as "custodian of being", as "shepherd of being". For characters of Tarkovskij's film to listen to the external world is the same as listening to themselves, to their individual and inimitable inner impulses. The nature is showed in the film

as animated being, and an intercourse between man and nature turns into infinite dialogue in which man reveals and perceives himself.

In films *Solaris* (1972) and *Stalker* (1979) Tarkovskij exposes all contradictions and paradoxes which are contained in the new world outlook and new understanding of human essence. The reality of *Solaris* and *Stalker* is the reality which is not "objective" any more, which demonstrates clearly its dependence on man and at the same time its threatening power over man. Tarkovskij's personages discover that the world, seemingly so stable and strong, is in fact fully dependent on themselves. The subjectivity is as if turned inside out: all man's innermost thoughts, emotions and impulses of his will turn out to be involved with the reality around, become the most important factor of changes in the world. This situation reveals true sense of the tragedy of man's existence: man, if taken as such, in his everyday conditions, cannot bear the responsibility of creating his own world by his own will.

In *Solaris* a very important personage is Hary, she is the embodiment (created by rational ocean of Solaris) of Kelvin Kris' memory about his beloved, who died many years ago. In this character Tarkovskij gives artistic expression of one aspect of the new conception of man — full dependence of human beings from other man and beings of the world. Hary is like the "self-appearance" of being, is the voice of being appealing to being itself (it is very near to the idea of Frank's and Heidegger's philosophies).

In *Solaris* Tarkovskij proves that a man ought to change his relations with world. It is necessary to reject man`s traditional position as "owner" and "conqueror" of the world. A man ought to realize a deep interaction and intercommunication between himself and external being, he ought to take the new position of respect for being — the position of dialogue with being. A man has to listen to the "appeals" of being and try to reply to theirs.

In *Stalker* one more important aspect of the new understanding of man is demonstrated. To establish new intercommunication with the world man has to carry out examination of all his feelings and ideas. The characters of *Stalker* are performing such examination during their travelling around the enigmatic Zone which was left after the visit of extraterrestrial civilization. Here all that was important and valuable in the ordinary world become untruthful and insignificant. As a result man which has achieved true unity with being is showed as mad and feeble-minded from the point of view of the ordinary world. Main characters of Tarkovskij's last films are such kind of men (Stalker, Domenico from *Nostalgia*, Mr. Alexander from *Sacrifice*).

By his last films Tarkovskij persuades us to reject traditional values and ideas which are connected with old European culture going to ruin. The sole hope consists in radical change in connections between man and reality. A man ought to give up the position of self-sufficiency, he ought to understand that subjectivity and separated individuality are not superior values of human being. We must understand the meaning of our intercommunications with being and with other men and choose the way of self-sacrifice and self-

renunciation for the sake of wholeness and harmony of the world. If we will prize only our self-sufficiency and will regard the world as an object of "domination" and "conquest" the emancipated irrationality of being will have ruined us and our culture. But if we will live in harmony with being and will sacrifice ourselves, it is possible that our existence will find wholeness and new sense.

NOTES

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[2] Ortega y Gasset, H. "Essay on aesthetic themes in form of preface"// Ortega y Gasset H. *Aesthetics. Philosophy of culture.* Moscow, 1991. P.103, 107-108.

[3] Barthes, R. "Death of author"; "Pleasure from text"// Barthes R. *Selected works.* Moscow, 1989. P. 384-391, 482-492.

[4] Bergson, A. *Selected works.* V.1. Moscow, 1992. P. 169-173.

[5] Frank , S.L. *Object of Knowledge.* Petrograd, 1915. P. 151-152.

[6] Frank , S.L. *Soul of Man.* Moscow, 1917. P. 187.

[7] Hiedegger, M. "What is Metaphysics?"// Hiedegger M. *Time and Being (selected works).* Moscow, 1993. P.25.

[8] Frank, S.L. *The Incomprehensible.* P. 535-536

[9] Frank, S.L. "God with Us"// Frank S.L. *Spiritual Grounds of Society (selected works).* Moscow, 1992. P.308-346.

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V
PHENOMENOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS, EXISTENTIALISM: SOURCES AND PROSPECTS
ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ, ГЕРМЕНЕВТИКА, ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛИЗМ: ИСТОКИ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ

CIRCLES OF UNDERSTANDING AND HERMENEUTIC WEBS
Towards the Idea of Hermeneutical Logic

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What is omnipresent is imperceptible. Nothing is more commonplace than the reading experience, and yet nothing is more unknown. Reading is such a matter of course, that at first glance, it seems that there is nothing to say about it. (Tzvetan Todorov)

Some preparatory remarks

It is a commonplace to consider interpretation as a process through which the reader constructs the meaning of the text. Still we must ask what is involved in this process, how does the meaning actually emerge during it, what kind of mental activities are there at work? In what follows I try to answer these questions by exploiting two distinct but in many ways overlapping and intertwining research traditions - poetics and hermeneutics. Shedding light on their basic differences with regard to their origins and essential concepts and ideas and developing new concepts and methods capable of covering central aspects in both traditions, I try to find a new kind of basis for the philosophy of interpretation. My central theme is the logic of interpretation but for practical reasons I discuss three distinct (but not unconnected) activities- the logic of reading, the logic of interpretation and the logic of understanding, because this trichotomy reflects my contemporary research interests appropriately. [1]

In his work *Genres in Discourse* Tzvetan Todorov calls attention to the fact, that although the problem of reading in literary studies has been taken up from different points of view - for instance readers have been taken into account in their historical, social, collective or individual diversity or readers have been treated as manifold text strategies - there is one area that remains unexplored. This area is the logic of reading. Todorov adds that this logic is not represented in text and yet it antedates individual differences. (Todorov 1990, 39) Todorov's original text dates from 1978 and it is obvious that from today's point of view his remark seems to be an overstatement. But the fact remains that there are many

aspects in the logic of reading which are still insufficiently examined, the most interesting being the very notion of "the logic of reading".

Concerned only with representational texts (or classic texts of fiction as he also puts it) Todorov's viewpoint is somewhat restrictive - even though it reflects prevailing practice in literary studies - overlooking a major area of texts and one which is continuously growing in interest.[2] Todorov's argument for supporting his choice, claiming that the reading of representational texts is the only type of reading undertaken in the mode of construction, does not sound wholly convincing either, at any rate it provokes the question as regards the other types of reading. There also seems to be an apparent inconsistency between this argument and Todorov's idea that the logic of reading is not represented in texts and yet it antedates individual difference. It is just this idea that calls for philosophical reflection.

Logical considerations have always formed an important theme in poetics (suffices it to recollect that Aristotle's Poetics was until the Middle Ages included in *the Organon),* but during the last three decades - in the wake of structuralism, narratology and semiotics - logic has gained a quite special position in it. A telling example is the great interest directed to possible world semantics [3] among some well known structuralists and semioticians, like Umberto Eco, Thomas Pavel and Lubomir Dolezel. In many respects this interest has also been well grounded for PWS seems to form an apt background for clarifying some essential aspects in the logic of interpretation, especially those connected with the textual level. It is, for instance, capable of enlightening many ambiguities apropos of truth, reference and cross world identifications in fiction and the relations between language and reality in general. (I shall later return to these items more exhaustively.) However, PWS does not seem to offer appropriate means to handle the whole interpretative process in which objects of interpretation can not be separated from authors and receivers and their situations and lifeworlds. In this respect hermeneutics creates quite different perspective to approach interpretation, giving the opportunity to raise questions excluded in PWS - questions concerning for instance the essence of the object of interpretation and the mode of the being of meaning. These questions are essentially connected with the notion of lived experience which is fundamental in the logic of understanding.

PWS and hermeneutics seem to be strikingly different starting points to examine interpretation, but they can also be viewed as representing only different viewpoints to meet essential notions in interpretation - like explanation, understanding, generality, individuality, knowledge, meaning, truth, method, science etc.. It goes without saying that these notions do not acquire similar importance within these traditions but it seems to me that questions concerning method and the logic of interpretation form the core and common basis for both traditions, even though this basis includes seemingly irreconcilable elements.[4] This irreconcilability culminates in the concepts of world and lived experience,

which lie at the heart of my present research.[5] From these intuitions spring the crucial themes of my present work:

1. The general and the individual are necessarily intertwined in the interpretative process. This fact raises the question about method. There are valid methods - philological, linguistic, structural, text analytical and so on - which produce the starting point for any interpretative activity, but there is also the limit which no method can overstep. Beyond this limit we enter the area where we meet the question, how is it possible for individual consciousness to understand objectivations produced by other individual consciousness. Thus it seems that we need, to use Hans-Georg Gadamer's (or originally Aristotle's) terms, a conception of interpretation not only as *techné* but also as *phronesis.*

2. It is a commonplace to talk about the logic of interpretation, but how do we understand the term "logic" in this connection? To answer this question it is pivotal to make a distinction between two different logics, both operative in interpretation. The one, which I have called *logic of coherence* relies upon general laws and principles which control the steps and inferences in interpretation, the other, which I call *logic of uncertainty* is more indeterminate striving for covering those aspects in interpretation which are individual, contingent and depending on the worldhood of interpretation. Another way of describing the above mentioned logical distinction is talking about the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of interpretation. These two dimensions ground my searching idea of *hermeneutic web* which, I think, characterizes the nature of interpretation more properly than the idea of hermeneutic circle.

The abovementioned logical dichotomy is crucial for the more basic dichotomy mentioned earlier - that between poetics and hermeneutics - even if the dividing line between these logics is not identical with the one between poetics and hermeneutics. But what do I ultimately mean by the aforementioned two logics? What is their connection or is there any? And why does the notion of hermeneutic web seem so promising? To suggest some possible answers, or better, some areas within which the answers might be hidden, I shall give a closer look to the items mentioned above.

How possible are possible worlds?

There is some confusion connected with PWS. To explain the reason I begin by a quotation from Ruth Ronen's recent book *Possible Worlds in Literary Theory.*

> The concept of *possible worlds* has, in recent years, served as an interdisciplinary metaphor representing a sphere of mutual fusion and interchange between philosophical logic, philosophy of science, literary theory, aesthetics and linguistics. This interdisciplinary interchange has been based on the presupposition of a common ground to which the various disciplines refer; that is possible worlds serve as a common point of reference where problems raised by each discipline separately seem to converge. Yet the dialogue among the disciplines is more intricate than it seems, because talk about

> possible worlds turns out to be talk about different things in each particular discipline. (Ronen 1994, 47)

Ronen seems to hit at the heart of the matter. Representatives of for instance philosophical logic and literary theorists do not always seem to understand each other when discussing possible worlds. The reason for this lack of mutual understanding becomes obvious if we give a brief look on the uses of the concept.

Naturally the history of the ideas of *probability, possibility and necessity* goes back to Aristotle - it should be remembered how crucial they are for his argumentation in the *Poetics* - and in the middle ages Duns Scotus formulated a theory of modality which comes quite close to contemporary possible worlds semantics. (See for instance Knuuttila 1993, 139-149) A more familiar notion of possible worlds is the one elaborated by G.W.von Leibniz and his ideas seem to have an impact also on literary theory.[6] The notion of possible worlds, as it is generally understood today, has been elaborated in the area of modal logic. PWS is concerned with the meanings of propositions and their truth conditions in connection with different modalities - alethic modalities, concerning possibility and necessity; deontic modalities, corcerning norms; epistemic modalities, concerning knowledge and doxatic modalities, concerning belief. These are accepted general principles but otherwise there is a deep disagreement among representatives of philosophical logic about the nature of possible worlds. The opinions vary from really existing entities to some sort of rational or semiotic constractions.[7] But what about literary theory?

I have suggested that there are two characteristics in the notion of possible world which make it especially useful to the philosophy of interpretation. Firstly, it helps to clarify the idea of the logic of coherence, secondly, as an epistemological notion it forms a basis to understand the cognitive dimension in interpretation. These characteristics are closely connected to the title of this section: *How possible are possible worlds?* because I think that the dividing line between possible worlds in philosophical logic and possible worlds in literary theory can be located in this question. A quotation from Aristotle forms an appropriate starting point for further reflections. In *Poetics* we can read the following:

> Impossible incidents that are probable should be preferred to possible ones that are unbelievable, and stories should not be constructed from improbable parts, but above all should contain nothing improbable. (Aristotle 1987, 36)

Aristotle's words can be understood in many ways[8] but whether we understand them in one way or another they contain an undisputed claim to coherence. This claim connects the modern continuers of poetics to the Aristotelian legacy.[9] Those literary theorists interested in PWS have applied it very selectively. They have picked up the idea of rational construction and used the different modalities to describe the principle of coherence for instance in the reading process. Simultaneously they have altered the notions of possibility and actuality in many ways.

In his article *Literary Text, Its World and Its Style* Lubomir Dolezel poses the question:

> Is reading as a practical activity which is grounded on art and experience the only way to reach the literary texts, or is it right to claim that the analyst and the theorist with their methodological and theoretical instruments are in a privileged position with respect to texts. (Dolezel 1985, 90)

The question deserves attention, because immanently it urges us to take a stand in the controversy between hermeneutics and poetics. Dolezel chooses the latter alternative and he regards PWS as a means to develop literary theory. He does not give his reasons openly but I believe that the benefits of PWS for literary studies can be crystallized as follows. On the one hand it forms a theoretical framework within which it is possible to elaborate a methodical starting point for the logic of interpretation on the other it gives an opportunity to detach the world of the text, as an autonomous whole, from the actual world which naturally means that the world of the text can be subjected to objective analysis. This is what I mean when I say that in PWS the notion of world is an epistemological notion.

This latter point is worth noticing because it is here that the logic of coherence starts functioning. The adherents of possible worlds literary theory do not use the notion of possible world only metaphorically. For them it is useful in explaining the different principles according to which the meaning of the text is constructed, principles which can be either quite general or specific - including principles of for instance genre or style or those connected with the logical structure of language.[10] But the principles include also text-internal principles like the different kinds of modalities mentioned above. (For instance the belief or knowledge worlds of the characters.) Common to these principles is that they operate on the textual, or as I prefer to express it, on the horizontal level of interpretation.

Until today the logic of interpretation has primarily been investigated in the framework of genre theories, which means that the appeal to genre has usually offered a categorizing principle as the basis for interpretative inferences. It seems, however, that we have reached the end of that road, for contemporary literature questions forcefully just this categorizing basis. If we do not have genres anymore at least not in the conventional use of the word - we have to search for the principles of the logic of reading somewhere else. This means that we must challenge the very notions of our interpretative logic and this might clear the road for a project of hermeneutical logic.

Possible worlds as rooted in the lifeworld or preliminary foundations for a hermeneutical logic

Possible worlds literary theory relies on the subject-object distinction characteristic to modern positivistic science.[11] This fact has some significant consequences for the notion of world as it is understood in this theoretical framework for it limits the interest to the question of how the different worlds are constituted, and at the same time conceals the more important idea of world as a general horizon for interpretation and understanding, in other words it conceals the

rootedness of understanding in the lifeworld. This is the reason why I am sceptical for the ability of PWS to explain the whole interpretative process. Another problem is that in possible world framework the sentence is regarded as the smallest meaningful unit of the text. Anyway, in addition to the horizontal level of interpretation there is also the vertical level which connects the text to the world. It is evident that these levels are so intertwined that their separation functions only as an idealization, but as a useful idealization to the logic of interpretation.

To conclude I give a brief look to some hermeneutical principles which might be useful to develop the logic of interpretation in the direction of hermeneutical logic. Emphasizing onesidedly the coherence of the text the possible worlds literary theorists have been compelled to exclude some essential details operative in interpretation. The idea of the autonomy of the text has obscured both the role of the reader and the cultural context of the text. For instance Dolezel stresses that PWS looses its usefulness in that semiotical process in which the actual reader interprets the text. (Dolezel 1989, 233) In the background of this thought there can be seen a hidden fear that the coherence of the text is threatened in the area where the text meets the world and the reader with his/her lived experience. In reality, however, it is not possible to create a sound philosophy of interpretation without considering all these elements. Naturally, the complexity of the logic of interpretation increases when we start to focus on the whole hermeneutic situation, which uncovers the rootedness of this logic in life and simultaneously the stratified nature of interpretation. As for Paul Ricoeur it is not possible to separate the world of the text from the world of the reader, (see for instance Ricoeur 1988, 157-180) it is also impossible to think of the horizontal (textual) level apart from the vertical (lifebound) level of interpretation. It is obvious that these to levels can be understood as forming a hermeneutic web within which the interpretative process does not follow straightforwardly the linearity of the text and does not proceed in circles either, but makes digression which may seem arbitrary but factually follow paths that appear to be quite rational. It is my project on hermeneutical logic which aims at uncovering this underlying rationality.

NOTES

[1] I want to stress that the trichotomy I use is anything but unambiguous- The above mentioned activities naturally overlap in many respects and it is not always possible to specify the activity we are referring to. For all these difficulties the trichotomy gives support to my idea of interpretation as a manylayered process and at the same time helps to make this manylayeredness visible. But before all it helps to develop my central idea of hermeneutic web (as will be shown later) and to uncover the necessary interaction between semantical and hermeneutical viewpoints in interpretation.

[2] Using the notion of text is of course problematic on the whole and we should be aware of the distinctions among different kinds of texts, not only among written texts representing different genres but also among cultural texts in general. It goes without saying that after the work of the semioticians (for instance Jurij Lotman) and the deconstructionists (like Jacques Derrida) we have lost our innocence apropos of texts. Problematic as this extended notion of text seems it gives an appropriate footing for my investigation, focusing not so much on literary interpretation as such but on the philosophical basis of interpretation.

[3] Henceworth PWS.

[4] The controversial status of method itself within hermeneutics on the one hand and PWS on the other gives a telling example.

[5] To be able to understand the central ideas of PWS, on the one hand, and hermeneutics, on the other, it is necessary to reflect on the notion of world because it seems to receive quite different function and significance within these traditions. My argument is that in hermeneutics the notion of world is viewed as an ontological notion, whereas in PWS it is basically epistemological. Also the notion of lived experience is problematic for it is clear that every attempt to base the logic of interpretation in lived experience necessarily reforms our conception, not only about interpretation but about logic itself. This fact has been clearly understood by such scholars as the Germans Georg Misch and Hans Lipps and the Russian Gustav Shpet who have been trying to extend classical logic towards life and lived experience to be able to create a new kind of logic, which they call hermeneutical logic. Their ideas concerning hermeneutical logic, however, are by no means clear or integrated. (To have some suggestions see for instance Shpet 1993, 145-155). An excellent introduction to some central ideas in hermeneutical logic can be found in Gudrun Kühne-Bertram's recent article *Logic als Philosophie des Logos - Zu Geschichte und Begriff der hermeneutischen Logic (1*993).

[6] Lubomir Dolezel has studied Leibniz's influence on two Swiss scholars in the eighteenth century, Johann Bodmer and Johann Breitinger in his study *Occidental Poetics: Tradition and Progress.* Dolezel emphasizes that during this era there occurs a rupture in literary theory which is connected to the idea of *mimesis.* According to him the relationship between art and world had been for more than two millennia explained by the doctrine of *mimesis* and only the Leibnizian idea of possible world breaks this tradition giving the opportunity to reflect on art as a means of creating alternative possibilities for the actual world. Dolezel's thoughts are crucial but for my mind also controversial, but it is not possible to examine them here. For more extensive information see Dolezel 1990, 33-53)

[7] To give some examples, there is the "ontological argument" of David Lewis, the realist approach which takes talk about possible worlds as talk about real, abstract entities wholly independent of our language or our thought. Then there is the more moderate conception which regards possible worlds as for instance linguistic or semiotic constructions. In this connection Jaakko Hintikka should be mentioned.(See Lewis 1983 & Hintikka 1975)

[8] These different ways are of great importance for my work-in-progress.

[9] It is evident that speaking about continuers of poetics is controversial, but representatives of structuralism, narratology and semiotics openly consider themselves as ones and there is certainly a common pursuit linking them to each other - the pursuit to elaborate poetics as science. So they are carrying on the dream of the Russian formalists. Still, the fact remains that both poetics and hermeneutics are at the moment quite indeterminate research areas which increases the responsibility of the researcher.

[10] It is not at all suprising that these theorists have been especially interested in a fairly limited area of literature like in fairy teles, detectives, traditional narrative prose or renaissance drama - in general in such genres which are quite clearly determined.

[11] This is of course due to, on the one hand the origin of PWS in analytic philosophy, on the other, the inclination of structuralism and narratology to emphasize the scientific nature of poetics.

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CULTURAL IDENTITY, HERMENEUTICS AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSLATION

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1.

1. There are at least two different reasons why the issue of cultural identity is presently at the forefront both in philosophy and in 'cultural studies' in general.

First of all, there is the globalisation of the world as a consequence of modern information technology and changes in the mode of travel. Thanks to the electronic media, we are all virtual tourists today, living in one single, global community. That which is different continually penetrates into our familiar cultural lifeworld.

Secondly, there is the postcolonial fact of migration to the West, causing a growth of the number of immigrants, especially in the metropolitan cities of Western Europe. 'Strangers' are not a new phenomenon in European societies. But what is new now is the phenomenon of the stranger who is dispersed from his homeland forever but cannot be easily assimilated to his new culture, the stranger who lives with his family next to our door whereas his language, his values and religion are very different from ours. The migrant is a *perpetual* stranger who's cultural identity and alternative way of life manifest a curious 'hybridity', an in-between-ness that refuses the comforts of both tradition and assimilation, and revokes the transcendental justification for our own way of life (Kazmi 1994).

In this paper I will focus on phenomena such as hybridity, displacement and new identities and explore how they are dealed with in contemporary hermeneutical philosophy.

2.

Philosophical hermeneutics is not simply an academic issue. Behind seemingly abstract questions of interpretation, broader issues of a practical-political sort can be seen to surface. One of the central topics concerns the political interaction and the formation of cultural identities appropriate to our 'global culture'. Hermeneutics is widely agreed upon to be the philosophical perspective that best respects the plurality of cultural differences. It encourages us to seek to comprehend alien lifeworlds, to tolerate dissent and pluralism. Hermeneutical philosophy relies on 'dialogue' or 'conversation' as paradigms that can offer an adequate explanation of how agreement, understanding and selfunderstanding are created in multicultural societies. It does not assume that there will be a convergence between the languages of different cultures into a single new language. Neither does it assume that every different culture inhabits its own linguistic universe, without the possibility of dialogue and understanding. Hermeneutics moves beyond traditional universalism and romantic relativism. It seems to be motivated by a single pluralistic desire, to stimulate the communication between heterogeneous cultural groups in society as much as possible.

Gadamer's hermeneutics, besides offering a theory of interpretation and understanding, presents a challenge to the metaphysics of modernity. Three aspects could be mentioned in this respect. First, for Gadamer there is no possibility of a transcendental, language-free standpoint for human understanding. Language is a primary philosophiçal issue: not a mirror, but the possibility of a world and the medium of dialogue and interpretation. Secondly, Gadamer's philosophy shares the critique of the subject and does no longer believe that the subject controls its discourse. As interpreter or participant in a dialogue, the subject is not a transparent *cogito,* but a being-in-the-world with its personal and cultural prejudices that make interpretation possible. Prejudice, according to Gadamer, is a condition for the possibility of understanding. Thirdly, for Gadamer, all interpretation is tied to the historicity of the interpreter, to the contingency of his or her historical preoccupations and preconceptions, and to the authority of tradition in general. So circularity, contextuality and contingency are the main features of hermeneutic understanding. Interpretation according to Gadamer is always open-ended, there is no meta-interpretation, no interpretation is ever final and new interpretations will always be needed.

I will argue that in spite of this 'postmodern' and critical outlook, Gadamer's analysis belongs to a Hegelian model: it is, in fact, a hegelianism after the linuistic turn.

3.

In *Wahrheit und Methode* Gadamer uses the phenomenological notion of a horizon, to describe our situatedness in the world. His question is how it is possible for us to represent within our own horizon, within which we move and which moves with us, the horizon of another time or culture that we find speaking to us from a text or any other cultural phenomenon. If the understanding is ours, how do we discover differences between the text or the culture and ourselves? Gadamer's answer is that we often do find that the text strikes us as being strange, and unlike what we expected. The point is not then to translate the strangeness into something with which we are already familiar. Instead, we first project a separate cultural and historical horizon - an act that is immediately followed by consciousness recombining what it had distinguished in order to fuse and to become one again. Though Gadamer uses the notion of horizons, he certainly does not want us to think of horizons that are closed off from each other. The so-called *Horizontvervchmelzung* means that the cultural and historical horizon is first projected and then again eliminated as a separate entity. Besides, we should not fall into the illusion that we can entirely recreate the otherness of the other horizon and contrast it totally to our own.

Gadamer affirms us, however, that the 'fusion' of horizons that takes place in the exchange of speech and counterspeech, question and answer, can produce genuine consensus and that the dialectics of dialogue generate understanding and a new intersubjectivity. When we understand the other, with its many differences, we are expanding our horizon, not stepping out of our horizon into the other horizon. Understanding is a process in which the differences that arise are assimilated and consensus is reached.

Gadamer's notion of 'fusion of horizons' can be so read, to make him seem more of a postmortem pluralist than a Hegelian universalist. But there are mo-

ments when he does sound definitely like a modem quasi-universalist. For example: Gadamer holds up the Platonic dialogue as the model for philosophical conversation. He makes it clear that the success of dialogue depends on the continuing willingness of the participants to be carried along by the conversation for the purpose of letting meaning emerge in an 'event' of mutual understanding (Michelfelder and Palmer 1989). Both partners must have the good will to try to understand one another. Without this, one will simply read one's own presuppositions into what the other is saying, and will misunderstand what he or she is saying. So both partners aspire to disregard their own individuality; at the same time they try to maintain themselves against the otherness of the other. The problem is that according to Gadamer and Plato, the will to understand one's opponent is the same as the effort to cancel the other in his otherness, since the other can not be understood in any other way than from the understander's own standpoint (Simon 1989).

In other words, the fusion of horizons is possible only because we are representing the strangeness of the other by reducing it to the familiarity of our own horizon. Besides, in reality these 'fusions' are coerced by the very nature of the practical situation in which they occur, and the conversational situation is one that is characterized by a constitutional inequality of position, of power. The notion of an open dialogue in which the interlocutors share an equal status and seek to arrive at a pure, disinterested agreement, determined by good will alone, is one of the utopian illusions of modernity. The point is that relations between people are relations of asymmetry and inequality. The cultural practices of subjection operate not merely through the coercive machinery of the imperial state but also through the discourses of cultural conversation, philosophy, literature, anthropology etc.

Another problem is that what for Gadamer ensures the possibility that the different horizons can be fused is that they are already implicitly joined 'in the depths of tradition'. Tradition is portrayed as an all-encompassing and ever-developing, continuous and unified totality. Tradition unites the different understandings of its participants who are both shaped by it and who continually extend and reshape it. The participants exist in the previously shared meaning; 'That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is nameless ... tradition has a justification that is outside the arguments of reason and in large measure determines our institutions and attitudes', Gadamer says in *Wahrheit und Methode.* But whose tradition is this, anyway? Probably not that of the vast number of migrants and political refugees in the West. Is it 'our' Western tradition, then? Contemporary society does not seem to be unified by a single cultural tradition at all, but is instead more like the conflict of many traditions which refuse to melt together. And is not every homogeneous tradition a construction, a story of the winners, while the dissenters have been excommunicated? (Caputo 1989). Gadamer, according to Caputo, is a 'closet-essentialist', who has given up on the notion of a *Geist,* and puts in its place a pluralized, historicized multiplication of historical forms and a concretely situated subject. Meanwhile, his hermeneutics keeps faith in conversation, in the deep powers of

the tradition. But perhaps we should have a more suspicious eye. Aren't all official, traditional deep truths purchased by deep violence, by excluding what contaminates the system of truth, by repressing the hybridity that disturbs its unity ?

4.

The migrant experience is no less a transitional phenomenon than a *translational* one, for Homi Bhabha (1994). Everywhere, identities are emerging which are not fixed but in transition, drawing on different cultural traditions at the same time. It may be tempting to think of identity as destined to end up in one place or another: either returning to its roots or disappearing through partial assimilation, in a hermeneutic 'fusion' that is possible because of the supposed translatability and commensurability of the different cultures. But this may be a false dilemma. What we need is a radical rethinking of the concept of translation.

Caught in between a nativist traditionalism and a postcolonial metropolitan assimilation, according to Bhabha, the subject of cultural difference becomes a problem that Walter Benjamin has described as the element of resistance in the process of transformation, the element which does *not* lend itself to translation. Translation, in Benjamin's view, opens up the question of how to continue when the past is not allowed any continuance. The migrant culture of the 'in-between' dramatizes precisely the activity of culture's *untranslatability.* The way in which the interpreter/translator can bear witness to what actually happens is not by assimilation or imitation, but only by a new creation. Cultural interaction is not simply a cognitive process, but rather a performance of cultural change and of motion and transformation. Translation is the performative nature of intercultural communication.

Through the concept of cultural translation, it is possible to draw attention to the common ground of contemporary critical debates. For they all recognize that the problem of cultural interaction emerges only at the significatory boundaries of cultures, where meanings and values are misread or signs are misappropriated. Culture only emerges as a problem at the point at which there is a loss of meaning in the articulation of everyday life, between classes, genders, races, nations. (Bhabha 1994) The migrant's survival depends, as Salman Rushdie put it, on discovering 'how newness enters the world'.

'Translation' is the paradigm for constructing a new relation to the past, a relation that consist, essentially, in the historical performance of radical discontinuity, in the creation of hybrid identities. An international culture cannot be based on relativism (cultural diversity) or hermeneutic quasi-universalism (cultural fusion, *Horizontvervchmelzung).*

It has to be based on the inscription and articulation of culture's hybridity.

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MAX SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY AS PARADIGM FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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The German philosopher, Max Scheler, may have been the most brilliant thinker of his day (*Good, 1975*), high praise for someone who is now fairly obscure for many. Even so, Scheler's work has had an extraordinary even if subtle impact on the whole field of philosophy of religion in Europe. He is usually a source for insightful ideas that others find unique among the world of ideas. Thus, thinkers of all sorts have borrowed the brilliant if somewhat haphazard insights of Scheler even as they tend to ignore the philosophical program that Scheler argued was an essential ingredient of his work. That is to say, precious few scholars actually contend that Scheler's vision for philosophical methodology is an option for a paradigm for philosophy. In fact, many thinkers doubt that Scheler consistently worked with a methodology at all choosing to consider him a rather unsystematic thinker. However, closer inspection of Scheler's work may prove that contention false and even uncover an especially fruitful model for philosophy of religion, at least, that may serve us well in our efforts to shape such a philosophy in a post-modern world.

This paper will take up that task in a series of stages that finally move us beyond Scheler to a workable paradigm for philosophy. This will require first of all a detailing of Scheler's own description and application of this method he calls eidetic phenomenology (*Scheler, 1968*). Second, we need to account for the critique's of Scheler's work, including the criticism that surely can be levelled not only toward Scheler but many similar approaches given our post-modern critical perspective. Finally, we will attempt to shape, with some help from Paul Ricoeur and David Tracy, a revised form of Scheler's phenomenology that can be a working model for philosophy of religion today.

Scheler's Own Vision

Max Scheler's own vision of phenomenology was certainly forged in relation to the work of Edmund Husserl (*Staude, 1967*). On the one hand, Scheler was enticed and persuaded by Husserl's program, but on the other hand, Scheler distinguished his ideas from what he saw as Husserl's excesses. Scheler argued that phenomenology could not be a model for philosophy as such, thus it is not methodology, but that argument presupposes an understanding of phenomenology and a sweeping program that we find in Husserl's work, especially the early Husserl. Scheler did not believe that phenomenology could provide the framework for a foundational science, for example, and thus could not see phenomenology as a means for unifying the sciences (*Scheler 1968*).

Instead, Scheler viewed phenomenology as a way of knowing among various ways of knowing. Even as Scheler makes such arguments, though, it is clear that he means a way of knowing that systematic, that can be characterized by a method. In that sense, phenomenology is for him a method, an approach that can be quite useful for the doing of philosophy. We should be careful as we say

this to note that the approach that is phenomenology is at once systematic and intuitive. Thus, it is a method in the sense that this way of knowing follows certain rules of approach, but is unsystematic in the openendedness of its results. This openendedness of discovery and intuition is often the source of the seemingly erratic and apparently unsupported assertion of insights that one finds in Scheler's writings. In the end, the present of the erratic emergence of insight is probably an unavoidable maddening quality of Scheler's work. Even so, we are not conclude from this that Scheler did not propose or employ a method, even a systematic method.

Scheler refers to his work as phenomenology but he also distinguishes between two types of phenomenology. A descriptive phenomenology can be employed which is as it implies a detailed description of isolated phenomena. For example, religions can be subjected to a descriptive phenomenology in which the various components of religious belief and activity can be described in detail, something we might imagine a cultural anthropologist or sociologist of religion doing. Scheler was certainly familiar with some of the groundbreaking work just appearing at the turn of the century, like the work of Emile Durkheim.

This kind of phenomenology was not what Scheler proposes as a method for doing philosophy even though surely the results of descriptive phenomenologies might be useful for philosophers to note. It would surely be useful for a philosopher of the social sciences to be aware of the methods that such disciplines employ, for example. Even so, the results of a descriptive phenomenology may serve not to reveal but to obscure what philosophers are anxious to uncover -- the deep structure of knowing and of reality. Instead, Scheler proposes what he calls an eidetic phenomenology and through much of his career seeks to make use of this approach as a method for doing philosophy.

The Elements of Eidetic Phenomenology

Scheler saw phenomenology as the method by which philosophy proceeds and believed that Husserl's approach presented a framework for understanding this method. Thus, Scheler allows for the bracketing of the question of truth in order to explore the deeper structure of reality, of the phenomena of reality, in much the same way that Husserl proposed. Given this bracketing of certain questions, Scheler argued that there are certain basic self-evident assertions that make knowledge and the growth of knowledge possible -- that there is something, that there is an absolute entity, and that the essence of a thing is true of all existents, e.g. These self-evident assumptions allow philosophy to proceed on the level of insight, intuitive awareness of the logic of a thing. This necessary structure is its eidos, thus eidetic phenomenology.

Given this basic approach borrowed from Husserl, Scheler could define philosophy:

> "In essence philosophy is strictly self-evident insight, which cannot be either augmented or nullified by induction and which has a-priori validity for contingent existents; insight into all such essences and essential interrelations of beings as are accessible to us from available instances, in the order and hierarchy as the stand in relation to the absolute entity and its essence." (*Scheler, 1968*)

Phenomenology, then, has the following characteristics. It is negative in the sense that the search is for that which cannot either be augmented or nullified by induction. Thus, the search is for that which is necessary for the being itself. It is apriori in that the approach uncovers that which is self-evident in the thing itself. Thus, while each available instance is an instance of the apriori eidos, that deeper structure precedes the individual instance and is true of all instances of the same essence. Finally, this phenomenology is analogical in that all essences are given a relation to that which is absolutely necessary in its being, the absolute entity. Scheler's life work found him working out the details of this method both formally and in application. His work on a phenomenology of religion is only one example of this work which draws on the detail of other projects (his ethics [Scheler, 1966] and social philosophies [Scheler, 1960] for example).

The philosophy of religion is, however, a special case of the use of this method since the last component of the approach (analogy) falls away in a sense in that the object of study, of knowledge, is the absolute. This reversal of the analogical which must be true of philosophy of religion has implications for the second component as well in that the absolute, as necessary being itself, is in its own essence apriori. Thus, the phenomenology of religion cannot simply treat instances of the absolute as phenomenal bearers of the essential structure of being. Instead, the phenomenology of religion makes the absolute its object by focussing on religion and the phenomenal expressions of religion (positive religions) with the same self-evident assumptions that guide all of philosophy -- above all, that there is an absolute entity and that each phenomenal instance is true in its presentation of its object. This allows for an eidetic philosophy of religion, which Scheler says aims to: "uncover what we would call the logic of religious acts, i.e., the active principles of religious reason." (*Scheler, 1968*) Since religion is essentially an activity of receiving insight into the absolute, then the logic of religion must be that which prepares any of us to receive religious revelation, whether that be positive or natural revelation.

In this sense, a phenomenology of religion will proceed through an exploration of religious phenomena to identify that which is apriori in religious knowledge, that is, that which must be true if religious knowledge is to be at all. This investigation proceeds as with all phenomenology in a negative fashion stripping away from all religious thinking that which must be seen as unnecessary to the essence of religion or by induction must be accounted as false. But since we presume that all instances of religious knowledge are bearers of the religious eidos, then we can begin with a expression of religion trusting that it is true given this principle and we can enhance our exploration by a widening knowledge of the religions and their histories. Thus, Scheler's work envisions an approach to the study of religion that incorporates much of what has happened in the last several decades. Once again, Scheler's insightful anticipation of what was to come is made evident.

The Limitations of a Phenomenology

This phenomenological approach was not unlike other proposals that were being offered by Scheler's contemporaries, like Rudolf Otto (*Otto, 1971*). The advantage of this method was that religious experience could be accepted as a legitimate source of knowledge, avoiding the positivistic, empiricistic philosophies that had also begun to appear on the continent and in England. Though Husserl proposed his phenomenology as a science, even an empirical science, he also regretted the turn to positivism that had swept through philosophy, a view that Husserl believed to be a false empiricism.

Scheler followed Husserl's lead on this question, but he became aware almost as soon as he had finished his philosophy of religion that this phenomenology alone could not suffice. Perhaps he saw the limits apparent in his own work or maybe he, like others, saw the turn in the social/political world of Europe in the 1920's as sure hermeneutic of suspicion (to use Ricoeur's term [*Ricoeur, 1970*]) of any absolute philosophy. Indeed, Scheler saw the need for a critique of the results of his phenomenology and began to work toward that check against false absolutism that might emerge from an eidetic phenomenology. At first, he worked at a sociology of knowledge, taken by the new discipline that he learned from William Jerusalem. Scheler may have been the leading figure in forging the shape of that discipline, a work that would reveal the cultural context of the transmission of all knowledge. For many Scheler scholars, this sociology of knowledge is the important bridge toward a workable philosophy.

My own work suggests that Scheler was moving back toward his vitalist metaphysics as the proper dialectical check on religious and ideological absolutism. Unfortunately, Scheler's work on a metaphysics is fragmentary, actually only rudimentary in his *Man's Place in Nature* and filled out more only in the posthumously edited and published papers. There is enough in this material to show that Scheler did indeed set up metaphysics as the dialectical partner to a phenomenology of religion in order to build a complete philosophy of religion. In his unpublished papers, Scheler both develops the shape of a metaphysical method and pairs it with the ideas that emerged from his phenomenology of religion. In order to see how this works for him, we need to explain his view of metaphysics (*Scheler, 1976, 1981*).

Scheler understood that metaphysics as it had been developed by the idealists (e.g., William Dilthey, his teacher) was also open to absolutism. He fought through much of his career to avoid the direction of this philosophical movement even though he respected and remained attracted to their ideas, particularly a form of vitalistic ontology that re-appears in Scheler's later work. Scheler, by contrast, believed that metaphysics was precisely that, an extension of physics and required a method that enabled philosophy to build on the scientific view of reality. That is to say, Scheler sets up a dialectical relationship between his phenomenology and the empirical sciences which he could manage by introducing what I have called a phenomenology of being. If science is also a course of knowledge, then it is also subject to an eidetic phenomenology. The central difference between his phenomenology of religion and his phenomenology of being is the object of observation -- on the one hand the

object is the summum bonum, on the other the object is being itself. There is little wonder that Martin Heidegger considered Scheler to be the most insightful philosopher in Germany and Scheler played a significant role in the early thinking of Heidegger (*Good, 1975*).

Thus, Scheler proposed a philosophy that would set religion and its ideas in dialectical relation with science and its ideas using phenomenology as the bridging method. I admit that few read Scheler this way, that is see his work as a developing systematic whole. He is often viewed as a deeply divided thinker often subject to quick, insightful but undisciplined thinking. A more thorough investigation shows, however, that he was more consistent in his work than at first appears. His posthumously published papers show that he was nearing the culmination of his life's work in his turn to metaphysics, putting the whole philosophy together. Unfortunately, his untimely death allows us to see this proposal in fragmentary form, still needing some basic development in order to flush out how this dialectical approach actually works.

Ricoeur and Tracy as a Bridge to an Important Paradigm

Unfortunately, I will not be able to illustrate adequately how Scheler's view modified by using other thinkers and my own work actually can be used as a novel approach to a full philosophy of religion. Even so, I can lay out the parameters of the method as a paradigm for philosophy and explain further through discussion if that is possible. Scheler's work provides a framework, at least, for understanding the nature of the holy and the nature of being itself, but the question remains, how does this all fit together? Scheler did work with a dialectical approach that allowed him to see through to results of this interchange, but is not so clear as to how anyone else might be just as successful. Perhaps and application of Paul Ricoeur's insightful approach may help us at this point.

Ricoeur develops what he sees as the *Verstehen* tradition in philosophy, essentially the work of Gadamer (*Ricoeur, 1976*, and *Reagan and Stewart, 1978*), by arguing that the process of coming to know is not merely a merging of horizons of understanding. While that merging does take place throughout moving us from a first naivete toward a more critical view of that initial understanding of the world, the movement requires another step (*see also, Ricoeur, 1969*). That is, there must a critical step, a critical moment that enables us to see our first naivete in a critical light. In fact, that critical moment is not unlike the phenomenological epoch that suspends certain questions for the purpose of stripping away that which is not essential. But Ricoeur aims for more needing a true hermeneutic of suspicion that moves us to a different level of understanding, a critique of both what we receive and the perspective that we bring to that process. This critical moment must bring questions of explanation that can make for us a basis for judging whether our understanding is actually credible.

To be sure, the sciences act as a source of theoretical explanations of reality and would work well as a critical moment in relation to religious/philosophical claims. But for Ricoeur, this dialectic is a process that moves us from the

critical moment toward a second naivete, that is, a second level of understanding that actually takes up the critique into a new way of looking at the world. We can readily see that such a process does prevent the emergence of absolutist views as Ricoeur argues that the dialectic is an ongoing process requiring a constant back and forth between accepted ways of understanding our world and experience of it and empirical explanations. In order to work through this approach more thoroughly, we would need to follow Ricoeur's whole project, which is quite impossible in a short paper. Still, I am convinced that Ricoeur's proposal makes sense of what Scheler was attempting to craft. He was working toward a dialogical process between religion and science that was mediated by a phenomenological philosophy. It makes sense that Scheler really intended a thought process that follows the pattern of Ricoeur's proposal.

This suggestion may or may not be palatable either for Scheler scholars or for Ricoeur scholars, but my point is to work toward a paradigm for philosophizing, specifically for philosophy of religion. I complicate this structure even more by introducing the work of David Tracy, who interprets Scheler for the sake of developing his own view of a philosophical theology (*Tracy, 1981*). As a matter of fact, Tracy's goals and my own goal are quite compatible. His argument is that the dialectical process is itself complicated by an internal dialectic when applied to philosophy of religion. The phase of understanding (in the religious view, of proclamation, that which forms the basis of religious knowledge) is also dialectical in that we always live with the sense of what is revealed and what is not. That is to say, we never possess of full knowledge of what is true about reality. This self-imposed humility is what compels us forward in the process on the one hand and enables the emergence of new insight that can produce new views, new understandings. In relation to any text, Ricoeur argues that there is always a surplus of meaning. We also must say that the process of understanding is connected to whatever any reader brings to a text. Thus, meanings emerge between the text and the reader suggesting that each reading potentially holds new insight. If applied to philosophy of religion, we can see that what is presented to us (proclaimed as central to the tradition) is always an open book on the one hand subject to new possibilities quite apart from any other critical moment and holds us in check with our own humility before the summum bonum realizing that there is always this dialectic between the hidden and the revealed, always a surplus of meaning.

The same could be said about the critical process itself (what is made manifest to us by our experience of the world, in religious terms). There is also an internal dialectic in that moment that allows for the emergence of new theories of explanation. The incompleteness that is always present in our empirical experience makes us realize that there is never the possibility of a final theory, that which explains all. It is this dialectic within that allows for the emergence of new theories and propels us forward to new tests even without the crafting of new understandings of the whole of reality, that is, even within any given system of understanding. In this process that we first saw suggested in Scheler, further clarified in Ricoeur and now expanded by Tracy, we now see a dynamic philosophy of religion that encompasses three different dialectical

processes. First, there is the dialectic within our understanding between that which is revealed and that which is hidden. There is the second dialectic within our efforts to explain between that which we know and that which is yet to be known. Finally, we have the dialectic between understanding and explanation that propels us forward in an ever renewing process of crafting new perspectives.

This paradigm is surely a hybrid of positions that awaits some testing and further developing. My own work is now moving in this direction as I attempt to devise a way of understanding the religion/science dialogue so as to produce an intelligible theology for a scientific age. That is, my work is work in progress. Still, I now realize that my own project has been shaped by this vision of a different paradigm for philosophizing, certainly not new in many ways as the components can be seen in Scheler, Ricoeur and Tracy. Ricoeur and Tracy, at least, are still at work on their own projects that may well produce insight that I will need to account for. Still, this proposal leaves us with a beginning point that has several advantages. First, we have a model that can take seriously both religious/ideological wisdom and religious experience as well as empirical wisdom and experience. That is, the model merges the two major strands of twentieth century philosophy. Second, we have a model that effectively creates and openendedness appropriate both to the ever changing arena of the empirical sciences and the pluralistically religious world in which we live. Third, the dialectical model now encompassing three dialectics, each requiring further explication and illustration, gives a perpetual hermeneutic of suspicion that guards against absolutism either within idealistic or empirical models while still allowing the free development of both poles of our dialectic. Any model is surely dependent on those who use it, but this model does portend some optimism for a new kind of philosophy of religion.

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PHENOMENOLOGY OF CHARLES S. PEIRCE

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Charles S. Peirce (I839-1914) is held as the father of American pragmatism and as the father of semiotics. But in his later philosophy he was mainly interested in phenomenology - or, using his own term, in "phaneroscopy"[1] - which he defined as the science of that which is common to "...whatever is *experienced* or might conceivably be experienced or become an object of study in any way direct or indirect" [CP 5.37].[2]

Peirce's "pragmatic" phenomenology is deeply interconnected with his general theory of signs (i.e. semiotics) and with the metaphysical categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.[3] The connections are not easily extractable from Peirce's later writings (after 1893), but the source of his "phaneroscopy" can be found in his earlier writings, especially 1867 to 1868. In what follows, I shall first briefly introduce Peircean terminology and then move towards the very problem of "pragmatic" phenomenology.

1. Introduction

Peirce's later philosophy (ca. from 1890) can be considered as being a manifestation of his conception that the world ultimately devolves into three primal categories, none of which can be further reduced to another. As Corrington (1993: 119) points out, Peirce also with respect to his semiotics "...insists that sign function must take place according to the basic categories and that it cannot take place without reference to the sovereign ontological structures".

The three primal categories were introduced by Peirce for the first time in "On a New List of Categories", 1867, influenced strongly by Kant's philosophy.[4] Peirce [W 2.49] begins his analysis by claiming that the function of categories "...is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity", and that the validity of a category "consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it". According to him the category nearest to sense is that of *the present, in general.*

But, as he points out, "...as the act of *attention* has no connotation at all, but is the pure denotative power of the mind [... so the category] of *what is present in general,* which is nothing but the general recognition of what is contained in attention, has no connotation, and therefore no proper unity [W 2.49]". Peirce calls this category as the *it*, and takes it to be "identical with the conception of substance". The *it* is without determinate shape and content, and, consequently, almost akin to the domain of pure possibility. "Therefore it is roughly equivalent to the category of *Firstness."* See Corrington (1993: 122) - italics mine.

Besides substance we have also the category of *being,* "which completes the work of conceptions of reducing the manifold to unity [W 2.49-50]". When we then go from being to substance, the categories in order are Quality, Relation,

and Representation. Peirce [W 2.54] illustrates the situation by the following kind of a figure:

BEING,
Quality (Reference to a Ground),
Relation (Reference to a Correlate),
Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),
SUBSTANCE.

Figure 1: Peirce's List of Categories from 1867.

According to Corrington (1993: 122) the *correlate,* referred to by Relation, is roughly equivalent to *Secondness,* and the *interpretant,* referred to by Representation, is "less roughly equivalent to *Thirdness."* [5] But, besides that, Peirce continues, "[... the] three intermediate conceptions [i.e. categories] may be termed accidents. [...] Since no one of the categories can be prescinded from those above it, the list of supposable objects which they afford is,

What is.
Quale - that which refers to a ground,
Relate - that which refers to ground and correlate,
Representamen - that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant.
It. [W 2.55].

Figure 2: Objects of Phenomenological Research.

On the basis of these considerations Peirce introduces the following three kinds of representations: (1) Those whose relation to their objects is a mere community in some quality, and these representations may be termed *Likenesses.* (2) Those whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in fact, and these may be termed *Indices* or *Signs.* (3) Those the ground of whose relation to their objects is an imputed character, which are the same as *general signs,* and these may be termed *Symbols.*

We can notice that this classification resembles not only Peirce's way of distinguishing between the three intermediate categories (in Figure 1) but also Peirce's (later) theory of signs, where he speaks about three kinds of signs, namely, *icons, indices,* and *symbols.* [6]

2. The Key Problem

The metaphysical categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are, according to Peirce [CP 5.37-43], the most basic elements to be found within experience. And because the 'object' of phenomenology is nothing less than all experience and its objects (see Figure 2, above), it follows that phenomenology is the most primary and foundational science. Peirce contrasts phenomenology with what he calls "normative sciences", namely, *logic, ethics,* and *aesthetics.*

We can say that each one of these three "sciences" are concerned with distinguishing (1) between acceptable and unacceptable premises, (2) between desirable and undesirable purposes, and (3) between right and wrong uses of methods. In other words, these three sciences are *normative.*

But - and this is the key problem - if phenomenology is to be a nonnorrnative, that is, a *descriptive* science, we should be able to separate normative from descriptive tasks. However, this distinction is not easy to draw. It, namely,

often happens that *descriptions* turn out to be *interpretations* which are based on some *norms.* And to use any metaphysical categories in order to handle with experience is to follow instructions, that is, to commit oneself to some normative basis.

NOTES

[1] By "phaneron" Peirce means "the total field of awareness prior to its subdivisions into capacities or layers". See Corrington (1993: 100-101). Compare Peirce [CP 5.37-38].

[2] Throughout the text, Peirce's writings are referred to by the standardized notations as follows: CP followed by volume and page numbers abbreviates *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce;* and W followed by volume and page numbers abbreviates the ongoing publishing project *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition.*

[3] Actually, Peirce employed the terms Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness not until (as far as I know) in a series of articles published in *The Monist* 1891-1893. But I shall use these terms, instead of the *ground,* the *correlate,* and the *interpretant,* also when considering Peirce's earlier writings. This is because Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are more connotation-free terms, but also because there seems to be something odd in the way Peirce uses some other terms, such as, for instance, *quality, relation, and representation* in his "On a New List of Categories" - see the next two figures, below.

[4] The impact of Kant's epistemology on Peirce's "earlier" theory of representations is considered, for instance, in my (1994). On Peirce's list (see Figure 1, below) there are *five* categories, but according to Max H. Fisch's "Introduction" [W 1.xxvi] Peirce soon reduced the five to three by sloughing off Being and Substance.

[5] Italics mine. However, it seems to me that Corrington's interpretation is not correct. Firstly, if Fisch is right (see the previous note), then Substance cannot correspond to Firstness. Secondly, even if Fisch were not right, it is hard to see how *interpretant* is "less roughly equivalent to Thirdness" than *correlate* to Secondness, if (1) Firstness represents the timeless present as an experienced whole, (2) Secondness contains a thought of something, and (3) Thirdness is manifested by concepts. See, especially [CP 5.212] and [CP 6.455-6]. Compare also my (1992: 226-227) and Tarasti (1990: 26-27).

Probably the confusion is due to Peirce's 1904 essay "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?", especially [CP 8.291-2], where he correlates feeling to Firstness, experience to Secondness, and the consciousness of the future to Thirdness. See also Corrington (1993: 99-100).

[6] See [CP 2.243-250]. Compare also my (1992: 226-227) and (1994: Ch. 2).

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METAPHYSICS RESTORED IN CHRISTIAN EXISTENTIALISM — THE CASE OF PETER WUST
(abstract)

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Peter Wust (1884-1940) is one of the minor philosophers of European Existentialism. Having been formed in the environment of Philosophy of Life, the metacriticism of the Kantian heritage, and after a kind of conversion to Catholicism his mayor theme in philosophy was the instability of metaphysics in modern anthropology.

Post-Kantian subjectivity is taken as the personal subject itself which on its turn is related to the absolute spirit viewed as the personal God. Therefore in Wust 'spirit' and 'person' have the identical meaning of the whole of nature, power, regularity, freedom, will, decision etc.

In full accordance with contemporary intellectual debates philosophy is a challenge to the individual as a human being which questions all humanity. So Wust conceives man as a "philosophizing individual which strives for a region of stability in Being because he perceives himself as unstable and longing for firmity". 20th century personalism and existentialism are the philosophies which try to put man into his context of 'world' and 'nature' to that extent that 'person' and the unity of Being and existing (Dasein) are defined by the relationship of the individual to the non-individual, to god, the mysterious, the otherness, society, and similar. In Wust the subject as a philosophical concept, the logical instance of affirmation, finally coincides with the thinking and real 'I'. All paradoxes of Being and existing, body and soul, identity and difference are now located in the person itself

As a result 'instability and risk' (Ungewißheit und Wagnis) become the key concepts of Wust's anthropology. His paradigm of philosophizing is the human condition of permanently affronting one's self and the totality of humanity. It is here where man is ontologically 'at risk'.

Instability or insecurity are removed by taking the risk of connecting man with his ultimate foundation in transcendent security. But this can only be achieved by a voluntary act of mind. Existentialism ends up to be both a science and a moral obligation: "Wissenschaft und Willenschaft".

PARADIGMS OF MORAL REASONING: HUME AND GILLIGAN ON JUSTICE AND CARE

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Introduction

Carol Gilligan's *In a Different Voice* identified a new paradigm of moral reasoning based on feminine culture. Her book generated enormous controversy in the west by suggesting that men and women make moral decisions differently. It revived the classical rationalist-sentimentalist debate over whether moral theory ought to reflect care or justice; the former a consequentialist approach emphasizing concrete particulars and sentiment, and the latter a non-consequentialist approach emphasizing abstract universals and reason. Gilligan claims that standard moral theory fails to take account of the `different voice' (or `care paradigm', as distinguished from the `justice paradigm'[1]), an alternative moral paradigm which emphasizes responsibility, connection and context over rights, autonomy and abstraction; with the latter understood as the canon of orthodox moral theory. Simply put, Gilligan argues that theories of moral development (Lawrence Kohlberg's in particular [2]) claim universality, yet fail to represent that portion of the population whose moral reasoning does not operate according to universal principles and reason (the justice paradigm), but instead operates according to concrete particulars and emotion (the care paradigm).

Gilligan's argument rests on empirical, not philosophical grounds, nevertheless it caught the attention of moral and feminist philosophers, since her work can be understood as making a contribution to the question, "Is ethics gendered?". Gilligan's answer was resoundingly affirmative. The vast literature which arose in response to her work reveals several different positions.[3] At one extreme, represented by Bill Puka and Joan Tronto, it is argued that the very suggestion that women are more caring, less rule-oriented, and less `principled', amounts to saying that women are incapable of sophisticated moral thinking, which flirts with sexism itself.[4] At the other extreme, represented by Nel Noddings and Sara Ruddick, it is argued that not only is Gilligan's gender difference hypothesis sound, but also that women's morality, characterized by the care paradigm (caring, empathy, and benevolence) is a superior moral paradigm.[5] Still others argue that her work is beside the point: invoking the naturalistic fallacy, they claim that Gilligan's empirical results have no bearing on philosophy, and thus no philosophical merit.

Much of the controversy surrounding Gilligan's work rests on a caricature [6] of it that men and women make moral decisions differently, what Marilyn Friedman calls the `gender difference hypothesis' [7] This interpretation obscures what I take to be the more philosophically interesting aspect of Gilligan's work, that the criteria which constitutes normative moral theory reflects a masculine bias. According to Gilligan, Kohlberg's paradigm of moral development, which emphasizes rationality and use of principles, fails to recognize alternative forms

of reasoning as moral. More particularly, it tends to recognize masculine (justice) reasoning as moral, and either ignores feminine (care) reasoning altogether, or deems it to be an inferior kind of moral judgment. Thus Gilligan challenges the completeness of Kohlberg's theory of moral development, since he claims universality, but (if Gilligan is correct) the parameters of his theory does not reflect care reasoning.

It is important to note that Gilligan accepts the parameters of Kohlberg's overall programme. She endorses the project of trying to identify stages through which all moral agents will likely pass, but rejects his particular contribution as insufficiently complete. In other words, she believes universality with respect to moral development is possible, but thinks the introduction of the care paradigm [8] makes Kohlberg's theory more comprehensive since it gives both forms of moral reasoning paradigmatic status in moral development. In order to claim universality, moral development theory cannot justifiably ignore a form of moral reasoning, the care paradigm, which is both widespread and legitimate, according to Gilligan. In particular, Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development, intended to be formal, universal, invariant, and hierarchical, fails to reflect the care paradigm as a legitimate moral orientation. It is for this reason considered incomplete, in Gilligan's opinion.

Engaging in what Sandra Harding calls, "feminist empiricism"[9], Gilligan accepts Kohlberg's basic thesis that morality evolves through fixed and distinct stages, but claims that he does not have the full truth, since he ignores feminine cultural experience.[10] In so doing, both Kohlberg and Gilligan continue the long-standing tradition of normative or prescriptive moral theory, ignoring other possibilities.[11] In this tradition, behaviour is evaluated according to how it measures up to preset standards of morality. The hierarchical set-up presupposes structural bias with respect to norms— that certain norms and methods are built into the structure of the paradigm. As Susan Hekman observes:

> "although [Kohlberg 1982:525] claims that his goal is "the rational reconstruction of the deep structure of a morally educated adult's moral judgements and intuitions", it is quite clear that what he designates as "moral" is a pattern of thought that has been identified as moral in a very long tradition of Western moral theory"[12] ..."That the moral discourse of modernity has been dominated by formal, abstract principles, particularly as they were expressed by Kant, needs no argument here. Kohlberg relies heavily on one of the most prominent twentieth century representatives of the formalistic tradition, John Rawls."[13]

Gilligan claims that the norms which provide the foundation for Kohlberg's moral-psychological paradigm, with strong philosophical relations to Rawls and Kant, are structurally biased against other forms of moral reasoning, particularly those which rely on feeling over rationality, and resist the use of principles.

Gilligan's critique of the formalistic tradition has resulted in the revival of the classical rationalist-sentimentalist debate over whether reason or emotion dominates in moral reasoning.[14] In this paper I attempt to establish key similarities between Hume and Gilligan; ultimately I argue that Hume avoids many of the problems associated with Gilligan's ethic of care. Hume develops a mechanism for the interplay of care and justice, whereas Gilligan does not.

Hume is a `sentimentalist' or `emotivist' who believes that emotion alone drives moral reasoning, while Gilligan holds that both reason and emotion drive moral reasoning, without outlining any systematic account of how the two paradigms interact.

I. Emotivism in the Moral Paradigms of Hume and Gilligan

In her pioneering work, "Hume, the Women's Moral Theorist?"[15] Annette Baier suggests that the ethic of care is similar in form and content to Hume's emotivism, since both stress the reliance of emotion over universal reason.[16] In this section I attempt to flesh out some of the similarities and differences between Gilligan and Hume. Both explicitly claim emotion is central in moral reasoning, but differ substantially in terms of how they conceive of the relationship between justice and care.[17] I argue that Hume's account is more tenable, in as much as he provides a mechanism which allows emotion, rather than reason, to occupy pride of place in moral reasoning, without subordinating it to justice. I will show that justice considerations are met in Hume's account, but are met through the paradigm of care.

Gilligan's `different voice' is indeed different in the sense that it is not expressed in the dominant discourse of ethics[18] , but it is not different in the sense of `new, revolutionary, or not otherwise available': Hume had developed a similar account of morality some two hundred and fifty years earlier.[19] While Gilligan sees morality operating both at the level of emotion and reason, her work has largely helped to revive discussions about the importance of emotion for morality. While Hume's claim is somewhat stronger, both emphasize the importance of feeling and sentiment.

For Hume, "[m]orality...is more properly felt than judg'd of"[20] Using the example of wilful murder he asks us to:

> examine [murder] in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call *vice*...which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts...[y]ou never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action[21]

In Humean language, this means moral emotions fall under the category of *impressions*, such as Hume describes them, as "stronger perceptions, such as our sensations, affections and sentiments".[22] This are contrasted with *ideas*, or "copies...in the memory and imagination"[23] of those impressions. For Hume, "reason...cannot oppose passion in the direction of the will"[24] "The moral distinctions...are not the offspring of reason"[25] "The rules of morality...are not conclusions of our reason" and it is "vain to pretend, that morality is discover'd only by a deduction of reason"[26] According to Hume, "reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action" except when a "judgement concurs with a passion"[27] The moral sentiment arises from the indirect passions: love, hatred, humility, and pride [28] But this does not mean we are slaves to our immediate, and at times capricious, feelings and emotions for reason also plays

an important role in morality. Not all sentiments are moral, and some need to be "corrected" by reason before they can attain the status of a moral sentiment, which excites passions and produces and prevents actions. As Stanley Tweyman explains, "[w]here a passion is directed to its end through reasoning, if the reasoning is seen to be in error, the passion again will no longer move us to act"[29]. Hume criticizes those "who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them" [30] Both Hume [31] and Gilligan share an appreciation for the scope of the justice perspective. Both agree that reason does not do all the work in morality.

The manner in which Gilligan characterizes the way most women make moral decisions is in fact the *only* way Hume thinks moral decisions *can* be made. For Hume moral distinctions are not derived from reason, thus they are not derived from artificial constructs like justice and universality. Like Gilligan, Hume's focus is on passion and sentiment, which are impressions not ideas. The justice paradigm forces its users to make moral decisions on the basis of reflection and reason, and therefore by definition to make them at the level of ideas. The only way to make moral decisions is reflected in the way Gilligan's subjects did: by appealing to context, emotion, and a sense of responsibility. In this respect, Hume's paradigm of emotivism is almost identical with Gilligan's paradigm of the ethic of care.

II. Justice in the Moral Paradigms of Hume and Gilligan

Whereas Hume believes emotion is critical to morality, Gilligan believes care is one of two legitimate forms of moral reasoning. She argues that Kohlberg's moral paradigm ignores the lesser-known care orientation, and sets out to try to find a place for it in the `map of human development'. Gilligan opts for a dualistic moral theory, part justice, part care.

In the previous section I showed that central elements of Gilligan's ethic of care are similar to Hume's theory of moral emotions. However, while both extol the virtues of care, only Hume sets out a comprehensive way of understanding how the paradigms of justice and care co-exist. Gilligan believes care is but one of two major moral orientations, the other consisting in the justice orientation.[32] Care is meant to co-exist with justice. Despite this, Gilligan does not provide a mechanism for understanding how this could be accomplished, given the radically different natures involved. If it is true, as Gilligan thinks it is, that the care and justice paradigms can lead to conflicting moral positions and therefore conflicting courses of action, then which one should predominate in cases of conflict?[33] I argue that Hume offers a more tenable account of the relationship between justice and care through his distinction between natural and artificial virtues.

But first it should be noted that the claims Gilligan advances in *In a Different Voice* are numerous, and often contradictory. Owen Flanagan, for

instance, has distinguished seventeen logically distinct claims that one finds in the literature on the ethics of care but seldom sees carefully discriminated from one another.[34] Susan Hekman reports that "[m]oral philosophers, feminist theorists and moral psychologists have asserted, variously, that Gilligan's "different voice" represents a significant departure in moral theory; that it is empirically unjustified; that it establishes the superiority of a distinctively feminine moral voice; and that it provides a complement to the unitary voice of moral theories that have dominated moral philosophy in the west."[35] Hekman ameliorates this confusion to some extent, by distinguishing two main arguments in Gilligan's work: (1) the separate but equal thesis, and (2) the complementarity thesis. The former, as the name suggests, sees justice and care as "separate but equal", a claim which supports the argument that a dualistic theory should replace the unitary voice of western moral philosophy.[36] Relying on the duck/rabbit model from Gestalt psychology, Gilligan argues that justice and care are two distinct perspectives which cannot be held simultaneously. The latter, the "complementarity thesis", advances the opposite point, that "the themes of justice and care are woven into a harmonious whole"[37] As Hekman observes, "complementarity entails convergence, not separation"[38] Gilligan, by simultaneously holding these contradictory claims, is obviously vulnerable to numerous objections. Among them, that:

> "[t]hroughout Western history women's moral perspective has been understood as an inherently inferior supplement to man's moral principles. Gilligan is here taking a familiar understanding of women's voice and trying to raise it from inferiority to equality. Once more her effort is noble but futile; complements are always inferior to that which they complement."[39]

Gilligan's position, that the feminine care paradigm is as equally valuable (morally) as the masculine justice paradigm may well be interpreted within a predominantly masculine culture as a lesser form of moral reasoning. Hekman's discussion helps to illustrate how while Gilligan understands justice as paradigmatic in moral reasoning, she does not produce a viable explanation of how the paradigms of justice and care are meant to interact.

III. Justice in Hume's Emotivism

I submit that Hume's account of natural and artificial virtues[40] provides a way of bridging the gap between justice and care. Natural virtue can be understood as the natural affection we feel for our friends, loved ones, and fellow humans. For Hume, "sentiments of vice and virtue are natural" in one sense, since:

> there never was any nation of the world, nor any single person in any nation, who was utterly depriv'd of them [the sentiments of morality], and who never, in any instance, shew'd the least approbation or dislike of manners. These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that without entirely confounding the human mind by disease of madness, 'tis impossible to extirpate and destroy them.[41]

However, since both virtue and vice are natural in the sense that they are found in every known society, Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtue does not turn on that narrow point. In everyday life we can see action arising

from either emotion or from reason. Sometimes we `do the right thing', not because we feel the desire to (the way we would feel lust or hatred), but because we understand it is right. Hume would claim that the desire to do what is right is always rooted in emotion. However, reason might be needed to supplement emotion. On these occasions, "a person may perform an action merely out of regard to its moral obligation" [42] According to Hume:

> A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousins, his cousins better than strangers, where every thing else is equal. Hence arise our common measures of duty, in preferring the one to the other. Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions (T 484)...The remedy, then, is not deriv'd from nature, but from *artifice*, or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgement and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections..."by a convention enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability[43]

Artificial virtues (like justice, honesty, chastity and modesty) are not good in themselves, but rather as a means to general cultural conformity and overall communal morality. This is Hume's `noble lie' which inserts motivation where motivation is lacking. As Marcia Baron explains: "it is this sense of duty or artificial motive which prompts us to act justly...Hume thus emerges as a teleologist who holds that social good is best achieved when the members of that society are deontologists with respect to the artificial virtues"[44].

It is through this distinction we see the role of justice in Hume's emotivism. Natural virtue for Hume involves the kind of actions which are intrinsically valuable whether or not they are universalized. Artificial virtues, by contrast, have value in so far as they promote the overall well-being of society. It is for this reason that care and justice can be understood as forms of natural and artificial virtue, respectively. Artificial virtue is the public morality or justice which takes place at the level of ideas, and supplements natural emotion, or `care', when necessary. Natural virtue is the realm of individual, or `impressional' morality, since it operates under the jurisdiction of impressions or immediate emotions. Hume argues that artificial virtues like justice arise from impressions, not ideas, but this is because we are educated according to a `noble lie'. We think of justice as a natural virtue or `feeling' even though for Hume its worth is limited to the instrumental good of general cultural conformity or overall moral stability.

Hume would agree with Gilligan, I think, that the care paradigm on its own is often insufficient. Nature, in Hume's sense, did not make us full moral agents; accordingly, we require artificial virtues like justice. Justice, as Kohlberg, Rawls and Kant conceived it, plays a role in Hume's moral theory. Hume does, however, differ from them in terms of the ultimate origin of the justice paradigm, in as much as for Hume acting in accordance with justice is ultimately based on feeling, not reason. Within a Humean perspective, moral theories such as those of Kohlberg, Rawls, and Kant, reflect artificial virtue, but are ultimately rooted in what Gilligan identifies as care, what Hume calls natural virtue. In this way Hume accommodates justice in his theory of emotivism. [45]

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to show how central elements of Gilligan's ethic of care are not unlike Hume's emotivism. While credit is accorded Gilligan for inadvertently reviving the seventeenth and eighteenth century rationalist-sentimentalist debate in modern moral philosophy, I have shown that her programme would have been much more successful had it been grounded in Humean emotivism, as opposed to moral developmental psychology. Ultimately Gilligan fails to properly integrate the paradigms of justice and care as fully and comprehensively as Hume did two-hundred and fifty years earlier.

NOTES

[1] Gilligan describes the main differences between the two orientations, or paradigms, in this way: "Whereas the rights conception of morality that informs Kohlberg's principled level (Stages Five and Six) is geared to arriving at an objectively fair or just resolution to the moral dilemmas to which "all rational men can agree," the responsibility conception focusses instead on the limitations of any particular resolution and describes the conflicts that remain...a woman in her thirties...says that her guiding principle in making moral decisions has to do with "responsibility and caring about yourself and others, not just a principle that once you take hold of, you settle (the moral problem). The principle put into practice is still going to leave you with conflict", "Women's Place in Man's Life Cycle", 49 *Harvard Educational Review*, 1979, 444.

[2] Lawrence Kohlberg's model outlines stages of moral development which are universal, invariant, and hierarchical. According to Kohlberg, morality evolves through three distinct and fixed stages: preconventional (hedonism or egoism), conventional (social conformity), and postconventional (universal ethical principles). Despite vigourous testing, Kohlberg was never able to empirically verify the existence of the sixth and `most adequate' moral stage. See his "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgement", 70 *Journal of Philosophy*, 1974, 630-645.

[3] Owen Flanagan has identified seventeen logically distinct claims found in the literature. See his *Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991, 198-99.

[4] See Bill Puka, "The Liberation of Caring: A Different Voice for Gilligan's `Different Voice'", reprinted in *An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Routledge, New York, 1993, 215-239; and Joan C. Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care", in the same volume, 240-257.

[5] See Ned Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984, and Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking", 6 *Feminist Studies*, no.2, Summer 1980. For a clear exposition of the differences amongst feminine, feminist, maternal and lesbian ethics, see Rosemarie Tong, *Feminine and Feminist Ethics*, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, 1993.

[6] Gilligan's denial notwithstanding, much of the readership took her to be suggesting that men and women make moral decisions differently, and it was largely the result of this interpretation which generated enormous controversy. Two major factors are responsible for the misinterpretation. First, the subtitle of the book, "Psychological Theory and Women's Development", is misleading if she does not wish to emphasize gender differences. Second, the common western gender stereotype of women as caring, coupled with cultural prescriptions which designate caring as appropriately the business of women, have led commentators to believe she was offering empirical and scholarly verification of an age-old idea.

[7] See Marilyn Friedman, "Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender", in *Science, Morality and Feminist Theory*, edited by Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen, The University of Calgary Press, Calgary, 1987, 90.

[8] Gilligan described it this way: "The psychology of women that has consistently been described as distinctive in its greater orientation toward relationships and interdependence implies a more contextual mode of judgement and a different moral understanding. Given the differences in women's conceptions

of self and morality, women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order human experience in terms of different priorities." See *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982, 22.

[9] Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1986. See also Susan Hekman, "Moral Voices, Moral Selves: About Getting It Right in Moral Theory", 16 *Human Studies*, 1993, 143-162.

[10] Susan Hekman also makes this point in "Moral Voices, Moral Selves: About Getting It Right in Moral Theory", 16 *Human Studies*, 1993, 148.

[11] F.H. Bradley's descriptive-based Ethical Idealism is a little read alternative. See Andrea Austen, "Bradley and Feminist Ethics", 1 *Bradley Studies*, no. 1, Spring 1995.

[12] Susan Hekman, "Moral Voices, Moral Selves: About Getting It Right in Moral Theory", 16 *Human Studies*, 1993, 151.

[13] Ibid, 154. [14] For an excellent overview of the rationalist-sentimentalist debate, see Stanley Tweyman's, *Reason and Conduct in Hume and His Predecessors*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974.

[15] In *Women and Moral Theory*, edited by Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, Rowman & Littlefield, New Jersey, 1987, 37-55.

[16] While both Gilligan and Hume hold the largely empirical belief that emotion governs moral reasoning, only Gilligan maintains the further normative claim that it is moral to do so. She is therefore subject to the naturalistic fallacy where Hume is not. Gilligan's argument is of the form, X is the case, therefore X ought to be the case. For Hume we have no choice but to make moral decisions as a function of emotion, therefore any considerations of ought are foreclosed.

[17] Objections raised against the ethic of care lose some of their force in theories which contain a justice component. Since both Gilligan's and Hume's emotivist theories contain a justice element, these criticisms will not be addressed in this paper. For a brief summary of these objections see Andrea Austen "Bradley and Feminist Ethics", 1 *Bradley Studies*, no. 1, Spring 1995. For more detailed critiques of the ethic of care see Bill Puka, "The Liberation of Caring: A Different Voice for Gilligan's `Different Voice'", reprinted in *An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Routledge, New York, 1993, 215-239; and Joan C. Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care", in the same volume, 240-257.

[18] By "dominant discourse of ethics" I am referring to contractarianism and Kantianism especially. Kantianism in particular is hostile to emotion. According to Lawrence Blum, "[t]he defining qualities of the morally admirable man include...rationality, self-control, strength of will, consistency, acting from universal principles, adherence to duty and obligation." See his "Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism: A Feminist Perspective", XII *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, no.2, June 1982, 288. While acknowledging that some theorists argue that emotion does play a role in Kantian morality, Blum argues that "sympathy and compassion play a decidedly secondary role to reason." (288, ftn. 1) See his *Friendship, Altruism, and Morality*, Routledge, London. To be emotional in the context of moral reasoning, according to Kant, is to be immoral.

[19] There are no references to Hume in the lengthy bibliography or index to *In a Different Voice*, which suggests that Gilligan is unaware of the similarities between Hume's approach and her own. This is understandable given that she is a developmental psychologist, not a philosopher.

[20] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888; 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, 470.

[21] Ibid, 468. [22] Taken from the advertisement for Volume III of the Treatise immediately preceding Book III "Of Morals", David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888; 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, 456.

[23] Ibid. [24] Stanley Tweyman, *Reason and Conduct in Hume and His Predecessors*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974, 127.

[25] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888; 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, 458.

[26] Ibid, 457. [27] Ibid, 458-459. More particularly Hume says reason can influence our conduct only 2 ways: by exciting a passion or by discovering a connection between cause and effect (see 459).

[28] [See] ibid, 575. [29] Stanley Tweyman, *Reason and Conduct in Hume and His Predecessors*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974, 137.

[30] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888; 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, 456.

[31] According to Hume, reason is the slave of the passions, corrected and moralized. "To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to *feel* a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character" (*Treatise*, 471). "Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour" (*Treatise*, 469).

[32] This is maintained in Gilligan's later work, including "Moral Orientation and Moral Development", *Women and Moral Theory*, edited by Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., U.S.A., 1987, 19-33; and in *Mapping the Moral Domain: A Contribution of Women's Thinking to Psychological Theory and Education*, edited by Carol Gilligan, Janie Victoria Ward, and Jill McLean Taylor with Betty Bardige, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988.

[33] According to Gilligan, moral problems can be structured either according to a justice paradigm, or according to a care paradigm, but never both at once. Like the duck-rabbit figure in Gestalt psychology, moral situations can be seen in terms of care or in terms of justice, but never as both simultaneously. I grant Gilligan's point that there is no inherent `conflict' between the duck and the rabbit, since only one can be perceived at any given time. Conflict can develop, however, between individuals or groups of individuals who simply cannot perceive the duck as a rabbit, or the rabbit as a duck. Similarly, conflict can develop between care reasoners and justice reasoners, yet Gilligan does not provide any way of resolving this conflict. Given that the viewpoints are so fundamentally irreconcilable, how can they co-exist as they are meant to in Gilligan's dualistic moral theory? Gilligan would likely respond that while it is impossible to see both at once, it is possible to alternate between the two at different times. However, if the care paradigm results in moral position X, and the justice paradigm results in moral position not-X, which should predominate? See Gilligan's "Moral Orientation and Moral Development", *Women and Moral Theory*, edited by Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1987, 19-33.

[34] See his *Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991, 198-99.

[35] Susan Hekman, "Moral Voices, Moral Selves: About Getting it Right in Moral Theory", 16 *Human Studies*, 1993, 143.

[36] Ibid. [37] [See] ibid, 146. Also see C. Gilligan, A. Rogers and L. Brown, "Epilogue", in *Making Connections*, edited by Carol Gilligan, T. Hanmer, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, 314-334.

[38] Ibid, 146. [39] Ibid, 146.

[40] For a full explication of the differences between the natural and artificial virtues, see Ken O'Day's, "Hume's Distinction between the Natural and Artificial Virtues", XX *Hume Studies*, no.1, April 1994, 121-141

[41] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888; 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, 474.

[42] Ibid, 479. [43] Ibid, 489.

[44] Marcia Baron, "The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting From Duty", XII *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 1984, 541.

[45] Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, Hume's emotivism does in fact allow for a conversion of ideas into impressions, or of thoughts into feelings (or further still, of justice into care), although he believes that impressions precede ideas. According to Hume, we can take a cold thought of some moral travesty, which would not by itself motivate us to empathize and to ultimately `care about' that situation, and transform it into a hot emotion or feeling, which is capable of motivating us towards (to use Gilligan's expression) the `activity of care'. We can see such Humean emotivism at work, for example, in the contemporary abortion debate. Pro-Life activists frequently refer to the fetus as the `pre-born child' and include graphic depictions of bloody post-operative fetal tissue in their brochures. In so doing, they succeed in luring those who otherwise think of abortion at an ideation level (in other words, they `think' it, rather than `feel' it) as something which they know exists, which they know is legal, and about which they read in the newspaper, but are not compelled to `feel' for the fetuses/pre-born children/potential human beings which are being `destroyed'. Such graphic depictions force individuals to see the fetus as a human form, not unlike their own infant perhaps, and this in turn generates moral outrage and disgust, which in turn causes them to become involved in the Pro-Life movement.

NIETZSCHE'S MONSTERS
(abstract)

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The influence of Nietzsche upon philosophy during the last century has been enormous, especially for so-called "continental" philosophers. Much of the contemporary poststructuralist critique of philosophy has Nietzsche as its source of inspiration, although it is not at all clear that the *motivation* behind postmodern philosophy as a whole is quite the same as Nietzsche's. While postmodern philosophers rejoice in Nietzsche's destruction of the false idols of metaphysics, they base much of their own theorizing on *The Will to Power*, where Nietzsche is at his most doctrinal, theoretical, and even metaphysical. Furthermore, there is good reason, both philosophically and philogically speaking, to doubt that Nietzsche took this odd collection of notes to himself as seriously as they seem to do. The first part of the paper concerns the extent to which Nietzsche may have unwittingly given birth to a new metaphysical doctrine ("perspectivism", or perhaps, "the doctrine of the absence of idols"). Another way of putting it is to ask if Nietzsche has not committed the same mistake as those he criticizes in *Toward a Genealogy of Morals*, namely, if he has not simply "replaced one error with another".

Nietzsche's much-vaunted focus on "perspective" has been, in some sense, taken too seriously, and yet not taken seriously enough. It has been taken too seriously in the sense that it has been treated as a *theory* of knowledge (or the limits thereof) which must be either justified or explained. Yet it has not been taken at all seriously with regard to the motivation behind it: what Nietzsche calls the "philosopher's duty" to see beyond "the bourgeois world and its Yes and No." The aim is to escape the nihilist trap set by metaphysical abstractions, "monsters of the night", as Nietzsche calls them, and return to "the unpretentious, little truths which have been discovered by means of rigorous method", but which have been shunted aside by "dazzling errors." If metaphysics sets the stage for nihilism by questioning the veracity of what is linguistically and experientially indubitable, and, if there are forms of life and language practices which set the boundaries for knowledge and are, therefore, immune to theoretical doubt, what possible use can there be for philosophy? The second part of my paper deals with nihilism as a concern, first and foremost, of intellectuals. One might define nihilism, as Nietzsche does, as the feeling that there is nothing more "worth taking seriously". I would like to show that this "feeling" is actually an intellectual construction, or, in Nietzsche's words "a monster of the night", or perhaps, quite simply, "metaphysics".

КАЗУС НИЦШЕ, ИЛИ ИГРА В COGITO
CAUSE OF NIETZSCHE OR PLAY IN COGITO

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Одной из существенных философских интенций является суждение о том, что бытие человека в мире подобно отражению в зеркале. Линии этого отражения определяют основные жизненные проблемы , "раздачу ролей", саму "игру". Мир, в который мы смотримся, состоит из бесконечно раздваивающихся зеркал и неисчислимого количества отражений. Древняя мудрость "человек есть мера всему" изначально фиксирует амбивалентную природу такого отражения: бытие смотрится в человека, не находя в нем окончательного ответа, но существует "иное бытие" (инобытие), в которое смотрится сам человек и также не находит ответа. Вторая часть Протагорова афоризма ("человек есть мера несуществующему в том, что оно не существует"), по-видимому, с еще большей точностью и неотвратимостью закрепляет данную амбивалентность.

Именно эта многоплановая интенция стала прообразом возникновения целого спектра культурно-философских идей, столь характерных для XX в. Начиная с экзистенциальной диалектики и философии жизни (С.Кьеркегор - Ф.Ницше - К.Ясперс - М.Хайдеггер), различных вариантов психоаналитической концепции (З.Фрейд - К.Г.Юнг - Ж.Лакан) и кончая современными вариантами структурализма (Ж.Делез - П.Рикер - Ж.Деррида), идея "зеркала", разделяющего мир человека и мир иного, всегда оформлялась при помощи нетрадиционных моделей антиномического вопрошания. Можно утверждать, что порожденные европейской культурой конца XIX - XX вв. интенции "иного" философствования поставили между "Я" и "Другим" новые лакановские зеркала. Зеркала эти особого рода: человек в них смотрится, а бытие, иное с противоположной стороны видит человека, никогда не раскрываясь перед ним полностью. Дискурсивные практики феноменологического и постструктуралистского плана, мучительные поиски новых "онтологических миров" в постпозитивизме, постмодернистический синтез "без синтеза", шизоаналитический слом "классического письма" сами по себе напоминают порой осколки подобного зеркала. Видимая (и вполне реконструируемая) цельность зеркальной границы-поверхности оказывается подчас потенциально деконструктивной. Смещаются основные классические пространственно-временные параметры мира, и образ кэрроловской "страны чудес", как это не парадоксально, оказывается наиболее адекватной моделью дискурсивных практик такого рода.

Конечно, любой пессимизм, будь то экзистенциальный надлом души или же "пессимизм с ленцой" - нечто вроде постмодернистского изыска - вещь хорошо известная и порядком надоевшая. Манифеста-

ции смерти Бога, культуры, субъекта и даже конца философии уже состоялись в истории. Философия архетипически предуготовлена к подобному антиномическому скольжению, к совершению головокружительных взлетов и падений по синусоиде культуры. Значение полюсов здесь весьма относительно. Объяснение "полетам" философской рефлексии может быть найдено, в частности, там, где метафизическая проблема стремится обрести нравственный статус, религиозный опыт становится частью философского, а сама философия начинает опираться на универсальные ценности.

Логическая природа cogito сама по себе представляет определенную загадку. Еще Декарт утверждал, что речь в нем идет не о четко выраженном силлогизме: соответствующее общее положение ("все, что мыслит, существует") получается путем обобщения, а не образует основу для дедукции[1] . "В cogito ergo sum мы имеем дело не с дедуктивным выводом, а с положением, истинность которого явствует из перфомативного противоречия в его отрицании... О перфомативном противоречии, в противоположность семантическому, - заключает В.Хесле, - речь идет не тогда, когда субъект и предикат противоречат друг другу, а тогда, когда то, что предполагается тезисом как посылкой, противоречит содержанию этого тезиса"[2].

Идея перфомативного противоречия весьма продуктивна, поскольку позволяет поставить более общий вопрос о природе антиномических высказываний в культуре. Если мыслить может не только то, что "реально" существует (герои художественных произведений; например, Гамлет с его классической "парменидовской" проблемой "Быть или вовсе не быть"), то смысл противоречивых "сюжетов" культурно-исторического бытия оказывается не вполне рациональным. Вместе с тем, если антиномический дискурс выходит за традиционные рамки классического cogito, то встает вопрос о тех механизмах, которые определяют срезы его культурного бытия.

Корень этой проблемы, как представляется, заложен в "сломе письма", который происходит в европейской философии и культуре на рубеже XIX и XX веков и может быть выражен формулой "Казус Ницше". Автор использует здесь ту реминсценцию, которую вводит К.А.Свасьян в своем переводе известной работы Ф.Ницше о Р.Вагнере - "Казус Вагнер" ("Der Fall Wagner"),[3] только в применении к самому Ницше. "Казус (случай, падение, диагноз) Ницше" свидетельствует не об известных вариациях на тему фальсификации ницшевских текстов и не о культурфилософском противостоянии "Ницше versus Вагнер". Речь идет о том позитивном со-бытии Ницше, которое выступает в качестве катализатора и провозвестия "смены вех" европейской философии и истории. В этот сюжет входит и идея "смерти Бога", столь важная для Ницше, и проблема грядущих культурных катастроф, и интерпретация смыслов декартовского cogito.

Общий вопрос может стоять двояким образом: в каком отношении антиномии европейской культуры, столь характерные для XX века, находятся к идеям века XIX и в каком отношении раздел-граница, проходящая по "телу" декартовского cogito, обозначает рубеж в понимании проблемы антиномического дискурса.

С одной стороны, основная антиномия культуры рубежа веков была выражена Ницше трагическим противопоставлением друг другу символики "дионисийской" и "аполлонической" культуры Древней Греции. На языке философии речь шла об оппозиции между рациональным и интуитивным типами знания, а в более широком контексте - о противопоставленности класического cogito и идеи телесности. Проблема тела в философии Ницше становится явной альтернативой классическому пониманию cogito. Ницшевский вопрос о телесности - это вариант кантовского вопрошания о том, "что такое человек". Но, в отличие от Канта, специфику бытия и антиномий человеческого существования Ницше пытается обрести именно через проблему тела.

С другой стороны, антиномической является одна из центральных и наиболее радикальных идей немецкого философа - идея "Бог умер". Она ставит вопрос всей европейской культуре XX века. Если христианский Бог мертв, то неизбежен приход сверхчеловека. Но если тезис Ницше ложен, то ложным оказывается и тезис о сверхчеловеке, поскольку его приход возможен только в качестве "оформления" состоявшейся смерти Бога. Таким образом, как и в ситуации с Декартовым принципом cogito ergo sum, речь идет об обоснованности большей посылки, в данном случае - ницшевского силлогизма о смерти Бога: если все Боги смертны (включая и христианского Бога), то реально приходит сверхчеловек. Но если большая посылка не имеет достоверного обоснования, то все разговоры о сверхчеловеке оказываются новоявленной мистификацией, даже если она воплощается в социальном пространстве человеческого бытия.

Получается, что ни посылка о приходе сверхчеловека, ни посылка о смерти христианского Бога не имеют достаточной степени достоверности у Ницше, а следовательно, сам реконструируемый силлогизм носит антиномический характер ("бессмертный" Бог против "сверхчеловека"). Невозможность принятия обеих посылок как безусловных приводит к той же схеме, которую дает Кант в четвертой антиномии чистого разума (тезис: " к миру принадлежит или как часть его, или как его причина безусловно необходимая сущность"; антитезис: "нигде нет никакой абсолютно необходимой сущности - ни в мире, ни вне мира - как его причины"[4]. Слова о смерти Бога по сути означают то, что "сверхчувственный мир лишился своей действенной силы. Он не дарует уже жизни...[5]

Тезис о смерти Бога носит у Ницше многогранный, полифонический смысл. Эпоха европейского нигилизма, предсказанная им, одновременно является эпохой испытания, проверки нравственных ценностей культуры. "Атеизм Ницше, - полагает К.А.Свасьян, - ни просвещенческая прихоть, ни того менее "научное" убеждение, а своего рода непреложность измерительного прибора: стрелка сейсмографа, фикси-

рующая глубинную ситуацию эпохи, иначе - преступный диагноз, повлекший за собой наказание ничуть не повинного в нем диагностика"[6]. Ницшевский "танец о Боге" происходит в той же ауре дилеммного поиска, в которой, например, бьется мысль античных стоиков. Стоики полагали, что свободным может считаться лишь тот, кто владеет собой в любой ситуации. Раб же - не тот, кто телом своим принадлежит другому, но тот, кто подавлен собственными страстями и аффектами (ненавистью, гордыней, похотью), то есть является рабом самого себя. Внутренняя свобода человека возможна только тогда, когда он принадлежит не миру случая и страстей, но универсальному космическому порядку. Можно утверждать, что вопрос Ницше о Боге - это не вопрос о бренности человеческого существования вообще и подверженного аффектам тела в частности, но вопрос о сущности и смысле человеческой свободы. Тем самым метафизический смысл ницшевского вопрошания раскрывается в той же системе координат, что и классическая постановка вопроса о свободе воли.

Как остроумно замечает Ж.Делез, "мы искажаем Ницше, когда превращаем его в мыслителя, который писал о смерти Бога. Это Фейербах был тем, кто последним помыслил смерть Бога: он показал, что с тех пор, как Бог стал чем-то вроде "развертки" человека, последний должен свернуть и "пере-вернуть" Бога. Но для Ницше это старая история, и как старые истории стремятся мультиплицировать свои варианты, так и Ницше мультиплицирует версии смерти Бога. Все они комичны до такой степени, как если бы они были вариациями совершенно достоверного факта..."[7]. Философское бытие изначально основывается у Ницше на логике антиномического мышления, и этот факт весьма роднит его позицию с позицией Декарта. "Надо увидеть, - пишет М.Хайдеггер, - что Ницше стоит на заложенном у Декарта основании метафизики и отчего он вынужден стоять на этом основании. Невозможно отрицать, что Ницше отклоняет поворот, вносимый Декартом в метафизику, но остается все же вопрос, почему и как происходит отвержение Декарта у Ницше"[8].

Главный упрек Ницше в отношении Декарта строится по логике перфомативного противоречия, поскольку Ницше полагает, что тезис "все, что мыслит, существует" не является у Декарта доказанным, а следовательно, и аргумент cogito не опирается на достаточные предпосылки. Подобная постановка вопроса, на первый взгляд, наносит существенный удар по принципу классической рациональности и переводит проблематику антиномического дискурса из сферы "чистого" мышления (в зеноновском и кантовском смысле) в сферу общекультурную, антропологическую. Но все ли здесь так просто?

Хайдеггеровский анализ позволяет достаточно четко выявить антиномическую противопоставленность позиций Декарта и Ницше. Во-первых, если для Декарта человек - это субъект в смысле представляющего Я, то для Ницше - человек это субъект в смысле "последнего факта" наличных порывов и аффектов, то есть, короче, тела. Во-вторых,

если для Декарта существование сущего равнозначно представленности Я-субъектом и для этого последнего, то для Ницше бытия, понятого как постоянство, недостаточно, чтобы охватить собственно сущее. Поэтому для Ницше становится необходимой идея "воли к власти". В-третьих, если для Декарта истина означает то же, что достоверность, то для Ницше истина равнозначна принятому-за-истинное. И, наконец, в-четвертых, если для Декарта человек есть мера всего сущего (в смысле самонадеянности, как говорит Хайдеггер, "отпускания представления до самообеспечивающей достоверности"), то для Ницше не только "пред-ставление как таковое есть произведение человека; всякое формообразование и формозапечатление любого рода есть произведение и собственность человека как безусловного господина над всякого рода перспективой, в которой мир формируется и овладевается в качестве безусловной воли к власти"[0].

Подчеркнем две интересные особенности антиномического дискурса, возникающего "на стыке" декартовского и ницшевского вопрошания. С одной стороны, проблема истины, безусловная для Декарта, в интерпретаци Ницше приобретает форму "принятого-за-истинное", что весьма напоминает ситуацию классических антиномий, где смысл тезиса часто заключается не в безусловной его истинности, а как раз в "кажимости" истинности. С другой стороны, легко заметить, что точки зрения Декарта и Ницше не являются контрадикторно противопоставленными, то есть не представляют собой тезисы завершенной антиномии-проблемы. Они противоположны, но лишь как стороны контрарного отношения, а следовательно, предполагают не одно-однозначное принятие (либо неприятие) по закону логического противоречия, но конструируют некоторое объемное поле дискурса, в рамках которого пересекаются, совсем не отвергая друг друга нацело, взаимодополняющие трактовки рациональности. Речь, следовательно, идет не об отрицании принципа cogito, а о "переоценке" его функций в культуре. На это хотелось бы обратить особое внимание, поскольку многие современные философские новации (особенно в рамках постмодернистической парадигмы) доводят линию сомнения в принципе cogito до предельного абсурда, когда вообще отрицается его эвристическая сущность, тогда как телесность и все его атрибуты представляются в качестве единственно возможного и единственно "истинного" поля применимости философии. Происходит именно то, что автор обозначил в названии данной главы с помощью словосочетания "игра в cogito". Принцип "я мыслю..." становится обычной разменной картой в попытках обоснования принципиально иных горизонтов философского знания. И мы имеем в данном случае не столько проблему ("казус") Ницше, сколько казус определенных форм философствования.

Cogito в философии Ницше отнюдь не перестает играть роль принципа (символа) идеального единства знания. Но Ницше - и в этом его несомненная заслуга - видит в cogito внутренне присущую ему противоположность: своеобразный аффект воли к власти, насилие, выли-

вающееся в требование мыслить так, а не иначе. Иными словами, Ницше удалось показать, что абсолютизация cogito приводит к тотальности мышления, хотя проблема как раз и состоит в том, чтобы не декларировать а показать и объяснить смысл перехода от "я мыслю" к "я существую".

Как пишет В.А.Подорога, "по отношению к ницшевской критике Декарта мы не должны терять чувства иронии. Декарт не так прост, но и Ницше указывает на другое: на возможность иного типа философствования, нежели исключительно декартовский"[10]Мшление посредством тела, которое становится для Ницше поводом усомниться в истинности классического cogito, как считает тот же автор, призвано принципиальным образом предотвратить засилье в философском мышлении классических оппозиций типа "внешнее-внутреннее", "дискретное-непрерывное", "субъект-объект" и т.п. [11] То есть речь действительно идет о попытке снятия классических антиномий европейской культуры. И дело здесь, возможно, не столько в самом Ницше и его уникальном философском "танце" (буквальном "танце тела", как он описан в "Заратустре"), но в тех выводах, которые сделала последующая философия по поводу возможности или же невозможности присутствия такого рода оппозиций в философском мышлении. Речь фактически идет о том, достоверен ли прогноз Ницше об исчерпанности классического философского языка "бинарных оппозиций" или же этот проект оказался в лучшем случае одним из вариантов уже состоявшегося опыта. Является ли философия Ницше тем самым "визитом в себе" ("der Besuch an sich"), о котором он сам упоминает в одном из писем, посвященных Вагнеру[12]. Или же эта философия самой судьбой призвана очертить недоступные горизонты человеческого познания.

Можно предположить, что внутренняя ироничность стиля и смысл ницшевской критики принципа cogito не сразу были поняты. В его "танце" и в его "музыке", скорее, были услышаны классические формы антиномического отрицания, но не сам язык "искусства мысли", который не терпит подобного отрицания. Произошла уникальная смена регистров, хотя ницшевский вопрос (подчеркнем это еще раз) есть повторение кантовского вопрошания о человеке. Антиномическая интерция, как и в случае Канта, становится для Ницше неизбежной. Отсюда и возникает то невероятное поле притяжения-отталкивания, в котором новый вариант антиномического дискурса обретает свою самостоятельность.

Проблема Ницше становится более понятной в свете проекта экзистенциальной диалектики С.Кьеркегора. Категория парадокса не случайно является важнейшей для мировоззрения датского философа. Трагическая антитетика, заложенная в основание его системы, заграгивает наиболее существенные, болезненые ступени антиномического дискурса. "Парадокс веры" в интерпретации Кьеркегора как бы намечает ту тропинку, по которой впоследствии выстроится основная интенция ницшевских вопросов. Проблема веры возникает у Кьеркегора

не просто как нетипичная или редкая, но принципиально невоспроизводимая строгим логическим мышлением. Речь может идти только о специфическом "прыжке веры", поскольку "вера - высшая страсть в человеке. Пожалуй, в любом поколении найдется много людей, которые даже не дошли до нее, но не найдется ни одного, который мог бы уйти дальше нее"[13]. Вера для Кьеркегора являет собой особый тип познания, осуществляющийся без предварительного опыта коммуникации с объектом познания. Сложность феномена веры связана не только с ее спецификой как познавательного (и одновременно возвышающегося над познанием) средства. Поскольку вера тесно связана с волей, то постановка вопроса о ней неизбежно влечет вопросы о свободе воли, а также о коммуникативных связях верующего с Богом. Возникает целая вереница классических антиномических запросов, возобновляющих тот ряд вопрошаний, который ведет свое начало от Лютера и Канта[14]. В "Страхе и трепете" парадокс веры возникает и как проблема объективности ценностных установок. Принесение Авраамом в жертву собственного сына выходит за рамки "общезначимости", и поэтому ситуация состоявшегося и одновременно не состоявшегося, запрещенного жертвоприношения антиномична по самой своей природе. И если само действие отца (бесконечно длящийся "жест Авраама") в корне противоречит этическому началу, то стоящий за этим действием высший принцип - принцип Веры - ставит Авраама вне суда морали. Он должен, обязан идти дальше этического, чтобы воплотить идею Завета, осуществляющегося между Богом и человеком. Парадокс веры в принципе невыразим языком логического дискурса, и в этом его трагическая сущность. "С этической точки зрения, - говорит Кьеркегор, - Авраам хотел убить сына; с религиозной - он хотел принести Исаака в жертву Богу; но такое противоречие этической и религиозной точек зрения как раз и повергает человека в страх"[15] "Рыцарь веры" в конечном итоге становится заложником самого себя, но в этом исходе заключено и разрешение парадокса, лежащего в основании экзистенциальной проблемы. Как верно замечено в одном из исследований, "процесс ценностной самоидентификации индивида представляет собой "диалог" полярных субъектов бидоминирующего сознания, который имеет конечной целью "самоприемлемость", состояние мира с самим собой, переживание... собственной адекватности внутреннему эталону"[16].

И здесь возникает проблема, которая оказывается чрезвычайно важной для последующего развития европейской философии и культуры. Ее вариации уже в XIX веке достаточно разнообразны и связаны не столько с творчеством самого Кьеркегора, сколько с реально ощущаемым разрывом культурных смыслов, прочувствованных и А.Шопенгауэром, и Ф.Ницше. Диагноз предвещают сами названия произведений Кьеркегора ("Страх и трепет", "Или-Или", "Болезнь к смерти", "Несчастнейший"...). Опасность для классической идеи cogito возникает "с другой стороны", собственно, из сферы самого Декартова

принципа. Не телесное и не "духовное" становятся символами инверсии (и искажения) идеи cogito, а как раз наоборот: в самом cogito находятся такие смыслы, которые стремятся повергнуть его к подножию внерефлексивного и даже противоположного рефлексивному. Речь идет о возникновении феномена разорванного сознания. "Казус Ницше" на рубеже XIX и XX вв. воспроизводит характерный парадокс философского мышления, а следовательно, предсказывает принципиально новые горизонты проблемы cogito в культуре.

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ЯЗЫК ФИЛОСОФИИ
(Философия языка М.М.Бахтина).
THE LANGUAGE OF PHILOSOPHY (Bakhtin`s philosophy of language)

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The theme of the report is Bakhtin`s philosophy of language. According to his theory the expression of thought at the level of the existential Being needs the language in all its variety: including intonation, rhythm and gesture. The ideas of Bakhtin were close to those developed by Wittgenstein and oxford school.

Бахтин исходит из первичности бытия по отношению к сознанию, но под бытием он понимает не материальное субстанциализированное бытие, а бытие-со-смыслом, осмысленное бытие, а им может быть только бытие-событие человеческой жизни, бытие субъекта как свобода (выбор) и ответственность. Все теоретические построения наук вырастают из него. При этом науки пытаются выдать сконструированные ими концептуальные модели мира за действительный мир, в котором свободному бытию субъекта места не отводится. Следовательно, "первая философия" - философия первичного, нравственного, экзистенциального бытия (философия поступка) не может быть теорией в обычном смысле слова: в теории исследуется объект, а здесь нам надо сохранить себъективность и свободу. Философия поступка, по Бахтину, может быть только феноменологическим описанием, выраженным во всем богатстве языка, его стилистическом многообразии. "Для выражения поступка изнутри, - пишет Бахтин, - единственного бытия-события, в котором совершается поступок, нужна вся полнота слова: и его содержательная смысловая сторона (слово-понятие) и наглядно-выразительная (слово-образ) и эмоционально-волевая (интонация слова) в их единстве" [1]. Здесь впервые в философии провозглашается уважение к естественному языку и прямо указывается, что язык философии сродни языку художественной словесности, ибо и философия и искусство обращаются к первичному бытию (а им может быть только бытие человека!) Такое уважение к языку, проявленное Бахтиным, предвосхищает позицию Хайдеггера, его учение о языке , в том числе языке поэзии и философии. Однако дальнейшее развитие философии языка самого Бахтина привело его на путь, отдалившийся от немецкой онтологии языка, а направившийся скорее в сторону перформативной трактовки высказывания, развиваемой впоследствии Витгенштейном и Оксфордской школой. Философия языка Бахтина в конце 20-х годов - это своеобразное учение о языковых играх, только вместо правил игры предлагаются законы жанра. Введение понятия жанра общения из сферы художественно-эстетической в реальную жизнь - новаторство, давшее ключ к пониманию того, как строится общение, как в жизни, так и сфере философского диалога.

[1] Бахтин М.М. К философии поступка.//*Философия и социология науки и техники.* Ежегодник 1984-1985. М., 1986. С.105

ТЕЛЕСНЫЙ ЛОГОС (Феноменология тела)
CORPORAL LOGOS (The Phenomenology of Body)

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The report is devoted to the theme of the phenomenology of body. The author states that the first investigator of the body's as inner (I-for-myself) and outer (I-for-the other and the other-for-me). Later on the theme of corporal logos developed by German and French phenomenologists (Heidegger, Merlo-Ponty, Ricoeur The report is devoted to the theme of the phenomenology of body. The author states that the first investigator of the body's as inner (I-for-myself) and outer (I-for-the other and the other-for-me). Later on the theme of corporal logos developed by German and French phenomenologists (Heidegger, Merlo-Ponty, Ricoeur).

Одной из перспективных линий развития феноменологии в XX веке является проникновение в "телесный логос", или феноменология тела. На возможность такого пути указывал сам основатель феноменологии. Гуссерль трактовал объекты культуры как телесно-духовные, включая в них такие образования, как церковь, государство, народ. Но в целом он ограничился исс ледованием глубинных структур сознания. Одним из первых, кто применил феноменологический метод к исследованию тела, был русский фелософ М.М.Бахтин. Первичным бытием по Бахтину является событие жизни, обладающее качествами открытости, не законченности, становления, заданности смыслового наполнения. Оно ставит человека все вромя в ситуацпию выбора, где он должен принимать решение, не обладая информацией о том, как надо поступить. Творчество жизни - первичный и самый сложный процесс, сложнее, чем креативность в специализированных областях деятельности. Его механизмом не может быть логический рассудок, теоретическое мышление, а способ выражения не укладывается в абстрактный сухой язык терминов. "Практический разум", позволяющий принятие экзистенциальных (нравственных) решений, не может быть оторван от эмоционально-волевой сферы, вовлекающей в действие всю телесную субстанцию, а выражение во-вне происходит на полновесном живом языке, включающем все богатство интонаций и кинесики. В связи с этим Бахтин разделяет внутреннее (я-для-себя) и внешнее (я-для-другого и другой-для-меня) тело человека, выражающее смысловую направленность его поступка. За рубежом параллельный ход мысли прослеживаетсмя у М.Хайдеггера и французских феноменологов. По Хайдеггеру рефлексивная соотнесенность человека с самим собой является бытийным отношением к совему бытию ("вот-бытию"). Данное положение развивается и уточняется Полем Рикером, отмечающим, что тело человека разделяет с его Я "статус перспективной точки отсчета, задающей границу мировосприятия". Мерло-Понти развивает теорию "феноменально-го тела" как "третьего рода бытия". Будучи непрерывным трансцендированием, феноменальное тело является у Мерло-Понти всеобщим способом обладания миром, так как фундаментальная структура субъективности - не ментальность, а бытийность, онтологична. Соответственно тело выступает основой языка всех интерсубъективных феноменов (со-бытий). Идеи феноменологии тела находят перспективное применение в социологии межличностных отношений, культурологии, эстетике.

"ФИЛОСОФИЯ КАК СТРОГАЯ НАУКА": ЛОЗУНГ ИЛИ НАУКА?
PHILOSOPHY AS A STRICT SCIENCE

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В рационалистической традиции университетской философии XVII века сформировалась идея философии как строгой науки. На нее оказала влияние и трансформированная Лейбницем в логическом духе схоластическая традиция (школа Вольфа) . Под ее воздействием строгость понималась как соответствие ряду формальных требований аристотелизма, а равно и подчиненность "геометрическому методу".

Очевидно, что эта концепция строгости противостояла модели философии в эмпиристской традиции, начинающейся примерно в это же время. Она тяготела к адаптации, в качестве философских, методов естествознания.

Таким образом, до начала XX века в европейской философии существовало две альтернативные программы построения философии как строгой науки.

Первая программа, несмотря на свою логистическую и формалистическую установку, сохраняла, особенно в начале, онтологическую осмысленность. Категориальная структура метафизики воспринималась как формальный аналог онтологической структуре, что вполне согласовывалось с аристотелианской традицией учения о категориях. Однако постепенно формализм оказывался более значим в качестве критерия, и в рационалистической традиции представление о строгой науке деонтологизировалось.

Чисто рационалистическая программа в X1X веке уступила место квазикантианским: школа Фриза, марбургская школа и др.

Новый стимул к возрождению рационалистической программы возник в начале XX века под влиянием логистики. В ней мы различаем ветви неосхоластического концептуализма: Н.Шольц, И.Бохеньский и др., и номиналистическую версию: Ст.Лесневский, Т.Котарбиньский. Кантианские программы реагировали на эмпирические влияния, а рационалистические - на влияния, идущие от лингвистической философии, переформулировавшей проблему строгой философии в проблему логико-лингвистического пуризма и перфекционализма.

Эмпиристская традиция в течении X1X-XX веков дала не менее славную конфигурацию. Ее ведущим мотивом было нахождение процедур включения философии в систему эмпирических наук. Примером может служить концепция Брентано, главы континентального неореализма, и позитивистские поиски. Психологизация предмета философии существенна размывала онтологическую достоверность эмпирических моделей строгой науки. Гуссерль сделал героическую попытку соединить в понимании философии как строгой науки онтологическую фундированность и логическую ясность рационалистической традиции с достоверностью эмпирической трактовки строгости.

ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ И ЭСТЕТИКА — ПУТИ НАВСТРЕЧУ (эстетика Г.Г.Шпета)
THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND AESTHETICS — POINT OF INTERFACTION (Shpet`s aesthetics)

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The influence of phenomenology on aesthetics is the problem which has not lost its actuality by this time. It is interesting to us to research into the variant of phenomenological aesthetics, which has been suggested G.G.Shpet, which has been introduced in its work *The problems of modern aesthetics* and his other works.

At the same time G.G.Shpet remains on the position of "philosophy as pure science" and following from this the status of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline.

That is why his view is alternative to Heidegger`s variant of aesthetics for example, that gives us interesting possibilities for comparing of their positions.

Распространение феноменологии в область эстетики, создание феноменологической эстетики - процесс, в котором заинтересованы обе стороны. Эстетике тесно в рамках нормативности, феноменология нуждается в конкретизации своих принципов. Начало века ознаменовано возникновением первых вариантов подобного синтеза, осуществленного еще непосредственными учениками Гуссерля (Ингарденом, Мерло-Понти и др.), но данная проблема не потеряла актуальности и до сего дня. Показательно, что происходит даже ее радикализация (так, например, работа Fellman названа им "Феноменология как эстетическая теория" - Fellman F. *Fhaenomenologie als aesthetische Theorie*. Freiburg, 1989). Очевидно, что не существует общепризнанной точки зрения на проблему приложения феноменологического метода к эстетической сфере, поэтому представляется интересным повнимательней приглядеться к варианту феноменологической эстетики, предложенному Г.Г.Шпетом. В основных концептуальных положениях он изложен в работе "Проблемы современной Эстетики" (1923), но повторения и конкретизации этой темы можно найти в других его сочинениях. Представляется особенно интересным, что, полемизируя с нормативной эстетикой, с неокантианством, с экспансией в эстетику психологизма, Шпет остается на позициях "философии как строгой науки", и вытекающего отсюда статуса эстетики как философской дисциплины. Поэтому его подход альтернативен, например, хайдеггеровскому варианту, что дает интересные возможности для сопоставления позиций.

ШВЕДСКАЯ ГЕРМЕТИЧЕСКАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ И ПРЕДЫСТОРИЯ ПЕТЕРБУРГА
SWEDISH HERMENEUTICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PREHISTORIC PETERSBURG

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The nearest context of the prehistory of St.Petersburg was formed by the Swedish town of Nien, situated a mile farther along the bank of river Neva, and on the extreme boundary of the cultural area of Western Europe of the 17th century. Cultural incompatibility of both towns seems obvious; however it reflected the understanding of inherent properties of time and space, elaborated by some leading Swedish minds of the Imperial age. Hermetic philosophy, taken in the broad sense of the term, tended to form an essential part of these concepts.

2. The report is centered upon creative production of three gene-rations of Swedish intellectuals, whose acme coincided in consecutive order with the age of Nien: Johannes Bureus, Georg Stiernhielm, and Olof Rudbeck. The former is represented by his concept of Baltic geopolitical space, as reflected in the structure of the "coronation tournament" of Gustav II Adolf; the second, by ideas forming the background of the illustrious "Discursus Astro-Poeticus"; the latter, by implications of the historiosophy of the "Boreal Atlantis".

3. A wider context is formed by such phenomena as the Jacobsdal "philosophical garden" (regarded in the framework of the general cultural outlook of the De la Gardie family), compared to semiotics of the initial Petershof park. General conclusion presents a tentative outline of some guidelines of the philosophy of space and time inherent to Swedish Hermetic tradition, along with the type of their possible reception in the early St.Petersburg context.

1. Ближайший контекст предыстории Петербурга составляет шведский город Ниен, расположенный в миле вверх по Неве, и на крайнем пределе западноевропейского культурного ареала XVII века. Несопоставимость обоих очевидна; однако взгляды крупнейших шведских умов на устроение пространства отразились в нем, как в капле воды. Существен-ную часть этих взглядов составляла герметическая философия в широком смысле этого слова.

2. Изложение сосредоточено на представителях трех поколений шведских мыслителей, акме которых последовательно пришлось на времена Ниена: Юханнесе Буреусе, Георге Шернъельме, и Улуфе Рюдбеке. В творчестве первого выделена концепция устроения Балтики,отразившаяся в структуре "коронационного турнира" Густава II Адольфа; второго- идеи круга "Астро-поэтического дискурса"; третьего- импликаций историософии "Северной Атлантиды".

3. В более широком аспекте, проводится сопоставление феноменов типа "философского сада" в Якобсдале (и общих мировоззренческих принципов рода Делагарди), и семиотики первоначального петергофского парка. В качестве общего вывода намечаются контуры философии пространства и времени в рамках шведской герметической традиции, и типа возможной рецепции некоторых ее черт в раннем петербургском контексте.

ПОНИМАНИЕ ПОНИМАНИЯ: ПОНИМАНИЕ ПЛАТОНОВСКОГО ПОНИМАНИЯ
UNDERSTANDING OF UNDERSTANDING: UNDERSTANDING OF PLATO'S UNDERSTANDING

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The Plato's conception of Understanding as Remembering is con-temporary or meta-temporary , eternal . Western Metaphysics contains it like own center. In this article the author tries both to analyze and develop this conception.

The basic question is: "What's means Understanding?" The scientific Cognition is based on the assumption that it is possible to know the world. The process of scientific Cognition is the way of Correlation between our Consciousness and the external World's phenomena through the sphere of Laws. The result of this process is the creation of Laws, which are necessary and universal . According to Kant, the quality of necessary and universal is testimony of a priority or "inner" quality of our Consciousness.

The author distinguishes threes sphere: the sphere of ordinary world or real things, the sphere of eidetic essences and the sphere of human subjectivity. The Cognition proceeds as movement between these three spheres. We realize the mutual opening (Heidegger's "aleteia") and identification of these three spheres during the process of Cognition. During this process (through the sphere of eidetic essences) we transcend our subjectivity and finitude, and have the possibility to open the sphere of eternal essences, therefore the act of Cognition is timeless.

"The act" of Cognition as a basic event is pre-reflexive and pre-active, pre-passive. The Cognition , which opens this timeless sphere of eidetic essences , displays the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, therefore Cognition of external things (world) is Self-understanding. This identification of Self-understanding and Understanding of the external world justifies the existential analytic as a mode of understanding of Being.

The act of Cognition, as timeless, allows the identification of Understanding and Remembering, and shows the basic relation between the three modes of Human Time.

> Итак, повторяю, одно из двух: либо все мы рождаемся, уже зная вещи сами по себе, и знаем их до конца своих дней, либо те, о ком мы говорим, что они познают, на самом деле только припоминают, и учиться в этом случае означало бы припоминать. [1]
>
> Платон."Федон".

Западно-европейская метафизика следует во многом путями, которые продумывались Платоном и Аристотелем. Несмотря на многовековое отстояние этих философов, их мысль (конечно, это звучит пате-

тично и банально) со-временна, т.е вне- и внутри-временна. Мы, как и многие и многие другие, попытаемся еще раз вспомнить Платона, вспомнить, чтобы понять, понять-вспомнить...Итак, Платоновская концепция познания-припомина-ния...

Концепция познания как припоминания, выдвинутая Платоном, не столь наивна, как это может показаться на первый взгляд. Припомнить можно то, что уже содержится в памяти. Познание есть припоминание, но припоминание того, что содержится в нас, а значит самопприпоминание. Таким образом, память и есть познание и, как самопприпоминание, есть также самопознание.

Касаясь научного познания, которое имеет дело с внешними объектами, необходимо сразу отметить, что оно идет, прежде всего, путем соразмеряющегося постижения. В процессе научного познания мы соразмеряем нас самих с внешней реальностью. Научное познание базируется на допущении постижении мира. Очевидно, что без этого допущения невозможно научное познание. Это есть своеобразное научное априори. Иными словами мы изначально допускаем и стремимся к соразмерению, согласованию нас самих и внешних объектов. Но познание не есть соразмерение, согласование, а то, что делает это соразмерение возможным. А сами внешние объекты насколько они "внешни", насколько они противополагаются нам?

Еще Фома Аквинский отмечал, что в этом месте научного познания нас подстерегает ошибка номинализма. Наука имеет дело с необходимостью, которая возможна лишь в сфере идеальных сущностей. Внешний мир партикулярен, единичен. Он не дает нам необходимости, ибо он подвержен случайности. Всеобщие и необходимые законы научного познания говорят о неких идеальных сущностях, реальное существование которых просто невозможно. Даже нестрогие законы статистики, достижения которой, кстати, используются в физике микромира, не могут ничего конкретного сказать о поведении отдельного индивида, а говорят скорее о тенденции. Таким образом, в науке мы имеем дело не непосредственно с реальными объектами, а с их идеальными образами. Задача научного познания заключается в том, что мы пытаемся согласовать реальное (как нам кажется) поведение объектов с идеальными конструкциями, в рамках которых и происходит научное постижение. Сфера науки, если она претендует на этот статус - сфера всеобщности и необходимости. В этой связи хочется напомнить, что И.Кант говоря о признаках априорности, отмечал, что признаками априорности, доопытности служит всеобщность и необходимость. Иными словами, мы, вступая в сферу всеобщности и необходимости, оказываемся в сфере априорности. Но что же такое эта сфера априорности? Это, без сомнения, сфера "субъективности", но той "субъективности", которая открывает и проявляет в себе идеальные конструкции, эта та область, где законодательствует наш разум.

Таким образом, даже "строгое", "точное" научное познание соотносит в лучшем случае мир идеальных, сконструированных, "открытых"

научных сущностей и мир реальный, или вернее то, как этот реальный мир нам является. Наука согласовывает реальный мир с нашей способностью познания используя "мир идеальных сущностей", который есть законы нашего мышления и который согласуется с нами самими.

Но если научное познание столь "субъективно", что же говорить о философии и о так называемых гуманитарных науках, в которых исследуется сам человек и горизонт его бытия? Даже если мы будем подходить к философии как науке наук, методологии науки, науке о наиболее общих законах развития ... то и в этом случае в рамках философии мы будем иметь дело с "идеальными сущностями" в "степени", т.е. выстраивать еще дополнительный ряд идеальных сущностей, наподобие "третьего человека" у Платона.

Отсюда мы можем заключить, что познание внешнего мира, даже если это научное познание, есть в том числе и прежде всего самопознание, самопостижение, поскольку в процессе постижения мира мы постигаем мир "идеальных сущностей", который благодаря своей всеобщности и необходимости (априорности) непосредственно соотносится со сферой нашей внутренней субъективности. В свою очередь эта внутренняя "субъективность" как непосредственно соотносящаяся со всеобщностью и необходимостью мира идеальных сущностей имеет внешний, "объективный" статус.

Теперь вернемся к решению Платоном проблемы познания. Концепция припоминания оказывается возможной лишь постольку, поскольку "идеальные сущности" существуют до и по ту сторону их реального воплощения. Они вневременны. В процессе познания-припоминания человек вспоминает свое вневременное" прошлое", когда он лицезрел мир идеальных сущностей. В миг понимания человек как бы становится прозрачным и может видеть "внутри" себя самого истинный облик вещей, эйдос сущего, который благодаря этому становится понятным. Возникает мгновение истины и это мгновение раскрывает человека и постигаемое сущее. Это мгновение есть "алетейя", как пытался ее помыслить вслед за древними греками М.Хайдеггер. Познающий вступает в область несокрытости сущего, а эта область есть также несокрытость себя самого, открытости для познания истины себя самого.

Момент понимания, который открывает себя самого, не оставляет человека прежним, происходит изменение, которое есть углубление в себя и, одновременно, трансценденция себя самого. Понимание выводит нас на более "высокий" уровень, который есть одновременно углубление в себя: "Понять - значит измениться, превзойти самого себя..."[2] "Возвышение" есть "углубление", выход "вовне" есть вступление в наиболее "внутреннюю" область самости. Понимание есть сплав трансценденции и углубления, поскольку в акте понимания трансценденция, выход вовне и изменение понимающего, и углубление в себя самого есть одно и то же. Трансцендения-превосхождение и углубление в себя самого как бы "говорят" (про-являют) одно и то же, но разными

"словами". Проявление же раскрывает истинность и тождественность субъективного, того, что обретается индивидуальным актом понимания, и идеально-объективного вневременного мира сущностей.

Мы имеем здесь следующую онтологическую структуру: "внутренний", субъективный мир отождествляется с "внешним", объективным миром в области идеальных сущностей. Оба эти мира имеют свою истину во вневременном и внепространственном мире идеального. Мир идеальных сущностей заключает в себе и субъект и объект. Эта сфера до-субъективна и до-объективна. Одновременно она транс-субъективна и транс-объективна. Субъективное и объективное отождествляются постольку, поскольку причастны этой идеальной сфере. Само же отождествление про-исходит в акте понимания-воспоминания. Мы употребляем термин "про-исходит", поскольку он наиболее рельефно отражает в русском языке момент возникновения и то, "откуда " осуществляется этот процесс - про-шлое, про-шедшее. Поскольку эта сфера заключает-объединяет в себе и внешний мир бытийствования и внутренний мир человека, наполненный словом, она есть сфера онто-логии, бытийствования слова и о-словленное бытие.

Сам же термин онтология может означать учение, науку о бытии и, одновременно, как онто-логия - бытие-слово или бытие, ставшее или становящееся словом. Эти два значения греческого слова "логос" подчеркивают следующее: логос есть одновременно слово и учение, наука , т.е. сфера познания изначально словесна, а слово научно в той же самой степени, что и естественно-научные формулы. Мы можем это утверждать, так как слово принадлежит к той же самой сфере, миру идеальных сущностей, оно выполняет ту же саму функцию, функцию сохранения и отождествления-соединения мира внутреннего и внешнего в сфере идеальности.

Как указывалось выше, тождественность "внутреннего" (априорного, субъективного) и "внешнего" (реальный, объективный мир) про-является в акте понимания. Но что же гарантирует эту тождественность? На чем основаны наши уверения о тождественности этих двух сфер и, следовательно, утверждение о том, что понимание внешнего мира есть также самопонимание, а самопонимание содержит в себе познание действительности? Сам акт понимания является гарантом их тождественности. Если хоть раз в мире произошло понимание, то оно самим своим осуществлением гарантирует соотнесенность и тождественность внутреннего, субъективного и внешнего, объективного. Сам этот акт говорит о том, что внешнее тождественно внутреннему. Этот же акт гарантирует "бытие" мира идеальных сущностей.

Понимание осуществляется как рефлексия. Однако само понимание есть более первичное, то, что дает возможность или "завершает" рефлексивный акт. Иначе говоря, понимание есть дорефлексивный уровень, который дает возможность осуществления рефлексии. Понимание не происходит в сфере идеальных сущностей, оно осуществляется в момент соотношения сферы идеальных сущностей и внутренней субъ-

ективности. Необходимо добавить, что сфера идеальных сущностей уже заключает в себе "образы", "эйдосы" или "схемы" реального мира. Рефлексия осуществляет соотнесенность всех этих трех сфер, однако она гарантирует лишь знание, а не мгновенный и вневременный акт понимания. Знание не дает гарантию пониманию, оно не дает возможность про-явления, а лишь может обеспечить условия возникновения понимания. Рефлексия - сфера активности, спонтанности, мы можем рефлектировать произвольно, чего нельзя сказать о понимании. Невозможно только произвольно, по собственному желанию нечто понять, нельзя также и заставить понять. Если даже мы приравняем познание к припоминанию (буквальное прочтение Платоновской концепции) то и здесь мы вынуждены признать, что вспомнить можно не все и не каждый способен осуществить полное воспоминание, мы находимся в ситуации амнезии различной степени. Понимание, как нечто неактивное, сопоставимо, поэтому, с благодатью в том отношении, что мы не можем пред-сказать с уверенностью условия его возникновения. Вместе с тем это не сфера пассивности, более корректно описать понимание как до-активное и до-пассивное состояние.

Что же такое понимание, когда мы можем сказать, что "поняли", постигли какое-либо сущее (сущее может быть нашими субъективными переживаниями, внешним миром, обществом, текстом и т.д.)? Мы стали открыты, дали простор для соотнесенности нас самих и сферы идеальных сущностей, и через эту открытость мы раскрываем также соотнесенность сферы идеальных сущностей и реального сущего. Соотнесенность сферы идеальных сущностей и реального сущего в свою очередь возможно лишь постольку, поскольку реально сущее может быть открытым для идеального. Вместе с тем идеальная сфера также дает простор для открытости истины реально сущего, которая таковой становится лишь через соотнесенность со сферой идеальных сущностей. Акт понимания есть момент открытости всех этих трех сфер и их взаимопроникновение. Именно как взаимоотрытость, акт понимания до-субъективен и до-объективен. До-субъективность и до-объективность есть возможность дальнейшего разделения на субъект, объект и возможность рефлексии. Этот "чистый акт" можно сравнить с Хайдеггеровским Бытием, которое, в отличие от сущего, нерефлектируемо. Акт понимания также нерефлектируем, поскольку именно он дает возможность осуществления рефлексии.

Но почему именно акт понимания? Акт - это конкретное действие, и именно поэтому возможно было бы корректнее говорить о чистом акте понимания. Но если мы будем понимать под конкретным не что-то единичное, а сопряженность всех трех сфер, то понимание то и оказывается наиболее конкретным действием, а то, что обычно считается таковым - скорее лишь аппликация действия.

Акт понимания, как про-являющий взаимооткрытость трех сфер, про-являет в себе сущностные характеристики этих сфер и их взаимопереплетения. Платоновская концепция познания как припоминания

уже заключает в себе возможные пути для раскрытия взаимопроникновения и взаимооткрытости этих сфер. Однако эти пути были развиты позднее, через много веков после смерти Платона. Прежде всего, понимание осуществляется конкретным индивидом, который участвует в этом акте всем своим существом, а не только мышлением. Более того, в этот процесс оказываются включенными и то, что формует ситуацию познающего: это историческая основа, реальное положение индивида, язык в котором происходит процесс познания, общество и т.п. Все это приобретает онтологический статус и оказывается про-явленным как в сфере идеальных сущностей вообще, так и в той проекции, проявленности реально сущего в этой идеальной сфере. Субъективность приобретает благодаря этому вневременность и всеобщность и становится внутри себя самой этой идеальной сферой. Через про-явленность внутри себя идеального субъективность может быть отождествлена с реальным сущим и, следовательно, про-являть истину объективно сущего. Субъективность есть среда, в которой может быть познана объективность, или, иначе говоря, она оказывается внутри себя тождественной объективности.

Человеческие чувства, экзистенция также есть про-являющая внешний мир среда. Таким образом, экзистенция как среда и как внутри себя могущее познать истинно-объективное приобретает онтологический статус: именно поэтому возможны феноменологическая редукция, которая внутри очищенного сознания обретает эйдетические сущности, а также экзистенциальная аналитика Хайдеггера, где экзистенция приобретает сущностный характер.

Субъективность в акте познания вступает и проявляет в себе в мир идеальных сущностей, обладающей вневременностью, всеобщностью и необходимость, и, следовательно, сама становится обладающей внутри себя вневременностью, всеобщностью и необходимостью. Именно это позволило Платону отождествлять процесс познания с припоминанием. Познанное, как вневременное в сфере временности можно только припомнить (как нечто уже предданное), ибо оно не может быть создано во времени, во вневременном идеальном мире сущностей познанное как бы "явилось" один раз и навсегда.

Но сам мир идеальных сущностей, обладает ли он тогда изменением? Если мы признаем полностью независимое существование этого мира, как это делал Платон, то, конечно, любое изменение невозможно. Однако в процессе познания, который только, собственно, и проявляет и дает "существование" этому миру идеальных сущностей, происходит взаимопроникновение и взаимопереплетение всех трех миров: все эти три мира открываются друг другу и приобретают свойства друг друга. Сингулярность и временность субъективности вносит в этот мир диалектический момент изменения, протекающий как вневременное логическое развитие, что выявила Гегелевская диалектика.

Понимание, осмысленное как припоминание или открытость вневременному миру идеальных сущностей, проявляет иное соотношение

внутри временности человеческого времени. В момент понимания происходит раскрытие вневременности мира идеальных сущностей, в котором временность изменения представлена как логическое развитие. Исторические горизонты, которые о-пределивают как понимающего так и понимаемое сущее, приобретают вневременное сосуществование и взаимоотрытость, взаимное "свечение" друг в друге в идеальной сфере. Акт понимания приобретает вневременную необходимость, а постигнутое становится вневременно существующим. Именно поэтому постигнутое в определенный момент, ставшее вневременным, теряет свою временную привязанность. То, что постигнуто, потом, в будущем может быть только припомнено, но поскольку оно как постигнутое приобрело вневременность, то и сам акт понимания, который происходит в определенное время, уже в этот самый момент становится будущим припоминанием, а то, что постигается в настоящий момент оказывается изначально уже познанным и потому могущим быть только воскрешенным в памяти.

Память совершенно справедливо рассматривают как базис сознания в целом. Однако ее обыкновенно понимают как некое "хранилище" прошлого. Но обладая вневременностью своего постигнутого содержания, память сплавляет в единство разделенность времен: она есть возможность воскрешения не только прошлого, но и будущего. Понимая мы вспоминаем прошлое, которое во вневременном акте понимания есть будущее. Вместе с тем мы вспоминаем будущее, которое во вневременном акте понимания есть прошлое. Пытаясь познать какое-либо сущее, мы вспоминаем, как, например, мы пытались это сделать в этом рассуждении, когда старались вспомнить-понять Платоновское понимание-припоминание.

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NORMS AND VALUES IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

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In this paper I shall draw a picture of changing philosophical methods in changing cultural and historical circumstances. I shall try to consider Husserl's phenomenology against the background of some important problems of German Classical philosophy, in which Husserl's philosophy may be considered to be embedded. First of all, I shall compare some aspects of the Kantian approach to philosophy and those changes Husserl introduced into the Kantian picture. Then I shall discuss whether Husserl escaped the problem described by Schelling in his 'System of Transcendental Idealism': the problem of infinite contradiction between Subject and Object and its resolution in art. In order to do this I shall turn to the main features of Husserl's phenomenology and very important categories in his system of philosophical knowledge: values and norms. The mode of consideration based on these categories adds something new to understanding of classical problems.

Hence, the last part of my paper will be devoted to the relations of the absolutely valid pure insight, norms and the phenomenological method.

I.

The whole structure of Husserl's philosophy can be considered as highly influenced by the structure of the Kantian one (Schuhmann, pp. 271-277). However, if for Kant phenomenology was a science of objects of experience, for Husserl it is the consideration of structures of consciousness which are beyond 'factual' experience and history: the structures which assure the real functioning of consciousness and coincide with ideal meanings of expressions in a language and psychological experience.

The difference between Husserl's phenomenology and Kant's theory lies, I believe, in different attitude to the transcendent and transcendental. Kant distinguishes carefully the transcendent — all which cannot be reached, embraced by the consciousness (Kant, v.3, p.338, translation from Russian) — from the transcendental — all cognition which deals mostly not with its own objects, but with types of our cognition of objects, because this cognition should be possible apriori (Kant, v.3, p.12). It should be stressed that attention to, not only awareness of the 'beyond' is intrinsic to the Kantian picture[1]. This 'attention' has little in common with Husserlian usage of the 'attentive intentionality' as best term for intentionality, since in Kantian philosophy it is set against the division of the sphere under consideration into transcendent and transcendental.

Although the structure of theoretical, practical and axiological reason in Husserl's philosophy is likely to be Kantian one (Melle, p.119), but the very picture of philosophical perspective was changed. In Husserl's philosophy the

vantage-point is moved to the perspective of the individual perceived as living and moving and existing in a human 'life-world'. "The lifeworld is the world that is constantly pre-given, valid constantly and in advance as existing, but not valid because of some purpose of investigation, according to some universal end. Every end presupposes it; even the universal end of knowing it in scientific truth presupposes it, and in advance." (Crisis, p.382)

It is commongly accepted that the concept of life-world underwent changes in Hussel's phenomenology. At the time of Crisis, the life-world represented a general structure, which is not historically or socially relative, in opppositions to relative character of world-views. As Carr stresses in the time of Meditations Husserl uses lifeworlds — in a plural form, which is radically different, according to Carr, from what Husserl considers as life-world in Crisis. I would suggest that perhaps the difference is not as great: in the Meditations the life-world is still a general structure; but using the word in plural form Husserl stresses that multiplicity of individual perspectives each of which can be considered through this general structure of life-world described in Crisis.

In phenomenology individual perspective, the vantage-point of looking at 'the world' becomes intrinsically individual: it is not designed by or entrusted to the Titans of the Renaissance. This perspective is experienced individually. What is more, it is not placed against some measuring scale of great world perceptions by genious. Rather, it exists within the recognition that others have, or experience their own distinct perspectives (not in a sense that they function differently, but in some sense of being distinct as a sort of undetachable property). The world is multicentered, making the society the multiplicity of those individual perspectives.

Phenomenology, insofar as its descriptions encompass the whole world, must confine itself to a consideration of the world exclusively as meant without invoking, as standard of comparison, the world 'in itself'. This represents the phenomenological reduction (Carr, p.27) [2].

'Life-world' is subjective in a sense that it represents kind of a shaft of light coming out of an individual consciousness which illuminates the transcendent, which hides immediately but is always present within intentional field in a form of phenomena. The subjectivity which phenomenology deals with is transcendental subjectivity. Transcendent, namely "all which is opposed to immanent, all beyond the limits of possible experience and immanent reasoning" is not a sphere under consideration in Husserl's phenomenology, because everything he deals with and describes comes out of immanent acts of direct seeing. In every act of perception there is the categorial contemplation apriori, which comes out of this particular act. Since 'subjective' is a part of 'indivisible totality' (Carr, p. 220) it has two sides: the life-world as a stable frame and experiences of life-world as changeable world-views.

II.

In the 'System of Transcendental Idealism' Schelling discussed the problem with Subject-Object relations which can be observed in their purity and released from their infinite contradiction only in the 'alienated' form of work of art. The art is considered as a sphere in which the theoretical is harmonized with the practical.

Husserl leaves the sphere of Subject-Object relations in the sense that he treats the sphere of philosophy as the consideration of 'life of consciousness'. However, it seems to be that the problem Schelling was faced with just was moved to the another level. Namely, if the task of philosophy is to consider apriori forms of consciousness and — as formulated in terms of consciousness — to direct consciousness' the self-reflection, then consciousness becomes divided into consciousness-Subject and consciousness-Object: considering, 'working' consciousness and 'considered' one. Therefore, in the act of contemplation one part of consciousness plays a role of 'object', becomes alienated. The problem described by Schelling seems to remain unchanged in principle: 'working' consciousness always presents in any judgement of object-consciousness, just as it was impossible to get rid of Subject in the consideration of Object in Schelling's scheme.

'The reduction is not simply the owerthrow of all natural prejudices or Selbstverstandlichkeiten so that one can proceed from there. In a sense there is nowhere to proceed, because the essence of the reduction is the very discovery of what is overthrown... The result is what Husserl describes as 'splitting os the self' and a pattern of inquiry that involves a zigzag movement between the two'. (Carr, p.116, Cartesian Meditations, p.35) Hence, one has to consider what in Husserl's phenomenology plays the role of analogy to the work of art in Schelling's system.

There are two possible solutions I can indicate in Husserl's phenomenology. The first is the extension of ego-phenomenology to inter-subjective phenomenology. This gives the possibility for the internal intersubjective reflections to look at each other as in the looking-glass... This solution arranges the situation of a dualistic division and preserves the phenomenological monism in double categories.

The second way of solution is that basic categories are modified to become values, the pivotal category in Husserl's phenomenology playing the role analogous to that played by the work of art in Schelling's system. Scheler wrote: 'pure axiology in some sense corresponds to pure logic', and I perceive the role of values as representing the structure of pure insight — like the level of art at which the infinite contradiction of consciousness is solved by mere representation. What is more, the second way of solution is connected with the first one: some 'values' is almost the only observable part of the other subject life-world's content.

III.

I shall consider how exclusion of 'transcendent' from the sphere under consideration and the solution of 'Schelling's' problem was applied in Kaizo V.

As it can be reconstructed from the text of Kaizo V, although the absolutely valid pure insight always existed, it simply was not reflected on until the very recent period of history. Norms were changed in the course of time from the homogeneous undivided stage into the norms of different levels: individual, group, society ones — divided and developed[3]. That was perhaps the reason why mind became able to observe them. Once again, I would like to stress that life-world(s) seems to represent a general structure, unchangeable over the time, what is changes is world-view, filling of this general form.

Husserl's approach to axiology[4] is rather mathematical then historical. He starts his Kaizo V with a kind of axiom: the animal lives by mere instincts, whereas the human person, lives under norms as well. He assumes normativity as an axiom of the human existence. Then he gives a description of what he understands by norms, and doing this he works as a kind of 'historian', or a 'biographer', and describes all spheres where he can observe his axiom as being possibly applied. Only in this sense is the approach can be referred as 'historical'.

Norms penetrate all spheres of human activity and can be applied to aesthetic, ethical, utilitarian and others dimensions of human life, thus being universal. They should be universal, because they are a kind of ultimate cause, because they are the focal point of Husserl's cognitive world, conceptual scheme. Consciousness is always normative for Husserl. 'Entering into all manner of acts of consciousness thereby is a related normative consciousness of correct and incorrect and motivates a corresponding cognitive, evaluating, real and communal effective activity' (Kaizo V, p.1). Husserl stresses that norms can be related to individuals, to groups and to the totality of humanity. He also gives another scale of classification for norms: norms can be relatively valid as connected with contingent powers, contingent traditions and presents the changes of moral in the course of time and from place to place. Since phenomenology is neither about the 'objective' world, nor about the consciousness, but about how this consciousness reflects on its own interrelations with the world, this S-S reflection can be done only on the basis of the absolutely valid pure insight which observes its estrangement in values, norms — the means it operates with. I shall come up with the following version: norms form the general field of philosophy and values play in phenomenology the same role as the work of art in Schelling's system.

Among norms there are norms, which are recognized as absolutely valid and demonstrate the connection of individual with the transcendental. This type is that one I am interested in to show the difference between Husserl's conceptual world and German Classics. These norms are absolutely valid not because they are valid for everybody, or for all times, but because they represent a technical aspect of personal connection with transcendent in the sphere of

transcendental, and they are a pure absolutely valid insight. 'Technically' they are the same for everybody, as a mechanics — or as two legs and two arms represent the normal human constitution — but they are not shared, in a sense that they are in personal possession. These absolute norms are connected with feelings of divine commands, unconditional 'categorical' imperatives.

It seems to be that this absolutely valid insight always exists but it is not always perceived by an individual: only at the highest levels of culture can the individual reflect on the nature of the insight, at the lower stages of culture it exists unrealized[5].

The most interesting point here is that Husserl has to determine somehow, first, what is 'more highly developed culture'. It becomes a difficult task if culture is defined somehow through insight and insight through culture. In this case it is unclear what is the leading category. I tend to conclude that 'culture' and 'insight' seem to be double categories defined through each other, and the nature of progress in culture should be considered in these double categories. This means that Husserl's phenomenology is a kind of dualistic monism.

However, if even this 'double' version is accepted then one question remains: does the absolutely valid insight exist unchanged over the centuries, waiting for its revelation by the advanced humankind? Our question can be reformulated in the following way: if the revelation of the insight is not connected with its nature and leaves it unchanged then what is that element which causes the movement of humankind? It definitely cannot be the relation to insight because the striving to know it does not emerge before one gets to know it. In the modernistic perspective it is hard to say that the transcendental part remains unchanged, but individual changes. Transcendental — as I perceive it — although it refers to the apriori, still exists in personal possession, as revealed in personal consciousness as a mode of its existence.

That perspective of viewing transcendent and transcendental was changed from Kant to Husserl allows the latter to reject the 'externalized' way of thinking of how to get to know the transcendent, to intrincically internal way of seeing it in the phenomenological reduction: in fact transcendent and transcendental are 'congruent', the 'invisible' transcendent maps on, penetrates transcendental and constitutes its 'substance'. The transcendental is like the light which shapes transcendent, and this light is in the individual possession. Then one possible answer to the question "where is the sourse of movement of transcendental will?" can be: in its unity with transcendent.

Nonetheless, the 'insight' model, although fascinating and promising, might be treated as 'static' one. Even if every member of humankind is connected with the transcendent by the insight then what one may expect from the theory based on the axiom of norms and absolute norms is that the author would show how it is possible to proceed smoothly along the lines of the system's development. That requires — in the Classical scheme — an addition of another dimension into consideration: dialectics of a Hegelian type.

Husserl, existing within another cultural framework, finds a different solution: in the system of norms it is possible to distinguish between the development of a system and self-development, between the external norms and norms guided by individual, between thinking according to external scheme and according to internal one. This seems to form a kind of dialectical framework which allows to consider historical stages of the development of pure insight. The distinction is made in observation of values as manifestation of norms[6].

After Husserl makes the distinction of absolutely valid pure insight and external norms, he proceeds to religion. He shows that the development of a consciousness of norms and development of religion are linked to each other in the development of culture (Kaizo V, p.1).

The earlier form of religious development is, according to Husserl, a social organization of willful power, which takes in all regions of life, and only occasionally leaves a room for private freedom. This early form of religion is the core of all communal life, social activities, and in this way it connects all events and activities as well as all individuals, subordinates them to absolute divine norms, absolute divine guidance, providence. The latter seems to designate something different from the absolute insight. It is in a sense of divine will in its social dimension. Divine norms do not refer to transcendent — they are considered as they appear to the individual consciousness. Kaizo V, p.2:

> the ancient Babylonian culture lives in the practical idea of the civitas dei, has the form of a hierarchical state, in which all individuals and social activities and organizations, institutions have their purpose from absolute norms to which they actually appropriately formed and thereby made holy. Religion is hereby indeed also a title for a uniquely considered region of culture, namely as ecclesiastical organization, as system of cultic forms and objects...etc.

In the model of 'absolutely valid pure insight', which represents an individual connection with transcendent in the field of transcendental, one thing is unclear when the model is considered in the historical perspective: when does an individual start to perceive the 'external norms' as opposed to the absolutely valid pure insight? However, at the early stage of culture individuals are not able to possess (and recognize) this absolutely valid pure insight in full. And if at the stage of the greatest freedom an individual discovers the external nature of divine guidance as it incarnated in the religious institutions, then will or will not this individual reject these outer norms as untrue? Besides, it is not clear how this type of culture emerges, and how it changes, where those free individuals come from, even if there are some persons, who possess this freedom, how the whole society comes to the changes in religion. Kaizo V, p.4:

> Freedom is an expression for a habitual critical attitude to everything that gives itself directly as valid, quite by chance as the absolute norm of validities. The capability of critique belongs to the essence of human person.

Husserl left transcendent aside, solving 'Schelling's problem' in the articulation of internal division of the intentional field of consciousness. For example, totalitarianism in the dialectics of norms of phenomenology can be described as a time when the individuals had lost the connection with insight. Husserl does not describe how individuals come to this stage. However, at any

stage there should be a proper balance among different levels of values, only if one level is rejected in favor of another — totalitarianism emerges [7].

However, although applied to different stages of history, the pattern Husserl offers works and gives clear distinctions for many cases, it should be mentioned that Husserl's position overall does not allow to describe historical development in its 'continuity'.

The interesting point in Husserl's consideration of religious progress, however, is the idea of 'waves' in the development of religion, entelechy, which is not like a straight line of progressive fulfillment, but has some kinds of take-off and decline.

'Schelling's problem' was solved by Husserl within the power field of intentional actions directed in reflection to itself. This reflection has nothing to do with transcendent as separated from transcendental, since transcendent is already present in absolutely valid pure insight. Self-reflection proceeds in the field of normative consciousness. Norms as goal-ideas belong to the sphere of subjectivity. The work of art in Schelling's system was substituted by the 'objectivization' of Subject-Subject relations in the system of values — observed both in the life and in the mordern art.

NOTES

[1] I would also like to point out that the famous line of criticism of Kant, made within this transcendent-transcendental distinction: "If one knows that something exists that one cannot say that it is impossible to get to know this something", — becomes just a historical example of a paradox of understanding, when one gets to know Husserl's phenomenology; the latter shows that not everything is simple...

[2] At this point I shall provide only one brief remark about the possibility of totalitarianism in Husserl's philosophy. Husserl is not totalitarian when he tries to ascribe the same structure to any individual consciousness: his intentions shouldn't be misunderstood. The trick is that he wants to stress that without constant connection with the transcendent, without the absolutely valid pure insight an individual becomes a possible — and easy — victim of any totalitarian system. I am not sure he expressed this straightforwardly, but this is my reading of his attitude to the absolutely valid pure insight. The latter, I assume, can be considered as a genetic structure of healthy consciousness discovered and described by Husserl. Without this structure, it appears, an individual cannot even get the feeling, the sense of him- or herself.

[3] Norms seem to be understood as the reflection of subject-subject activity.

[4] There might be counted two different approaches to axiology: mathematical and historical. Historical may be briefly described as follows: it points to values and describes their historical differences. A good example is Spengler's description of stages of culture. He gives a scheme of the external development, external dialectics of values.

Mathematical approach is striving for a kind of axiomatization. It describes norms as transcendental basis of values, deals with normative consciousness. The development of values is considered in this approach from the vantage-point of the axiomatization, of a whole system of norms and values relations. Of course, a conceptual scheme always exists before description but sometimes the pattern is changed according to historical material. In this sense Hegelian 'Phenomenology' is historical: different stages presuppose different mechanics of elements' settlement. Perhaps, it is better to use a milder formulation: one can say which counterpart — historical or mathematical — predominates in one or other approach.

[5] It has to be mentioned, although I have no possibility to explore this in my paper, that Husserl talks about such a phenomenon as historical reduction. Historical reduction aims at the particular, 'the

particular configuration of historical-cultural prejudices peculiar to the philosopher at his own age' (Carr, p.264). As Carr stresses, in the theory of life-world Husserl wanted to acheive the phenomenological project 'of describing the world and overcoming the historically acquired hindrance to that fulfillment.... Historical reduction has the function of revealing the philosophical-scientific interpretation precisely as an interpretation, a certain way of thinking about the world, and of allowing us to distinguish it from the world as we actually live it, the world of which science is a conceptual interpretation'. (Carr, p.240) Historical reduction as phenomenological reduction returns to the position of pure seeing.

[6] However, it appears that phenomenology needs, besides norms and values as providing (partial) solution to the infinite dichotomy problem ('Schelling's'), the side-observer to make any desisive conclusions about the world within individual intentional field (as psychoanalist in Lacan?). Because if individual herself makes a statement about those matters, this just ennumerates refelections within the intentional field, as it was in the Subject-Object infinite contradiction in 'Shelling's problem'.

[7] Totalitarianism seems to be possible at the stage when divine norms and individual norms are separated as a result of development - and individual norms are sacrificed, cease to exist, vanish, dissolve in the universal norms. Why was not the Ancient Greece totalitarian? In Greece those norms were not separated.

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VI
PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: THE BOUNDS OF ITS POTENTIAL UNITY
ФИЛОСОФСКИЙ И РЕЛИГИОЗНЫЙ ОПЫТ: ПРЕДЕЛЫ ВОЗМОЖНОГО ЕДИНСТВА

PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES: THE LIMITS OF THEIR POTENTIAL UNITY?

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Ontological Unity of Philosophical and Religious Experiences

Experience is a responsive contact with a person's environment. It starts at birth and ends at death. It commences with perception, passes through feelings and thinking. Finally, it reaches the stage of symbolism in a locale. Experience is an ongoing process. An individual's lived experience forms a totality. There is continual integration of experiences be they philosophical, religious, astrological or psychic in origin. Thus inside a human person, experiences are not compartmentalized in accordance with their sources — philosophical, religious, astrological, pedagogical, scientific etc.

Philosophy started as Egyptian Mystery System which was a mixture of philosophical and religious experiences. Socrates and some other ancient Greek philosophers were initiates of this Egyptian Mystery system. In addition, Socrates, for instance, is said to be under the influence of Belial. To that effect, his philosophical experience co-mingled resoundingly with his religious experience. Besides, the term "Philosophy" is etymologically defined as love of wisdom. But Pythagoras, the very first user of that term, said that wisdom *simpliciter* belongs to God. We are aware of at least two shades of wisdom: divine and human. As both of them are in man, the question then is, where does the one end and where does the other begin? In addition, God, according to St. John the Evangelist, is love and whoever lives in love lives in God and God lives in him/her.[1]

> The living God is with us and will not be measured, nor will He measure us, nor will He put us within boundaries and circumscribe us. Just as the man who wanted to see how far Jerusalem extends, what its boundaries are, so the human mind is always thinking in terms of limitations. In our Christian experience these borders on God's love keep us down, oppress us, anguish us, fill us with distress or resentment. When we build walls and fences the vision is limited and the panorama is no longer a panorama.[2]

Religious Experience

From a positive perspective, religious experience is an intimate knowledge of a deity or of the Supreme Being (God). It is an intuitive notion blending the

mystery of God's transcendence with immanent sentiments about God. Expressions such as "God is providence", "God is good", "God is love" etc., are indicative of a personal positive experience of providence, goodness and love. Personal religiosity predicates these qualities of the highest supernatural being. These reactions, qualifications and their interpretations are done in an atmosphere of true freedom. Hence a negative religious experience equally induces a person to adopt attitudes of refutation and unbelief, and even of total rejection. It may start off with indifference and end up with hate. But that is a person's prerogative. Religious experience is personal.

These days, the tendency is to place religious experience over and above religion so much so that some Christians boldly assert that Christianity is not a religion but a way of life. This assertion is philosophical, a kind of protest against ossified religious liturgy of some of the orthodox churches. For people in this category, mainly the charismatic, "prayer is a living experience with a living God" [3], not a formula that could be hurriedly recited (just to fulfill the law) without really contacting God. As George DePrizio noted,

> ... "theology" comes from two Greek words, *theos and logos. Logos* is Word. *Theos* is God. Basic theology then is simply the Word of God. This key is effecting a great transformation all across Christendom today, even among the clergy. And I find people in every area of the Body of Christ have the same hunger and thirst that I experienced. Often their theology is good, yet it is only abstract, for it is possible to read books and be very erudite in doctrine and philosophy without knowing the living Lord Jesus. [4]
>
> ... This is not what Jesus Christ came to teach us, I thought! We are not to die in the pews! We are to enjoy life, victory and resurrection in His name!
>
> Another comment frequently heard in the parish is young people saying, 'I don't want to go to church, Mom. There's nothing there relevant to me'. It took a while to realize that when Jesus Christ is not revealed a worship service isn't relevant. People won't continue to attend church just to hear sociology, philosophy or even abstract theology. People go to church to meet the living Lord. If they don't find Hi-m can we blame them for not coming back? Aren't they just being honest and facing the facts?[5]

Religious experience is much more than book learning, it is rather an encounter with a living God, and the pouring out of one's heart the love of God in a simple, yet magnificent way. It includes living out this outpouring of benevolence and other spiritual gifts in practical terms. As St. Paul puts it, "faith without good works is dead". One who has experienced God should not be tepid but should rather be aglow with the zeal to share not only his/her experience but spiritual gifts as well. One who has really encountered God should not be the same again. This holds not only in Christianity but also in Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism etc. That is precisely why it is assumed that through transcendental meditation, one can achieve immortality, freedom from diseases etc. Transcendental meditation aims at integration with the deity, at Nirvana as the absorption of the finite-soul in Supreme Atman[6], an eternal bliss which is attendant on the practice of spiritual discipline in the quest for self-realization of Noble Wisdom[7], where compassion for others transcends all thoughts of self, where the manifestation of Noble Wisdom expresses itself in Perfect Love for all; it is where the manifestation of Perfect Love expresses itself in Noble Wisdom for the enlightenment of all — there, indeed, is Nirvana![8]; in Noble Wisdom, all things are in Nirvana from the beginning.[9]

Philosophical Experience

Apart from being a speculative study, philosophy used to have a practical cum moral arm. Hence Cicero defined philosophy as the at-t of life, while for John Seldon, philosophy is nothing but prudence. Above all, to possess a philosophical temperament is to be calm, wise and patient like the virtuous Socrates. And to take things philosophically is to be broadminded and tolerant, prudent, cool headed and unruffled in turbulent periods; being able to live one's life according to consistent principles.[10] For Bertrand Russell, the chief value of philosophy is philosophic contemplation. From the vastness of the universe which the philosopher contemplates, the mind is ennobled and the self is enlarged. From the impartiality with which the mind contemplates truth results justice in action and universal love in emotion. In this, both philosophic and religious experience achieve the same purpose. Besides, "The *Summum Bonum"* — the Greatest Good, the lifting of man from the level of mortal and advancing him to the level of a God, the salvation of soul, the purpose of philosophy[11] or the purpose of the philosopher's seven liberal arts — is equally the purpose of religious experience.

The question then is, if a philosopher who is at the same time a religious person loves people, is it out of religious experience or out of philosophic experience that he/she does so? To put it differently, to what degree has religion helped and to what extent has philosophy contributed to his/her love of fellow human beings? And as love begets love, the love he/she receives in return, is it a philosophical or a religious experience? From another dimension, discernment, which religious people cherish as one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, is the very critical evaluation which the philosopher does. When a religious philosopher is very discerning, where does his/her religious gift stop and where does his/her philosophical insight begin? And how does any philosopher ascertain that his/her philosophical erudition is not a subsequent development of his/her endowments given that not everybody can freely chose philosophy as a career? For philosophy happens to be in the realm of *'Qui capers potest capiat!'* We say any philosopher because every person without exception is an *imago Dei,* and it is in God that we live and move and have our being. It may well be that an atheist is not willfully on God's side but God is on his side.

St Paul advised Titus: "avoid pointless speculations, and those genealogies, and the quibbles and disputes ... If a man disputes what you teach, then after a first or second warning, have no more to do with him."[12] In religious experience, the assurance of Nirvana is neither an assurance of numbers nor of logic; it is not the mind that is to be assured but the heart.[13] Whereas in philosophic experience, it is more of the mind than of the heart. However, this distinction can only hold for those whose philosophies are merely abstract and divorced from the practical implications of morality, metaphysics and philosophy of religion. It

does not apply to those for whom philosophy is praxis — theory and practice put together. It was about the former that St. Paul argued: "They claim to have knowledge of God but the things they do are nothing but denial of him; they are outrageously rebellious and quite incapable of doing good" [14]

> ... such people are without excuse: they knew God and yet refused to honour him as God or to thank him; instead, they made nonsense out of logic and their empty minds were darkened. The more they call themselves philosophers, the more stupid they grew, until they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for a worthless imitation.[15]

Blaise Pascal would agree with this piece of reasoning. For in "The Memorial" he wrote:

> FIRE
> God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,
> Not of the philosophers and the learned.
> Certitude. Joy. Certitude. Emotion. Peace. Joy.
> The World has not known Thee, but I have known Thee.
> Joy! Joy! Joy! Tears of joy.
> My God, wilt thou leave me?
> Let me not be separated from Thee in all eternity.
> This is life eternal that they may know thee.
> The only true God and him whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ.

This implies that even though Pascal was both "philosopher" and "learned", his mystical encounter with God was experienced in a different capacity all together. Mysticism is practical, not theoretical. It is the most intense form of experience, which Plotinus termed "the flight of the Alone to the Alone". Evelyn Underhill tells us that " In mysticism the will is united with the emotions in an impassioned desire to transcend the sense-world, in order that the self may be joined by love to the one eternal and ultimate Object of love.[16] A mystic is in love with the Absolute; a mystic is the person who attains to this union, not the person who talks about it. Not to know about, but to be, is the mark of the real initiate. [17] The business and method of mysticism is love; mystic love is a total dedication of the will; the deep-seated desire and tendency of the soul towards its source.

Obviously, not every philosopher and indeed not every religious person will be able to attain such a lofty height but the fact remains that this ideal is the aim of both religious and philosophical experiences. As man is an integral whole, a synthesis of both experiences other than their potential limits should be emphasised, especially for the attainment of "the salvation of soul", "The *Summum Bonum."*

NOTES

[1] 1 John 4: 16.
[2] *The Acts of the Holy Spirit Among Catholics Today*, Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship Internal, Costa Mesa, 1974, p. 66.
[3] Ibid., p. 65. [4] Ibid., p. 62. [5] Ibid., p. 63.
[6] Mourant, A. *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion*, Thomas Crowell Company, INC., New York, 1954, p. 456.
[7] Ibid., p. 457. [8] Ibid., P. 459. [9] Ibid., p. 460.
[10] Eboh, M.P. *Elements of Philosophy: African and Western Perspectives* (Forthcoming).
[11] George G. M. Jaines, *The Stolen Legacy*, p. 176.
[12] Tt 3: 9-10. [13] Mourant, A. op. cit., p. 458. [14] Tt 1: 6. [15] Rom 1: 21-24.
[16] A. Mourant, op. cit., p. 137. [17] Loc. cit.

HUME'S DIALOGUES ON A PARADIGMATIC CRITICISM OF A PRIORI CAUSAL PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE[1]

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> The argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on is the common one. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason it its existence, it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all, or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is *necessarily* existent: Now that the first supposition is absurd may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause, which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any thing: And yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any particular object, which begins to exist in time. The question is still reasonable why this succession of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there be no necessarily existent Being, any supposition, which can be formed, is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in nothing's having existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes, which constitutes the universe. What was it then, which determined something to exist rather than nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? *External causes*, there are supposed to be none. *Chance* is a word without a meaning. Was it *nothing*? But that can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction. There is consequently such a Being, that is, there is a Deity.

In Part 9 of Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Demea offers his *a priori* argument for God's existence, an argument, I suggest, which appears to have a *prima facie* plausibility. Consider the structure of the proof. Any object which currently exists is related causally to a chain or succession of objects which extends back to infinity. Demea argues that, although particular members in the chain or succession can be accounted for by reference to earlier members in the chain, nevertheless, two questions remain unanswered. One question is, "Why is there something rather than nothing?", and the other question is, "Why does this particular succession of causes exist rather than some other, or no succession at all?" Demea contends that these are legitimate causal questions, which can only be answered by making a modal leap. Since no contingent being can account for the eternal (backward) chain of causes and effects (any such contingent being would be a member of the succession and, therefore, part of the problem), and since we cannot explain the chain through either Chance (chance for Hume means no cause, and this is unintelligible) or Nothing (*ex nihilo nihil fuit*), Demea concludes that we can explain the infinite or eternal succession only by having recourse to "a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction" (D. 149). According to Demea, therefore, the eternally contingent must be grounded in the eternally necessary.

When Cleanthes undertakes his critique of Demea's argument, he begins with the well-known Humean criticism of this argument, and says of this criticism: "I propose

this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it" (D. 149). The criticism at issue is the one which concerns the Humean point that nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. This criticism, in full, reads as follows:

> I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by an argument *a priori*. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no Being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently, there is no Being whose existence is demonstrable.

Cleanthes' point centers around the Humean view that since the premises in a sound deductive argument offer conclusive support for the conclusion, the only type of statement which can be demonstrated is one which is *necessarily* true, that is, where the relata are inseparable from each other. Mathematics, of course, offers the paradigm for the type of demonstrative proof which Hume has in mind.

Hume has a test for determining whether the relata in a statement are connected necessarily or contingently: the first relatum is affirmed in thought, while the second is denied. If the first cannot be thought once the second has been denied (as is the case with, for example, 2+2=3+1), then the relata are necessarily connected, and are inseparable from each other: on the other hand, if the first can be thought once the second has been denied (as is the case with, for example, 'strawberries' and 'red'), then the relata are contingently connected, and are separable from each other.

Now, Cleanthes' point is that since 'God exists' functions in the way 'All strawberries are red' functions, in that the test of inseparability does not succeed in either case (if I think of strawberries and deny they are red, I can still think of strawberries; similarly, if I think of God and deny that He exists, I can still think of God), a demonstrative proof of God's existence is (logically) impossible. But Demea will hardly find this a decisive criticism regarding a demonstrative proof of God's existence, since he claims to be unable to think of God's nature, if God's existence is denied. For Demea, as we have seen, God carries the REASON of his existence in himself, and...cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction" (D.149).

Does Hume have arguments which can convince Demea that the denial of an existential claim is conceivable? In *Treatise* I.2.6, "Of the idea of existence, and of external existence," Hume maintains that, although there is no impression or idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not conceived as existent, there is no separate idea of existence which can be associated, or conjoined with, ideas of objects which we believe exist. His argument for this focuses on the fact that there are no distinct impressions which are inseparably conjoined: "Tho' certain sensations may at one time be united, we quickly find they admit of a separation, and may be presented apart. And thus, tho' every impression and idea we remember be consider'd as existent, the idea of existence is not derived from any particular impression" (T.66).

Could it be, then, that existence can be distinguished from ideas of objects we believe exist by a distinction of reason, that is, is existence an inseparable aspect of every perception we believe exists? If this is the case, then existence would be related to the idea of an object as color is related to figure, or motion to the body moved, and

could be distinguished from the idea of the object believed to exist only by a distinction of reason. In this way, Demea's position would be shown to be correct, for the attempt to separate the thought of God from the thought of God's existence would render the thought of God inconceivable. [The actual example employed in his discussion in the *Treatise* (p.25) is the distinction between the color and the figure in a globe of white marble. He points out that when presented with a globe of white marble, the color is inseparable and indistinguishable from the figure. However, if we also observe a globe of black marble and a cube of white marble, and compare them with a globe of white marble, we will be able to distinguish the color and figure of the latter through the resemblances it has with the other two objects. That is, the color of the globe resembles the color of the cube, and the figure of the globe resembles the figure of the black marble: "[W]e consider the figure and color together, since they are in effect the same and indistinguishable; but still view them in different aspects, according to resemblances, of which they are susceptible" (T 25).] Is existence, then, distinguishable from the object held to exist only by a distinction of reason?

As we have seen, Hume maintains that, "Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent" (T 67). A number of passages show that by this he means that, 'whatever we conceive, we conceive as *possibly* existing.'

> Whatever can be conceiv'd by a clear and distinct idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence (T43).
>
> "Tis an establish'd maxim in metaphysics, *That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence*,...(T32).

Hence, all perceptions are conceived with the modality of possibility. That certain perceptions or objects are regarded as possibly existing and others as actually existing is discussed in the context of Hume's theory of belief. In the appendix to the *Treatise*, he clarifies his account of belief presented in *Treatise* 1.3. He argues there that belief is either "some new idea, such as that of *reality* or *existence*, which we join to the simple conception of an object, or it is merely a peculiar *feeling* or *sentiment*" (T 623). For Hume, a satisfactory account of belief also provides a satisfactory account of reality or existence. The awareness of existence is explained through the awareness of belief. His analysis of belief focuses on the *manner* of conception rather than focusing on the *content* of a conception:

> there is a greater firmness and solidity in the conceptions, which are the objects of conviction and assurance, than in the loose and indolent reveries of a castle-builder,..They are different to the feeling; but there is no distinct or separate impression attending them (T624-625).

For Hume, therefore, to have a languid perception is to believe that the object corresponding to that (those) idea(s) may exist; to have a more vivacious perception is to believe that the object corresponding to the perception does exist. The force and vivacity of the perception will determine whether the object corresponding to the perception is regarded as something which may exist, or as something which does not exist.

Force and vivacity are inseparable, although variable, features or aspects of perceptions; what we apprehend is a perception with a certain force and vivacity. Now, since all perceptions have some degree of force and vivacity, we are able to distinguish, in thought, the force and vivacity of a perception from the perception itself through a distinction of reason, or contrasting comparison with other perception. There is no more difficulty in distinguishing the force and vivacity of a

given perception from the perception with that force and vivacity through a distinction of reason than there is in distinguishing (again through a distinction of reason) the color from the figure of an object.

It must be emphasized, however, that since force and vivacity cause our beliefs in the modalities of possibility and actuality, distinguishing force and vivacity from a given perception through a distinction of reason is not tantamount to distinguishing possible or actual existence from the perception. Since possibility and actuality are neither separate ideas, nor aspects of an idea as are color and figure, it follows that they are not separable in any sense from what is conceived. For Hume, the *content* of a perception never discloses the modality with which it is being apprehended. And since force and vivacity cause, but are not identical to, our apprehension of possible or actual existence, it can be seen that existence cannot be separated from an idea by a distinction of reason. Ascriptions of possible and actual existence for Hume are caused by the force and vivacity of our perceptions, and these ascriptions are dispositional. To believe that something may exist is to be disposed to ascribe relations, connections, and durations to it which differ from those we would be disposed to ascribe were we to believe that that object actually exists. Now, since how we are disposed to regard our perceptions is not a further aspect of that perception (or these perceptions), it remains the case that for Hume, existence–possible and actual–cannot be distinguished from our perception by a distinction of reason.

Inconceivability, for Hume, requires that we deal with two relata, and determine that the first is unthinkable when we attempt to separate it from the second. In the preceding paragraphs, I have shown that ascriptions of existence for Hume are caused by the force and vivacity of our perceptions, and are dispositional. Since there is no separate idea of existence or inseparable "aspect" of a perception which constitutes our awareness of existence, it follows that existential claims, such as God exists, never involve two relata. Accordingly, the mental experiment which reveals the necessary connection between relata is inapplicable to all existential claims, including God exists. Since existential claims involve only one idea, the denial of the existential claim will always be conceivable.

To sum up. Despite the fact that Hume has much to say to convince Demea that the non-existence of the Deity is conceivable, and, therefore, that the existence of the Deity is not demonstrable, Part 9 is silent on all the supporting material, and *in itself*, cannot be considered to be offering a decisive criticism. Since the second and third criticisms in Part 9 also focus on, but do not prove, that the non-existence of the Deity is conceivable, they, too, are without full philosophic support, and cannot be considered decisive.

It does seem to me that the criticism of Cleanthes' which, as stated, is devastating to Demea's effort in his *a priori* argument is the criticism in paragraph 8. The criticism reads as follows:

> Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to enquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time and a beginning of existence?

Although Demea fails to use modal language, other than the reference to God as a 'necessarily existent Being', the general thrust of his position is that the succession of causes and effects, despite its being eternal, at least in the sense of not having had a beginning, is also contingent. And it is this contingency which leads Demea to ask,

why anything at all exists, and why this succession exists and not some other. The criticism in paragraph 9 makes it clear that, if the causal succession exists from eternity then, following Hume's analysis of causality, wherein causes must be temporally prior to their effects, it follows that the succession itself does not, better cannot, have a general cause or first author.

As everyone knows, Hume is adamant that we never understand the powers of objects through which they act as causes of certain effects. Hume is equally adamant that designating an object as cause, and another as effect, requires seeing objects of those types constantly conjoined. How does constant conjunction assist us in understanding causes and effects? In one respect, constant conjunction assists us by generating the habit or determination of the mind, so that we naturally associate the cause with the effect (this, in the language of the *Treatise*, is causality as a 'natural relation'). In so far as causality is viewed as a 'philosophical relation' (once again, utilizing the language of the *Treatise*), the importance of constant conjunction is this: even though we lack any insight into causal power, the constant conjunction between objects convinces us of the causal *relevancy* of one object to another. The powers of the first object, although unknown, appear to be directed to the production of, or a change in, the second object.

Applying this analysis of the importance of constant conjunction to ascriptions of causality to our discussion, we can understand the full weight of Cleanthes' criticism in the ninth paragraph of Part 9. If the succession of causes and effects is eternal, then *even if there is an eternal necessary Being*, there is no way to establish the causal relevancy of this necessary Being to the production of the causal chain. So Cleanthes' point must be that, even if there is a necessarily existent Being and an eternal succession of causes and effects, it is impossible for us, using Demea's premises, to show that one is causally relevant or responsible for the other. Each would exist in a manner which appears to be incompatible with its having been caused. What exists in what we call the world might someday cease to exist, and in this respect, we might be tempted to say that what exists exists contingently. But even if this is true, Cleanthes' point is that the eternity of the world, at least in terms of not having had a beginning, rules out its having been caused. Accordingly, it may be the case that the causal chain of which Demea speaks is both uncaused and contingent.

Cleanthes is, therefore, arguing that the two questions which Demea insisted require an answer which only a necessarily existent Being can provide-'why is there something rather than nothing?' and 'why is there what there is rather than something else?'- are, in fact, not questions which can be answered. The fact that the world (according to Demea's argument) is eternal, rules out any causal explanation which can accurately and justifiable address either question.

[1] All references to David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* are to the Routledge edition, edited and with an Introduction by Stanley Tweyman (London; New York, 1991). All references to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* are to the Oxford edition, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, second edition, rev., edition, edited by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1987).

AGAINST LIMITS AND SPEECH: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF GAZE AND LIGHT IN THE BYZANTINE ICON

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The second chapter of Nichephoros the Patriarch's *Antirrheticus*, written as a coherent and speculative text in response. to the iconoclasts during the crisis of the ninth century, is precisely one which needs to be discussed in terms of the. phenomenology of the gaze. To the doctrine of sign (*sémeion, typos*) of the iconoclasts, for which the inscription (*graphé*) circumscribes and limits the divine infinity, Nichephoros opposes one of the most richly conceptual theories of the pictorial inscription of the icon, revealing the endless openness of the Word. If for the iconoclasts the line is the limit where Being begins, for the iconophiles the line generates a continuous space in which Christ, without being encircled or fixed, traces his presence and absence in an iconic paradox"

For the icon addresses the problem of the infinity of the line, of the transfiguration of matter and light through the mediation and arbitration of the line. Transfiguration, metamorphosis and light all meet in the icon in a place of recognition and formal likeness (*homoiôsis, regio similitudinis*), but sending the viewer beyond the and the iconic *'mimésis'* towards a point which could never be fixed, but is only to be guessed and gazed at in the infinity of the icon. The aim and end of the icon is certainly not to be seen in cognitional mode, but to be gazed at, beyond cognition and objectivity. Moreover, the inaugural 'graphé' of the icon is the epiphany of the Light and of the Word, the origin of all gaze: the light and line which is itself the bringing into being of Light and Line.

The icon is neither a question of circumscription, nor one of representation, for the Light is neither image nor words, but the World. Light resists all images and all representations. Light abolishes all words. The divine nature is, for Gregory Nyssa, 'beyond all name and all speech' ('Epistle to Ablabius', PG 45, 120 D-121 D).

The resistance of the hesychasts against the prolixity of words and images is well-known, The hesychast is one who says: 'Close your cell door to your body, the door of your lips to words, the interior door to spirits' as St. John of the Ladder writes in *The Ladder of Perfection* (step 27) and invites one to the simplicity of prayer. 'Prolixity in prayer', says John Climacus, 'often fills the mind with images and distracts it, while often one single :word draws it into recollection...' (step 28). 'May the name of Jesus be united with your breath; then you will understand the value of solitude' (step 27). 'There is no need to waste time with words [in your prayer],' advised abbot Macarius, 'it is enough to hold out your hands and say: Lord, according to your desire and to your wisdom, have

mercy...' (from the French translation by Gouillard, *Petite Philocalie* Editions des Cahiers du Sud, Paris, 1953, p. 58).

The novice is never asked, points out John Meyendorff (*St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox spirituality*, St. Vlladimir's Seminary Press, 1974, p. 38), to imagine an image exterior to himself, but to become conscious of the actual presence of Jesus in the interior of his being. The luminous vision experienced by the monk is not image, nor symbol, but a theophany like that experienced, by the apostles on, Mount Tabor. The icon is itself this light which is contiguous with the viewer and which enveils him with the divine grace.

If the 'morphé' designates the tangible character of the body, the 'metamorphôsis' is the Transfiguration of Christ and the icon is the place of this ephiphany. The icon is the matter of wood and pigment transfigured into a space of light and glory, in which the viewer himself is absorbed in the process of gazing. The iconic 'graphé' is therefore neither limit nor speech, but rapture (*arpagi*) of light and the exultation of the Gazc in meeting the endless face of the Word.

ENEGETIC PARADIGMS OF THE HESYCHAST PHILOSOPHIZING

(abstract)

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A variety of philosophical paradigms hidden in the mystical and practical doctrine of Hesychasm is displayed. We describe the non-aristotelian nature of the basic hesychast notion of energy and demonstrate, how this notion generates a new philosophical discourse, the Discourse of Energy. We analyse the relationship of this discourse to the essentialist discourse of classical metaphysics and the existentialist discourse. The Being in the discourse of Energy presents itself as Event (or Ereignis, in Heidegger's sense) and the human mode of being (the analogue of Dasein) turns out to be the specific Being-Bifurcation, characterized by the inherent alternative between the lasting finite being and not lasting energetic transcending. The realisation of the latter implies the ontological inversion of the transcending energies: they turn from the energies of repulsion from finiteness and death into those of attraction, or Agape. The concluding paradigm of the Being as the Transcensus Event is Synergy, which is the accordance and coherence between all the energies of man and the transcending energy.

THE ALCHEMY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
(abstract)

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I.

Quotation from Nicholas Roerich.

- ONTOLOGY: The definition used in this paper "Consciousness is Soul and Reality is Consciousness".
- Introduce Consciousness into Einstein's $E=mc^2$ (Malone and Teilhard).
  80% of Reality lies beyond the speed of light (Bentov).
- Leading to new *Paradigms of Philosophizing and Knowledge.*
- GOD is Energy.

II.

Quotation from the Hermetic Tradition.

- Resurgence of Gnosticism in the 19th Century Transcendental movement.
- Where we go from here? TRANSFORMATION, "The Alchemy of Consciousness".
- The Universe as Consciousness expressed in three principles:
  1. GOD is Omnipresent
  2. GOD is Omnipotent
  3. GOD is Omniscient

1) Realms beyond the physical-holograph, interdimensional realities and descriptions by seers and ascended Masters Djwal Kuhl.

2) Fundamental Source or Energy as purely consciousness.

3) GOD as Divine Mind/Principle: "In the Beginning was the Word..." as the natural consequence into manifestation;

continuing examination of the primordial cultural "myths" in various cultures: *Genesis I* the impact of Cyrus the Great and Zoroaster upon Hebrews in Babylon; Vedic Indian traditions; Hermetic Egypt.

III.

Quotation from a contemporary wisdom source.

WISDOM TRADITIONS AS THEY RELATE IN OUR TIMES.

- The perceived clash of empirical science with the ancient Sophia.
- Designing the Wisdom Academies of today.
- An alchemical curriculum — Including a tribute to Nicholas Roerich.
- Coda: Design and implementation of New World Academy, as response to the state of our times, being WISDOM-IN-ACTION Fellowship.

МЕТАФИЗИКА И СЕМИОТИЧЕСКАЯ КОРРЕКТНОСТЬ СОПОСТАВЛЕНИЯ НАУЧНОГО И РЕЛИГИОЗНОГО ЗНАНИЯ
METAPHYSICS AND THE SEMIOTIC CORRECTION IN THE COMPARISON OF SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

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Значительная часть научных, религиозных или философских интуиций для своей экстеоризации должна быть выражена семиотически, например, в языке. Хотя понятия языка и тем более имени (Флоренский) содержат не только рационализированную информацию, очевидно то, что рационализированное должно подчиняться некоторым законам для сохранения своей идентичности. без этого едва ли можно идентифицировать мышление как научное или как религиозное. Нумерическая классифицируемость категориальных структур в форме монарности, бинарности и тернарности является одним из оснований6 на котором строятся максимально обобщенные системные характеристики для описания функционирования символов в концептуальных системах.

Семиотический анализ любого понятия в научных и религиозных системах представлений ориентирован (предполагает) различение символической функции этого понятия на синтаксическом, семантическом и прагматическом уровнях. В первом приближении эти уросни удобно различать по степени репрезентации онтологической реальности или рефлексивности концептуального прототипа. Корректное сопоставлени общих понятий в науке и религии невозможно в тех случаях, когда сравниваемые теологические и научные концептуальные структуры принадлежат различным семиотическим уровням. В этом случае можно проводить не прямой категориальный анализ научного или религиозного знания, а тех метафизических систем, на которые они опираются. С семиотической точки зрения, метафизика является скрытой синтаксической, а не семантической системой, ибо объектом ее референции являются абстрактные сущности, наделенные тем же онтологическим статусом, что и остальные элементы этой концептуальной структуры. По отношению к науке и религии метафизику можно рассматривать в качестве мета-языка представления реальности. Тем самым к метафизике как абстрактному мета-языку наших представлений можно применить известную гипотезу Сепира-Уорфа о лингвистической относительности и с этой точки зрения рассматривать специфику синтаксического и семантического представления о Природе в науке и религии.

Обычно сравнивают сильные стороны концептуальных систем безотносительно к учету семиотических условий корректности такого сравнения: например, сравнивают прагматический аспект

теологических и семантический аспект научных систем, обладающих самоценным значением в своих суверенных предметных областях. Это может послужить предпосылкой как для иллюзорного обоснования "двойственности истины", так и для анализа корректности совмещения семантического и прагматичемкого уровней представления о понятии Природы в философии пантеизма.

Семиотическую корректность сопоставления научного и религиозного знания можно достигнуть на метафизическом уровне, например, посредством деятельности абсолютного трансцендентного субъекта (Кант), в который преодолевается противоположность символиыеского и апофатического. Кант сконструировал абсолютное трансцендентное сознание, опираясь на анализ эмпирического сознания субъекта. Кантовское преодоление противоположности символического и паофатического сознания позволяет поставить вопрос в двойственности истины эипирического сознания с точки зрения абсолютного трансцендентного субъекта: Природа есть цель научного познания (эмпирическая истинность), что является только способом (этапом) постижения Божественной истины (трансэмпирической) для религиозного сознания. В деятельной метафизике Канта абсолютным статусом обладает все же не деятельность трансцендентного субъекта, хотя она и конструировалась в качестве репрезента всеобщего. Кант стримится всеобщему придать характер определенного, но эта определенность достигается посредством обособленности и выделенности, а это - существенное свойство категории вещи. Поэтому продолжение созранения монистической ориентации метафизики Канта неизбежно превращает ее в реизм. Соответствующее этой метафизике научное понимание Природы синтаксически ограничено дихотомиями типа общее (ортодоксальная метафизика Канта) и единичное, индивидуальное (метафизика специальной теории относительности и квантовой механики). Такие дихотомические ограничения преодолеваются религиозным сознанием.

Рационализированная система представлений даже синтаксического уровня должна быть так организована, обладать такими системными характеристиками, чтобы представление о прекрасном или собственно религиозное чувтсво возникло в качестве арт-эффекта (эмерджентного свойства) синтаксиса, тем самым наделяя эту концептуальную структуру семантическим статусом. В этом случае устраняется проблема семиотической корректности двойственности истины при сопоставлении концептуальных структур различных семиотических уровней: эстетическое изящество математической теории (синтаксис) как индикатор ее истинности (семантика); или религиозность мироощущения Природы как предпосылка научных исследований Кеплера, Ньютона, Лейбница или Эйнштейна.

РАЦИОНАЛИЗМ ПРИЧИННО-СЛЕДСТВЕННЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ В КОСМОЛОГИИ И ТЕОЛОГИИ
RATIONALISM, CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS IN COSMOLOGY AND THEOLOGY

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Рациональное осмысление сущности феномена Вселенной предполагает или постулирование вечности ее существования, или допущение акта творения, Первый случай гносеологически мало интересен, хотя предполагает нетривиальное осмысление категорий вечности, бесконечности и т. д. Ко второму случаю склоняются многие современные теологи и современная физика и космология. Рациональное осмысление акта творения предполагает использование причинно-следственных отношений. Но отношение причинности между Вселенной и трансцендентной сущностью, ее сотворившей, может и не являться предметом рационального осмысления, или же нельзя корректно ставить вопрос о причинно-следственном отношении между ними, как считал Н.Трубецкой. Таким образом, вопрос о том, почему Бог сотворил Вселенную не является корректным.

Ликвидация причинно-следственного отношения несколько сужает возможности рационального осмысления несколько сужает возможности рационального осмысления сущности феномена Вселенной, ибо понимание причины возникновения любого феномена является важным моментом в понимании его сущности.

В отличие от теологии, в физике допускается постановка вопроса о причине творения Вселенной или из Ничто, или в результате "Большого взрыва". Современная квантовая космология вносит существенные коррективы в традиционное противопоставление теологической и научной точек зрения по вопросу Творения.

Если человек создан по образу и подобию божию, то, строго следуя копенгагенской интерпретации квантовой механики: человек унаследовал способности творения определенных фрагментов Вселенной. Природа не только результата одного акта божественного творения, ее существование постоянно поддерживается существованием человека. Поэтому создание человека было необходимым следствием предшествующих актов божественного творения. Здесь произошел определен-

ный перекос фундаментального причинно-следственного отношения в акте Творения.

Использование рационализма имеет как минимум одно неприятное следствие: строгое следование логике рассуждения может приводить к результату, который практически невозможно принять, как например, в случае концепции солипсизма. Аналогично и концепция "Участия" Уилера является следствием копенгагенской интерпретации квантовой механики.

Теологическая система знания - это попытка рациональной концептуализации трансцендентального, отстранения от достигнутых границ познания в гораздо большей мере, чем это может позволить себе наука. На этой границе познанного и непознанного в основном и реализуется семантика семиотики Трансцендентного. Но собственно концептуализация Трансцендентного образует синтаксический уровень его семиотической репрезентации: трансцендентное может репрезентовать только само себя, остальное - майя и уже другой семантический уровень репрезентации. Определенную параллель с этим в христианской теологии можно усмотреть в апофатическом богословии.

Катофолическое богословие - это попытка семантической концептуализации Трансцендентного (конструировании новых "адекватных" понятий) как и в научной системе знания.

Трансцендентное порождает Природу, а к этому, возможно, и неприменимо причинно-следственное отношение (хотя только о следствии здесь можно говорить: асимметричность причины и следствия), но после создания материальной природы отношения причины и следствия становятся симметричными, что и открывает дорогу рациональному осмыслению Природы. Причинно-следственные отношения являются следствием образования материальной природы.

Приход Бога-Сына в этот мир является следствием образования материальной природы. Была бы необходима эта ипостась при отсутствии материальной природы? Тогда не было бы и грехопадения.

Максимально трансцендентен Бог-Отец, Бог-Дух Святой - способ манифестации Трансценденции в материальном. Христос как Бог-Сын - это манифестация возможности освоения семиотической триады в теологической системе знания.

С.КЬЕРКЕГОР И Л.ШЕСТОВ В ПОСТ-ГЕГЕЛЕВСКОЙ СИТУАЦИИ ФИЛОСОФСТВОВАНИЯ
S.KIRKEGAARD AND L.SHESTOV IN THE POST-HEGELIAN SITUATION OF PHILOSOPHIZING

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The report is devoted to the ideas of religious existentialism represented by Kierkegaard and Shestov in post-Hegelian philosophy. It is argued in the report that Kierkegaard and Shestov open a new path for philosophical thought overcoming the tradition of European rationalism. On the other hand their emphasis on uniqueness of human existence and faith annihilate the objective foundation of philosophy since religious faith is the result of God's Revelation but not of speculative philosophical thought.

В перспективе развития классического рационализма Нового времени философия тождества бытия и мышления Гегеля представляет собой некую завершающую точку, в которой эта основополагающая проблема новоевропейской метафизики "снимается" в диалектическом единстве, и мысль окончательно исчерпывает бытие, отрицая всякое самостоятельное значение сущего. В гегелевской логике Абсолютного Духа бытие предстает в качестве самого абстрактного и малозначительного понятия, тождественного по своему логико-понятийному значению ничто. Согласно Гегелю, в концептуальном определении бытия мысль оказывается неспособной охватить его абсолютную всеобщность, поэтому в научной логике бытие отождествляется с пустотой, сводится к Ничто. В его системе не бытие выступает условием мысли, а мысль задает логику бытия.

В пост-гегелевской ситуации философствования раскрывается подлинная суть "хитрого" диалектического разума, подменившего объективное существование мира логикой человеческой мысли и заключившего свободу философии в догматы новой рационалистической веры. Таким образом исчерпывпается традиционное в новоевропейской метафизике поле мысли и утверждается принципиально иные смыслы философствования. В марксизме философия приобретает значение "идеологии" и переводится в план политической практики преображения мира, позитивизм отводит ей роль методологии науки и способа обобщения научных открытий.

Религиозный экзистенциализм С.Кьеркегора обращает философию к проблеме уникального человеческого существования, к религиозно-этическим темам. С этой позиции Кьеркегор стремился разрешить философские проблемы своего времени, преодолеть кризис постгегелевской ситуации философствования, найти новые пути и горизонты мысли, впервые создав подлинную религиозную философию, в которой философские темы предшествуют теологии.

Как и других мыслителей его эпохи, Кьеркегора не удовлетворяет грандиозность познавательных устремлений философов Нового времени. Его привлекают не абстрактные темы бытия и мышления, а конкретная эмпирия человеческого существования с его бедами и невзгодами, его одиночеством и отчаянием, страхом и трепетом. То, что в принципе не могло стать предметом гегелевских размышлений - проблемы этики (ибо Абсолютный Дух шествует в своей мнимой разумности по головам людей и ничего изменить нельзя) для Кьеркегора становится главным; и самой подлинной темой - проблема выбора и нравственной ответственности. Именно отчаяние и страх, ужас и трепет делают меня уникальной личностью, обеспечивают подлинность моего существования, ибо только в такой ситуации возможна "встреча" с Богом, только в "страхе и трепете" переживается Божественное. Идеи религиозного экзистенциализма Кьеркегора определяются положением "либо-либо", утверждением принципиальной непостижимости личности и мироздания, предполагают непосредственную веру в Абсурд и "нелепость" бытия. Л.Шестов выступает в качестве прямого наследника этой философии.

Как известно, Шестов познакомился с сочинениями великого датского мыслителя достаточно поздно, уже будучи в эмиграции; ему порекомендовал их прочесть сам Э.Гуссерль, философский "противник" и ближайший друг Шестова. Это знакомство стало подлинным Откровением, до конца жизни Шестов оставался страстным приверженцем и увлеченным последователем творчества датского экзистенциалиста. Открывая путь мысли Кьеркегора, он продолжал идти своей дорогой, ибо их движение совпадало; читая сочинения Кьеркегора, Шестов обнаруживал собственные мысли и идеи. Но единственно, что не смог принять Шестов в религиозном экзистенциализме своего предшественника - это преклонение перед Сократом, культ Сократа в сочинениях датского мыслителя представлялся ему отклонением от пути веры и абсурда, проявлением дьявольского искушения разума не высотах экзистенциальной мысли. Л.Шестов считал, что только в абсолютном

отказе от традиций европейского рационализма, от претензий разума и догматов умозрительной философии возможно подлинное откровение веры, той веры, которая утверждает Абсурд и "отменяет" разум, веры, которая превозмогает всю необходимость мира и открывает перед человеком свободу, сокрушающую человеческие сердца и способную сдвигать горы, веры, в которой только и случается живое личное чувство Божественного, а не мертвое либерально-рациональное рассуждательство о Боге как перводвижителе мира.

Подобная позиция вызывает уважение, но с ней нельзя спорить, в ней нельзя усомниться, ее можно воспринимать лишь как данность, как пророчество. Главное в ней - это дар Божественной благодати и веры, который нельзя подвергнуть сомнению, ибо это уникальный опыт Богообщения, не повторяемый и до конца не высказываемый, восходящий к мистике Средневековья (поэтому Л.Шестов так почитал Тертуллиана, Петра Дамиани, Бернара Клервосского). Но такой опыт не может стать предметом философского дискурса, ибо в нем отсутствует объективное поле мысли.

Философия требует радикального сомнения и возможности всеобщей осмысленности, поэтому ее главный вопрос - что есть сущее. Философия не может согласовываться с данностью веры, любые попытки ее "приручения" к тем или иным истинам оказываются губительными не столько для философского дискурса, сколько для самой веры. Философия запредельна вере, а вера философии. С помощью религиозных убеждений и личных чувствований невозможно разрешить философские проблемы, ибо всегда будет присутствовать необоснованность идеалов, недосказанность последних мыслей, неразвернутость предельных вопросов. В своем изначальном истоке, в греческой мудрости философия утвердилась в перспективе всеобщей открытости, вопрошаемости всего сущего, поэтому ее течение мысли, которое призывает к ответу весь мир, все сущее, согласуется с космической гармонией Универсума. В философии нет раз и навсегда установленных идеалов и абсолютных истин, но есть извечные проблемы. И каждая новая эпоха требует их разрешения. Философское осмысление бытия должно развертываться во времени.

ВЕРА КАК "ТРЕТЬЕ ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ МЫШЛЕНИЯ" В ТВОРЧЕСТВЕ Л.ШЕСТОВА
FAITH AS THE "THIRD DIMENTION IF THOUGHT" IN THE WORK OF L. SHESTOV

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Проблема отношения разума и веры занимает важное место в работах Шестова. Резко критикуя идею разума, он отвергает не рациональность вообще, а лишь классический ее тип. Для Шестова философия является экзистенциальным познанием и носит ценностный характер, связана с областью смыслообразующей деятельности личности. Он убежден, что вера является необходимым "измерением" такого мышления. Вера понимается философом как личная непоколебимая уверенность в основополагающих принципах своего мировосприятия, верность самому значимому и направлена на сохранение ценностей в качестве жизненного горизонта личности, что подкрепляется верой в Бога, которая есть неограниченная возможность и гарант воплощения идеалов. Акт веры для философа- источник, необходимая составляющая и вершина экзистенциального познания, критерий истины.

Убеждение Шестова в том, что ценности творит человек, приводит его к фактическому обесцениванию сверхчувственного, которое из абсолютной данности превращается в условие достижения уюта и покоя. Философ показывает, что рефлексия рационализма поп поводу своих оснований обернулась для человека потерей почвы под ногами. Он полагает необходимым принять существующее положение дел и учиться жить в ситуации беспочвенности. Мыслитель убежден, что отныне выбор ценностей не может покоиться на следовании всеобщим и необходимым неиндивидуальным идеалам и не в состоянии совершаться путем рационального обоснования. Для Шестова здесь заканчивается всякое возможное обоснование веры разумом, а выбор может диктоваться только абсурдной верой в невозможное, которая полностью исключает философскую рефлексию и эмпирическую подтверждаемость.

МНОГОМЕРНАЯ КОЛЛЕКЦИЯ,
собранная и скомпонованная *Геннадием Бревде*
из интереса к явлениям большей размерности непостижимым трехмерным существом, а также к чудесной субстанции, лежащей за пределами гиперсферы материи и пронизывающей ее элементарные ячейки

Утверждение, что физическое пространство обладает тремя измерениями, имеет столь же объективный характер, как и утверждение, например, что существует три физических состояния вещества: твердое, жидкое и газообразное; оно описывает фундаментальный факт объективного мира. (***Рейхенбах*** [1])

Равновесные состояния могут быть 1-фазными, 2-фазными и многофазными. К фазам, кроме газообразного, жидкого и различных модификаций кристаллического состояния, относятся сверхпроводящее, сегнетоэлектрическое, различные магнитные состояния и др. Как отдельные фазы следует рассматривать жидкие кристаллы, сверхтекучее состояние гелия, плазму. (***Физический энциклопедический словарь***)

Природа в широком диапазоне масштабов описывается моделью пространства в виде трехмерного многообразия.

Математические теории, призванные описывать единым образом все виды материи и взаимодействий, естественно задаются в 10- или 11-мерном пространстве-времени или 10- и 26-мерном пространстве-времени.

Для космологических теорий, кроме стандартных моделей трехмерного пространства, иногда рассматривают двумерные и многомерные пространства. Структура скоплений галактик в кластерах указывает на переменное значение размерности пространства в разных областях Вселенной и/или на след переменного, флуктуирующего значения размерности пространства на ранних этапах эволюции Вселенной. (***Махалдиани*** [2])

...мы все обладаем интуицией непрерывности любого числа измерений, так как мы имеем способность построить непрерывность, как физическую, так и математическую... эта способность могла бы нам позволить построить пространство четырех измерений так же хорошо, как и трех измерений. Только внешний мир, только опыт побуждают нас развивать эту способность в одном направлении, а не в другом. (***Пуанкаре*** [3-4])

...при выводе геометрии многих измерений требуется постоянно чистый акт построения, "духовное действие", при котором мы переходим за границы данного, причем, однако, новосотворенный элемент определяется наперед тем, что мы мыслим его подчиненным известным всеобщим законам отношения. (***Кассирер***[5])

...можно следующим образом связать размерность физического пространства-времени с учитываемыми фундаментальными взаимодействиями:

4-мерие - гравитационное взаимодействие;

5-мерие - гравитационное + электромагнитное взаимодействия;

6-мерие - гравитационное + электромагнитное + слабое взаимодействия;

7-мерие - гравитационное + электромагнитное + слабое взаимодействия + учет трех поколений элементарных частиц;

или другой вариант 7-мерия - гравитационное + сильное взаимодействия.

Предстоит дальнейшее изучение вопроса: достаточно ли семи измерений или нужно перейти к 10-мерию для объединения гравитационного, электрослабого и сильного взаимодействий. (***Владимиров*** [6])

...Подобным образом возносится кам, прокладывая себе путь на восьмое, девятое небо и т.д. Чем сильнее кам, тем дальше проникает он в небесные пространства: есть

такие, которые могут долетать до десятого, одиннадцатого и двенадцатого и даже выше... (*Михайловский*[7])

...В ряде космологических систем говорится о трех пространствах, а иногда и о большем количестве - о девяти, тридцати трех, девяносто девяти... (*Топоров*[8])

...Но нет, клянусь зарею,
и ночью, и тем, что она собирает,
...вы будете преходить из слоя в слой!
(*Коран*)

...непосредственный горизонт, данный нашему восприятию, неизбежно представляется нам окаймленным новым, более широким кругом, существующим, хотя и не воспринимаемым. (*Бергсон*[9])

Четвертое измерение непостижимо. Если оно существует и если все же мы не в состоянии познать его, то, очевидно, в нашей психике, в нашем воспринимающем аппарате чего-то не хватает, иными словами, явления четвертого измерения не отражаются в наших органах чувств...

Мы знаем, что область четвертого измерения не только непознаваема для нашего психического аппарата, но недоступна чисто физически... (*Успенский*[10])

В течение полутора веков в наших умах осуществляется, возможно, самое изумительное событие, когда-либо зарегистрированное историей во времени возникновения ступени мышления, - проникновение сознания (уже навсегда) в сферу новых измерений и, следовательно, возникновение универсума, всецело обновленного путем простого преобразования его внутренней основы без изменения линий и складок. (*Шарден*[11])

Но самое крупное светило на небе событий, взошедшее за это время, это вера 4-х измерений"... (*Хлебников* [12])

...Вообразим мир плоских существ, имеющих всего два измерения, населяющих плоскую поверхность... способных двигаться в двух направлениях.

...Подняться над плоскостью или отойти от нее они не в состоянии. Точно так же они не могут видеть или ощущать что-либо, лежащее вне их плоскости. Если одно из существ поднимется над плоскостью, оно совершенно покинет мир других, ему подобных существ, скроется, исчезнет неизвестно куда.

...Не в силах объяснить наблюдаемые явления, оно наверняка назовет их чудесными, превосходящими его понимание, пребывающими вне пространства, в "третьем измерении".

...И допустив однажды гипотезу третьего измерения, оно вынуждено будет сказать, что реальное тело, в отличие от воображаемого, должно, хоть в незначительной степени, обладать третьим измерением.

Допуская существование четвертого измерения, мы точно так же вынуждены признать, что реальное тело должно обладать хотя бы самым ничтожным протяжением в четвертом измерении. (*Успенский*[10])

...приходится считаться с возможностью, что свойство +1-мерности нельзя экстраполировать неограниченно, в частности, на сколь угодно малые пространственно-временные масштабы. (*Горелик* [13])

В ряде работ по многомерным теориям Калуцы-Клейна дополнительные компактифицированные размерности мыслятся как сферические внутренние пространства, как бы "приклеенные" к каждой точке 4-мерного классического пространства-времени. (*Владимиров*[6])

...Оно естественным образом объясняет, почему именно три пространственных измерения расширяются, а семь - нет. (*Ходос* [14])

...формулировка теории супергравитации в одиннадцати измерениях эквивалентна четырехмерной расширенной супергравитации... Дополнительные семь измерений пространства-времени, как считается, были "закручены", скрыты от нас в первые 105-40 с после Большого взрыва, как и пятое измерение Калуцы-Клейна. (*Салам*[15])

Когда солнце будет скручено...
и когда небо будет сдернуто,
и когда ад будет разожжен,
и когда рай будет приближен -
узнает душа, что она приготовила.
Но нет! Клянусь движущимися обратно, -
текущими и скрывающимися...
Это - поистине, слово посланника благородного,
обладающего силой у властителя трона... (*Коран*)

Возможно, что пространство-время имеет дополнительные измерения, кроме тех четырех, которые мы непосредственно воспринимаем... Может быть, электрический и ядерные заряды свидетельствуют о наличии мелкомасштабной структуры пространства-времени, напоминающей пенообразную ячеистую структуру, которая выглядит однородной, как бы "сглаженной", при грубом рассмотрении. Пространство-время может оказаться похожим на разновидность сыра с дырками в тех местах, где расположены заряды. Некоторые из этих идей были сформулированы еще при жизни Эйнштейна.... Сегодня эти идеи кажутся близкими к осуществлению. (*Салам*[16])

Теперь снова представим себе двумерное существо, но не на плоскости, а на сферической поверхности... Площадь поверхности этого мира конечна... Прелесть такого рассуждения заключается в том, что мы увидели мир этих существ конечным и все же не имеющим границ.

Имеется трехмерный аналог двумерного сферического мира, а именно, трехмерное сферическое пространство, открытое Риманом. Все его точки равноценны.

...Легко убедиться, что трехмерное сферическое пространство вполне аналогично двумерному. Оно конечно, но не имеет границ.

...реальный мир будет отклоняться от сферического; он будет квазисферическим. Однако он должен быть конечным. (*Эйнштейн*[17])

Таким образом, в науке возник один из наиболее реакционных и идеалистических выводов в отношении материального мира - вывод о его материальной и пространственной конечности. (*Свидерский* [18])

...Но понятно, что единое неделимое начало не изливается само вовсю массу производимого им шара, а, напротив, шар весь на нем держится; другими словами, одна и та же жизнь проникает и охватывает весь шар, который весь содержится в этой одной и той же жизни. Таким образом, все и все души составляют одну душу, которая потому есть единая и, вместе с тем, бесконечная. (*Плотин*[19])

...Оно стало. Оно обратилось в яйцо.
(*Чхандогья-упанишада*)

...Таким образом, Бог - только един... Будучи же единым, он повсюду однороден... Будучи же всюду однородным, он имеет форму шара... Будучи же вечным, единым (однородным) и шаровидным, он ни беспределен, ни ограничен. (*Анаксимандр* [20])

Но так как существует конечная, предельная граница, то бытие -подобно массе со всех сторон округленной сферы, одинаково отстоящей повсюду от своего центра. (*Парменид*[20])

...Итак, он округлил космос до состояния сферы...(*Платон*[21])

Современная буржуазная наука снабжает поповщину, фидеизм новой аргументацией, которую необходимо беспощадно разоблачать. ...многие последователи Эйнштейна договариваются до конечности мира, до ограниченности его во времени и пространстве... они обращают бессилие своей науки в клевету против природы. (*тов.Жданов*[22])

Но не является ли допущение пространственной конечности Вселенной отходом от материализма? Сильнейшим аргументом здравого смысла против идеи конечности пространства является "убийственный" вопрос, задававшийся тысячи раз: а что находится за конечным пространством? (*Наан*[23])

...Отрицателем духовного мира, или возможности познать его, человек становится не потому, что можно "доказать" его "несуществование", но потому, что хочет наполнить душу мыслями, обманно отвлекающими от "боязни перед духовным миром"... "Материализм", как "феномен душевного страха", является важной главой в науке о душе. (*Штейнер*[24])

Пусть же они поклоняются Господу этого дома,
который накормил их после голода
и обезопасил после страха.
(*Коран*)

...Есть, однако, и третий род - людей божественных, которые обладают и большей мощью, и более острым зрением; они, как только заметят сияющий свыше свет, тотчас воспаряют в сверхчувственный мир, и по достижении его, забыв о земле и обо все земном, там уже и остаются как в своем настоящем родном отечестве и радуются той радостью, какую испытывает человек, который после долгих скитаний на чужбине оказался наконец на родине. (*Плотин*[19])

Для большей наглядности часто прибегают к образу круга, в котором из одного центра исходит множество радиусов; подобно этому, говорят, и так (от первоединого) происходит множество существ.... Когда же впоследствии радиусы распространятся в пространстве, они будут зависеть от тех точек, из которых вышли, причем каждая точка будет иметь свой особый центр, хотя и неотделимый от первого (общего) центра. Эти центры, несмотря на соединение всех их в одном первом центре, будут также и обособленными... (*Плотин*[19])

...по существу всякая энергия имеет психическую природу... в каждом элементе-частице эта фундаментальная энергия делится на две составляющие: тангенциальную энергию, которая связывает данный элемент со всеми другими элементами того же порядка (т.е. той же сложности и той же "внутренней сосредоточенности"), и радиальную энергию, которая влечет его в направлении все более сложного и внутренне сосредоточенного состояния. (*Шарден*[11])

Психическое... должно существовать в четвертом измерении, и мы вправе сказать, что мысль движется в четвертом измерении.

...что физиологический акт, переходя в область четвертого измерения, вызывает там эффекты, которые мы называем чувством и мыслью. (*Успенский*[10])

Современная наука... начинает видеть, что в молекуле заключено больше, чем в атоме; в клетке больше, чем в молекулах; в социальном больше, чем в индивидуальном... На каждой последующей ступени комбинации выступает нечто несводимое к отдельным элементам... Тем не менее наука далеко еще не выявила специфическую величину независимости прочности этого "нечто".(*Шарден*[11]).

...процессы в Мире происходят не только во времени, но и с помощью времени... непрестанное течение времени, воздействуя на материальные системы, будет препятствовать наступлению равновесных состояний... в свойствах времени следует искать источник, поддерживающий жизненные явления Мира.

...Произведенные опыты показывают возможность изучения сути причинности и свойств времени с помощью физического эксперимента. Из этих опытов вытекают следующие основные свойства времени:

Ход времени может создавать дополнительные напряжения в системе и тем самым менять ее потенциальную и полную энергию. Поэтому ход времени может быть источником энергии.

Благодаря конечности хода времени причинные связи не являются абсолютно прочными. Имеется возможность их видоизменять и даже обращать...(*Козырев*[27])

...если Ньютон принимал в качестве скрытого, непосредственно ненаблюдаемого параметра всемогущего Творца, то Козырев принял в качестве такого параметра время.

...Козырев создал механику физического вакуума - и заложил основные экспериментального исследования макроскопических проявлений его свойств. Беда заключалась только в том, что физический вакуум он называл временем... (*Жвирблис*[28])

Богини высятся в обособленье
От мира, и пространства, и времен.
Предмет глубок, я трудностью стеснен,
То - Матери.
(*Гете*[29])

Этот мотив космического болота - места пребывания мифических матерей вселенной - фигурировал и в описаниях нганасанского шамана.Странствуя по мирам вселенной, шаман подходит к болотной сопке, а та оказывается жилищем матерей-жизнедательниц, рождающих на глазах шамана окружающую человека жизни. (*Анисимов*[30])

Фауст
Где путь туда?

Мефистофель
Нигде. Их мир - незнаем,
Нехожен, девственен, недосягаем,
Желаньям недоступен. Ты готов?
Не жди нигде затворов и замков.
Слоняясь без пути пустынным краем,
Ты затеряешься в дали пустой.
Достаточно ль знаком ты с пустотой?
(*Гете*[29])

...мы вообще очень мало знаем о той сущности, называемой полем нулевых колебаний, которая может быть названа материей физического вакуума и которой мы отказываем в непосредственной пространственно-временной определенности. Мы знаем о ней очень мало, быть может, потому, что сталкиваемся с совсем особым видом физической реальности, принципиально отличным от всех до сих пор известных физических состояний.

Сегодня этот новый эфир, который введен в картину мира вместо отвергнутого теорией относительности механического эфира, представляется весьма и весьма сложным.

...что бы он ни представлял собой в действительности... мы твердо знаем только одно: на него не может быть распространено представление о непосредственной пространственно-временной определенности; в нем нельзя выделить "там" и "здесь", "раньше", "позже"; он не может служить системой отсчета, точно так же как не имеет никакого смысла и пространственное перемещение любых объектов по отношению к нему... Это заключение принципиального характера, вытекающее из основ теории относительности. Что бы мы ни рассчитывали узнать в будущем о физическом вакууме, из этих надежд мы должны навсегда исключить возможность получить какое-либо однозначное определение его в пространстве и времени...(***Цехмистро***[11])

...Начало, которому предстояло вобрать в себя все роды вещей, само должно было быть лишено каких-либо форм... обозначив его как незримый, бесформенный и всевосприемлющий вид, чрезвычайно странным путем участвующий в мыслимом и до крайности неуловимый, мы не очень ошибемся... (***Платон***[21])

...Кроме пространства, существует еще не-пространство, его отсутствие, воплощением которого является Хаос, состояние, предшествующее творению...(***Топоров***[8])

...Анаксимандр - сын Праксиады... признал началом сущего некую природу Беспредельного, из которой возникают небеса и находящиеся в них миры. Эта природа вечна и неизменна... (***Ипполит***[20])

...наша Вселенная, возможно, имеет нулевые истинные значения для всех сохраненных величин. Если бы это было так, тогда наша Вселенная могла бы появиться из ниоткуда без нарушения законов сохранения.

...тогда речь идет просто о пульсации вакуума, вакуума некоего большего пространства, в котором помещена наша Вселенная. В ответ на вопрос, почему это произошло, я мог бы выдвинуть скромное предположение, что наша Вселенная - это просто одна из тех вещей, которые происходят время от времени. (***Трайон*** [32])

Не существовало еще небо и не существовала земля.
Я сотворил их там из Нуна, из небытия.
(***Книга познания творений Ра*** [33])

Теперь можно уточнить вехи 1-5 эволюции Вселенной:

1а. Неметрический вакуум (эволюционирующий до метрического 10-мерного вакуума).

2а. Рождение квантованного 10-мерного струнного поля (эволюционирующего до метрически неустойчивого струнного поля).

а. Появление неустойчивого метрического поля (эволюционирующего до 4-мерного поля).

4а. Рождение классического гравитационного поля.

5а. Появление предельного случая классического гравитационного поля - плоского 4-мерного метрического поля. (***Дубровский*** [34])

...Но не есть ли и все - материя? Не есть ли и все - дух? Не являются ли, быть может, различия, полагаемые нами только мерой материи или духа?.. (***Кандинский*** [35])

"То, что выше неба, то что ниже земли, то, что между ними обоими- вплетено в пространство". "Во что же вплетено пространство?"

"Поистине, это называют непреходящим. Оно ни толсто, ни тонко, ни коротко, ни длинно, оно ни тень, ни ветер, ни пространство... без меры, без внутреннего, без наружного...

По велению этого непреходящего пребывают отдельно солнце и луна... По велению этого непреходящего поистине одни реки текут с белых гор, другие - на запад... По велению этого непреходящего люди воздают хвалу, боги жаждут жертвоприношений...(***Брихардараньяка- Упанишада***)

...именно потому, что всесущее не связано ни с каким местом, оно присутствует в своей целости во всем, чему присуще бытие, всецело присутствует по всей вселенной точно так же, как и в любой ее части... (***Плотин*** [19])

...воздействие времени не распространяется, а появляется всюду мгновенно... время является грандиозным потоком, охватывающим все материальные системы Вселенной, и все процессы, происходящие в этих системах, вносят свою долю в этот общий поток. (***Козырев***[27])

Там, где слились все "где" и все "когда".
Не чтобы стать блаженней, - цель такая
Немыслима, - но чтобы блеск лучей,
Струимых ею, молвил "Есмь", блистая, -
Вне времени, в предвечности своей,
Предвечная любовь сама раскрылась,
Безгранная, несчетностью любвей.
Она и перед этим находилась
Не в косном сне, затем что божество
Ни "до", ни "после" над водою носилось.
Врозь и совместно, суть и вещество
В мир совершенства свой полет помчали...
Как в янтаре, стекле или кристалле
Сияет луч, причем его приход
И заполненье целого совпали...
(***Данте***[36])

...ум есть мир чистых сущностей. Он содержит их в себе не как в пространстве или месте, но так, как и сам существует, он - одно с ними; все они сразу в нем и с ним, оставаясь в то же время отличными (друг от друга и от него) наподобие того, как многообразие представлений, знаний в душе вовсе не ведет к их смешению...

...Сверхчувственное бытие, будучи бытием первичной природы, не имеет ограниченного и измеримого протяжения... Равным образом оно не находится и во времени... и превосходит его своей вечной силой... (***Плотин***[19])

Всякое перемещение или передвижение в мире духовном совершается вследствие изменения внутреннего состояния самих ангелов... Вот почему расстояния для них не существуют; если же нет расстояний, то нет и пространства, а вместо тех и других - состояния и изменения в них. (***Сведенборг*** [37])

Мир истинно-сущего - всеобъемлющий, мир же видимый - лишь его подобие... Речь о месте, пространстве уместна лишь применительно к чувственному миру; тот же мир, будучи первым по бытию и обладая истинным существованием, никакого места для себя не требует и ни в чем другом не находится.

...Первоединый нигде и ни в чем, и если бы дух наш был таков же, то есть не связан был бы с каким-либо местом... тогда непрестанно созерцал бы Первоединого, даже более: пребывал бы в нем, был бы един с ним... (***Плотин***[19])

Еще (выше), чем небо, далеко распространилась его громадность. (***Ригведа***)

"Единое - это [единовластие], над которым нет ничего. Это [Бог истинный] и Отец [всего, Дух незримый]...

...он больше бога, [ведь нет никого] выше него.

...все [время] он полностью совершенен...

...Он невыразим... Он не большой, [не малый. Нет] возможности сказать [какого его количество...]...

...Его [эон нерушимый,] он неподвижен, [он пребывает в молчании, он покоится]. (*Апокриф Иоанна*[38])

...профаническая длительность разрывается, и все более и более сакрализующееся время в апогее как бы исчезает (как и пространство), слившись воедино с трехмерным пространством. Эта новая четырехмерная структура своей мифопоэтической и бытийственной фундаментальностью настолько превосходит трехмерное пространство и одномерное время обычного профанического опыта, что в этом случае они пресуществляются в состояние своего собственного преодоления... (*Топоров* [8])

...Раздвигаются и раскалываются, рушатся стены, которые держали в заточении наше сознательное существо; теряется всякое ощущение индивидуальности и личности, ощущение Пространства и Времени, собственной деятельности и, наконец, вообще всякого закона Природы; нет больше эго, личности, определенной или отделимой - только сознание, только существование, только мир и блаженство; становишься бессмертием, становишься вечностью, становишься бесконечностью. Все, что остается от индивидуальной души, - это гимн мира, свободы и блаженства, вибрирующий где-то в Вечности. (*Ауробиндо* [39])

Двигаясь в направлении, поперечном времени, мы легко видим горы будущего.

Это движение, столь знакомое уму пророка, есть постройка высоты по отношению к ширине времени, т.е. создание добавочного размера. (*Хлебников* [12])

"Восприятие более высоких измерений становится возможным благодаря объединению ощущений различных центров и уровней сознания. Этим и объясняется невозможность описать некоторые ощущения, возникающие при медитации, на плоскости трехмерного сознания и внутри системы логического мышления, которая накладывает еще большие ограничения на процесс мышления.(*Говинда* [40])

...в индивидуальном опыте медитации, транса, молитвы известны такие небесные путешествия душ... (*Топоров*[8])

Когда мы смотрим не на видимое, но на невидимое: ибо видимое временно, а невидимое вечно.

Ибо знаем, что когда земной наш дом, эта хижина, разрушится, мы имеем от Бога жилище на небесах, дом нерукотворенный, вечный.(*2-е коринфянам*)

...жилища вышние и жилища нижние. Из одних создаются небосводы, а из других - земля... А когда небосводы уже созданы... то самое святое солнце основало в них жилище и обитель свою... (*Зогар*)

Господь на небесах поставил престол Свой, и царство Его всем обладает. (*Псалом 102*)

И мы коснулись неба и нашли, что оно наполнено стражами могучими светочами. (*Коран*)

...Некий покров простирается, и из среды этого покрова... начинает светить то, что светит. И тогда высшая Мысль светится скрытым свечением, неразличимым, и эта Мысль неразличима... И созидаются девять чертогов. И эти чертоги - не света, и не духи, и не

души, и никто не находится в них... В них находятся все тайны веры, и все они, эти свечения из тайны высшей Мысли, называются Бесконечным. До этого уровня доходят света, и не доходят, и непостижимы. (*Зогар*)

"Время, пространство и причинность похожи на стекло, сквозь которое мы смотрим на Абсолют... В самом же Абсолюте нет ни времени, ни пространства, ни причинности". (*Вивекананда*[41])

То, что мы воспринимаем, как плотные или непрозрачные "вещи", порожденные определенной "настройкой", позволяет нам определить по конграсту то что мы воспринимаем, как "пространство" этого уровня.

Если мы прибегнем к новым "фокусировкам" и посмотрим как они работают, мы придем к всеобщему пониманию, которое само по себе является пространством некоторого рода. Более того, это "понимание", являющееся также "пространством", объясняет, выражает и является всем. (*Тулку*[42])

...Ставши ясновидящей, душа может сказать себе в духовном мире...по ту сторону этого берега лежит некий мир, который я могла бы воспринять... Душе необходима в этой точке ее развития такая сила, которая делает ее способной стоять на берегу единственно знакомого ей доселе мира и выносить предстояние перед мнимым "ничто".

Если душа хочет перейти в сверхдуховный мир, она должна своей собственной волей изгладить свои воспоминания от физического мира...Сверхдуховный мир дает душе человека знание об "истинном Я".(*Штейнер*[24])

Наиболее критический и серьезный вызов ньютоно-картезианской механистической модели Вселенной исходит от психоделических переживаний, для которых я подобрал термин трансперсональные. Общим знаменателем этой богатой и разветвленной группы является ощущение индивида, что его сознание трансцендировало границы времени и пространства...

Существование трансперсональных переживаний попирает самые фундаментальные положения и принципы механистической науки...

Эти переживания ясно указывают, что каким-то необъяснимым пока образом каждый из нас имеет информацию обо всей Вселенной, обо всем существующем, имеет потенциальный эмпирический доступ ко всем ее частям и в некотором смысле является как всем космическим полем, так и только бесконечно малой его частью, отдельной и незначительной биологической сущностью...

...В предельной форме индивидуальное сознание охватывает целостность существования и отождествляет себя с Универсальным Разумом или с Абсолютом. Высшей точкой всех переживаний будет, очевидно, Сверхкосмическая или Метакосмическая Пустота - загадочная предвечная пустота и ничтойность, - которая осознает себя самое и содержит всю экзистенцию в зародышевой форме. (*Гроф*[34])

Одно полезное слов, услышав которое становятся спокойными, лучше тысяч речей, составленных из бесполезных слов.

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Comprising the "multidimensional collection" are extracts from Scripture Books, dissertations of scholars, thinkers and art workers on the multidimensional reality of the Universe, metaphysical meaning and structure of extraspatial components, ontological and epistemological consequences of the multidimensional appreciation of the world. Getting acquainted with the "collection" reveals the urgency of introducing the notion of hyperspace as a category of scientific and mystical cognition into the philosophical and theological discourse of the end of the 20th century.

A report is -to be delivered in the form of discussion.

VII
THE ONTOLOGICAL AND EXISTENTIAL INTENTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY: WESTERN EUROPEAN, RUSSIAN AND EASTERN TRADITIONS

ОНТОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ И ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫЕ ИНТЕНЦИИ ФИЛОСОФИИ: ЕВРОПЕЙСКАЯ, РОССИЙСКАЯ И ВОСТОЧНАЯ ТРАДИЦИИ

COMMUNAL NARRATIVE AS A PARADIGM OF ETHICAL HERMENEUTICS IN INDIAN CULTURE

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Philosophy in Europe and America is usually thought of as the work of individuals laboring over written texts, in which explicit arguments are provided for ethical rules or propositions. In India, however, we often find a very different paradigm of philosophy — that of communal narratives and their retellings. I will argue that traditional *kathakalekshepam* (communal story-telling) is the primary paradigm of ethical hermeneutics in the Indian environment. I will argue, further, that communal story-telling is, in a very important sense, authorless (or, perhaps more accurately, subsumes individual authors into a greater authorship *of* the story *by* the story).

First, I should briefly outline the tradition of *kathakalekshepam.* Stories have long been told as a means of communal entertainment and, because the majority of the population was, traditionally, illiterate, also as a means for conveying news and history of significant events. While some of these stories have remained free-standing (in, for example, many of the *Puranas*), vast numbers of them congealed around the two great epics, the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana.* The *Mahabharata*, because it includes the *Bhagavad Gita*, may be the better known of these stories in the West. I will concentrate here on the role of the *Ramayana*, though, both because of its cultural prevalence and because (as we shall see) there has been no attempt to compile an authoritative text.

These stories are not *texts*, but are revisable *oral* traditions. Traditionally, villages have hired *kathakars* (professional story-tellers) to retell portions of these epics at important community events. The narrative structure of these stories is well known to members of the community: these are stories with at least as much popular currency as, for example, the myth in the United States of George Washington chopping down the cherry tree. The *kathakar* is not hired to

tell *new* stories. Rather, his task is to tell *appropriately chosen* stories in a dramatic, even spellbinding, fashion.

We can leave aside the skills of dramatic presentation and concentrate, instead, on the task of appropriately choosing stories to tell. Both the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* are huge, epic tales. At a *kathakalekshepam*, only one or a very few (closely related) stories can be told. A skilled *kathakar* discreetly investigates the current controversies or problems within the community first, and then retells that portion of the epics which most directly addresses those controversies or problems. If, for example, the community is torn between what it understands to be its ethical responsibilities (*dharma*) and unethical opportunities for material advancement, the *kathakar* might well retell the story of Vibhîshana, the brother of Râvana, who tried to dissuade Râvana from unethical behavior.

Thus, the retellings of the epics serve as a means of public ethical education and discourse. This teaching is not merely didactic and unidirectional, though. The basic frame story (the incarnation of Vishnu as Rama; Rama's exile in the forest; the kidnapping of Rama's wife, Sita; the rescue of Sita from her captivity on Lanka; and the restoration of Rama's rule in Ayodhya) remains the same throughout. However, the *details* of the story change considerably, from the primarily heroic epic of Valmiki through increasingly devotional, *bhakti* versions down to such highly devotional retellings in recent years as that by Rajagopalachari.

The transformations of the details of the story are far from accidental. In its early years, *Ramayana* was publicly performed at state-sponsored *Ram Lilas*. As time went by, though, and states were increasingly dominated by or beholden to Muslim rulers, *Ramayana* performances became much more village-centered. The *kathakar* would emphasize those details of the story which were most pertinent to the needs of that community at that time. The needs of the communities lead to revisions and new emphases within the epics. Thus, the lived evolution of real communities serves as a means to adaptation of the stories within the epics. What emerges, then, is a history of *retellings*, of repeated re-adaptations of the frame story to the needs of changing times, places and languages.

This flexibility and gradual change of the great, popular stories is sometimes noticed by the *kathakars* themselves. For example, Chakrabarti Rajagopalachari, in the printed edition of his retelling of the *Ramayana* (originally serialized in Tamil in the *Sunday Standard* newspaper), suggested that such retellings constitute the principle paradigm of ethical discourse in India.

> But, how can we comment on a work composed thousands of years ago and coming down to us in palm-leaf manuscripts subject to corruption?...
>
> Rain falling from the heavens flows into the rivers and flows down to join the sea. Again from the sea the water is sucked up by the sun and rises to the sky, whence it descends again as rain and flows down as rivers. Even so, feelings and values rise from the people and, touching the poet's heart, are transformed into a poem which, in turn, enlightens and inspires the people. Thus, in every land the poets and their people continually reinforce each other....Whether the epics and songs of a nation spring from the faith and ideas of the common folk, or whether a nation's faith and ideas are produced by its literature is a question which one is free to answer as one likes. Does a plant spring from the seed or does seed issue from the plant? Was the bird or the egg the first cause? Did clouds arise from the sea or was the sea filled by the waters from the sky? All such inquiries take us to the feet of God transcending speech and thought. (Rajagopalachari, 1952, 311-12)

Rajaji has focussed the issue. Are the stories composed (or received), and then conduct is brought into accord with them? This seems not to accord with the realities of the ever-changing stories. Do the stories emerge from the conduct of communities, and the stories then merely embody the norms of the communities? This seems not to accord with the use of the stories to change the behavior of communities.

The problem with both of the ways in which I have framed the central, interpretive question about the relationship between the stories and living communities is that they commit the fallacy of complex question. Both presume that the stories and the communities are *separate* entities which can exercise causal agency on the other without altering themselves in the process. My proposal, on the contrary, is that it is more fruitful to understand the complex of living communities, the history of real communities, and the development of the stories *as a single, organic, and living history*, in which the stories and the communities are certainly *distinct* from one another but are certainly *not* separate.

In order to understand how this might be so, let me first suggest how we might relate to the narrative content of popular stories. As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, we understand ourselves and our lives primarily through narrative continuity (MacIntyre, 1988). Regardless of the philosophical and psychological theories which might be offered about the self, the real continuity of the self as we experience it is one of narrative unity. Who we are (and the unity of who we are) makes sense if and only if there is a life-story which, with narrative sense, explains how we came to be where we now find ourselves. This life-story may have to be constructed retrospectively (and, in the case of an 'epistemological crisis', *must* be constructed retrospectively if the crisis is to be resolved), but its components emerge *tacitly*. (For a further discussion of how I am using the term 'tacit', see, e.g., Polanyi, 1969.)

Many, perhaps most, of our daily decisions about how we ought to behave are guided by an *aesthetic* sense of *fittingness* (or, perhaps, harmony) with the narrative of our lives thusfar. The guidance of narrative continuity removes ethical deliberation from the realm of the explicit and places much (perhaps all) of that deliberation in the realm of tacit integration of social and aesthetic *gestalten*. Further, in the very act of removing much of ethical deliberation from the realm of the explicit, it also removes the need for *effort* in ethical behavior. When we are integrated into a harmonious narrative experience, avoidance of that which would be dissonant and/or discontinuous is natural and effortless.

If we are to be integrated into a community, there must be a place within the larger narrative of the community for our individual roles. If the community is

to be integrated into a tradition, then there must be a role for the *changes* which take place in a community, a role within a larger narrative. If we are to project that integration into a future of purposive action for the community, then the frame story of our communal existence must also provide narrative guidance for future purposive action (in this case, *dharma*). All of these purposes are served by the retellings and adaptations of the *Ramayana*, and all of them are accomplished *primarily* through the bringing into harmony of everyday life with the narrative structure of the story. Let us consider each of these tasks.

The *Ramayana* integrates its audience into a larger narrative framework, but that integration is guided by the need to harmonize our everyday actions with the *dharma* expressed by the actions of the characters in the narrative. Because of the rich variety of characters who exemplify the *dharma* of an equally-rich variety of social roles, each member of the audience can find a character with which to identify. The characters permit us to observe others who are undergoing deliberative processes concerning problems which are found in real life, and thus permit us to gain some distance from our own predicaments. When we have gained such distance, we can re-center ourselves through a tacit re-integration with the larger narrative and our *dharma*. (For a further discussion of this process and its relation to the role of tragedy in Aristotle's *Poetics*, see Gaskill, 1994.) That *dharma* is precisely the sanctification of everyday life by transforming the mundane and ordinary into sacrifice, into a making-holy. The rectilinear motion of mundane activities is thus transformed into ceremonially instantiating *dharma* in the temporal realm.

For a local community, it is also necessary periodically to re-interpret and re-center itself, both in the internal relations among members of the community and in its relations to the world outside the community. Again, the stories provide archetypes for the conduct of community, archetypes which allow a re-balancing of roles within the community. While we often are tempted to neglect responsibilities to others in our communities because of the demands of everyday life, a larger story about communal unity (e.g., the story of Ayodhya's reaction to Rama's placid acceptance of his exile) acts as a powerful reminder of the *proper* (i.e., *dharmic*) balance within the community.

The community, though, must be able to integrate its story into a larger narrative of Indian history *and* of India's future. Retellings of the great stories accomplish this not only because the stories provide a mythic link with the past, but because the stories also provide a continuous narrative of the way in which we have come to be where we are. *Dharma* is not a univocal and timeless set of rules: rather, it is the attempt to stand uprightly in the Truth according to the specific demands of the times. Because the nature of human life changes (according to the cyclical nature of time in the Indian *kalpa* cycle), the specifics of *dharma* will change, as must, also, the stories which integrate us into *dharma*. The *Ramayana* and other stories provide not merely an expression of contemporary community norms, but an expression of an attempt to unite,

through narrative continuity, the current needs of and demands on a community with a continuous past history.

Since the *kathakars* are usually itinerant (often travelling quite widely), the dialectic between stories and communities serves also as a means for conducting geographically broad-ranging dialogue on key ethical issues. The changes in the details of the stories are moderated by the need for geographically and culturally broad application of those stories.

The tacit re-integration of experience occurs by means of the aesthetic moment. The community which listens to a *kathakar* retell tales from the *Ramayana* does not then deliberate explicitly about future actions. Instead, the dramatic performance has re-integrated the details of everyday life into the *dharma*. *Dharma*, too, is neither within nor without: the *dharmic* person acts from and in *dharma*. In India, narrative unity with a semi-mythic past has taken priority, and the primary means for communal self-understanding is the *kathakalekshepam* (story-telling). By bringing to light the need to harmonize present experience with the narrative structure of the great stories, the story-teller (for example Rajagopalachari in his retelling of the *Ramayana*) acts as facilitator for communal ethical understanding.

The frame story provides an atemporal narrative archetype of our condition in the world: incarnation of the divine in the world; exile through the manipulations of self-centered, this-worldly people; and return to rightness through devotion to duty (*dharma*). The atemporal archetype of provenance and return, though, must be adapted to the specific changes which occur in human societies in the temporal realm. Through those adaptations of details, the story itself changes (some roles, such as that of Hanuman the monkey god, grow in importance, while some stories, such as the test of Sita by fire, sometimes drop out altogether). In those very changes, though, the shadow of the atemporal narrative archetype is refreshed in the temporal realm. The life-stories of individuals and villages are re-synchronized (if I might be permitted this pun) to the atemporal narrative archetype through the process of *kathakalekshepam*.

For the *kathakar*, subjectivity is subsumed into a greater harmony. The ethical is not grounded in the subject, but rather is emergent in the attainment of harmonious balance in which the goal is harmony *of the actions* in a larger, social and historical, *aesthetic* whole. With effective aesthetic experience, ethical action becomes *effortless*. This process is, thus, essentially one of narrative hermeneutics in which the goal is the rewriting of the lived narrative of the community to harmonize with the divine narrative. The relationship between community and epic tale is reciprocal: the story is adapted to the needs of the community, while (concurrently) the community adapts its behavior and self-understanding by reflecting on the *dharma* of the characters in the story. The story itself is the ongoing process of narrative re-understanding in which the community and the story aim at attaining mutual harmony. The story has

become essentially authorless, and the lines between temporal individuals (and communities) and the atemporal, archetypical story has been blurred.

The revision of the stories by the needs of the community (and *vice versa*) constitutes a distinctive communal hermeneutical relationship with the narrativity of the community's history, and with its temporal and divine responsibilities. The primacy of narrative, aesthetic balance and harmony so thoroughly integrates us into a larger aesthetic whole that subjectivity is completely subsumed into something larger than the individual. The self is understood narratively, and is understood as a character within a narrative which is, in part, being written by its characters as they attempt to instantiate that narrative as well as they can in these troubled times.

What does this tell us about the *paradigm* of ethical discourse in the Indian narrative environment? First, it should dispel a frequent misconception in the West that there is a paucity of ethical theory' in the Indian environment. Ethical theory' is not done, ordinarily, in isolation from narrative, and narrative is in a dialectical relationship with practice. Further, though, ethical discourse is *not* conducted primarily by individuals or by means of written treatises.

Actual ethical discourse is itself a narrative history, constituted by individuals, communities, histories, and myths, united by a *hermeneusis* of which the *kathakar* is the mediator. It is a lived culture and a real history, and it is the unification of them in a continuous tradition of revisions and adaptations of stories which are the means for ongoing narrative continuity. This is, perhaps, disturbing initially to those of us who function in an academic realm of separated disciplines and published treatises. We may be tempted to react to this disturbance by dismissing the role of stories as mere popular culture. We do so, however, at our peril and our loss, for we then ignore the means by which one-fifth of the world's population engages in ethical discourse.

A nation and a people *are* an ethical discourse conducted in and by the stories which it tells about itself. In order to understand this, we must leave academia behind and examine the real lives of communities. In India, at the very least, ethical discourse is primarily narrative *praxis*.

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THE AESTHETICS OF TRANQUILLITY AND BEAUTY: TIMELESS, EXPERIENCE AND WORLDLY TRANSFORMATION

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In recent years, the philosophical discourses which have taken place in India for over one and a half thousand years, have begun to be treated with the seriousness they deserve by western readers. This has been due in part to the translation work, both textual and conceptual, by a number of scholars (particularly Karl Potter, Dan Ingalls, Gerald Larson, Phyllis Granoff, Harold Coward, Kunjunni Raja, and B.K. Matilal. And from an earlier generation P.T. Raju, T.R.V. Murti, K.C. Bhattacharya and others) . In a book called *Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity* John Arapura posits the idea that anxiety is a deep, irreducible characteristic of western thought, while tranquillity is a deep, equally irreducible characteristic of Indian thought.[1] In this paper I would like to develop an aspect of this idea with reference to an Indian philosophical tradition which has become known as I 'Kashmir Śaivism' ; a tradition, which developed between the eighth and eleventh centuries CE, focused at a ritual level on the worship of the deity Śiva, and at a philosophical or theological level on the idea of consciousness. The specific question or problematic I wish to address here, is the relation between aesthetic experience, religious experience, and metaphysics as posited within the Kashmiri tradition. Put briefly, these discreet areas of discourse meet in the concept, and experience, of tranquillity, which is identified with pure or reflexive consciousness (consciousness without an object). This tranquillity of an essential consciousness is contrasted with the agitation or even violence of everyday or transactional consciousness within the world of appearances.

There has been a long and sophisticated discourse on aesthetics in the Indian intellectual tradition which stems from the earliest period of philosophical speculation. This aesthetic tradition developed a descriptive phenomenology of aesthetic categories and their experiential contents. An aesthetic experience is the flavour or relish (*rasa*) induced by a work of art, particularly a drama or poem, which involves the creative imagination (*pratibhâ*) of the spectator, who is absorbed to the exclusion of all other thoughts and experiences. This *rasa* is a cognitive enjoyment of an emotional experience which occurs upon the fulfilment of certain conditions such as the appropriate mental attitude of the experiencer; confidence in the value of the experience of art; and the ability to transcend one's personal emotions. The essence of *rasa* is a pleasure which has no relationship to any particular ego.

The earliest text of aesthetics, dating from around the 5th cent. CE, is Bharata's *Nâtya Śâstra* which became the key text upon which other thinkers commented, particularly the doyen of Kashmir Śaivism, Abhinavagupta (c.975-1025 CE). In his text, Bharata posits eight aesthetic flavours or *rasas* to which

correspond, at a lower level, with eight principal emotions of human nature (*sthâyibhâva*). These aesthetic experiences are erotic love (*śrngâra*) , the comic *(hâsva)* , the pathetic *(karuna)* , the angry *(krodha),* the heroic *(vîra),* the terrible *(bhayânaka),* the odius *(bîbhatsa),* and the wonderful *(adbhuta).* The ninth *rasa,* 'tranquillity', *(śânta),* was added after Bharata which became one of the central concerns of Abhinavagupta's theology. These aesthetic experiences have correlations in the everyday human emotions of delight *(rati),* laughter *(hâsa),* sorrow *(śoka),* anger *(krodha)* heroism *(utsâha)* , fear *(bhaya)* , disgust *(jugupsâ)* and astonishement *(vismaya)* ninth *rasa* of tranquillity correlates at a lower level with the human emotion of serenity *(śama).*

Abhinavagupta wrote two treatises which deal with aesthetics, a commentary (the *Locana*) on a treatise on poetry by Ânandavardhana (the *Dhvanyâloka*) , which deals principally with the theory of suggestion *(dhvani),* and the commentary (the *Abhinavabharati*) on Bharata's *Nâtya Śâstra,* which deals with aesthetic experience particularly in relation to drama. It is this latter text which I shall draw on here, a text whose meanings have been illumined by the work of pioneering scholars in this field (such as Raniero Gnoli, Pandey, Masson and Patwardhan).

For Abhinavagupta aesthetic sensibility (*sahrdayatva*) produced when watching a play or hearing a poem, is the capacity to access a realm beyond the empirical or transactional *(vyâvahâra)* world. It is not so much the transformation of human passion into aesthetic experience, Abhinavagupta explicitly denies this for the worldly cannot cause the transcendent, but an opening out into the realm of the aesthetic which is a modality of transcendence. Such aesthetic experience is characterised by wonder *(camatkâra)* and is discontinuous with ordinary *(laukika)* experience. Abhinavagupta writes:

> Aesthetics, whose nature is transcendent wonder, is distinct from worldly cognition (which arises) due to memory and inference.[2]

The presence of the elements which make up a play, the theatrical conventions, stage, the actresses, and dances eliminate the perception of a particular individual in a particular place. Here aesthetics is a perception discontinuous with worldly cognition, such as pain, sorrow, and delight, and is regarded as a quite distinct state. While aesthetic experience is not a perception of one's own mental processes, similarly it is not a perception of other's, namely the performers' , mental states.[3] Aesthetic experience in the sensitive 'reader' *(sahrdaya)* is transindividual; a loss of present time and location in which usual desires and anxieties are in abeyance and the subject of first person predicates is occluded by an absorption in transcendent wonder *(alaukikacamatkâra),* a situation brought about by a dramatic or poetic, visual *(drśyam)* or aural *(śravyam)* depiction.

The way in which such a transcendent wonder is evoked is analysed by Bharata and Abhinavagupta as the union of three factors: the determinants or causes *(vibhâva),* the consequents *(anubhâva)* and the accompanying transitory

emotional states *(vyabhicâri).*[4] Abhinavagupta compares this relation to causation in the everyday world in which a cause results in a 'permanent' emotional state *(sthâvibhâva)* . For example, the death of a friend is the determinant *(vibhâva)* which causes the consequents *(anubhâva)* of wailing, tears and so on, and whose emotional state *(sthâyibhâva)* is grief or sorrow *(śoka).* An aesthetic experience, while comprising a determinant, consequent and emotional state, is very different from such an everyday occurrence. In an aesthetic experience, the determinants, which might consist of expressive glances in a drama, or even mental states such as contentment, give rise to the consequence which is *rasa,* the aesthetic experience, accompanied by transitory (rather than permanent) emotional states *(vyabhicâri).* While the structure of the relationship between cause, consequence and emotional state is paralleled in both ordinary and aesthetic experience, aesthetic experience, because of its nature, is not a part of everyday awareness. Indeed the relationship between everyday cognition involving a cause, consequence and emotional state, and the aesthetic experience involving essentially the same factors, is one of the central problems of Indian aesthetics. For Abhinavagupta the difference lies in that the tasting of *rasa,* the aesthetic experience, is thought not to occur temporally; aesthetic experience is outside of everyday time and so is outside of ordinary causation. Abhinavagupta writes that:

> Here [in aesthetic experience], the tasting of the determinants etc. is like a miraculous flower [a blossom without cause], whose essence is the present only: [aesthetic experience] is not continuous with the past or future.[5]

Absorption in the aesthetic object is freedom from spacial and temporal specification *(deśakâlaviśesa),* the highest experience of which is tranquillity *(śânta).* This is a condition regarded by Abhinavagupta as being outside of time, in which there is no pain, no happiness, and no hatred. This is the natural state of the *(prakrti)* out from which all other emotions, such as love, flow, and which are deformations of it.[6] This aesthetic experience of tranquillity has serenity (*śama*) as its correlative human emotion, its determinants *(vibhâva)* are knowledge of true reality *(tattvajñâna),* detachment *(vairâvgya)* and purity of mind, while its consequences *(anubhâva)* are discipline, meditation upon the Self, and compassion for all creatures. Its accompanying transitory mental states, says Abhinavagupta, include disgust with the world *(nirveda)* , remembrance of the absolute, rigidity of the body and horripilation.[7]

This claim by Abhinavagupta is interesting because here we have an aesthetic condition brought about by a metaphysical cognition which has ethical consequences. This is to elevate aesthetic experience to a very high pedestal indeed: aesthetics becomes the link between, on the one hand a monistic metaphysics which posits the idea of a single, consciousness reality of which the world is an appearance, and, on the other, an ethics which is focused on a spiritual or yogic discipline intended to recognize *(pratyabhijñâ)* that monistic condition. Indeed the subject who has experienced the supreme aesthetic emotion, which is his self-effacement, does good *(śubha)* and avoids inauspicious *(aśubha)* behaviour. For Abhinavagupta, in the *śântarasa* there is a

synthesis of metaphysics and aesthetics which meet in a state beyond time and beyond the world of everyday transaction.

By way of conclusion I would like to suggest contrasts between the Śaiva understanding of the aesthetic of tranquillity as the highest sensibility which transcends appearances, in a state which is timeless, with the western aesthetic of beauty as the world eschatologically transfigured in a future time. This idea of aesthetics as a perception of the world eschatologically transfigured, is found very prominently in Russian thinkers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rather than a timeless aesthetic in which individuality suppressed, the Russian theologians were concerned with an aesthetic of beauty which was not in some other timeless, realm, but was a transfiguration of this cosmos; a transfiguration of matter. Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900) writes about the idea of beauty in nature and art. 'We must define beauty', he writes, 'as the transfiguration of matter through the incarnation in it of another, a supermaterial principles'. [8] Here, rather than the individual consciousness being effaced in a transcendent experience of union and tranquillity, a supermaterial principle, the Holy Spirit of Christian thought, incarnates into the world and transforms it. An idea which Solovyov perhaps develops from the deep tradition of iconography in Orthodoxy. Aesthetic sensibility is therefore an appreciation of the Holy Spirit in matter and its transformation through this incarnation; an idea related to the transformation of the world in a future time. For both Abhinavagupta and Solovyov, aesthetic sensibility is soteriological, but for Abhinavagupta this is realized through, transcending the world of temporal sequence, whereas for Solovyov this is realized through the eschatological transformation of matter in a future time.

In a short paper such as this it would, of course, be absurd to try to do even partial justice to these ideas, but the difference in approach to aesthetics highlights and illustrates a fundamental distinction in an intellectuality and culture stemming from the Judeo-Christian tradition, on the one hand, and an intellectuality and culture stemming from a South Asian religiosity on the other.

NOTES

[1] J.G. Arapura, *Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity* (The Hague: Nijhof, 1972).

[2] tenâlaukikacamatkârâtmâ rasâsvâdah smrtyanumânalaukikasamvedanavilaksana eva / M. Ramakrishna Kavi, *Abhinavabharati* (Baroda: Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1926), vol. 1, p.286.

[3] *Abhinavabharati* p.282.

[4] *Abhinavabharati* p.274.

[5] iha tu vibhâvâdicarvanâ adbhutapuspavat tatkâlasâraivoditâ na tu púrvâparakâlânubandhinî - *Dhvanyâlocana* p. 160, cited in R. Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* (Rome: Istituto Italiano per Il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, 1956). p. 97, n.1.

[6] See J.C. Masson and M.V. Patwardhan *Śântarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics* (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Insitute, 1969), p. 93.

[7] *Abhinavabharati* p.332.

[8] Vladamir Solovyov, 'Beauty, Sexuality, and Love' in Alexander Schmemann, *Ultimate Questions: An Anthology of Modern Russian Religious Thought* (London and Oxford: Mowbrays), p. 75.

GANDHI'S PHILOSOPHY OF SATYAGRAHA: THE FORCE OF TRUTH AND SOUL

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Philosophy is defined as the pursuit of truth. This is par excellence a succinct and sufficient definition of Philosophy and accepted by all. Satyagraha is also relentless search for truth. The term Satyagraha was coined by Gandhi in South Africa to express the force that Indians there used. It was conceived as a weapon of the strong and excluded the use of violence and hatred in any shape or farm. It literally means holding onto truth. So it is a truth force. Gandhi calls it the sole force (Gandhi, 1958). This technique can be used by individuals as well as communities. It is also a law of universal application. It is not based on the force of arms, but on the force of truth and love. We are usually aware of two kinds of forces - Physical force and Spiritual force. We are generally acquainted with the physical force. It consists of violence. It is a weapon of the brutes. Man is more familiar with the physical force which Gandhi was opposed to. The spiritual force is an invisible one. So he described it as truth force. Therefore Satyagraha Presupposes self-discipline and self-purification.

According to Gandhi satyagraha is a philosophy of life. It is the religion by which he lived. It is also the religion where he wanted all men to live by it. Satyagraha is a new way of life. It has several features. For him truth and non-violence are as old as hills. But truth through non-violence alone is really a new feature. Secondly the application of this principle to every walk of life and all human affairs, and to fight evil and injustice to establish truth and justice, is also one of the new features. Thirdly the emphasis on action which has always to be non-violent against all evil and injustice also finds the satyagraha way of life. Fourthly the application of this principle to all fields of life and finding solution to all conflicts - socio-economic as well as political -- is another new feature. Finally it is identification in spirit with all life through love to serve and sacrifice for the good and welfare of all. These are important features for satyagraha as a new way of life (Diwakar, 1969).

A Technique of Conflict Resolution

Satyagraha as a weapon of social control is eternal and creative. Its creativity is inherent in its basis of ahimsa and moral persuasion. The satyagrahi would adopt satyagraha as a weapon and insist on truth being established. He resists all unjust authority and the source of evil. But the aim of satyagraha is destruction of evil, not the evildoer; sin, whom actually a satyagrahi loves to liberate from the grip of evil or sin.

It is a sin to suffer unjust behaviour at the hands of another person or organisation or society. Hence Gandhi did not hesitate to carry on tireless crusade against injustice both in South Africa and India. Therefore satyagraha

may be understood as a technique for resolving conflicts and a method for fighting evil. Satyagraha became something more than a method of resistance to particular legal norms; it became an instrument of struggle for positive objectives and for fundamental change (Bondurant, 1959).

Satyagraha is practicable in every situation if applied in the spirit of Gandhian thought. The satyagrahi becomes mentally strong by enduring physical suffering. The suffering has no limitations. It may stretch to the extent of imprisonment or even death. So great suffering is highly correlated to great relief. The suffering is undergone in the purest form of satyagraha.

Forms of Satyagraha

There are different forms of satyagraha. These forms may be employed in a satyagraha campaign. These were most commonly employed during the freedom struggle in India under the leadership of Gandhi. There are mainly three forms of Satyagraha i. e, (1) Noncooperation (2) Civil disobedience and (3) Fasting.

Non-cooperation with the evil doer is a mild form but can be an immensely potent technique when undertaken on a mass scale. Non-cooperation is the activisation of love for the redress of wrongs. It also means renunciation of the benefits of a system with which we are associated. The technique can be applied at the domestic as well as national levels. At the domestic level there can be non-cooperation between father and his sons as well between the headmaster and the students. It is resorted to if the headmaster or the father is unjust. Similarly if the government perpetrates an act of grave injustice, the subjects should withdraw their cooperation and they make the ruler give up the policy of wickedness. But whatever be the level of its application, the aim is always to convert the opponent and hence, it is not to be considered punitive and vindictive. It really aims to touch the heart of the opponent.

Civil disobedience is an active, strong and extreme form of Satyagraha. It involves direct contravention of specific laws like non-payment of taxes and so on. This form of Satyagraha is based on the belief that no state has the right to make laws which run counter to the will and aspirations of the people. Hence, there is the necessity for Satyagraha in the form of civil disobedience if morally unjustified laws are imposed on citizens.

Fasting is the most potent form of Satyagraha. It is a conscious self-suffering. It is the highest expression of the prayer of a pure and loving heart. It is a means of resisting injustice and converting the evil-doer.

The Satyagrahi must possess spiritual fitness and a clean heart. He should believe in God. There is no room for lack of faith, anger, impatience and selfishness. According to Gandhi these are the conditions for the success of the movement of Satyagraha.

The philosophy of Satyagraha is related to the two other ethical and basic principles. They are called Satya (truth) and ahimsa (non-violence).

Understanding of these fundamentals determines the effective functioning of Satyagraha.

Truth and Non-Violence

Sat or truth is the supreme essence and the primordial being. Gandhi conceived of Sat not only as an ethical category but as an ontological being of the highest realm (Kher, 1962). Truth is not merely a theoretical value or intrinsic moral ideal but is the highest reality. Gandhi used to call God as truth but later he started calling truth as God. Gandhi says "denial of God we have known, denial of Truth we have not known" (Radha Krishnan and Muirhead, 1952). Though it was a momentous psychological transition for Gandhi, he came to this conclusion after a continuous and relentless search after truth. Truth can be practiced both by theists and atheists. Agnostics and Atheists can also come under the fold of truth because of their allegiance to values like love, compassion, universal brotherhood, humanitarianism etc. That is why there were atheists in the ranks of followers of Gandhi i.e. Acharya Bhansale, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Jayaprakash Narayan etc. Gandhiji was a theist whereas Broadley was an atheist and both were good friends and mutually respected each other.

In Gandhi's viewpoint practice of truth contains these aspects: 1. Complete unity between thought, word and deed and absence of contradiction 2. Truth follows fearlessness 3. Truth accompanies justice, courage and morality and 4. Truth is universal just like scientific laws of nature and has no variation. Hence, scientific truth cannot be different from religious and philosophical truth. Its true meaning is reality and objectivity. That is why truth can be better replaced by the concept of reality (Sarma, 1956).

As mentioned above practice of truth is very difficult. Hence, it is highly upheld as the highest virtue by the people. Though its practice is beyond their reach yet they pay highest regard and respect to it. Hence, its practice wins admiration, support and appreciation of people. Practice of falsehood results in chaos, quarrels, conflicts, violence, crime and injustice. On the other, practice of truth results in the opposite. This is how truth and non-violence are interrelated, interdependent and inseparable.

The philosophy of satyagraha is very much related to the concept of non-violence. The satyagrahi also must have a sound basis for his love or hatred. Gandhiji's philosophy of non--violence is distinct from the view points put forwarded by other philosophers who fought against violence. They used violence to destroy violence and established nonviolence in its place. But Gandhiji's philosophy does not permit any measure of violence in the fight against it. In this respect he is very intolerant. Gandhi hated British System in India because of several demerits in it. But he did not hate the British in India. A sense of universal brotherhood prevented him from hating them as human beings. In fact Satyagrahi makes a distinction between evil and the evil doer.

He said that we should resist the evil but not evil doer like Sin but not sinner. The satyagrahi wins the heart of the opponents through love, persuasion and self-.suffering. He regards their lives as worthy of reverence. He said: "you are no satyagrahi if you remain silent or passive spectators while your enemy is being done to death you must protect him even at the cost of your like" (Gandhi, 1946).

The word satyagraha implies the method of action which must be non-violent. Non-violence is a weapon, a technique and a method which man can adopt to fight the battles of the world. It is a soul force as well as truth force. That is why non-violence knows no defeat. He wrote 'Non-violence is the greater force at the disposal of mankind. It is mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of man' (Gandhi, 1936).

Gandhi's life is a testimony of a series of the practice of non-violence in South Africa and India. He never preached anything without he himself practicing it. He evolved his philosophy of non-violence as a result of experimentation. He was on many occasions faced with humiliation and injustice and he invented the weapon of nonviolence as the only weapon to face them. As an exponent of the modern concept of non-violence he faced all the challenges of his life with extraordinary courage and love.

Critique

Gandhi stressed upon the persuasive character of nonviolent satyagraha. He -denied the presence of even any mental violence or coercion in it. But in reality this is a distant possibility. Any satyagraha to be successful should enjoy the support of the people. In India hunger strike, a form of satyagraha, is undertaken upon the flimsiest issues. There is an inherent coercion in these strikes. There is no Gandhian stuff in them. For the success of satyagraha it is essential to mobilize the force of public opinion. It is of great concern that the public are convinced of the genuineness of the cause.

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A NOTE ON THE CURRENT DIRECTION OF ST.PETERSBURG PHILOSOPHY

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Young philosophers in St.Petersburg are now in transition together with their country. Following the lifting of Soviet strictures on philosophical thought, Marxism-Leninism has been left to compete with the wide variety of philosophical paradigms active beyond the Russian border. By observing the papers presented by our Russian colleagues at this conference, **Paradigms of Philosophizing**, we can see the wholesale replacement of the Marxist-Leninist paradigm by Western ones. Why is this shift occurring? Does it represent a revolution in paradigms (in the Kuhnian sense)?

We believe the current paradigm shift in Russian philosophy is occurring for two reasons: 1) the fundamental irrelevance and insincerity of the previous paradigm; 2) the sudden absence of the academic authority which for decades artificially supported the previous paradigm. We consider the current shift to be a *normalization*, rather than a revolution in the paradigms of Russian philosophy. It is important to realize that the Western paradigms are not new, even for the Russian philosopher. Prior to the demise of Marxist-Leninist academic authority, Russian scholars read and discussed Western philosophers. However, at that time it was not possible for Russians to overtly subscribe to a Western paradigm. Rather, it was their political duty to use the official paradigm to produce a critique of the Western ones. Clearly, that has all changed. We now see a more "normal" situation in which Russian philosophers are free to subscribe to any philosophical paradigm they choose, without regard for political considerations. One interesting feature of the current normalization is the frequent desire, on the part of those young Russian philosophers who are adopting the Western paradigms, to try to unify these paradigms. Unfortunately, this tendency sometimes gives their words the appearance of jargon — it sounds strange to learn that the "EIDOS" philosophical group has an "existential-hermeneutic-phenomenological approach which incorporates the structuralist and Freudian traditions." Today's Russian philosopher, denied his/her old professional language, needs to use the Western language and idioms. However, due to his/her sense of the uniqueness of Russian thought, there is the expectation that use of this international language will eventually result in the expression of a new paradigm, uniquely Russian. It is our hope that after the consummation of the current shift, Russian philosophy will be elevated to a new synthesis infused with an inspiration drawn from the unique spiritual qualities of contemporary Russian life.[1]

[1] The current conditions of instability and poverty which confront today's Russian intellectuals often inspire them to find philosophical transcendence in the midst of a stubbornly prosaic existence.

БИМОДАЛЬНОСТЬ СОЗНАНИЯ И КУЛЬТУРА
BIMODALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE

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The author considers the relationship between mentality of a European man, his culture, existential problems and laterality of functions of the brain hemispheres. Discussing this problem in broad terms one can speak of three types of culture: European culture with a dominant differentiating hemisphere, Indian culture with a dominant right integrating hemisphere and Chinese culture with harmonic division of hemispheric functions. According to the authors opinion existential difficulty of an European man which is neurotic in its character has not been yet solved and lies in a dominating position of a left hemisphere. The latter is formalisms, reasoning, diverting from life. Existential difficulties in such a state have no solution and will become more and more serious. Wushu being a sort of Chinese martial arts contains the conception of "man" or completeness. An adherent of wushu has a feeling of completeness of his initial nature and his interrelations with the world. This state results in harmonisation and normalisation of function of human body including an interaction of the brain hemispheres. An emblem of Great Limit - Taiji -can be used for symbolic description of the brain activity in such a state. It gives a specific sensation of existence in all completeness of human nature and differs in quality from all other states experienced in dominance of one of hemispheres. Some substantial notions of European culture including religious conceptions are deprived of their ontological status and appear only as products of left-hemispheric consciousness when regarded from the point of view of completeness - "man".

1. Сопоставление общих черт менталитета человека европейской культуры (а следовательно, стиля его философии и культуры) с латерализацией функций гемисфер мозга (для левой гемисферы) показывает их совпадение. Сам по себе факт доминирования левого полушария мозга у европейцев известен. Но не следует ли тогда предположить, что не культура, философия или религия определяют и предопределяют подходы человека, а именно характер взаимоотношений полушарий мозга в их функциональной асимметрии? И что здесь же корень столь актуальных для европейского человека невротических проблем?

2. Два тысячелетия патроната христианства, философия существования, современная психотерапия так и не смогли разрешить основных экзистенциальных трудностей еврочеловека. И тем не менее иначе не могло быть. Перманентное следование стилю, так сказать, левополушарного сознания с его дискурсивностью, логицированием, формализацией; иными словами, отрывом от жизни, неизбежно должны только порождать новые экзистенциальные проблемы.

3. В практике так называемых "внутренних школ" китайских "воинских искусств" - ушу - используется понятие полноты "мань". Оно в психологическом плане означает переживание адептом ушу предельной полноты, целостности своей природы, полноты связи с миром, соответствия с совершенством-добродетелью - дэ. Достижение состояния полноты-мань приводит к нормализации, гармонизации, натурализации всех функций организма, в том числе и взаимодействий гемисфер мозга. Иероглиф "мань" своей структурой и формой конгруэнтен эмблеме Великого Предела - Тайцзы, символизирующего в традиционной китайской культуре основной принцип любых взаимодействий в мире. Гармонически функционирующий мозг, видимо, опишется Тайцзы: гемисферы - черно-белые области инь-ян и т. д. Представляется, что функционирующий таким образом мозг будет некоей плеромой, предельно прегнантным гештальтом, поражающим особое качество существования, экзистенцию во всей полноте свойств человеческой природы. Диктат одного из полушарий мозга нарушит форму или структуру Тайцзы, приведет к внутренним психологическим противоречиям, напряжениям, стрессу и, представляется, в европейском варианте, к невротическим проблемам. В этом смысле, в самом общем виде можно говорить о трех типах культур: европейском - при доминировании левой, дифференцирующей, гемисферы мозга, индийском - правой, интегрирующей, и китайском - при гармоническом разделении функций гемисфер мозга.

4. С позиции полноты-мань, как представляется, можно увидеть в другом контексте некоторые само собой разумеющиеся для человека европейской культуры явления... Почему, например, европеец уверен в онтологическом статусе вероисповедания, религии? Если имярек не утратил полноты своего существования полноты претворения себя в мире (Homo authenticus? Китайский первоисточник - чжэнь жэнь), то будет ли он нуждаться в некоей "вере"? Не есть ли понятия теизм и атеизм, Бог и Сатана не онтологические данности, а только продукты левополушарного сознания, А понятие "Бог" — архетип Отца — воплощение таинственностей правополушарного сознания для человека с преобладающим левополушарным мышлением, причем на промежуточной стадии до обретения гармонии функционирования гемисфер мозга.

ИДЕЯ СВЕРХЧЕЛОВЕКА И ГУМАНИЗМ
THE IDEA OF SUPERMAN AND HUMANISM

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The idea of superman concerns the spiritual tradition which splits human into two. From this point of view, humans themselves do not present an objective value, since we are thought of being creatures, but we are not thought of as creators. The questionable remedy that is offered for humankind is a transformation into over-human being.

Man has to stop his life with reference to old perceptions. This appears to be a contradictory reasoning: we must die to transcend, to evolve.

At the same time the idea of superman expresses human self-criticism and his wish to be more perfect. These intentions of mortal souls do people the honour and are indicative of great human potentialities.

Humanistic philosophical anthropology considers the idea of superman as a mythological image. In fact, man is primordial not only a creature but also a creative being, homo creans. Creation is a factor of the human rescue. If suffering without creation destroys man, creation without compassion turns an individual to non-human existence. Suffering and compassion humanize creation. The process of our self-creating signifies the becoming of man but not of superman. Human is becoming that which he is becoming.

Весь мир мыслит категорией сверхчеловека. На протяже нии двух тысячелетий христианство предлагает идеал богочеловека - Иисуса Христа. С конца прошлого столетия живет своей жизнью Übermensch Фридриха Ницше. В двадцатом веке Шри Ауробиндо рассказал о своем пути к сверхчеловечеству. Наконец, современная обыденная ментальность неустанно тиражирует образ супермена. Таким образом, идея сверхчеловека носит универсальный характер. Люди мыслят ее, истово верят в нее, они желают ее. Возникает резонный вопрос: что такое сверх-человек и почему люди мечтают о нем? Вопрошая о сверхчеловеке, мы лучше узнаем сущность человека.

I.

Для ответа на поставленный вопрос требуется более внимательное рассмотрение различных доктрин сверхчеловека. Обратимся к концепции Ф.Ницше. Его Заратустра учит о сверхчеловеке, который должен стать смыслом земли, смыслом бытия людей. Что касается человека, то он есть посмешище или мучительный позор. Человек - грязный поток, и нужно быть морем, чтобы принять в себя эту грязь и не сделаться не-чистым. Сверхчеловек является тем морем, где может потонуть великое презрение к человеку. Человек - это канат над пропастью, канат, натянутый между животным и сверхчеловеком" [1]. "В человеке важно то, что он мост, а не цель: в человеке можно любить только то, что он пе-реход и уничтожение"[2].

Чем же не нравится человек Фридриху Ницше? В частности тем, что цивилизация оказалась переполненной "маленькими людьми". Они ста-ли господами и теперь "проповедуют покорность, скромность, благоразумие, старание, осторожность и длинную вереницу остальных маленьких добродетелей" [3]. Именно эти маленькие люди с маленькими доб-родетелями, чернь составляют величайшую опасность для сверхчеловека. По определению Заратустры, человек есть нечто, что должно превзойти.

Этот основной постулат, который так или иначе присутствует во всех доктринах сверхчеловека, является весьма сомнительным с точки зрения гуманистической философской антропологии. Как заметил Альберт Швейцер, "...чем больше мы превращаемся в сверхлюдей, тем бесчеловечнее мы становимся"[4]. Между тем у Ницше имеются свои адвокаты. Например, К.А.Свасьян полагает, что псевдоправедники всех стран состряпали из Ницше "интеллектуальный комикс", от которого следует решительно избавиться. Они вспоминают сентенцию философа "толкни слабого" и начинают травлю "мученика познания". К.А.Свасьян стремится исправить положение, пытаясь ответить на ключевой, по его мнению, вопрос: о каком "слабом" идет речь в данном тезисе? Исследователь апеллирует к афоризму 225 "По ту сторону добра и зла", но, к сожалению, не дает никакого ответа на свой же вопрос [5].

Но все же о каком "слабом" идет речь? По Ницше, слабые - это чернь, маленькие люди, популяция страдающих существ, не способная к творчеству. Один из первых признаков творчества - воля к власти. Если же еще учесть, что "сама жизнь есть воля к власти"[6], то повседневный человек, который не стремится к власти, представляется практически безжизненным и потому никчемным существом. При таком взгляде обыкновенный человек теряет самоценность. Человек обретает ее лишь тогда, когда в нем пробуждается воля к власти и, следовательно, к трансценденции в сверхчеловека. Поэтому падающего, т.е. слабого, лишенной всякой жизненности и ценности индивида, нужно обязательно подтолкнуть, помочь его падению. Подобная помощь есть подлинная доблесть настоящего человека, который своим толчком очищает дорогу для движущейся колонны сверхлюдей. Логика Ницше безупречна.

Однако идеал Ницше оказывается весьма заурядным и довольно тоскливым, если иметь в виду, что "...под моралью подразумевается именно учение об отношениях власти, при которых возникает феномен "жизнь"[7]. Другими словами, властвую, следовательно, существую. Таким образом, философия Ницше есть философия господина, администратора. Не стоит удивляться, если миллионы чиновников во всем мире с тайной и ни с чем не сравнимой радостью повторяют про себя: "Когда я властвую, тогда воистину живу". Следуя Ницше, мы должны признать, что чиновник любого ранга, который хоть чем-нибудь да управляет, является сверхчеловеком. Он вырвался из толпы безликих единиц и теперь при наличии собственной воли к власти придает "красоту и пропорциональность" целому миру. Очевидно, тотальная угрюм-бурчеевщина была бы великолепным воплощением мечтаний Заратустры. В самом деле, каждый градоначальник из "Истории одного города" М.Е.Салтыкова-Щедрина был подлинным сверхчеловеком, "танцующей звездой" Фридриха Ницше.

II.

В концепции Ницше имеется еще один аспект, на который в свое время обратил внимание В.С.Соловьев. Он хорошо видел дурную сторону ницшеанства: презрение к слабому и больному человечеству и присвоение себе отдельной группой лиц какого-то исключительного сверхчеловеческого значения (элите все дозволено). Вместе с тем он по-пытался найти в демонизме сверхчеловека ту истину, которая привлекательна для живой души[8].

Согласно Соловьеву, из всех земных существ один человек может относиться к себе самому критически. Мы всегда несовершенны, и "чело-веку естественно хотеть быть лучше и больше, чем он есть в действительности, ему естественно тяготеть к идеалу сверхчеловека. Если он взаправду хочет, то и может, а если может, то и должен" [9].

Иными словами, люди сознают свое несовершенство и стремятся улучшить себя. В идее сверхчеловека слышится самокритика человечества и желание большего совершенства. Без всякого сомнения, эти интенции смертной души делают честь людям, они свидетельствуют о великих возможностях самого человека. Вместе с тем трудно согласиться, что идеал сверхчеловека является "естественным" для человека. Этот имидж можно считать естественным в том смысле, в каком естественно (т.е. реально) существует мифология. Однако никакой Ubermensch не является тем пределом, той целью, к которой должен "естественно" стремиться homo sapiens.

Образ сверхчеловека есть миф, который уводит человека от самого себя, отчуждает его от собственной сущности. С точки зрения данной концепции человек фатально плох. Его изменение к лучшему означает становление не человека, но сверхчеловека. Чтобы стать совершеннее, человек должен перестать быть человеком, он должен умереть и перейти в иное, над-человеческое состояние. Любая идея сверхчеловека принижает самого человека, лишает его внутренней ценности и значимости, закрепляет за ним второсортное положение в мире.

На оценке В.Соловьевым идеи сверхчеловека лежит печать его религиозно-философской позиции. Ubermensch привлекателен для философа отчасти потому, что он сам исповедует религию сверхчеловека. Человек, рассуждает Соловьев, есть прежде всего "смертный", т.е. побеждается, преодолевается смертью. Сверхчеловек должен быть победителем смерти, "исполнителем тех условий, при которых возможно или вовсе не умирать, или, умерев, воскреснуть для вечной жизни"[10]. Таким "сверх-человеком", действительным победителем смерти является Иисус Христос.

Религиозные образы и символы имеют свой глубокий смысл, причем идея бессмертия не является исключением. Однако ее адекватная ин-терпретация невозможна в рамках идеи сверхчеловека.

III.

Имеются основания полагать, что человек есть микрокосм, дитя творческого Космоса; поэтому он изначально является не только тварным, но и творческим существом, homo creans. Его творчество есть не что иное, как форма космического творчества. Творчество есть неотъемлемое свойство человека. Человек способен творить себя.

Вместе с его саморазвитием изменяются его сущность и существование, истины человеческого бытия. Человек становится тем, кем он становится.

Сегодня наука располагает определенными доказательствами творческой природы человека. Так, Эрих Фромм утверждает, что самые сильные страсти и потребности человека коренятся в особенностях его существования. Среди таких потребностей выделяется трансценденция через творчество или разрушение[11].

Но что такое творчество? В платоновском "Пире" имеются замечательные слова: "...Рождение - это та доля бессмертия и вечности, которая отпущена смертному существу" [12]. Однако под рождением можно понимать не только воспроизводство жизни, но и творчество. Как говорит Платон, "все, что вызывает переход из небытия в бытие, - творчество, и, следовательно, создание любых произведений искусства и ре-месла можно назвать творчеством, а всех создателей их - творцами"[13]. Таким образом, творчество, вопреки Ницше, - не только и не столько во-ля к власти. Творчество представляет собой рождение новых идей, чувств, образов, материальных продуктов человеческой деятельности. Поэтому в творчестве можно видеть проявление бесконечного в конечном, бессмертного начала в смертном существе. Благодаря творчеству люди становятся, так сказать, богоподобными. Творчество есть фактор спасения человека.

Разрушение противоположно творчеству, поскольку оно вызывает обратный процесс - трансформацию бытия в небытие. Творчество утверждает жизнь, разрушение умножает смерть. Если же однажды творчество, т.е. "переход из небытия в бытие" прекратится, то воцарится полное Ничто. Когда творческое начало человека подавляется неблагоприятными внешними условиями, в нем начинает доминировать одна лишь тварность, с которой связаны пассивность и страдание. Эти качества неуклонно приближают человека к небытию, способствуют его умиранию. Страдающее бытие прогрессирует в Ничто. Страдание очаровано смертью. Ничто есть энтелехия страдания. Ничто является тем пределом, к которому (даже с известной легкостью и желанием) стремится пассивность; и потому страдающее бытие само по себе является наполовину небытием. Страдание сродни Ничто и потому оно ничтожит.

Ф.Ницше совершенно прав, когда указывает, что "в человеке тварь и творец соединены воедино"[14]. Однако он не делает из этой посылки адекватных заключений. Философ продолжает духовную традицию, которая расщепляет человека надвое. Смертным оставляется пассивность и страдание, а активность, творчество отдаются сверхчеловеку. Это - традиция униженного человека. С этой точки зрения человек не имеет объективной ценности, поскольку он - тварь, а не творец. Когда же человек представляет собой только тварное образование, то он навсегда оказывается страдающим существом, которое вызывает одно лишь сострадание. Для своего избавления человеку остается одно: трансформироваться либо в богочеловека, либо в Ubermensch. В любом случае человек прекращает свое существование, но... приобретает цен-ность. Странная логика: человек должен умереть, чтобы

возвыситься, спастись. А кое-кто в этой трансценденции усматривает высший гуманизм.

Нормальное развитие человека связано с пробуждением и культивированием в нем интеллектуального, эмоционального и практического творчества. Но этот процесс означает становление человека, а не сверхчеловека. Именно творчество возвышает человека, преодолевает в нем тварное, страдающее существо. Чтобы превратить человека в мутанта, достаточно отнять у него возможность творить. И наоборот, благодаря творчеству человек становится человеком. Вакуум творчества жизненно опасен. Можно сказать, что в тварности человека заключен "инстинкт смерти". Кто культивирует в обществе пассивность и страдание, тот является садовником смерти, взращивает небытие. В творчестве, напротив, заключен "инстинкт жизни". Творчество наделяет людей долей бес-смертия и вечности.

Итак, сущность человека представляет собой реальное противоречие. В человеке неразрывно соединены смертное и бессмертное, тварь и творец, пассивность и активность, страдание и величие. Но все это - "человеческое, слишком человеческое". Страдание без творчества не возвышает, оно не спасает наши души, оно их разрушает. В свою очередь, творчество без страдания и сострадания превращает индивида в не-человека, в сверх-человека, одним словом, в постчеловеческое существо. Страдание и сострадание очеловечивают творчество. Если человек отвергнет методологию гуманизма, т.е. метафизику уважения к человеку, то вместе с ней он отвергнет и себя.

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ОБЫДЕННОЕ СОЗНАНИЕ — УСЛОВИЕ ЕДИНСТВА?
ORDINARY CONSCIOUSNESS — THE CONDITION OF UNITY?

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Сразу извинюсь за амбициозность, так как речь пойдет о попытке представить обыденное сознание в качестве основания единства не только сознания, но и всего человеческого существания. Предвижу возражения, иерархия поставлена с ног на голову: экзистенция больше, чем просто сознание, а обыденное сознание представляет из себя лишь один из аспектов сознания вообще (уровень, состояние или еще что-либо).

Подобные возражения имплицитны западной персоналистской философии, которая характерна и некоторым русским философам (Н.Бердяев, Н.Лосский), и несостоятельны в рамках соборной философии русских религиозных мыслителей (В.Соловьев, П.Флоренский, С.Трубецкой, С.Булгаков, С.Франк). Понимая обыденное сознание, в лучшем случае, как средство, как ступеньку в гносеологической лестнице, персоналистская философия утверждает культ субъекта в доделывании тварного мира. Ущербность природного сознания человека (=обыденного сознания) должна быть преодолена личностными усилиями, потому что, как уверяет И.Хайдеггер, оно стучится в дверь, "за которой скрывается осязаемая полезность, и усердствует против знания о сущности сущего, которое как существенное знание с давних пор называется "философией""[1].Еще более однозначно и уничижительно о возможностях обыденного сознания высказывается Н.Бердяев: "Средне-нормальное, обыденное сознание определяется своей прикованностьв к обыдевнной действительности, неспособностью сосредоточиться на иной действительности, направить себя к иному миру"[2].

Иная позиция представлена в русской религиозной философии. Обыденное сознание - божий дар, оно реализует и характеризует человеческий род. Оно есть то общее сознание, "в котором я непосредственно воспринимаю вселенское согласие"[3]. Как дар оно совершенно и заключает в себе "все возможное богатство мысли"[4].

Но как принадлежащее человеку,оно неполно и подвержено порче. Каким образом снимается эта порча? - Через веру и через философию (и науку). Непосредственная связь обладателя дара с дарителем обеспечивает наилучшее и быстрейшее самораскрытие, самореализацию человека при помощи одного лишь обыденного сознания. Но есть и более окольный путь: через науку и философию, который способен завести и в тупик. Наука, утверждающая господство человека, его необозримых возможностей, получает преимущество в партикулярной

силе человека, пренебрежительно игнорируя или даже третируя "common sens" как тривиальный, низкий, очевидно-недостаточный. Философия возвращает науке отвергаемую ей интенцию соборности обыденного сознания на очевидно-достаточном уровне. Поэтому смысл взаимодействия науки и философии заключается в фразе: наука как строгая философия.

Необходима ли наука сама по себе? - Нет. Необходима ли философия до появления науки? - И да, и нет. Необходима ли философия после появления науки? - Однозначно, да.

Таким образом, обыденное сознание есть не область меонизации, а, напротив, та грань, которая только и способна отделить человека от этой области. Наука, противополагающая себя обыденному сознанию как самодостаточная - несамодостаточному как раз и находится за этой гранью в меонной области. Та же, которая признает за обыденным сознаниеи статус самодостаточного, неизбежно перерастает свои рамки, сливаясь с философией. Подобные метаморфозы науки телео- и теологичны. Философия же есть иное обыденного сознания, которое становится необходимо с появлением и укреплением науки.

Представленная апологетика обыденного сознания не имеет ничего общего с декларированием критериальности научности данного сознания или еще какой-либо ведущей роли в дискретной области. Опираясь на семантические этимологии античности и средневековья (sophrosune, common sens), даже на философскую традицию противопоставления "мнения" - "знанию", "толпы" - "философу", выявляя экзистенциальные позиции философских классиков, очевидно-обоснованным оказывается выделение русскими религиозными мыслителями софийной энергийности обыденного сознания, как сознания общего, целого, которое больше частичного человека, но равно соборной личности.

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ВЗАИМОНАПРАВЛЕННОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ МАТЕРИАЛИЗМА И ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛИЗМА
THE MUTUAL DIRECTIONS OF MOVEMENT OF MATERIALISM AND EXISTENTIALISM.

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Is it possible that Materialism and Existentialism are interrelated movements? Absolutely. Both the philosophy of J.-P.Sartre and discussions of his work in the French journal "La Pensée" in the 1950s, and retrospective movements of many contemporary Russian philosophers prove this fact.

Philosophical systems and corresponding problems never are given birth in a vacuum. Systems and problems depend on each other (including retrospective ones), add to and develop each other. In this case there is one central problem - man, the human character, life of man, his essence, freedom, unrepeatable individuality and that which unites humankind - Homo Sapiens.

Of course, man is a social being. Perhaps, it is more correct to say that he is psychobiosocial. The emergence of man is simultaneous to the emergence of society. There is no man outside of society. In. this sense, materialism is correct. But, at the same time, man is an individual. Many psychological states are experienced only on the individual level and can only be explained by a specific person. And it is precisely this area which is studied by existentialism (and, of course, psychologists).

The principle of complementarity will help unite and strengthen the position of these two contemporary philosophical movements in the area of social anthropology. The following categories demonstrate this coming together: being, existence, essence, life, death, freedom.

Возможно ли взаимонаправленное движение материализма и экзистенциализма? Вполне возможно. И философия Ж.П.Сартра, и обсуждение его творчества в редакции французского журнала "Мысль" в пятидесятые годы, и обратные движения некоторых русских философов в настоящее время это доказывают.

Философские системы и соответствующие проблемы никогда не рождаются на чистом месте, на "невозделанном поле". Системы и проблемы опираются друг на друга (в том числе и с обратным знаком), дополняют и развивают друг друга. А здесь центральная проблема одна- человек, человеческая личность, жизнь человека, жизнь человека, его сущность и предназначение, смысл его жизни, его ценность и са-

моценность, его свобода, его неповторимая индивидуальность и то общее, что объединяет род человеческий; Homo sapiens.

Конечно, человек социален.Может быть, точнее, психобиосоциален. Возникновение человека- это одновременно возникновение общества. Вне общества нет человека. В этом материализм прав. Но тот же самый человек индивидуален. Многие состояния его психики переживаются только им одним и могут быть объяснены только этим конкретным человеком. Человек радуется или страдает. В этих эмоциях много общего у разных людей. Но конкретный человек радуется или страдает от определенных внешних причин или от своего внутреннего состояния. Все эти психические явления индивидуальны. А это область, которая в поле зрения экзистенциализма (и, конечно, изучается психологией).

Принцип дополнительности поможет объединить и тем самым усилить позиции этих двух современных философских направлений в области социальной антропологии. Категории, по которым можно проследить это сближение: бытие, сущность, существование, жизнь, смерть, свобода.

СТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ФИЛОСОФСКИХ ПАРАДИГМ
THE FORMATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PARADIGMS

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In the theses are presented the formation of the philosophical paradigms in European thought as a history of philosophical reflection and the attempt to get away from the total gnosiologisation to wisdom, "looking " and feeling.

Историко-философская реконструкция мысли ограничена рамками времени и культуры, а также обычными ошибками, проистекающими от ее архаизации, модернизации, социализации и натурализации. Отказываясь от своих привычных структур, философия в XX веке переходит на иной уровень решения классических задач неклассическими средствами. По традиции философия - рациональная рефлексия, опрокинутая в знание и культуру, чтобы увидеть мир как нечто единое и понять себя. Через самопонимание она пытается понять сущее, освоить природную, социальную и личностную действительность. Рефлексируя,

философия пытается выразить себя в понятиях, теориях, в особой предметной области, специфических проблемах. Вначале это рефлексия над знанием в целом, затем над моралью, религией, началами научного знания, затем над нормами представления человека о его месте в мире и истории (от внеличностного космизма - к осознанию всеобщей значимости личности). Возникает рефлексия на процесс общения (культуры). Идея первосущего бытия, не вмещаемая в исторически ограниченное определение, не совпадает и с развертываемым процессом бытия культуры. От античного мифологизма философия переходит к рефлексии единотроичного Бога, чему способствуют универсализм латыни как языка межнационального общения, реализующий принцип общности индивидов как суверенных источников общественной связи. Латынь символизирует реализацию аристотелевского Ума как идеи идей в его синтетичности и органичной целостности, но это и искусственный язык науки. Единое затем определяется субстанционально, а основой любого знания о мире является деятельная целеполагающая способность человека. Всеобщее оказывается ограничено разумом и авторитетом. Философская теория отождествляется с набором логических средств приведения многообразия к единству . Здесь намечается сфера конкретно-научного познания философии и она выступает в роли всеобщего интегратора культуры.

Установление теоретически независимого языка культуры приводит на престол философии математику, которая становится некоей сферхчувственной сферой, предшествующей физическому бытию. Субстанциализм и математика в философии представляют принцип единства мира и меру рациональности. Так знание деперсонализирует человека и ведет к поиску предельных оснований мира. Тотальная гносеологизация оборачивается отождествлением логического с культурным. Отрицание спекулятивно-субстанциалистской рациональности приводит к введению герменевтико-экзистенциально-когнитивистско-антропологического -культурологического измерения философии.

"Снятие" культурной выразительности познания задает ему своеобразие и действительность, аппеляцию к порождающей и хранящей идее познания стихии человеческой жизни, судьбы, сердца, экзистенции и т.п. Мудрость и научное философствование пытаются соединить в мысли, которая погружается в собственно человеческое переживание содержания мира, при-общение к истине бытия и познания. Философия конституируется как наука, как метафора, как политика, как видение, как переживание смысложизненных оснований бытия.

РУССКИЕ ПАРАДИГМЫ ФИЛОСОФСТВОВАНИЯ: П. А. ВЯЗЕМСКИЙ
RUSSIAN PARADIGMS OF PHILOSOPHY: P.A.VYAZEMSKY

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Современный человек живет в ситуации огромного количества разных голосов разных культур. Встает необходимость понимания их сложного взаимоотношения и взаимовлияния, их жизни внутри культур и каждого из нас.

Гуманитарная мысль за время своего существования накопила достаточное количество систематических подходов к культурному тексту. Все они, став в свое время откровением, воспринимаются сейчас как классика. В ситуации постмодернизма в философии и в искусстве конца 20 века особую актуальность приобрел интеллектуальный подход, который по словам А. К. Жолковского: "... - открывает новый круг интересных возможностей. - Среди них и описание творческой эволюции автора как его диалога с самим собой и культурным константом."[1]

В этом смысле интересный пример "симбиоза искусства и философии" (Э. Сурио) представляет творчество П. А. Вяземского (1792-1878). Оригинальность поэтического лица П. А. Вяземского, отмеченная всеми исследователями творчества поэта, не была вписана в контекст европейской и русской философской мысли начала и середины 19 века. В докладе предпринимается попытка проследить соположенность философем Шеллинга и Гегеля эстетическим характеристикам метатекста поэзии П. А. Вяземского. Взаимовлияние и принципиальная несводимость друг к другу поэтического и философского дискурсов рассматривается в докладе как специфика русской литературы 19 века.

[1] Жолковский А.К. *Блуждающие сны*. М., 1994. С. 8.

О ФИЛОСОФСКИХ ТРАДИЦИЯХ В РУССКОЙ КУЛЬТУРЕ
ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADIDTION IN RUSSIAN CULTURE

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Investigation of the history of Russian philosophy reveals a conflict between two philosophical schools, the essential difference being in their relationship to tradition. A philosophical knowledge of ancient Russian books appeared in different genres, among which the Chronicle is one of the most meaningful. Practically every chronicle was created on the basis of many others, both previous and contemporary with it. The Chronicle itself appears a surprising phenomenon of mutual historical knowledge of different epochs. The only way to understand the Chronicle is to uncover the layers composing its historical horizons.

Последнее время отмечено весьма интенсивной полемикой о сущности и специфике русской философии. Ни в коей мере, не ставя под сомнение ее продуктивность, позволю себе обратить внимание на следующие два момента, в той или иной степени ускользающие от внимания исследователей. Полемика эта указывает не только на весьма вероятное наличие многих тенденций в истории русской мысли, но и на разным способом ориентированное сознание ученых. В этом смысле она в неявной, но все же потенциально настойчивой форме заявляет о конфликте двух философских школ, сущность которых определяется степенью включенности в традицию. Несколько снижая и профанируя тему, можно сказать, что одна из них, слишком тесно связывая себя с преданием, лишается возможности его понять, а другая, его объективируя и не учитывая в полной мере свою собственную историчность, ставит под сомнение справедливость своих притязаний на истинность. Отсюда становится ясным, что собственно историко - философским имеет право называться только исключающее себя из традиции сознание, поскольку философствование в ее рамках традицию эту осмыслить и не может, лишь взгляд извне, а не изнутри предмета делает его для нас видимым. Вместе с тем нельзя не отметить сколь удивительные, столь и настойчивые попытки сохранить традицию, что впрочем не так сложно понять, имея в виду привязанность русской мысли к истории и своим истокам.

Обращая к ним свое внимание, сталкиваешься с удивительным феноменом практически полного отсутствия того, что в западной традиции собственно и называется религиозно - философскими текстами. Философское сознание древнерусских книжников проявилось в иной и непривычной для нас форме. Я имею в виду летописание. представ-

ляющее собой на первый взгляд обычную запись тех или иных исторических событий. Число, объем и полнота летописных текстов, бытовавших на Руси, в такой степени превышает что-либо подобное им в других странах, что заставляет предполагать, что здесь мы имеем дело с уникальным и единственным в мировой истории культурным событием. и обнаруживаем истинные истоки привязанности русской мысли к своему прошлому. Однако все не так просто, как то кажется на первый взгляд. И речь идет не только о том, что летописи включают в себя помимо исторических известий философские, политические и богословские рассуждения. Несмотря на их внешнюю простоту и бесхитростность,понять летописи почти невозможно, поскольку они представляют собой не просто свод исторической информации, но и сознание и рефлексию книжника того или иного века. А поскольку практически каждая летопись создана на основе многих предшествующих и современных ей,- она являет собой удивительный феномен взаимодействия исторических сознаний (часто взаимоисключающих и спорящих друг с другим) разных эпох в той форме, которая позволяет нам воспринимать эти написанные. не раз переписанные и сознательно правленные тексты как один единый, непрерывно создававшийся в течение пяти - семи столетий текст. Понять его можно, лишь последовательно вскрывая, составляющие его исторические горизонты, которые находятся в сложной взаимозависимости,. так что каждый из них немыслим без других и определяется ими. Помимо этого следует иметь в виду ту простую вещь. без которой любая попытка их понимания обречена на неудачу,- я имею в виду необходимость восприятия летописей одновременно как законченного целого и каждый раз как процесса, то есть существования и движения исторического сознания конкретного времени и его взаимодействия с другими. В этом смысле летопись это движение и диалог разных исторических горизонтов, историческое вопрошание и ответ. Правильное прочтение древнерусских летописей являет нам возможность постижения способа существования исторического бытия, в том виде, как оно жило и отражалось в сознании книжников и нашло нужным сохранится и по сию пору. Это есть постижение той самой фактической бытийственности, о которой столь много писалось в последнее время. В это смысле летописи - это загадочный и утаивающий от герменевтически невоспитанного сознания свое содержание текст, понимание которого, хотя и с большим трудом. но все же доступно но не выразимо. И именно потому, что здесь мы имеем дело, говоря языком М. Хайдеггером, с реальным присутствием сущего, как то оно проявляло себя в прошлом и хранит в настоящем в единственно подобающей и достойной себя форме.

КНИГА В РУССКОЙ ДУХОВНОСТИ.
THE BOOK IN RUSSIAN SPIRITUALITY.

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The unique character of thought of the Russian Culture of the Middle Ages is found in the principles of its written works. The author does not insist on the independence of his position because truth can only be guaranteed by the collective. Here, there is no difference between the author's own text and the other's text. The book is "built" using pieces already in existence and is intentionally left open for completion by other co-authors. The intellectual work of the Middle Ages takes the form of compilations, translations, re-structured texts. The contemporary researcher should take into consideration these meaningful factors of the culture of the Middle Ages.

Книге принадлежит совершенно особое место в русской культуре и это место связано со спецификой национальной духовности. Традиционная средневековая мысль при обращении к метафизическим проблемам исходила из аксиомы ограниченности возможностей человеческого познания. В этом мировоззрении не существует человека, способного уяснить весь смысл мироздания, и нет такой точки зрения, которая гарантировала бы охват всей полноты бытия.

Критерием надежности и "правильности" истины выступает традиционность ее жизнеподтверждения. Многочисленность свидетельств придают истине устойчивость и непреложность. Само понятие "непротиворечивости" имеет исходный этимологический смысл и отсылает к общепризнанности.

При всей неразвитости вербальных форм постижения и хранения истины (школа, публичный диспут, проповедь и т.п.) чрезвычайно авторитетна была книга - слово запечатленное. затворение слова в букву, воплощение слова - акт в значительной степени сакральный и даже обслуживаемый специальным языком. От писателя здесь требовалась сознательная надиндивидуальная позиция, и он выступает не как автор, т.е. самоуверенный и автономный субъект, а как транспондент - извне (или свыше) ведомый исполнитель.

Интеллектуальная деятельность может приобретать формы компилятивства, перевода, текстовой справки и даже копирования. Обнаруживается принципиальное соавторство, включаемость в традицию. Книга "строится", "собирается", и не из букв, слов или отдельных мыслей предложений, а из блоков более крупных.

Летописец в прошлые времена не видел разницы между своим и чужим текстом. Истина ничья (кроме как Божья) и ее можно и нужно вычитывать из мира, в том числе (а может и в первую очередь) из книг. Чем больше прочитано книг, чем больше сведено непротиворечащих

друг другу свидетельств в единый корпус, тем основательнее преодолевается частное и случайное, тем ближе к Правде. Отсюда стремление в трудные моменты сомнений и сметения расширить круг чтения, вплоть до грандиозного замысла митрополита Макария "собрать все книги, чтомые на Руси".

Сфера духовной деятельности в средневековой русской культуре была организована иначе, нежели в последующие эпохи. Средневековый автор формирует контекст и вживается в него, осмысляет проблемы и формулирует смысл как авторским словом, так и переструктурированием текста, оформляет книгу и адресует ее. При этом книга принципиально не закрывается, и исполнитель призывает новых соавторов, подтверждая неисчерпанность истины. Принципы строительства "гипертекста", использование языка и даже буквенная графика несут смысловую нагрузку, призваны воплощать мысль, которая часто не замечается последующими поколениями, использующими иной стиль мышления.

ДОВЕРИЕ К МИРУ В РУССКОМ ФИЛОСОФСТВОВАНИИ (на примере Н.Лосского)
THE TRUST THE WORLD IN RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY (considering Philosophy of Nikolay Losskiy)

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Интуиции "русского доброго человека" мир и Бог даны адекватно, а "западный человек" озабочен недоверием и нескончаемыми верификациями-фальсификациями. В русском философствовании Бог не только не злонамерен, но и не изощрен, — в противоположность с Богом А.Эйнштейна. Эта фундаментальная установка приводит в русской философии к доминированию образа над понятием. Не столько эстетика поверяется философией,сколько философия — эстетикой.

Центральный образ онтологии Н.О.Лосского стоит на соединении абстрактно-идеального бытия идей, с одной стороны, и индивидуальных субстанциальных деятелей, которые обладают творческой силой, с другой. Субстанциальный деятель, овладевая идеей, создает реальность. Существенно, что образный строй примеров и метафор, используемый Н.Лосским, восходит к древним тотемическим структурам. В западном философствованииXX века этот образный строй вытесняется в художественную культуру (Ионеску, Оруэлл и др.).

ВИБРИРУЮЩИЙ ЛАНДШАФТ РУССКОЙ СОБОРНОСТИ
THE VIBRATING LANDSCAPE OF RUSSIAN "SOBORNOST"

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"Умозрением в красках" Е. Трубецкой в начале XX века назвал русскую икону. Неслучайность подобной трактовки сферы, казалось бы, довольно отдаленной от дискурса, в рамках которого традиционно ставился и разрешался один из центральных вопросов человеческого существования - вопрос о смысле жизни, - очевидна: наш век дал прекрасные формы, которые до того вроде бы не покушались на метафизику - философствующей кадр И. Бергмана, рефлектирующий звук К.Штокхаузена, сакральный жест М. Бежара. Безумные идеи - Вселенская Мистерия - А. Скрябина совсем не утопия, но лишь новое прочтение однажды бывшего, где в свернутом виде уже содержался весь разворот специализации ("архаический ритуал").

Норма все более теряет смысл при распадении тотальности, а потому краска , жест, взгляд, звук имеют не меньшие права на обладание и презентацию истины. Прецедент с русской иконой не единичен. Гораздо более близкий к нам пример - народные музыкальные драмы М. Мусоргского, которые лишь с большой натяжкой можно именовать западным словом "опера". Без сомнения, здесь, на сцене, в звуке, в озвученном слове содержится тот же ряд смыслов, что и в русской иконе. Вопрос о смысле жизни, о "собирании всякой твари под Покров Богородицы" - важнейший. Вероятно допустимо предположить, что любая область художественной специализации, которая всегда была очень условной, есть все тот же навязчивый разговор, непрекращающийся и незатухающий.

КОНЕЦ РУССКОЙ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИИ КАК МИРОВАЯ ПРОБЛЕМА
THE END OF THE RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION AS THE WORLD PROBLEM

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Russia is the only independent Orthodox civilisation in Euro-Asia. Historical existence of Russia is fulfilled not by necessity and law but by freedom and catastrophe. Russia as a spiritual reality has its place in the interval between divine energy and earthly world. A saint and a robber are the main characters of our history. "The Russian communism" and "the Russian capitalism" are but different forms of the Russian national idea (Olga, Oblomov, Shtoltz). The destruction of basic elements of Russian Orthodox civilization may lead to unpredictable consequences for whole world community.

Россия - единственная полноценная (самостоятельная) православная цивилизация в Евразии. Духовно-культурное и историческое бытие России осуществляется не в элементе необходимости и закона, а в элементе свободы и катастрофы. Истина, красота, добро в русской культуре формально не даны, но энергетически заданы. Россия "не вся видна" (кенозис). Выражаясь языком религиозной философии, Россия как духовная реальность находится в промежутке, в зазоре между тварным миром и нетварной полнотой (святой и разбойник как главные действующие лица нашей истории). Отношение к Богу, царю и отечеству суть несущие конструкции православно-русской цивилизации на всем протяжении ее истории (в т.ч. коммунистической).

Воинствующее безбожие, революционное самозванство (диктатура) и "пролетарский" интернационализм - превращение формы эсхатологической сверхбытийной установки русского духа. Пути "блуждающей столицы" России (Киев - Москва - Петербург - Москва) раскрываются в конце XX века как символы исторического поиска отечественного "своего места".

Русский "коммунизм" и "капитализм" в их многосторонней соотнесенности являют собой различные ипостаси национальной симфонической личности (Ольга - Обломов - Штольц).

В России равно отсутствует духовно-культурная почва как для протестантского капитализма, так и для марксистского (тем более либерального) социализма. Разрушение коренных основ русской цивилизации (духовности, культа страдания и правды, нестяжательства) приведет к разрыву ее релизиозно-нравственно-эстетической ткани и разложению всего ее государственно-экономического порядка, что чревато непредсказуемыми геополитическими последствиями для мирового сообщества.

ВЕЧНЫЕ ТЕМЫ МЕТАФИЗИКИ
ETERNAL THEMES OF METAPHYSICS

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The metaphysical archetypes are the possible ways to solve "the eternal problems" of philosophy such as the problem of the first principles: the quantity of the substances and how they are interrelated, the problem of life meaning, the truth criterion, God's existence, soul's eternity, etc.

All the archetypes can be found out and counted. Some of them become "the main ones" in philosophical conceptions' typologizations. This list of fairy-tale schemes. It is connected with the place of metaphysics in the philosophical discourse system, with its most abstract metalevel where the antinomies of asking are formulated in the generalised, "rolled up" way. The process of philosophizing is now the "writing" of the already presenting metaphysical scheme into a socio-cultural context.

The process is well illustrated by using of the "standard" lot of metaphysical themes by the Russian philosophy, which shows that the essence of philosophizing is not in describing of a metaphysical archetype, but in its interpretation.

As an example, one can take the thinking over the theodicy problem actualised in connection with the Lisbon earthquake in 1755.

Историка философии, особенно если он занимается достаточно отдаленными по времени периодами часто преследует мысль о том, что философия бесконечно повторяется, обсуждая одни и те же темы и сюжеты. С некоторым разочарованием мы "открываем", что декартовское cogito и спинозовское "субстанциональное" понимание Бога как causa sui содержится у Бл. Августина, а учение о бессмертии души - сердцевина христианской антропологии - развивалось Платоном.

Эти совпадения могли бы навести на мысль о плагиате или несамостоятельности, если бы были исключениями, а не своеобразным правилом. Кроме того, "совпадения" касаются обычно существенных сторон формулируемой проблемы, ее "сущности" или метафизической основы, что позволяет усмотреть здесь некоторую закономерность.

Традиционное, незаостренное позитивистской полемичностью понимание метафизики связывает ее с некоторыми фундаментальными структурами. В разные времена они рассматривались как "первая часть философии" в которой "содержатся начала познания" (Декарт), "глубочайшее постижение принципов вещей" (Лейбниц), "совокупность всеобщих определений мышления" (Гегель), "центральное учение всей философии" (Хайдеггер) и т. д. Будучи наиболее абстрактной частью философии, метафизика формулирует свои проблемы в предельно отвлеченном виде, что позволяет как бы "освобождать" их от прикованности к "сомнительным фактам исторического времени" (Бердяев). Конечно, каждый конкретный мыслитель, творец философской теории не-

пременно детерминирован определенной социокультурной ситуацией. Он умозаключает, аргументирует, сравнивает, противопоставляет и даже поучает согласно традициям своей эпохи и в рамках свойственного ей способа мышления, однако, при этом некий изначальный "набор" поставленных для решения задач может быть достаточно стандартным. Созданием этого "набора", формированием проблем в общем, как бы "свернутом" виде и является метафизика, выполняя функцию своеобразной "лаборатории архетипов". В этом смысле чрезвычайно справедлива расхожая мысль о том, что "древние уже все сказали".

Метафизические архетипы или "вечные вопросы", к числу которых относятся проблемы "первоначал" - количества субстанций и способа их соединения, смысла жизни, критерия истины, бытия Бога, бессмертия души и т. д. могут быть выявлены и даже исчислены старательным классификатором. Те или иные из них становятся "основными" при необходимости типологизации философских учений или других способах "наведения порядка" в философском хозяйстве, их иерархия или рядоположность носят исторический, а не сущностный характер. "Список" этот так же разработан и завершен, как перечень сказочных сюжетов, хотя пока и не "явлен". Та или иная философская теория есть ни что иное как интерпретация одного из пунктов этого "списка", "погружение" его в конкретный социокультурный контекст. Философствование, таким образом, можно представить не как "выдумывание", а как "вписывание" одного из определенных метафизических сюжетов в новую систему координат, одна из осей которой может выражать личностные характеристики мыслителя. Так, в конкретно-литературной форме сказок о Пиноккио и Буратино содержится метафизическое ядро "истории о деревянном человечке".

Метафизические архетипы имеют антиномический характер, как это хорошо показано Кантом. В акте философствования из каждой пары составляющих его антиномий выбирается одна, а затем из этих "половинок" составляется "система". Можно предположить, что таких систем может быть несколько сотен, хотя в действительности философская мысль вовсе не стремится к разнообразию метафизических построений. Философствование - это не комбинаторное манипулирование "метафизическими единицами", хотя они и составляют "цветовую гамму" того или иного произведения.

"Метафизические архетипы" указывают круг собственно "философских" проблем в их принципиально вопрошающем виде. Статус законченности, решенности они приобретают лишь в конкретно-исторической форме, соответствуя определенному типу (ир)рациональности и системы культурных ценностей.

Для понимания метафизического смысла текста необходимо вычленение из него того или иного архитипического сюжета, хотя для выявления философского смысла этого явно недостаточно , как недостаточно перечисления цветов, используемых художником для понимания его эстетического замысла. Используемый архетип как цвет для художника или высота тона для музыканта есть лишь условие, материал для процесса его творчества, но не цель его. Именно поэтому на них не может распространяться "право собственности", равно как перечисление их не есть творчество.

"Сколько ни есть на свете идей, все они последствия некоторого числа передаваемых традиционно понятий, которые так же мало составляют достояние отдельного разумного существа, как природные силы - принадлежность особи физической"[1], - писал П. Я. Чаадаев. Он полагал, что все многообразие идей есть результат некоторых "предваряющих какие бы то ни было проявления души" "зародышей разума", которые возникают "посредством взаимного соприкосновения душ и в силу таинственного начала, которое увековечивает в созданном сознании действие Сознания Верховного, поддерживают жизнь природы духовной"[2].

Рассмотрим эти утверждения на примере известного метафизического сюжета-архетипа, или одного из "вечных вопросов". В античной философии он был сформулирован впервые как проблема "необходимости и случайности", а затем "необходимости и свободы". Эпикуровская "свобода как случайность" в христианстве превращается в "свободу воли". Свою "христианскую" теоцентрическую формулировку он получает у Августина, антиномический динамизм - у его интерпретаторов Годшалька и Эриугены. Проблема начинает развиваться в направлении выяснения "причины мирового зла", "природы греха" и "богооправдания". Очевидно, что причиной всего сущего является Бог, однако является ли он творцом зла? Если да, то, следовательно, он не благ, если нет и зло сотворено другим, то он не всемогущ. Более того, если Бог благ и всемогущ, но, предвидя зло, не препятствует ему, а допускает, скажем, как наказание за грехи, то он не правосуден. Разрешение этой дилеммы заставляло пускаться в различные схоластические ухищрения, вплоть до полного отрицания Буриданом возможности решить ее логическим путем. В более позднюю эпоху вопрос о свободе воли приобрел вероисповедную форму оппозиции божественного предопределения в протестантизме и возможности искупления грехов в католицизме и православии.

В начале XVIII века проблема приобрела "имя" и по названию сочинения Лейбница "Опыты теодицеи о благости Божией, свободе человека и начале зла" стала называться теодицеей. Лейбниц предложил дифференцированное понимание зла как метафизического (простое несовершенство), физического, (страдание) и нравственного (грех). Зло физическое и моральное не являются необходимыми. Они возможны лишь как следствия зла метафизического. Последнее же является результатом принципиального несовершенства тварного по отношению к Творцу. Поэтому зло имеется даже в самом лучшем из бесконечного количества возможных миров - то-есть в нашем. "Теодицея" Лейбница была, в свою очередь направлена против статьи "Рорарий" в "Историческом и критическом словаре" Бейля, где последний подверг критике систему предустановленной гармонии.

Поводом, придавшим отвлеченным рассуждениям статус ответа на конкретный вопрос, было знаменитое лиссабонское землетрясение 1755 года, разрушившее город и унесшее тысячи жизней. Это тра-

гическое событие не могло не быть осмыслено представителями мировой философской мысли, в особенности сквозь призму обсуждаемой темы. Вольтер, например, посчитал, что такого рода факты являются убийственными для лейбницевского "теологического оптимизма". В 1756 г. им была написана "Поэма о гибели Лиссабона, или проверка аксиомы "Все благо", где прямо говорилось, что источником мирового зла может быть только тот, кто сотворил этот мир. В 1758 г. Вольтер продолжил эту тему в философской повести "Кандид, или Оптимизм", где со свойственным ему блеском высмеял идею "прекраснейшего из миров".

Поэма Вольтера вызвала резкие возражения Ж.-Ж. Руссо, который писал, что лиссабонское землетрясение лишний раз доказало несостоятельность цивилизации и способствовало ослаблению естественного здравого смысла, ибо разрушений и жертв было больше всего в разрушившихся многоэтажных зданиях и густозаселенных районах.

Примечательна небольшая статья "докритического" Канта "О причинах землетрясений". Кант рассматривает в ней природу землетрясения 1755 года исключительно с точки зрения ученогоестествоиспытателя, высказывая соображения о том, что "некоторые предосторожности" по отношению к всеобщим бедствиям имеют статус "дерзких" и "тщетных". Однако, землетрясения для Канта отождествляются не столько с Божиим гневом, сколько с его премудростью, ибо в космологической концепции Канта они выполняют важную и небходимую функцию "обновления" жизни на планетах.

Полемика Вольтера и Руссо побудила вступить в диалог русского мыслителя В.А.Левшина, который в 1788 г. публикует "Письмо, содержащее некоторые рассуждения о поэме Г. Волтера на разрушения Лиссабона, писанное В. Лвшнм к приятелю его Господину З***". Левшин не согласен с богообвинительной позицией Вольтера, но и возражения Руссо, по его мнению нуждаются в некотором дополнении и развитии. Левшину кажется очевидной неправота Вольтера, ибо "справедливую сторону легко усмотреть уже из двух сих противных заключений, когда единое тщиться избавить от отчаяния, а другое в оное повергнуть"[3], однако он считает необходимым не отрицать, а опровергать выводы "фернейского мудреца", равно как и "женевского мыслителя".

Рассматривая поставленный вопрос следует постигать не божественную сущность, а человеческую; ибо именно человек является "средней точкой всей природы" и "средоточием дел Божиих на земле". Деистический антропоцентризм Левшина ставит первым в иерархически устроенном мире именно человека, который определяет не бытие мира, но его осмысленность. Для Бога нет невозможного, но он следует целесообразно, а не "для пышности показания, что он все может сделать", последовательно, а не "своенравно". Возвысив человека, Бог подчиняет ему природу, а то, что в ней кажется вредным или опасным, не что иное, как "мнимая неполезность". Добро сокрытое кажется отсутствием добра, злом, но злом его делает наше незнание, а не Божеское "намерение". Стремление к счастью, добродетельной жизни, вечному блаженству могут быть реализованы, в противном

случае Бог не стал бы вкладывать их в наши души. Впрочем, наши знания о душе явно недостаточны, это дополнительный аргумент против безапелляционного утверждения о "попустительстве" зла нравственного.

Некоторые свойства души достаточно очевидны, она может "рассуждать", "умствовать", "чувствовать" и "хотеть". Главное свойство, отличающее душу от тела, есть именно "хотение", или, иными словами, свободная воля. Без последней душа уподобилась бы машине. Предоставив человеку свободу выбора, Бог вовсе не бросил его на произвол судьбы. "Аванпост" божественного духа в человеке - это совесть. Она подсказывает человеку, в "чем именно заключается Божественный закон, как следует наилучшим образом использовать свободу воли. Бог действует в человеке не предопределяя его поступки, а мягко направляя их в сторону "жизни по совести". Характерно, что когда "Бог умер", этот "верный советчик" превратился в безмолвного соглядатая, "евнуха души", "сторожа жизни", чужого и "постороннего".

Зла в мире нет. Есть лишь непонимание божественных замыслов, слабость разума. Что для нас важнее, знание или счастье? Левшин полагает, что последнее. "Русская теодицея" XVIII в. "оправдывает" Бога тем, что лишь веруя в него можно обрести "удовольствие, подкрепление и надежду". Интеллектуальным credo Тертуллиана и Августина она противопоставляет свое "Верую, чтобы быть счастливым". Метафизическая проблема переносится в сферу аксиологии, где и находит свое решение.

"Русское счастье" имеет не столько личный, сколько общественный характер. Придворный проповедник Елизаветы Петровны иеромонах Гедеон в "Слове о трясении земли" заявил, что считает отнюдь не случайным то обстоятельство, что землетрясение произошло в Португалиии, а не в России. Он полагает, что гибель Лиссабона, как ранее Содома и Гоморры, призвана стать предостережением для тех, кто еще может спастись. Тот же скрытый смысл присутствует в "Слове о рождении металлов от трясения земли" М. В. Ломоносова, отмечающего, что "благословенное отечество" отнюдь "не колеблется частыми земными трясениями". Так, аксиологический вектор обретает национально-государственное направление, а метафизический архетип немыслимую в культуре иного типа интерпретацию.

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РУССКАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ КАК ТИП ТВОРЧЕСТВА
RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY AS THE TYPE OF CREATION

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За тысячу с лишним лет развития отечественная культура демонстрирует непрерывность философского творчества. Решение сложнейшего вопроса о его периодизации и характере живых связей с просветительством, наукой, искусством, теологией и эстетикой зависит от базисного понимания "философии". Если этим словом обозначить тип творческого поведения, то генезис русской философии совпадает с процессами становления национальной культуры. Если же философия — это наука, создаваемая в диалогах профессионалов, и обладающая сознанием своих границ компетентная деятельность, то приходится признать весь период 11 - конца 13 вв. эпохой продуктивного накопления родной исторической качественности и перехода от состояния полуанонимного ученичества к автономному менталитету. Ни предпочтение одного из этих подходов, ни их сочетание не отменяет реального веса древнерусской мысли в составе культуры, но разнообразят векторы и технику ее типологического описания.

Вторая трудность — уяснение отечественной манеры создания философских текстов, их жанрово-стилистической фактуры. Множество авторитетных историков русской философии обнаружили, что имеют дело не с системными рациональными конструкциями, но с инонаучным, символически усложненным философствованием. Признание этого факта не превращает историка русской философии в культуролога, но позволяет искать национальную определенность русской философии и за пределами собственно историко-философского ряда. В этой связи правомочна попытка исследователей русской философии осознать в едином мыслепорождающем комплексе не только внушительный корпус переводов, переложений и толкований святоотеческого византийского и западного наследия, но также и феномен юродства[1], и широко разветвленную практику масонов-культутрегеров, и культуру устного салонного диспута. Если в юродском идеале мирской святости на века был задан русский тип амбивалентного и экстремального самоотречения (он многообразно выражен в позднейшем философско-литературном поведении и в семантике философских текстов), то субкультура масонства для конца 18 - начала 19 вв. стала школой воспитания мыслящей личности и лицеем самосознания. В обоих феноменах проявила себя кардинальная черта русского мышления: установка на метаценности, метасознание и опережающую рефлексию.

Во внутреннем пространстве отечественной ментальности борются за первенство в единстве слова и поступка термин (идея, "симбол") и мета-термин. Юродивый и вольный каменщик стали живыми субтитулами мучительного самоопределения мысли. На этот процесс своевременно наложилась логика апофатической теологии, органично определившая диалектику "от противного" в составе русской совести и на уровнях проблемного дискурса. Его атрибутами стали парадокс и энтимема, доверие непосредственной интуиции и личный религиозный опыт. Русский логос возрастает в аспекте смиренного самоотрицания, а на деле — логического бунта против самоочевидности, но не вопреки, а благодаря апофатическому испытанию ее на возможности смысловой альтернации. Русская философия демонстрирует тип "поступающего сознания" (М.Бахтин), когда высказывание приравнивается к поступку. На пути к так понимаемой задаче философии нужно было преодолеть страх перед внутренней свободой. Характерный жест И.В.Лопухина (перевел "Систему природы" Гольбаха, чтобы тут же раскаяться и написать опровержение[2]) фиксирует рождение интеллектуальной отваги и испуг перед нею. Народное правдоискательство и одержимость истиной сделало ее поиск самоцельным делом мыслителя. Бытовая незащищенность философа и его робость в мире прагматической "деловитости" объяснима самоисчерпанием энергии поступания в слове.

Русская философия стала практикой приоритетного слова (т.е. слова, в первый раз говорящего последнюю правду), бесстрашного и по-юродски бесстыдного, звучащего неуместно посреди изголодавшегося мира. Это слово исповедальное и патетически аффектированное, воскрешающее интонации Нагорной проповеди, т.е. это слово мессианско-апостольского благовестительства. От М.Щербатова и А.Радищего, от П.Чаадаева и В.Одоевского, от А.Герцена и А.Хомякова русская традиция приоритетного слова ширится в пространстве своего исторического подвига. Социальная активность текста отождествляется с бунтом, а над-конфессиональная широта (переходы в католичество, "уход" в секту) — с политической фрондой. Конфликт мысли и власти стал трагической стимуляцией философского энтузиазма, репрессии над которым лишь повышали его творческую напряженность, порождая мыслителей-интровертов, которые вольны целиком сменить ориентиры (Чаадаев) или радикально развоплотить утопию в революционном мятеже (масоны-декабристы).

За плечами первых светских мыслителей александровской эпохи стоят опыты монастырского просветительства; духовная аскеза; синтез греческой учености и византийской образованности; школьная схоластика академий; русское "франсисканство" (Серафим Саровский, Сергий Радонежский, Сковорода); утонченная православная эстетика и школа апофатического богословия; пошедшая своим путем идеология стяжания Св.Духа в церковной ограде и в скитском уединении; секулярная культура переимчивых вольтерьянцев, натурфилософов и метафизиков; профессиональная авторская литература, насыщенная философской рефлексией, что станет ее национальным качеством; философско-эпистолярный диалог с Западом; мысль о "русском пути",

укрепившаяся с победами отечественного оружия и ставшая центральным сюжетом для окрепшего национального самосознания.

Внутренней задачей философии в России становится выработка органического миросозерцания. Западным идеалам аналитического рационализма противостал универсальный синтез знания и жизни, раскрываемый в бесконечном тексте ("нон-финито" — специальное качество отечественной словесности и философского дискурса). Эстетический пафос формы, отмеченный С.Булгаковым ("Человечность против человекобожия", 1917) как особое качество русской культуры, выразил попытки завершения незавершаемой жизни средствами субординирующего ее слова. Древо категорий стихийно-органически вырастает из опорных мифологем: Соборность (А.Хомяков), Всемир (А.Сухово-Кобылин), Почва (славянофилы, Н.Страхов, А.Григорьев, Ф.Достоевский), Всеединство и Богочеловечество (В.Соловьев и С.Булгаков), мэон (Н.Минский), свобода (Н.Бердяев). Русский категориальный Органон может быть свернут в одну смысловую точку (Символ, Имя, София), а может развернуться иерархически (В.Соловьев, С.Трубецкой, Н.Лосский) или в авторском пространстве релятивизированной семантики (М.Пришвин, М.Бахтин).

Мировая диалектика "свертывания/развертывания" (см. популярность ее адепта Николая из Кузы и русскую философия от Сковороды до С.Франка) закреплялась переработкой европейской философии тождества (особенно энергично — шеллингианской). Западная метафизика усваивается "апофатически": испытывая ее возможности, русская мысль возвращает ее к своим истокам (платонизму, средневековой и позднейшей гностической традиции, святоотеческой компетенции), осложняет философско-исторической интуицией (Чаадаев), выводами естественных наук (В.Одоевский). На творческом преодолении классического немецкого идеализма возникает профессиональное богословие (Хомяков), национальная утопия (Аксаковы, Киреевские), антропология и философия истории. Учеба в школе гегелевской диалектики и спор с ее панлогизмом стали как бы обязательными со времен любомудров, В.Белинского, А.Герцена и М.Бакунина. Идеи французской романтической философии истории растворены в эстетике исторического процесса Герцена; в ней стереотипы философии тождества, богословская терминология и научные жаргоны естественного знания оказались равноправными метаязыками познания "существенности". Разрыв церковной и светской культур окончательно получает характер необратимости; тем энергичнее этот процесс компенсируется в подлинной войне второй половины 19 в. с позитивизмом. Духовная школа, с одной стороны, почвенники, Л.Толстой и В.Соловьев — с другой, противостоят плоскому материализму демократической традиции, народнической социологии и фейербахианской антропологии (на другом уровне позитивизм послужил укреплению доверия эмпирии). Здесь проясняется такое качество русской мысли, которое можно назвать принципом исчерпания позиции оппонента. Если история западной ментальности развертывается как смена одного типа рациональности другим (так, что модерн оказывается хорошо отредактированной классикой), то русская философия, проецируя готовые мыслительные конструкции на "жизнь" и убеждаясь в их неадекватности последней, все чаще возвращается к личному религиозному опыту, общезначимость которого опирается на Откровение и христианский историзм.

Успехи научного знания и техники во второй половине 19 в. породили сциентистские симпатии в философской среде; обратной стороной этого явления стало усиление нигилистических тенденций (Д.Писарев); в революционаристской идеологии идея героической жертвенности обернулась позднее практическим цинизмом террора. На этом фоне не слишком неожиданным выглядит и культурофобия Л.Толстого, с его критикой Церкви и православной догматики, и эстетская историософия К.Леонтьева, и эксплуатация почвенной мифологии в идеологии Достоевского.

Серьезным противовесом позитивистскому всезнайству стала теология Сердца П.Юркевича (ср. Б.Вышеславцев, П.Флоренский), новаторская антропология В.Несмелова и гуманитаристский активизм Н.Федорова. Гегельянцы второй волны (Б.Чичерин, Н.Дебольский) расширили круг гносеологических штудий. Увлечения монадологией Лейбница завершилось рождением персонализма (А.Козлов).

Самоисчерпанием классической парадигмы русской философии и одновременно — источником большинства новаций русского философского ренессанса стало творчество В.Соловьева. Попытка построить систему на обломках "положительного знания" ему в целом не удалась; тем существеннее для его наследников оказались : мифопоэтическая теология Софии; пронизанная неоплатоническими интуициями гносеология; философия Эроса; учение о Богочеловечестве; синтез теократической утопии с неославянофильством. Еще большее влияние оказал Соловьев фактом своей личности, амбивалентно-трагической в быту и с очевидным профетическим даром (ср. позднейшие представления о философе как "вестнике" у Д.Андреева, Я.Друскина и среди обереутов). Наименее отчетливо разработана у Соловьева проблема личностного сознания. Этот пробел торопятся восполнить наши неокантианцы, преодолевшие авторитет философского мифа о "всеобщем сознании" (актуальный для западноевропейских коллег) и поставившие вопрос о чужом "я", который своими существенными аспектами сомкнулся с традиционной для русской философии проблемой Другого (А.Введенский, И.Лапшин).

Детализация "другого" в персоналистской (Н.Бердяев) и интуитивистской (Н.Лосский, С.Франк) традициях привело к открытию диалогики мышления и пониманию Другого как диалогической спецификации "ближнего" (А.Мейер, Бахтин; ср. Ухтомский).

Кардинальное значение для русской философии имело присутствие в ней писателей-мыслителей. Демиург русского эстетического Космоса, Пушкин, снял запрет на художественное исследование судьбы и воли;

Гоголь учил мирскому служению ближнему; Тютчев открыл трагическую онтологию мира и личности; Щедрин средствами риторики создал философию социального поведения; герой Чехова отразил ужас перед смысловыми зияниями дискретной действительности. Л.Толстой одной фразой расправился с историческим провиденциализмом, заявив в "Войне и мире" (1863-1869): рисунок событий случаен, но когда они "вырезаются в свое значение" [3], мы имеем дело не с фактами, а с моментом перехода от значения события к событию значения; совокупность последних как смысловых следов и есть история. Подобным образом в реплике героя "Братьев Карамазовых" (1879-1880); "В Бога не верую, но мира его не могу согласиться принять" — необходимость в теодицее не отменяет символа веры как принципа искупительного путеводительства в обезбоженной пустыне дольнего мира.

20 в. осваивает философское наследие родной словесности в новой форме; в философской критике. Смыкание филологии и философии — черта русского философско-религиозного воззрения. Оно завершило преодоление рассудочности в формах философской символики. Чем внимательнее русским автором прорабатывается категория ("не-иное" Л.Карсавина, "миф" у А.Лосева), тем отчетливее она трансформируется в метафору. Русская философская символика и мифология призваны к снятию традиционных противоречий европейского дискурса ("антиномии Канта") и размыканию тупиков классического рационализма в свободное пространство диалектики Всеединства.

Пережив борьбу с "историческим христианством" (круг Мережковского) и "соблазн евразийства", русская философия на пути "от марксизма к идеализму" вернулась к отечественным истокам и выработала разнообразные формы органического миропонимания. "Живознание" Хомякова возродилось в "Живом знании" (Берлин, 1923) С.Франка. Античный онтологизм заново обогащен в христианской метафизике Трубецких, в иконософии Флоренского, в софиологии С.Булгакова и В.Эрна. Средневековая схоластика нашла себя в сложных персоналистских иерархиях Л.Карсавина. Потебнианцы (Г.Шпет; харьковская школа) и имяславцы обострили интерес к семантике слова, символа и мифа, проблемам богообращения.

Встреча на русской почве эллинского гения и иудео-христианской метафизики оказалась плодотворной и для иррационализма (Л.Шестов), и критиков трансцендентализма (В.Эрн), и для "мистического пантеизма" (В.Розанов), и ностальгического пассеизма символистов (Вяч.Иванов), и идеологов "Третьего Возрождения" (Ф.Зелинский), и теологии (Г.Флоровский, В.Ильин, В.Лосский), и исповедального религиозного творчества (А.Ильин), и богословия культуры (Г.Федотов), и культурологической экклезиологии (П.Флоренский, и для космистов (А.Вернадский), и концепции государственного Эроса и собственности (П.Струве).

Эсхатологическая метафизика творчества и истории Н.Бердяева и его диалоги с Шестовым уже в начале века предвосхитили многие построения европейского экзистенциализма и персонализма. Теории аристократического самовыражения (П.Сорокин, Гессен), развитые в изгнании, стимулировали зарубежную философскую мысль; экуменический энтузиазм эмигрантов и беспрецедентная по масштабам издательская деятельность русской мировой диаспоры наилучшим образом продемонстрировали интегративное единство русского духа и русской философии как национального подвига.

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
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